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ABSTRACT
This dissertation examines works of Philip Sidney (1554-1586), Robert Hooke (16351703), John Milton (1608-1674), Margaret Cavendish (1623-1673), and Anne Finch (1661-1720)
through the lens of two competing world views that were well-known to all of the subjects of my
study. The dissertation will begin with a discussion of these two different ways of perceiving and
representing truth—one informed by the poetic imagination and the other influenced by the
emerging new science of the seventeenth century. In his The Defence of Poesy, Sir Philip Sidney
advocates a poetic vision that possesses a unique spiritual and creative power to produce truths,
making the material world subordinate to the spiritual vision of the poet. In contrast, Robert
Hooke’s Micrographia (1665) insists upon the value of actual physical seeing, through the
microscope, and constructing models of the world based upon accumulated details of the tiniest
observable physical minutia. Though he wasn’t directly responding to Sidney’s works, Hooke’s

microscopic seeing disputes the autonomy of Sidney’s “inward light each mind hath in itself,” a
source of poetic sight that Sidney considered sacred to the poetic imagination. Because my chief
interest involves the topos of light and the representation of “inward light” articulated by Sidney
in The Defence of Poesy, Sidney’s metaphysics and conception of the poetic imagination remain
a constant, semi-theoretical foundation throughout my work as I examine the poetic works of
Cavendish, Milton, and Finch. Although Cavendish, Milton, and Finch had different poetic goals
among them, they are united in my study by their insistence that accumulating larger piles of
minute sensory data does not get one closer to “truth.” Because of the modern reader’s location
in history—given the grand success of the scientific narrative—such a position appears to border
on irrationality, but much is to be gained by reading these poets’ works through the less familiar
framework Sidney’s poetics provides.
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1

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

The only way which now remains for us to recover some degree of those former perfections,
seems to be, by rectifying the operations of the Sense, the Memory, and Reason, since upon the
evidence, the Strength, the integrity, and the right correspondence of all these, all the light, by
which our actions are to be guided, is to be renewed, and all our command over things is to be
establisht.1
Nay, truly, learned men have learnedly thought that where once reason hath so much overmastered passion as that the mind hath a free desire to do well, the inward light each mind hath
in itself is as good as a philosopher’s book.2
So much the rather thou celestial light
Shine inward, and the mind through all her powers
Irradiate, there plant eyes, all mist from thence
Purge and disperse, that I may see and tell
Of things invisible to mortal sight.3

The use of the topos of light in these epigraphs suggests the pervasiveness of physical
light in discussions of both human sensory perception and the intellectual processing of those
sensory perceptions. In this dissertation I am going to discuss the works of John Milton (16081674), Margaret Cavendish (1623-1673), and Anne Finch (1661-1720) through the lens of two
competing ways of supplying meaning to the diverse array of physical experiences and
impressions each human encounters on a daily basis, two competing world views, furthermore,
that were widely discussed and well-known to all of the subjects of my study. The dissertation
will begin with a discussion of these two different ways of perceiving and representing truth—
one informed by the poetic imagination and the other influenced by the emerging new science of

1

Robert Hooke, The Preface, Micrographia or Some Physiological Descriptions of Minute Bodies Made by
Magnifying Glasses with Observations and Inquiries thereupon, sig. A1r. This edition is a facsimile reproduction of
the first edition published by the Royal Society in 1665.
2
Sir Philip Sidney, The Defence of Poesie, printed for William Ponsonby, 1595, sig. E4r. For this
dissertation I am going to refer to the electronic version available online and regularizing to the modern spelling of
“Poesy.”
3
John Milton, Book III, Paradise Lost, lines 51-55.
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the time. I have chosen two figures upon which to base my analysis of these two opposing modes
of seeing, and although not strictly contemporaneous, both were public figures whose works
were widely discussed and who perfectly represent the contrasting poles of my study. Especially
with his sophisticated metaphysics in his The Defence of Poesy, Sir Philip Sidney (1554-1586)
advocated a role for a poetic vision that possessed a unique spiritual and creative power to
produce truths, making the mere material world subordinate to the spiritual vision of the poet.
Robert Hooke (1635-1703), on the other hand, wrote beautifully about the value of actual
physical seeing, through the microscope, and constructing models of the world based upon the
tiniest observable physical minutia and building up. Thus, though he wasn’t directly responding
to Sidney’s works, Hooke’s microscopic seeing seeks to undermine the autonomy of Sidney’s
“inward light each mind hath in itself,” which Sidney—and, as I will show, the other authors in
my study—considered sacred to the poetic imagination.4 Because my chief interest involves the
representation of “inward light” in the poetic works of three poets, Cavendish, Milton, and Finch,
Sidney’s metaphysics and conception of the poetic imagination will remain as a sort of
foundation throughout my work. Although Cavendish, Milton, and Finch certainly had different
poetic goals among them, they are clearly united in my study by their dogged insistence that
accumulating larger and larger piles of minute sensory data does not get one closer to “truth.”
Because of the modern reader’s location in history—given the grand success of the scientific
narrative—such a position appears to more than border on irrationality, but I hope to show that
much is to be gained by reading these poets’ works through the less familiar framework Sidney’s
poetics provides.

4

Sidney, The Defence of Poesy, sig. E4r.

3
The chapters will proceed in roughly chronological order. Sidney, as I describe above
central to my study, will occupy chapter one, and it was my fascination with his belief in an
“inward light” that inspired my examination of this idea in the poets in the next few generations
that followed him. My second chapter, on Cavendish, will present an especially pivotal aspect of
my analysis, for Cavendish was a natural philosopher who avidly read and responded to Hooke’s
works. Therefore, she represents an important figure who fought against the materialist impetus
of the new scientific method. The contrast between Cavendish and Hooke, as I will show, pits
two ways of seeing and knowing the world against one another—one that believed the
contemplative mind could uncover legitimate and large truths from very limited or even singular
sensory impressions, and the other that sought truth through careful observation, hypotheses, and
testing. Chapters three and four will examine Milton’s great works, which, I hope the reader will
agree, proved particularly fertile ground for an examination of inward vision and spiritual sight.
Finally, I will examine the works of Anne Finch, in which darkness—forcing the observer to rely
on inward vision and intuition—plays a special role, thus making her a fitting subject for the
conclusion of my project.
Since Aristotle’s conviction that the celestial region was more perfect than the terrestrial
region, including any living things in it, the material distance between such conceptualized
values as low and high or small and great represented both material and immaterial distance and
hierarchy. The physical nearness to the greatness signified not only metaphorical relationship but
also the metonymical relationship of significance and size.5 This hierarchy between the small and

5
In the ancient poetic tradition the size and greatness are proportional, and this tradition remains true and
influential; Aeneas, a legendary hero, appears in an epic--the bigger than life, longer poem containing poetic verse—
written by the poet whose name embodies the metonymy of poetic genius. In contrast to epic poems, eclogues are
indeed shorter and contain dialogues. Despite their depiction of pastoral idleness typical of bucolic lifestyle,
especially to an urban audience, eclogues subtly assume greater complexity and philosophical insight prefiguring the
bard’s—and the poet himself--potential to rise up the scale, moving away from his humble state to the lofty state of
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great inevitably reinforced the inverse relationship between celestial greatness and corporeal
proximity to it—the great must maintain its proportion of epic significance as well as the
physical distance from the small and mundane. Yet such an inverse relationship merely reflects
the perspective from the seat of celestial greatness.6 The descendant order from great to trivial
must maintain the inverse relationship between the material distance and conceptual significance.
For those living things in the terrestrial region, the hierarchy anticipated the necessity of the
congruous relationship between proximity and greatness—the smaller the distance they have
from the celestial world, the greater they might be. From the living things’ perspective,
perfection diminishes as things are farther removed from God, and any significant conceptual or
physical movement should project and aim for the greatness, should embody the ascending
movement from the small to great. On the other hand, the farther the celestial body was distanced
from the earth, the more perfect it was; especially under the influence of Neoplatonists, the
degree of perfection was “directly proportional to its proximity to the first heaven.”7
The topos of size and significance had a long tradition in poetic endeavors that sought to
transform and elevate the material smallness of a text into literary greatness, as in the epic style
and proportion accomplished in Virgil’s Aeneid or Milton’s Paradise Lost.8 In these amplified
representations of greatness, Lara Dodds points out, the world other than our own becomes
visible and magnified. Published in 1665, Robert Hooke’s Micrographia reveals “a new visible

epic hero. In this hierarchy of size and significance, the small and humble looks up to rise higher and become
greater.
6
There must be imaginable but intangible distance between the mundane, corporeal life of the everyday
reader and the range of those great heroes and epic poets. This is indeed the anxiety of the Author speaking.
7
Edward Grant, “Celestial Perfection from the Middle Ages to the Late Seventeenth Century,” Religion,
Science, and Worldview: Essays in Honor of Richard S. Westfall, Ed. Margaret J. Osler and Paul Lawrence Farber,
(New York: Cambridge UP, 1985) 137-162. On the medieval and Renaissance worldview on a hierarchical universe
ordained by God and the Chain of Being, see also The Elizabethan World Picture by E. M. W. Tillyard.
8
Lara Dodds, “‘Great Things to Small May Be Compared’: Rhetorical Microscopy in Paradise Lost,”
Milton Studies 47 (2008), 96-117.
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world discovered to the understanding” and magnifies the world previously too small to be
visible to our natural eyes.9 Though these poetic and scientific endeavors both aim to signify
greatness, the subject matter of Hooke’s Micrographia is mostly smaller than the printed letters
in the book—the objects observed through his microscope are much smaller than the
conventional small things of his time, and what the microscopic view revealed was invisible to
the naked eye. Hooke’s magnification of minute, trifling things such as a mite or linen cloth
signifies an “apparent reversal of [epic] topos,” argues Dodds; in Hooke’s text, small things are
magnified to show God’s great design, and “this recalibration of the reader’s perception of size
and significance” shows “the aim of directing attention from the artificial to the natural.”10 By
zooming in onto the minute things of the terrestrial world, Hooke tries to remove our fixation on
the sizeable world and direct our focus back to the “natural,” restoring “the material basis of a
reformed natural philosophy.”11 Visual images play a natural role in organizing and creating
knowledge about the natural world, but the images anticipate the content and scope that need to
be interpreted and defined according to the existing scale of size and significance. The “reversal
of topos” might change the position or place of the values, but it doesn’t change the common
values.
In addition, the reversal of the hierarchical values and “recalibration of the reader’s
perception of size and significance” cannot occur without “a remarkable and unprecedented
combination of text and illustration” in Hooke’s experiment. In fact, the combination of “the
natural” and “the artificial”—the image of the thing from nature and the interpretation of the

9

Hooke, The Preface, Micrographia, sig. A2v.
Dodds, “Great Things to Small May Be Compared,” 106.
11
Dodds 106. The author references Catherine Wilson’s influential study on how the invention of
microscope changed the philosophical and scientific understanding of the world. For more, see The Invisible World:
Early Modern Philosophy and the Invention of the Microscope by Catherine Wilson.
10

6
image using the language of comparison—makes such reversal in his observation sensible to the
readers. Simile is used as a rhetorical device to compare the size and define the significance;
Milton tries to reconstruct the lost world of Paradise through the topos of greatness, comparing
Paradise to things of celestial magnitude, while Hooke presents the hidden, invisible world inside
the visible world through the mechanical device that accomplishes rhetorical magnification
through visual magnification. Yet once discovered and seen, the small things also needed proper
names, or even more specifically, names that magnified their constituent function and
importance in the already conceptualized and materialized “shape” and size of our worldly
realm.
The science of perspective and dimension had been established in both verbal and visual
representation of the world; even the celestial world was somehow imagined and measured by
the unit of small to great. As Wilson points out, “estimating size was still a problem, for the
power of a lens could only be deduced from its magnification and could not be known
independently.”12 The microscopic discovery of a new, unseen world poses a linguistic urgency
over describing what seems to be completely all shape but no size. Natural philosophy aimed to
show how nature embodies its symbolic significance in God’s grand design by simply pointing
back at nature and the picture of nature’s material exterior; Hooke attempts to magnify the
complexity of small things by not only making them visible but also illuminating them with
magnifying—epic—similes. In a less fragmented world, what nature shows is supposed to
directly embody its significance. Nature’s symbolic interiority is obscured in a fragmented world,
and it is materialized and articulated through the literary commonplace of size and significance.
The microscope magnifies the material exterior of nature that is too small to see through natural

12

Catherine Wilson, The Invisible World, 90-91.
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eyes, but nature’s revealed interiority will remain all shape but no significance, if without a
commonplace in the hierarchy of small and great. Without the symbolic interpretation, the image
only does the appearing while it remains illegible and unintelligible. In other words, Hooke’s
images had to be made into a text to be understood as the smallness that becomes the greatness.
The dissonance between the visually magnified shape and the physically—and conceptually—
insignificant size of a mite further affirmed the spatial and perceptual detachment of the
microscopic view from the source of its new and exciting view of the new world. Hooke’s
attempt to reverse the traditional ladder of size and greatness is compelling, but men now see the
things that they cannot touch or feel. The advance in optical science undoubtedly induced the
estrangement between the haptic and visual world.
Materializing the world of the minute reversed the traditional way of understanding the
visible world. Often, the minute or invisible world too small to be perceived by human sight was
articulated as felt—sensed or experienced, mostly through haptic sense—darkness or
shapelessness. Yet with the microscope, what used to be unseen now becomes seen but
untouchable. The microscopic world alienates the world of sight from touch as it disables one
world by enabling the other. The enhanced sight became a prosthetic for the dissuaded touch.
Microscopic observation yielded a spatial identity to the invisible world, yet this spatial
understanding of the microscopic world began to subvert and complicate the conceptual
understanding of the macroscopic world with new artificial measurements and units. Where or
what is a context when the content is replaced by a shape or a form and becomes incoherent and
alien to the observer? Fundamentally, units of measure have always been image-based as in
hands, feet, and leagues—the discovery of the new visible world through microscope signified
not only a readjustment of the set values of small and great from the images of the physical,

8
visible world, but it also challenged those whose definition of size and shape derived from the
platonic idea of immaterial significance; spiritual significance is both real and abstract,
influencing both the spatial and conceptual scale of comparison. The microscopic world
challenges the source of knowledge and complicates the Great Chain of Being. What becomes
macroscopic after the discovery of microscopic world? How would a religiously garrisoned and
upheld hierarchical structure like the Great chain of being adapt to or even calibrate the
microscopically small into its scale of being? One might argue that the microscope widened the
realm of human perception and inspired the far-reaching excavation into the borders of
subvisibilia; perhaps the discovery of more empirical derivations promised the prospect of
revealing empirical origins and visualizing the mechanics of physical world. One might also
argue that images of the microscopic world give beauty and significance to the world that used to
be understood as insignificant. However, it is the linguistic comparisons of the microscopic
image to the conceptual space that raises Hooke’s small things to the realm of the great. Without
the intensified state of human perception and spiritually inspired mental faculty participating, the
microscopic view of a mite is merely a shape or a form without content through a lens. If the
microscope evades the authenticity of a spiritually fortified mental perspicacity and the subtleties
observed and reproduced through such intensified faculties of human perception, the microscopic
world loses its coherence in the world outside of it, the world constructed and sustained by
human perception.
When the idea of seeing became instrumentalized and materialized by the introduction of
microscopic seeing, the new way of seeing began to polarize the theory of poetic space as both
abstract and material, reflecting nature but also mimicking and improving nature; microscopic
seeing antagonized the idea of immaterial space—nothing is too small or immaterial to see—and

9
eviscerated the purposeful abstraction and delay of turning observation into description. Poetic
seeing, unlike microscopic seeing, doesn’t need artificial enhancement or manipulation of
sensory perception to pair the material image with the immaterial meaning. Despite its consistent
and material—linguistic—exterior, poetic representation changes its interior shape as it seeks the
movement toward the realm of less corporeality, the realm of celestial perfection. Because it is
not chained to one material shape, poetic imagination can imitate and enhance the original and
do more than mere representation.13 Both poetry and science seek to represent the worldly to
reveal the greater truth, yet the concept of “perfection” in poetry is fundamentally different from
the one in the sciences; the concept of imitation in poetry collides with the concept of
representation in sciences, the kind of representation that Hooke employs. The two
representations are judged differently even though they equally anticipate similar
epistemological and pedagogical goals of illuminating the truth. Representation in Hooke’s
experiment reveals the particulars on sight that could either obfuscate the potential truth by
focusing too much on the obvious matter revealed on sight or accurately reveal a physical
articulation of truth that could lead the observer to a better understanding of the truth. The
temporality of Hooke’s discovery matters so much to the scientific representation of truth that
Hooke’s visual renderings of his objects show the exact stillness of the moment of observation
that seems to be unaware of time. Poetic representation, as Sidney illuminates, promises nothing
will remain the same and that there is no guarantee that imitation will generate mutation--in fact,
he promises mutation more than anything else out of poetic imitation. Poetry is not about
reproducing exact truth, but producing more truth by keeping its imagination alive—by keeping

Sidney writes in The Defence of Poesy: “So then the best of the Historian, is subject to the Poet; for
whatsoever action, or faction, whatsoever counsel, policy, or warre stratagem, the Historian is bound to recite, that
may the Poet (if he lift) with his imitation make his own” (sig. E2v).
13
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apart and far away from the domain of one, single Truth. Poetic imagination anticipates in
heralding the distant truth put in abeyance; poetic imagination magnifies the oddities and
disparities between the small and great, worldly and spiritual, or lowly to perfection, while
scientific observation strives to reduce such distance. Through his microscopic view Hooke
might seek to congeal the image of the minute and invisible world as a kind of topological
evidence for and epistemological progression towards unreachable and immanent truth;
meanwhile, poetic imagination always motions at the spiritual realm and moves further into the
intangible and abstract by solidifying nothing—certainly, poetry promises uncertainty and
change.
Imitation leads to magnification or reduction, and undoubtedly, mutation. The poet
imitates both the experience being described but also a poetic genre that already exists. The
properties of poetic imagination such as imitation, improvement, or mutation are both abstract
and material, but its abstract quality always moves in ascending motion, affirming poetry’s
affinity to spiritual significance and celestial perfection; poetic imagination is kinetic as it is able
to develop and transform its worldly representation into spiritual significance. Magnification is
impossible without mutating the worldly appearance of that specific magnified world. The small
doesn’t and cannot immanently and immediately insist on its prospects and represent its
greatness without the mediating intellectual measure that recognizes its spiritual significance; Sir
Philip Sidney understands the necessity of that mediating intellectual measure when the
knowledge is generated from any kind of physical representation, when the sensory perception
leads to intellectual understanding:
The philosopher showeth you the way, he informeth you of the particularities, as
well of the tediousness of the way, as of the pleasant lodging you shall have when
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your journey is ended, as of the many by-turnings that may divert you from your
way. But this is to no man but to him that will read him, and read him with
attentive studious painfulness; which constant desire whosoever hath in him, hath
already passed half the hardness of the way, and therefore is beholding to the
philosopher but for the other half. Nay, truly, learned men have learnedly thought
that where once reason hath so much over-mastered passion as that the mind hath
a free desire to do well, the inward light each mind hath in itself is as good as a
philosopher’s book.14
Sidney’s argument for “the inward light,” which precedes before a motivation from “a
philosopher’s book,” suggests that if one is trained in education and becomes cultured, he or she
must be inspired by something inward, as they have shown “a free desire to do well.” No man
but himself who would like to write poetry will be propelled to write his own book as “no man
but to him that will read him, and read him with attentive studious painfulness”; the “constant
desire whosoever hath in him” is indeed internal, an intimate and personal light that fuels its own
desire and motivation to create. Magnification alone cannot ascend the small to the great. Hooke
argues that if human sense perception cannot visualize the great extent to which divine truths are
present in small and insignificant things, his optic device’s artificial resolution can assist our
passive sensory vehicle and provide a more active and animate experience of accessing these
truths that are hidden in nature. He claims that his book Micrographia records such magnificent
work of illuminating the great and spiritual in the worldly and low. As Dodds argues, such
ascending movement implied in Hooke’s observation makes his experiment more than a mere
physical magnification of the small world.

14

Sidney, The Defence of Poesy, sig. E3v-E4r.
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Perhaps then the ascending movement toward celestial perfection exemplifies the action
of “learned men” who have trained themselves to look inwardly rather than outwardly to find the
source of “inward light each mind hath in itself is as good as a philosopher’s book.”15 One must
be “learned” to look inwardly before projecting outwardly, to be able to transform small into
great. Look inwardly, look beyond the spatial image of heart, look microscopically—the learned
poet is supposed to be able to magnify the immaterial, invisible seed of passion and desire inside
the body; in Sidney’s sonnet sequence Astrophil and Stella, the “inward light” helps Astrophil to
magnify his “heart” that Stella provokes him to “look in.”16 The “inward light” reveals the
shapeless world magnified by Cavendish in her poem “It is hard to believe, that there are other
worlds in this world” where “not everything can shape” (line 8).17 The poet must locate and
conceive an image or sight—whether material or abstract—to be imitated or magnified by his
poetic imagination; and where do these images or sights come from? As Sidney explains above,
it is the “learned men” who are able to imitate and magnify what is outside—tradition is external,
like Astrophil measuring himself against Virgil, but Astrophil’s desire to ascend the poetic
tradition and be as great as Virgil is internal and thus immeasurable. The “learned men” know
the tradition before them and use the tradition as a measuring unit to give the spatial and spiritual
significance to their own work. In his discussion of a Restoration physiology of reading, Adrian
Jones points out the “fear of [reading’s] irreversible effects” in Restoration England (140).18
Jones explores the experience of reading and the emergence of an intimate involvement of reader
with text and provides the writings of seventeenth-century scientists, philosophers, and moralists

15

Sidney, The Defence of Poesy, sig. E4r.
Sidney writes in Sonnet 1 of Astrophil and Stella: “‘Fool,’ said my muse to me, ‘look in thy heart and
write’” (line 14).
17
Margaret Cavendish, “It is hard to believe, that there are other Worlds in this World,” Poems, and
fancies, sig. G2r-G2v.
18
Adrian Jones, “The Physiology of Reading in Restoration England,” The Practice and Representation of
Reading in England, 138-161.
16
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who predict the potential dangers of that intimate involvement. As with the increasing
development of natural philosophy and material science in the sixteenth and seventeenth century,
more things became microscopically and macroscopically visible; more things became sizeable
and comparable. More things became legible bodies. The discourse on the relationship between
the reader and the read became highly charged in late seventeenth-century England, as did a
variety of sciences relating to perception and the workings of mind. In this seventeenth-century
discourse, the cautionary tales of the moment when one confronts a false or erroneous body
warned about the “irreversible effects” of a bad impression of a bad text on human perception.
At the same time, the influence of a “great” literary tradition upon small individuals—whether
readers or writers—remained persistent. The learned poet knows the canonical work where he
finds the sizes and shapes to measure and compose his work, but “look[ing] in thy heart”
suggests an inward affair, a deliberate, intellectual movement towards a spiritual realm
antithetical to that of the learned. Sidney’s “inward light” in The Defence of Poesy suggests the
unmeasurable, immaterial fuel for greatness does neither exist nor come from the outside; the
passion and intelligence necessary for greatness resides in the learned men, and in Astrophil and
Stella Sidney urges himself--the learned man--should “look in [his] heart and write,” instead of
“Studying inventions fine, her wits to entertain:/ Oft turning others’ leaves, to see if thence
would flow/ Some fresh and fruitful showers upon my sun-burn’d brain.”19
How does a form without context possess a coherent meaning? How does something all
shape but no size, comparison, or significance begin to convey any meaning otherwise seen and
articulated through self-animated human perception and mental acuity—“the inward light”—that
looks beyond the surface, as Hooke himself exhibited in his galvanizing effort to show what

19

Astrophil and Stella, Sonnet 1, line 14 and 6-8.
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Micrographia can deliver beyond its pages? When Sidney suggests “look in thy heart” or argues
for the power of “inward light,” Hooke might as well be proposing “look in thy microscope.”
The “inward light” and the microscopic lens display a similar process of illumination; both give
significance to the world they illuminate by making it sensible, making it available for others to
experience, either through the lens of imagination or magnification. Yet the difference between
Hooke’s microscopic observation and Sidney’s “inward light” lies in the origination of the light.
Though immaterial and invisible, the inward light is the spiritual superlative that shines like the
celestial light; there is not much shape or size similar or proximate enough to describe its
significance. The microscope unveils the invisible world, providing more subtleties and
complexities of our terrestrial world and even signifying the inconceivable greater design of god
by human perception only, but the microscope still remains as an external source of illumination.
My dissertation aims to explore this commonplace of light consistently present and
ubiquitous in literary representations of truth. Though there are various metaphoric
representations of both the natural and artificial world to signify the spiritual authority of truth,
which might both challenge and complement scientific endeavors in examining the world and
understanding truth, light as a metaphor for truth champions in showing how poetic imagination
most eloquently expresses the pervasive authority of truth that is being “true of its own
accord.”20 Unlike the topos of size and significance, the topos of light remains unresponsive to
the external institutions or recalibration of artificial values. One aspect of light that I will be
examining in my dissertation will be its persistent association with “truth,” so much so that the
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Hans Blumenberg, “Light as a Metaphor for Truth: At the Preliminary Stage of Philosophical Concept
Formation,” Modernity and the Hegemony of Vision, ed. David Michael Levin, 30-62. The article was originally
published in 1957 in Studium General 10.7 and is a seminal read for the summary of philosophical ideas and
discussions of representation of truth I am invested in and intend to develop further in the discussions of poetic
representations of light as truth.
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terms within my discussion might at times seem interchangeable. Yet I begin my observation
exactly with that common and perhaps even banal familiarization of the ubiquitous and abstract
authority of truth with one of the most present and insistent signs of physical life—light. The
topos of light remains spatially and conceptually pervasive in the literary representation of truth.
Most literary representations of light as truth materialize the spiritual authority and pervasiveness
of truth in the form of illumination and transcendence or objects estranged and distant from the
sun. Sidney’s remark on looking inside to find the “inward light” should also suggest that despite
its omnipresent existence, truth requires a quality of inwardness—that truth is hard to see
through the physical eye and too abstract to be measured in a dimension capable of enough going
under the scrutiny of instruments like the microscope. Truth can be compared to the microscopic
view of the world, but the microscopic view doesn’t show truth. Inward vision or “inward light,”
then, suggests the spiritual authority preserved away from the corporeal reality, one that
surpasses material temporality. Hooke’s goal is to turn the invisible, minute world into one
sizeable and significant, and poetic seeing that perceives the illumination of truth as a more
inward, personal, and spiritual process reverses the process of Hooke’s magnification. In
Hooke’s experiment, light is the external source to reveal and magnify the small. This light,
however, represents only the mechanical quality of human faculties. In poetry, light is the inward
source to illuminate the small, the hidden, or the intangible. It is not the microscopic seeing that
reveals truth but the poetic seeing that imagines and creates the shapes and dimensions of a
world that conveys truth.
Cavendish chooses a form of blazing light as the self-fueled and self-sufficient flame that
emblazes and gives birth to the new world. Cavendish acutely criticizes science’s endeavor to
observe and define an intangible or “shapeless” realm of nature, and in “It is hard to believe, that
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there are other Worlds in this World,” she puns on the name Hooke and his microscopic process
of looking into what used to be unseen, shapeless, or even dark: “For many things our sense dull
may scape,/ For sense is grosse, not every thing can shape./ So in this World another world may
bee,/ That we do neither touch, tast, smell, heare, see./ What Eye so cleere is, yet did ever see/
Those little Hookes, that in the Load-stone bee,/ Which draw hard iron? or give Reasons, why/
The Needles point still in the north lye” (lines 7-14).21 Hooke’s microscopic view subordinates;
one world becomes a property or subject to the other world, so a world just can’t be a world once
under a microscopic lens. Any world visible must be defined and measured. Cavendish knows
her sentiment that “sense is grosse, not every thing can shape” will find very little support, and
she satirizes how the efficacy of optic devices intends on giving a “shape” to “this World another
word may bee,/ That we do neither touch, tast, smell, heare, see” (lines 3-4). By this kind of
invasive looking in, she argues, the dignity of the individual and intimate world is compromised;
she argues the magnified world is brute and exposed as it lacks poetic intimacy and philosophical
subtlety. Milton writes consistently about seeing both physically and spiritually, but his inability
to see physically didn’t stop him from seeing poetically. In Book III of Paradise Lost Milton
writes: “so much the rather thou celestial light/ Shine inward, and the mind through all her
powers/ Irradiate, there plant eyes, all mist from thence/ Purge and disperse, that I may see and
tell/ Of things invisible to mortal sight” (III. 51-55). Poetic seeing for Milton is like the
irradiating light; it enlightens him intellectually and spiritually while exposing him to a spiritual
radiation that “purges and disperses” corporeal sights, but leaves him with the sight of “things
invisible to mortal sight.” Though the poet is unable to see outward, he does not need to look
elsewhere anymore because the “celestial light” will “shine inward,” illuminating and escalating

Margaret Cavendish, “It is hard to believe, that there are other Worlds in this World,” Poems, and
fancies, sig. G2r-G2v.
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his “mind through all her powers” (III. 51-52). Anne Finch sees the lack of physical light as a
gateway to access poetic dawn—darkness was as significant as light for her poetic imagination to
become active. Her affinity to darkness is an esoteric and singular gesture breaking away from
the homogenous Western poetic convention and even an unintentional subversive denial of the
verbo-ocular-ego centric values of the hegemonic social and class structures that inspired her to
look for the less visual and obvious.
All of these authors, then, are linked in my study not through necessary influence of one
upon the next—though in many cases there were such direct historical connections—but because
they all contemplated the role of human sight and imagination in exploring and constituting the
material world surrounding them. As I will demonstrate ahead, simply overlaying a crude
distinction between science and spirituality upon the works in question would be at least partly
ahistorical and unwise; still, the championing of an “inner light” or “inward vision” by Sidney,
Cavendish, Milton, and Finch definitely signals a mode of seeing and representation that does
stand in stark contrast to the claims of objectivity forwarded by adherents to the emerging
observational science. Sidney’s praise for the “poetic imagination” in his Defence of Poesy, I will
argue in my initial chapter, provides a perfect foundation for examining the idea of “inner light”
in the works of the remaining figures in my study.
2

CHAPTER 2: How a Metaphor Can Create a Good Man: Sidney’s “Inward Light”
and Poetic Representation

Since our erected wit, maketh us know what perfection is, and yet our infected will, keepeth us
from reaching unto it. 22
22
Sidney, The Defence of Poesy, sig. C2r. Sidney explains the idea of “fore-conceite” as an act of
substitution, or, being a stand-in for the idea, not the work itself: “And that the poet hath that Idea, is manifest, by
delivering them forth in such excellencie as hee hath imagined them.” The readers—and the poet—have their own
“erected wit,” the spiritual sight that guides them and prevents them from “reaching” into “infected will” (sig. C2r).
Neither the poetry nor the poet can be responsible for anyone’s “infected will,” or the lack of “erected wit.”
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For any understanding knoweth the skill of the Artificer, standeth in that Idea or fore-conceite of
the work, & not in the work itselfe.23
Sidney would have received encouragement for his vision of the poet’s “erected wit”
materializing particulars from a more universal “fore-conceit” from multiple sources. Given the
amount of critical attention that I pay to the work, it seems important to note an essential element
of my view of Sidney’s The Defence of Poesy. As Robert E. Stillman points out in Philip Sidney
and the Poetics of Renaissance Cosmopolitanism, recent scholarship has often tended to
emphasize an incoherence and lack of effective synthesis in the work, but I am obviously among
those who view Sidney’s Defence, to borrow the words of A.C. Hamilton in his Sir Philip
Sidney: A Study of His Life and Works, as “closely reasoned and logical in all its parts” (111).24
As part of his evidence, Stillman closely examines Sidney’s incorporation of Scaliger, insisting
that “Sidney’s critical brilliance is enabled, in no small measure, by the methodical brilliance of
his reading skills, and there is no better example of Sidney’s skill in ‘methodizing’ the eclectic
matter of his Defence than his treatment at the very center of his golden world poetics of Julius
Caesar Scaliger” (105). Much of Scaliger sounds close to Sidney, especially when Scaliger
distinguishes (in his Poetices) the poet from the philosophers and historians because the former
“represent things just as they are” whereas “the poet depicts quite another sort of nature” (qtd. in
Stillman 106). Scaliger even considers the poet “almost” a “second deity” (qtd. in Stillman 106),
but as Stillman points out, Scaliger’s suggestive description stops short of its purpose, leading
the methodical Sidney “to devour Scaliger’s text and make it wholly his own” (107). As Stillman
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Sidney, The Defence of Poesy, sig. C2r.
Additional significant works that Stillman cites as demonstrating philosophical sophistication and
coherence in Sidney’s Defence include John C. Ulreich’s “‘The Poets Only Deliver’: Sidney’s Conception of
Mimesis,” Studies in the Literary Imagination 15.1 (1982): 67-84 and John Hunt’s “Allusive Coherence in Sidney’s
Apology for Poetry,” Studies in English Literature 1500-1900 27 (1987): 1-16.
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shows, Sidney introduces the concept of “scope,” so that in comparison to the other arts such as
astronomy and metaphysics that zoom in and focus on, as Sidney describes, “the works of
Nature,” the poet, again in Sidney’s words, “lifted up with the vigor of his own invention, doth
grow in effect into another nature” (107).
Sidney was certainly well-read and possessed an intimate knowledge of his sources. Even
before his Continental tour, he had, through his tutor and friend John Dee, undoubtedly come in
contact with even extremely esoteric currents of European thought, as well as earned continual
access to Dee’s library—by then, as Deborah Harkness explains in John Dee’s Conversations
with Angels, “the largest private library in England” (61).25 Considering the astonishing breadth
of his learning, Dee was certainly an effective conduit of Neoplatonism to Sidney, and to other
intellectuals in England as well, given Dee’s prominence. After a comet appeared in 1577,
Queen Elizabeth actually summoned Dee to explain the comet’s possible astrological
significance to her courtiers (Harkness 68-69). Though Sidney begins the Defence on squarely
Aristotelian territory—insisting that poetry involves “imitation”—he quickly changes the nature
of such imitation to bring it, as Marvin Carlson insists in Theories of the Theatre, “closer to
Neoplatonist than to Aristotelian thought” (82).26 Once the anti-Aristotelian impetus of the
Defence is underscored, another important source for Sidney becomes clear—Peter Ramus.
Although early scholarship tended to overstate Ramus’ influence on Sidney, many factors
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Deborah E. Harkness, John Dee's Conversations with Angels: Cabala, Alchemy, and the End of Nature
(Cambridge: Cambridge U P, 1999). In addition, Peter French, in John Dee, The World of an Elizabethan Magus,
marvels at the sophistication of Sidney’s assertion, “So of the contrary side, if we will turn Ovid’s verse, Ut lateat
virtus proximitate male, that ‘good lie hid in nearness of the evil,’ Agrippa will be as merry in showing the vanity of
science as Erasmus was in commending folly” (qtd. in French 144). Recognizing the obscurity of the source
mentioned, French observes: “What a revealing comparison! Sidney makes it clear that he perceived Agrippa’s De
incertitudine et vanitate Scientiarum declamatio invecta for what it was, a kind of satire. He had a complete
understanding of Agrippa and his magical philosophy if he knew that this work, which was meant to fool the
authorities, was a sham” (144).
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suggest at least some level of influence—John Dee’s close friendship with Ramus, for example,
and Ramus’ status as a genuine Protestant martyr after his slaughter in the St. Bartholomew’s
Day Massacre, something that would have appealed greatly to Sidney’s own Protestant
sensibility. Also, from the beginning of his career Ramus was staunchly anti-Aristotelian, to such
a level that he was fired from post after post for lecturing against the canonical teachings of
Aristotle that formed the basis for a university education in his day. To be clear, Ramistic logic
would have seemed extremely simplistic to Dee and, in turn, Sidney, especially given the
sophisticated turn of Dee’s alchemical and metaphysical thought. Still, it did function in a
markedly universal-to-particular direction as it, in the words of Dewey D. Wallace from Shapers
of English Calvinism, 1160-1714, “articulated the unity and diversity of all knowledge of things
human and divine by breaking wholes into parts and defining parts through their bifurcation or
by their opposites” (Wallace 16). In addition, as Richard Tuck argues in Philosophy and
Government, 1572-1651, for Ramus “there was no real distinction between philosophical science
and practical reasoning—and no logical distinction, moreover, between science and merely
probable ‘opinion’” (Tuck 25). Ramus’ suggestion that the mind possesses the power to discover
large truths first before pursuing a structure of logical proof that works toward component parts
fits Sidney’s Neoplatonic view of the imitative power of poetry, an imitation of universals over
particulars that captures truths exceeding those possible in the mere mechanical arrangement of
the world. Indeed, Jon S. Lawry convincingly argues in his Sidney’s Two Arcadias that both
Arcadias proceed by dividing the universal “truths” Sidney is trying to present to the reader into
component taxonomic pairs in order to move the reader to recognize the validity of his original
propositions, suggesting both a methodological and philosophical link between Sidney and
Ramus.
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I remind the reader of Stillman’s description of Aristotelian methodology above, that of
discovering forms or ideas through investigations of the material realm. This is, of course, very
familiar to modern readers, for scientific progress has largely depended upon a sort of
methodological reductionism that examines component parts to discover larger truths and
patterns—a movement from observed or quantified details to explanations that are tested through
further observations. Indeed, despite the more “systems”-oriented approaches seen in
contemporary calls for a holistic revision of scientific methodology, both ontological and
methodological reductionism appear to be completely embedded at the heart of the scientific
project. Against this movement—from specific observations to general conclusions—stands
Sidney’s call for an ontological and epistemological theory of knowledge that works in the
opposite direction, moving from universals and “fore-conceits” to specific representations that
are, in the process, more truthful than any mere copy or mimetic representation—a scientific
model, for example—could be. This is, I think, a significant strand of thought in Sidney’s
Defence, and certainly one of the most important for my comparison of Sidney to Cavendish
ahead. Stillman correctly concludes that Sidney was synthesizing Platonic elements and
abandoning the “Aristotelian project of locating forms (or ideas) embodied in the material realm”
(109), and the interweaving of Aristotelian and Platonic elements creates many of the most
striking features of the Defence and will be central to my analysis ahead.
Homer, according to Aristotle, mastered the art of figurative language by coming up with
active and tangible metaphors and endowed life “to lifeless things in his well liked similes:
Arched, foam-crested, some in front, but others upon others” (On Rhetoric).27 Though spoken,
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Aristotle, On Rhetoric: A Theory of Civic Discourse, trans. George A. Kennedy, 248. In Book 3 Chapter
11 of Rhetoric Aristotle explains why vividness of figurative language implies movement, which he calls
“energeia,” an “actualization”: “For example, to say that a good man is ‘foursquare’ is a metaphor, for both are
complete; but it does not signify activity [energeia]. But the phrase ‘having his prime of life in full bloom’ is
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and later written, Homer’s poetic language was able to evoke senses outside the linguistic
apparatus—“[Homer] makes everything move and live, and energeia is motion.”28 The
ocularcentric paradigm has dominated the major aesthetic theories in Western culture since the
ancient Greeks. With Homer’s use of poetic language, poetry becomes more than words
reflecting reality but instead interacts with and influences reality, and Sidney professed such as
the goal of good poetry: “Poesie therefore is an arte of imitation, for so Aristotle termeth it in this
word Mimesis, that is to say, a representing, counterfeiting, or figuring foorth: to speake
metaphorically a speaking picture, with this end: to teach and delight.”29 The notion that words
can generate pictures, or that pictorial properties can be converted into poetical ones, was
popularized by the Horatian dictum, "ut pictura poesis (as is painting, so as poetry).”30 Bruce R.

energeia, as is ‘you, like an apheton’ and ‘now then the Greeks darting forward on their feet.’ Darting is
actualization and metaphor; for he means ‘quickly.’ And [energeia is,] as Homer often uses it, making the lifeless
living through the metaphor” (On Rhetoric 248). Aristotle examines Homer’s simile that compares battle to waves
of the sea beating on the shore to emphasize the visual in Illiad 13. 799: “Arched, foam-crested, some in front, but
others upon others.” In addition, Aristotle opens Book 3 Chapter 11 with the following lines: “But it is necessary to
say what we mean by bringing-before-the-eyes and what makes this occur. I call those things ‘before the eyes’ that
signify things engaged in an activity” (On Rhetoric 248). The phrase “Bringing-Before-the-Eyes” first shows up in
Book 3 chapter 10 where Aristotle discusses the rhetorical stylistic urbanization or what he calls “asteia,” or
“urbanities” (244). The sense of urbanity in “asteia” signifies the activity of towns, the sense of vigilance or
movement associated with towns, and the element of alertness or vividness is critical for the cultivation of style:
“[urbanity is achieved] by means of bringing-before-the-eyes [pro ommatōn poiein, or visualization]; for things
should be seen as being done rather than as in the future. [To achieve urbanity in style] one should thus aim at three
things: metaphor, antithesis, actualization [energeia]” (245). What “visualization” does is “bringing-before-theeyes” for Aristotle, and the figurative language might be the only sophisticated linguistic tool that can deliver this
“energeia.”
By listing examples from Homer’s Odyssey and Illiad in Book 3 chapter 11 of On Rhetoric, Aristotle
further explains the element of “visualization” in figurative language: “In all [Homer’s] work he gains his fame by
creating activity, for example, in the following: Then to the plain rolled the ruthless stone’ and ‘the arrow flew’ and
[also of an arrow] ‘eager to fly’ and [of spears] ‘They stood in the ground longing to take their fill of flesh,’ and
‘The point sped eagerly through his breast.’ In all of these something seems living through being actualized, for
being ‘ruthless’ and ‘longing’ and the other examples constitute energeia. [Homer] applied these by using metaphor
by analogy; for as the stone is to Sisyphus, so is the ‘shameless’ one to the one ‘shamefully’ treated” (On Rhetoric
249). Analogy, as we know, is a comparison between two things, typically on the basis of their structure and for the
purpose of clarification; the distance between two comparisons in metaphors is not only inevitable but encouraged.
28
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Horace introduced the phrase “ut pictura poesis” in his Ars Poetica to compare the art of painting with
that of poetry. However, this analogy that poetry and painting are alike has been popular since ancient Greece and
wasn’t original to Horace, as expressed by Simonides of Keos, who was first paraphrased by Plutarch in De gloria
Atheniensium, 3.347a: “Simonides, however, calls painting inarticulate poetry and poetry articulate painting: for the
30
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Smith in The Key of Green: Passion and Perception in Renaissance Culture points out that
“Plutarch’s version of an observation originally made by Simonedes of Keos—‘poema picture
loquens, picture poema silens’ (poetry a speaking picture, picture a silent poem)—commanded
such a wide assent that Philip Sidney is exceptional in labeling it only a metaphor” (Smith
125).31 Unlike Horace’s analogy that conjoins the aesthetic function of painting and poetry,
Sidney’s analogy of painting and poetry keeps the two distant; pictures and words share a similar
mimetic act of representation and involve the sight as the mode of reception, but reading poetry
requires understanding of verbal signs. Poetry, simply put, teaches its audience how to become a
better reader of the world; it can teach the reader to recognize the mimetic relationship between
two distant things—words that describe the world in poetry or a picture that portrays the world in
painting—and imitate such associations between the representation and the original, which
resembles the act of metaphor: “If poetry is like painting, it is because the reader of poetry, in act
an act of judgment, makes it so” (Smith 125-26).32 Sir Philip Sidney’s The Defence of Poesy
argues for poetry’s capacity to mimic and “improve” nature, but such improvement also implies
the enhancement of the readership of poetry. Sidney’s “end” goal of poetry indicates the
transformation of the readers of poetry into the actors of metaphors, who can perceive what “a

actions which painters portray as taking place at the moment literature narrates and records after they have taken
place. Even though artists with colour and design, and writers with words and phrases, represent the same subjects,
they differ in the material and the manner of their imitation; and yet the underlying end and aim of both is one and
the same; the most effective historian is he who, by a vivid representation of emotions and characters, makes his
narration like a painting.”
31
Bruce R. Smith, The Key of Green: Passion and Perception in Renaissance Culture. (Chicago: U of
Chicago P, 2009). Smith opens the chapter titled “Green Spectacles” with the following: “Ut pictura poesis: no
Renaissance commonplace was more common than the claim that poetry is like picture”(125). In relation with the
concept of “picture” in poetry, Smith cites Lucy Gent who points out the word “picture” in early modern England
was “an extraordinarily capricious word” that signified many things, as broadly as paintings, sculptures, tapestry, or
embroidery, but even “things made out of words” (125). For further readings on Renaissance understanding of the
word “picture,” see Gent’s Picture and Poetry 1560-1620: Relation between literature and he visual arts in the
English Renaissance (Leamington Spa: James Hall, 1981).
32
In an end note to the text in page 125 Smith further explains: “Sidney, in The Defence of Poesy, is
altogether typical in making Horace’s observation part of the very definition of poesy, but is quite unusual in
realizing that the observation is, after all, a metaphor” (Smith 290).
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speaking picture” articulates and, furthermore, “speak metaphorically a speaking picture, with
this end: to teach and delight.”33
When poetry generates a “speaking picture,” it encourages the reader to connect two
distant or unfamiliar things together to make sense. The new science provided different ways of
seeing and representing the world, but as I will show in the next chapter, scientific observation
centered heavily on pictorial representation. Natural scientists like Robert Hooke argue that the
microscopic observation will cancel the distance between the visible world and the invisible by
revealing the invisible world to our natural eye through the help of his optic device, eventually
encroaching on the terrain of poetic distance necessary for metaphors to sustain their function. If
the pictures become too detailed and informative, they might claim to overtake the superior
capability of words that Sidney argues as unique in poetry. In this chapter, I will examine how
Sidney’s defense for poetic representation and reception prefigures the concerns voiced by the
subsequent generation of poets who believed the advent of scientific observation posed a threat
to the unique purpose of poetry. Furthermore, my examination of Sidney’s poetic theory in The
Defence of Poesy will help establish a framework for my examination of “inward light” in the
works of Robert Hooke, Margaret Cavendish, John Milton and Anne Finch in the following
chapters.
In “The Touch of the Blind Man: The Phenomenology of Vividness in Italian
Renaissance Art,” Jodi Cranston examines how the sight receives the most attention among the
various operations of the human senses in Italian Renaissance discourses on art. Leonard da
Vinci, she asserts, considered the function of the eye “the primary means by which the sensus
communis of the brain may most fully and magnificently contemplate the infinite works of
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nature, and the ear is the second, acquiring nobility through the recounting of things which the
eye has seen” (Cranston 225).34 Poetry cannot provide directly tactile and ocular experience, and
Leonardo believed sight to be the most vital sensory operation for aesthetic experience and
judgment. Cranston writes that Leonardo believed that a blind person’s sensory and aesthetic
experience is necessarily marred by lack of sight, and therefore a blind person cannot fully enjoy
and judge beauty and “lives as though dead” (226). For Leonardo, a blind man’s sensory
experience is controlled by speech, which he believes is subsidiary to sight, and the lack of sight
“limits expression through a fixed set of words and meaning” (226). To prove his point Leonardo
employed a specific example of how the king of Hungary, Mathias Corvinus, upon receiving
both a poem and painting on his birthday, found the painting more engaging and moving. The
poet, who learned that the king preferred the painting over his poetry, accused the king of
appreciating “the inferior mode of representation” (226). The king refuted the poet’s accusation
by insisting that the painting not only appears more accessible and alive to the viewer but also
offers something more than mere ocular experience: “Give me something I can see and touch,
and not only hear, and do not criticize my decision to tuck your work under my arm, while I take
up that of the painter in both hands to place it before my eyes” (qtd. in Cranston 226). In
Leonardo’s story, poetry is thus hidden—the aesthetic value and experience poetry can offer to
the king is insignificant, and, most of all, invisible, as his action of tucking the poetry under his
arm suggests. Cranston expands Leonardo’s ocularcentric aesthetic theory and suggests that the
agent of touch—the hand—can manipulate another sensory and aesthetic operation. This kind of
touching art, or touching of art, is also crucial for the art work’s vivid effect. Although the
operation of sight, especially in its role in judging beauty, “receives considerable attention in

Jodi Cranston, “The Touch of the Blind Man: The Phenomenology of Vividness in Italian Renaissance
Art,” Sensible Flesh, 224-42.
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Renaissance discussions on the arts,” the King of Hungary’s remark on his preference of painting
over poetry as well as the tucking of the poetry under his arm reveals the role that hands play in
both creation and reception of art; hands possess the ability not only to “facilitate and assist
sight,” but also “have the power to disable sight,” as the king’s arm can hide as well as reveal—
while the poetry is tucked under his arm, he extends his hands to “take up that of the painter in
both hands to place it before [his] eyes” (227).35 Hands serve as one of the essential parts of the
creative process and production of meaning. As a literal sign, the hand might represent an
individual body part rather than a whole body and coherent self, but as a symbolic sign—as a
synecdoche—the hand embodies a coherent sign that is connected to the poet and his art work,
extended out from the creator and pressed onto the creation at work. The trope of the hand
functions in both metaphorical and metonymical ways; its creative labor is both literal and
symbolic.
In poetry, holding the art work close is unnecessary because physical proximity to words
doesn’t do anything to the abstract distance between the vehicle and the tenor. However, the
figuration of the hand as an extension and connection between art and nature suggests the
metaphorical association between hand and writing. Poetry, just as painting does, can “place
[nature] before [one’s] eyes.” When reading poetry, poetry takes care of the hands’ work to
“place it before [one’s] eyes” because poetry can push towards or pull away its subject from the
reader through the manipulation of metaphors. Poetry can enhance and reconfigure our view of
the world, just as paintings can, and anti-theatricalists during the sixteenth and seventeenth
century were concerned for poetry’s capability to mimic or fabricate truth. In poetry, the signs—
the words—become the substance for the images. Unlike painting, which still uses images to

Touching and holding are two vital activities to bring something “before our eyes.” As Cranston points
out, tropes that involve touching “serve as metaphors for accessibility, clarity, and visibility” (227).
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deliver sight, words deliver sight in poetry.36 As I will discuss further, with Sidney in this chapter
and Cavendish later, the poets argue that poetry does not deceive because it never promises to be
the mere deliverer of truth, but rather insists on copying and altering—enhancing—truth. If the
figurative language can bring nature before our eyes, then poetry can facilitate the function of
hand that extends and contracts to bring nature as well as art closer to the viewer’s eye. Sidney
professes the purpose of reading and writing metaphors as the moral education of “learned men”
whose “mind hath a free desire to do well.”37 A man who wants to learn how to decipher hidden
or intricate metaphorical representations can learn to perceive the world more comprehensively,
and it is that clarity and scope of his vision that makes “a learned man” a good reader.38 Guided
by “the inward light,” both poet and reader of poetry can create a figure that appears closer and
more vivid, tangible and real as “[one] can see and touch.”39 This suggestion then subverts
Leonardo’s claim that only through the ocular experience of painting can a man experience and
judge art. A moving—to stress the active metaphor there—work of art, whether it be painting or
poetry, can create a tactile and visceral experience that manipulates the distance between nature
and art, image and language, tenor and vehicle, or art and its audience.40 Even with the obvious
association between touch and figurative language, the idea that the human body has a direct
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This change from one substance to another is far more severe—exaggerated--and inherent in poetry
because the pictorial representation is less alienated from our sensory reception of the world while the verbal
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include a more in-depth discussion of this transformative aspect of poetic metaphors later in this chapter. Also, for
further contemplation of how visual sight is the antecedent of verbal representation, read The Key of Green by Bruce
R. Smith.
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Sidney argues that—and encourages—the poet should exercise a wider scope and envision the world
beyond “the narrow warrant of” what nature provides; the poet should imagine and create things that are “either
better then Nature bringeth forth, or quite a newe forms such as never were in Nature” (sig. C1v).
39
Poetic metaphors not only train and create a good reader, but they can also enhance and magnify the
quality of a good reader to further suggest his moral superiority.
40
For instance, poetry’s capacity to create a “speaking picture” enables the poets to target more abstract
and elusive subjects, as in Finch’s “The Spleen,” which I will discuss the later chapter.
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impact on the creation of art could raise a problem, especially among the Neo-Platonists. A part
of the human limb, a part of the corporeal body, partakes in the creative process of recording
poetry to be read; hand and its capacity to manipulate the reality become an integral part of
artistic creation. Poetic representation comes from the association of hand in writing—thus
poetry is connected to the body in a metaphoric, metonymic way.41 Poetry’s long tradition of
representation through metaphor and simile modulates the ocularcentric representation of
painting to allow it to explore new terrain.
Sidney has long been thoroughly recognized as a major figure in the English
Renaissance, and to say that much has been written about his work is an understatement.
Because I am especially interested in the influence of philosophy and theology on his work, I
sometimes find myself gravitating to earlier works of scholarship less likely to eliminate these
fields of their meaning and view them, instead, as hollow expressions of power or mechanisms
for social order. I will admit at the outset that I have struggled with a way to finesse my reading
of Sidney into closer alignment with the more common contemporary handling of his works, one
that tends to subordinate larger philosophical concerns to local negotiations of power through a
New Historicist emphasis on expediency and “self-fashioning.” No doubt, such functionalist
readings are compelling, even as they almost do away with the need to examine the
epistemological and ontological complexities of Sidney’s poetics. Put simply, such a view sees
Sidney’s invocation of the Horatian ideal of pleasurable and instructive poetry as a necessary and
strategic instrument intended to bring into alignment his activist Protestant politics—more
typically championed by middle-class intellectuals like Gosson—and his own high status at court
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With more poetry being printed and read, instead of being recited and heard in front of the audience, the
transmission of poetry and its tactile impact on the audience became more personal and individualized; if educated
enough to read, people could hold poetry in their hands and read and enjoy it alone.
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and great skill as a courtier. In Gosson’s judgment, poetry did indeed produce pleasure, yet
“pleasure” was a force that quickly transformed men from warriors “wreastling at armes” to
courtiers “wallowyng in Ladies laps.” However, seeing the need to protect the leisure and
pleasure that were part of the social currency distinguishing between classes, Sidney attempted a
sort of reconciliation. Thus, even as he claims in Defending Literature in Early Modern England
to challenge earlier New Historicist assumptions about the ability of texts to be genuinely
constitutive of actual political power, Robert Matz is typical of current attitudes towards
Sidney’s works when he straightforwardly insists that in the Defence “Sidney attempts to defend
the courtly pleasure of poetry by claiming that such pleasure promotes warrior service” and that
“Poetry’s profit and pleasure thus mediates between Sidney’s ambivalent position as courtly and
Protestant aristocrat” (Matz 22).42
Although I have much different aims in my discussion of Sidney, recent theoretical
positions such as Matz’s do foreground many significant details of the Defence, and it might be
useful to summarize a few of them here. A reading searching for pragmatism as compared to
profundity, for example, readily accounts for the ambivalence sensed as the lofty claims to heroic
valor earlier in the work give way to Sidney’s description of the work at the end as an “inkwasting toy,” a conclusion, Matz insists, where writing “becomes instead excess, straying, and
waste” (76). Likewise, a reading focusing on Sidney’s anxious desire to reconcile two competing
value systems explains the frequent attempts on Sidney’s part to rescue poetry from Gosson’s
characterization that it is somehow a feminizing force, turning readers away from martial valor,
from “courage to cowardice,” and from “Dartes to Dishes” (qtd. in Matz 61). Although Sidney

Matz points out that “for both Sidney and Gosson poetry should profit as well as delight, and, in
particular, it should profit by moving men to deeds of military courage,” and he even concludes that “Gosson’s
dedication to Sidney seems reasonable in light of their shared Protestant activism” (62).
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does propose a rather feminine “sweet and charming force” for poetry, he quickly changes that to
a useful purpose in service to the state, transforming pen to weapon by contrasting the
embroidery needle that constituted a popular pastime of females at court with the soldier’s
sword: “Truly, a needle cannot do much hurt, and as truly (with leave of the ladies be it spoken)
it cannot do much good. With a sword though mayst kill thy father, & with a sword though
mayst defend thy prince and country.”43 The lack of opportunities to gain or solidify one’s status
in the court through military achievement under Queen Elizabeth definitely necessitated the
creation of alternate forms of status-seeking displays, and as Matz points out, the ritualized
performances in the tiltyard had become so distant from actual battle and so close to courtly
entertainment that they incorporated flowers and perfumed water (Matz 79); it is obvious, then,
that Sidney would attempt to masculinize and recuperate courtly display in all its forms after
Gosson’s attack. Because Sidney certainly was responding to local social pressures—often quite
consciously—analysis borrowed from New Historicism appears at times in my discussion. It is
striking, however, that in his lengthy study of Sidney, not once does Matz connect the actual
content of Sidney’s arguments to larger philosophical concerns as they would have existed in
Sidney’s day, and indeed as they still exist to this day. Instead, Sidney’s ideas are consistently
reduced to mere strategic deployments intended to negotiate and protect his own social standing,
a critical practice that misses much that interests me the most in Sidney’s great works.
In addition to New Historicism, reader-response and reception-oriented modes of analysis
have proven particularly fruitful in Renaissance studies, starting with the pioneering work of
such giants as Stanley Fish and Barbara Lewalski and continuing with a host of equally
insightful scholars. The following chapter will be very indebted to reader-response theory, and I
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would like to start with a general statement pointing out the affinity of Sidney’s work for studies
that examine both the writer’s intended and the actual actions that occur in the mind of the reader
as the text forces him or her to engage in an active transaction intended to convey truth far
beyond the truths possible through mere imitation or verisimilitude. For a variety of reasons that
I will discuss later, Sidney’s poetics presupposed a hermeneutic interpretive process that elevated
poetry above all other forms of literature in conveying truth and revealing glimpses of NeoPlatonic Ideal forms to the reader. Sidney, as author, also describes the poet’s active process of
interpretation in his poetry. His sonnet sequence Astrophil and Stella begins by protesting that
the poet wants to cease using obvious conceits and overused conventional sonnet form. He
wishes to invent a new sonnet form, but the task isn’t easy. Already demonstrating how the poet
is up against a daunting mission as Astrophil expresses his anxiety to keep up with “inventions
fine,” the first sonnet of the sequence begins with Astrophil moaning that he can’t seem to write
good poetry that will inspire his beloved--and move her--to love him back. As he tries to find a
way to compose a poem that will impress his beloved, Astrophil is already composing fine
poetry that reveals his poetic skill and understanding of poetic conventions:
I sought fit words to paint the blackest face of woe,
Studying inventions fine, her wits to entertain:
Oft turning others’ leaves, to see if thence would flow
Some fresh and fruitful showers upon my sun-burn’d brain.
But words came halting forth, wanting Invention’s stay,
Invention, Nature’s child, fled step-dame Study’s blows. (lines 5-10)
The unknown reaction of his audience—the fact that how his beloved, Stella, might react to his
words determines the success of his poetry—makes Astrophil worry and causes him to lament.
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At this point it is important that I explain why I am painstakingly describing the seemingly
obvious lines from the first sonnet of Astrophil and Stella. Although it seems plain that sonnet 1
focuses on the process and hardship of poetry writing, those lines are set up to show what really
occurs in the mind of a poet before composing his verse and to point out that the virtue of writing
may be tested not just in the act of writing but also in the reaction of its reader. The reader’s
reaction is not only a metaphorical deliverance and achievement of the text but also a physical
manifestation of virtues that the text tries to evoke. A good poem, a successful one, then, will
indeed be read as a good poem but will do its job, which is to inspire and move the reader to
action. Hence, a successful love sonnet is supposed to actually move the beloved’s heart and
make him or her do something. In other words, if a love poem doesn’t create love, then it can’t
be a good poem. This is more about turning words into a reality, and for Astrophil it is more
complicated since he wants to use a new and different set of poetic devices to accomplish this
alchemical task.
Here I want to describe the divine capability of a poet that Sidney argues for in The
Defence of Poesy, for it is central to most of my discussion ahead. When, for example, Sidney
argues that “Only the poet, disdaining to be tied to any such subjection, lifted up with the vigor
of his own invention, doth grow, in effect, into another nature, in making things either better than
nature bringeth forth, or, quite a newe forms such as never were in Nature,” he lauds the poet’s
ability to expand nature’s gifts “as he goeth hand in hand with nature, not enclosed within the
narrow warrant of her gifts, but freely ranging within the zodiac of his own wit.”44 The poet’s
ability to make something better than nature is the invention that Astrophil desires, and this
invention requires “study” and practice. The poets with the ability to examine the world and then
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create “things either better than nature bringeth forth, or, quite a newe formes” are not only great
learned men who learned from inventions already existing but also accomplished makers who
imitate and reinvent something better than the preexisting forms.45 The poet should not be
limited to “the narrow warrant of [nature’s] gifts” but be freely creative with what nature
provides using his or her wit; the poet shouldn’t merely copy nature but rather experiment with
it—“lifted up with vigor”--while inventing a new form, a new nature.
Nor, to finish up a very preliminary appraisal of Sidney’s poetics, was it just a matter of a
poet’s accomplishing more than mere imitation, for the manner of presentation was also vitally
important.46 Sidney begins The Defence of Poesy with an anecdote about his visit to Edward
Wotton in Italy. At the Holy Roman Emperor’s court, Sidney and Wotton “gave [themselves] to
learn horsemanship of John Pietro Pugliano, one that with great commendation had the place of
an esquire in his stable.”47 Sidney’s The Defence of Poesy displays much persuasive verbal and
rhetorical skill, accompanied by learned references to the classical literary tradition, and the
carefully modulated humorous, self-deprecating tone becomes apparent in the introduction,
which discusses horsemanship. Pugliano, with his eager and diligent delivery of teaching,
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Sidney further explains that through imitation the poet can “make his own, beautifying it both for further
teaching, and more delighting, as it pleaseth him” (sig. E2v). It is important to note that Sidney points out the creator
(poet or the artist) also experiences the “end” of poetry; while making “his own” and “beautifying it,” the poet
creates something that is not only instructive and didactic for the audience/reader, but receives joy in doing it.
Without a doubt, the Platonic perception of poetry as the least instructive and persuasive means to teach virtue
prevailed from ancient Greece and Rome through the sixteenth century, and in The Defence of Poesy Sidney
confronts ancient attacks on poetry and drama that had been revived by Puritan moralists. Stephen Gosson, whose
invective restated Plato’s criticism of poetry, argued that poetry is an art of imitation that is far removed from truth
and thus appeals only to “the inferior part of soul,” causing moral corruption and political unrest. However, Sidney
argues that imitation is the core of literary creation because poetic imagination doesn’t mindlessly copy but always
reflects the individual mind who is doing the work of mimesis: “Poesy, therefore, is an art of imitation, for so
Aristotle termeth it in this word mimesis, that is to say, a representing, counterfeiting, or figuring forth— to speak
metaphorically, a speaking picture—with this end, to teach and delight” (sig. C2v).
47
Sidney, sig. B1r. It was during the court of either Maximilian II or Rudolf II, the son of Maximilian II,
but the date of Sidney’s visit is uncertain; and scholars have pointed various dates between 1574-75. Rudolf II took
over his father’s reign in October of 1575.
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appears to be an unsophisticated, one-dimensional character owing to Sidney’s subtle wit: “And
he, according to the fertileness of the Italian wit, did not only afford us the demonstration of his
practice but sought to enrich our minds with contemplations therein which he thought most
precious.”48 Pugliano compares a horse to a courtier and suggests that horses are nobler than
courtiers. Sidney recounts: “Then would he add certain praises, by telling what a peerless beast
the horse was, the only serviceable courtier without flattery, the beast of most beauty,
faithfulness, courage, and such more, that if I had not been a piece of a logician before I came to
him I think he would have persuaded me to have wished myself a horse.”49 Sidney clearly thinks
that Pugliano’s assertion is too obvious and too eager to be understood as anything but a type of
self-love without self-control. Although Sidney says in his acerbic tone that “self-love is better
than any gilding,” Pugliano’s hyperbolic speech on the art of horsemanship is not only
overwrought but his “weake arguments” fail to satisfy an experienced courtier whose mastery of
balancing “self-love” and “gilding” helped him establish the steadfastness of his political and
social status.50
The seeming appearance of an easy, perhaps a bit reckless, thus self-effacing, and yet
impeccably controlled rhetorical surface in Sidney’s The Defence of Poesy reflects the most
conspicuous Renaissance aesthetical ideal, the supreme importance placed on grace and
sprezzatura. Furthermore, note how in the beginning of The Defence of Poesy Sidney thoroughly
lists numerous examples of ancient philosophers who used poetry to articulate their inner
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Sidney, sig. B1v. The word “gilding” could mean two things here— the typical metal gilding, but also a
pun on “gelding,” which is the meaning I am referencing in my later point about the art of balancing self-advocacy
(“self-love”) and self-effacement (“gelding”) to present oneself as an affable and sophisticated courtier who is also
able to hide his political greed and ambition.
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thoughts as they performed their profession “under the masks of poets.”51 Sidney’s description of
poetry as a mask informs his interpretation of the function of mimesis in poetic creation: “Poesie
therefore is an arte of imitation, for so Aristotle termeth it in this word Mimesis, that is to say, a
representing, counterfeiting, or figuring foorth.”52 Poetry, as Sidney argues, is undeniably
capable of not only representing but also masking, and therefore poetry is an incredibly useful
form of communication and production of individual knowledge as well as national posterity:
Let learned Greece in any of her manifold Science, be able to shew me one booke,
before Musaeus, Homer, & Hesiodus, all three nothing els but Poets. Nay, let any
historie be brought, that can say any writers were there before them, if they were
not men of the same skill, as Orpheus, Linus, and some other are named: who
having been the first of that Country, that made pens deliverers of their
knowledge to their posterity, may justify challenge to bee called their Fathers in
learning. (sig. B2r)
Sidney defends poetry’s mimetic quality by expanding the scope of poetry’s—and the poet’s-capability. A poet is someone who holds the veil to unveil truth, the one who performs behind a
mask; as Sidney writes, any writers who “made pens deliverers of their knowledge to their
posterity” learned to embody and perform metaphor—because it stands in for something else
while “representing,” it is “counterfeiting” and “figuring foorh” simultaneously. Note how
Sidney begins The Defense of Poesy by telling the story of Pugliano and his horse, whom Sidney
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Sidney, sig. B2v. Sidney explains how the mask of poetry enabled the great thinkers to embody their
ideas: “So as Amphion was sayde to move stones with his poetrie, to build Thebes. And Orpheus to be listened to by
beastes, indeed, stony and beastly people. So among the Romans were Liuius, Andronicus, and Ennius. […] After
whom, encouraged and delighted with theyr excellent fore-going, others have followed, to beautifie our mother
tongue, as wel in the same kinde as in other Arts. This did so notably shewe it selfe, that the Phylosophers of
Greece, durst not a long time appeare to the worlde but under the masks of poets. So Thales, Empedocles, and
Parmenides, sange their natural Phylosophie in verses” (sig. B2v).
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met through his friend and courtier Edward Wotton. This is a peculiar line up. Imagine--a poet, a
courtier, a riding master, and a horse? What kind of performance is occurring around this
significant, noble subject, a horse?53 Or, is Sidney pointing out that human beings can produce,
perform, and embody meaning only through the unbreakable assembly of mimetic pretense? As
David M. Posner points out in The Performance of Nobility in Early Modern European
Literature, Count Baldassare Castiglione’s The Book of Courtier appropriates Cicero’s concept
of “artful artlessness” in public performances when describing the effect of wonder and suspense
in a courtier’s public performance when a courtier appears graceful in his behavior and rhetoric
yet accomplishes the effect without appearing to try. Castiglione’s The Book of Courtier praises
sprezzatura, compactly defined as “effortless grace,” as the most essential quality for a courtier
to possess in order to achieve successful social and political nearness to the power.
The ideal of sprezzatura, then, extends to the ideal courtier’s aesthetic goal when
employed in creating art. An ideal courtier who employs his rhetoric and physical attributes to be
politically persuasive is equivalent to an ideal poet who artfully uses his words to be inspiring
and moving. Yet the key to diplomacy and courtly dissimulation is subtlety—Pugliano fails
because he is too eager, too obvious. In both Sidney’s and Castiglione’s discussions of artistic
creation, literary creation is further removed from the classical tradition and its expectation of art
representing or imitating nature—an ideal artist and his or her ideal literary creation will achieve
more than a mere representation of nature, and an ideal artist will deliver such an accomplished
and sophisticated piece of art without making the process of naturalizing art obvious. For
example, in Robert Herrick’s “Delight in Disorder” (1648), in praising “a wild civility” created
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We should also remember how Sidney describes Pugliano as a gauche and loud type, who comes across
as even less sophisticated than his own horse. Yet it is also Sidney who uses this story to allude to something else,
hiding behind a horse (and the horseman). This should make one wonder, “who is counterfeiting or figuring forth?”
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by feminine disarray, Herrick creates a site of sprezzatura through the poem’s metrical and
rhyme structure, which also includes his satirical criticism of the Puritan preference for precision
that eschewed the lush, languid, easy grace of courtly culture and its poetry.54 By idolizing the
lack of order as the abundance of delight, Herrick transforms and expands the natural, expected,
and common meaning of disorder into something unexpected and enhanced, so “golden” that it
would teach us something new and delight us with enlightenment. The abundance in disorder,
caught in “an erring lace,” “here and there,” and “ribbons to flow confusedly,” gives so much
delight to the poet, and to reiterate Sidney’s argument that while nature’s world is “brazen,” art is
able to “deliver a golden” world.55
The idea of a “golden” world brings us past gesture and style to Sidney’s core claim
about poetry, that it is able to transcend its material surroundings and participate in the ideal.
Again, this alludes to the capability of poetry, being able to turn brazen into gold, to use—
counterfeit and figure forth--an example of a horse to teach and inspire a man. Naturally,
contemporary discussions of Neoplatonic philosophy must be handled delicately to avoid
historical misrepresentations. For example, in Science, Reading, and Renaissance Literature,
Elizabeth Spiller criticizes Harry Berger, the author of Second World and Green World: Studies
in Renaissance Fiction-Making, for misreading the Platonic distinction between the physical and
the ideal. According to Spiller, Berger identifies “model worlds” as a “historical novelty” in
early modern thought: “The Renaissance was characterized by the rediscovery of a belief in the
human imagination… [that] leads to the creation of a ‘second-world attitude,’ the desire to live in
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55
Sidney, The Defence of Poesy, sig. C1v.

38
and therefore control a world made by human invention rather than in the ‘first world’ as God,
nature, or the gods have contrived it” (qtd. in Spiller 29).56 For Berger, then, the “physical”
corresponds to a kind of hard truth or objectivity while the “ideal” involves the creation of
imaginary worlds, the province of art. Spiller emphasizes that this distinction emerges from
imposing modern categories on sixteenth-century thought. The belief that description of the
physical world produces “truth” emerges from an acceptance of Aristotelian mimesis—and
corresponds closely with modern scientific methodologies—but Spiller insists that Renaissance
Neoplatonism provided an alternate model, one in which imagination produced truth by actively
creating new worlds and knowledge. This manner of discovering truth avoided what Sidney and
others viewed as a misleading reliance on merely copying the physical world of nature through
scientific description and modeling (as opposed to the Ideal forms that, in Platonic thought, the
physical world merely copies). Spiller presents Nelson Goodman’s Ways of Worldmaking as
offering a more accurate—though still flawed—account of Sidney’s theory of the imagination,
for Goodman emphasizes the active role of “worldmaking” in the production of both scientific
and artistic knowledge yet falls short, in Spiller’s judgment, by demoting the role of mind and
imagination in his insistence that there is an unmistakable distinction between knowing and
doing, or, as Goodman puts it, that “a broad mind is no substitute for hard work” (qtd. in Spiller
31).57
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Nelson Goodman, Ways of Worldmaking (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co., 1978). Goodman further
argues: “Moreover, while readiness to recognize alternative worlds may be liberating, and suggestive of new
avenues of exploration, a willingness to welcome all worlds build none. Mere acknowledgement of the many
available frames or reference provides us with no map of the motions of heavenly bodies; acceptance of the
eligibility of alternative bases produces no scientific theory or philosophical system; awareness of varied ways of
seeing paints no pictures” (21). Too much knowledge might take away from the liberty of imagination.
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However, Sidney and Cavendish would argue that a broad mind does hard work.58 Spiller
credits the Florentine Neoplatonist’s promotion of Plotinus as the source for Sidney’s view that
art transcends the merely physical forms of nature. Given the astonishing breadth of Sidney’s
reading there are additional probable sources that I will discuss later, but Spiller is correct that
Plotinus is certainly chief among them.59 As Sidney argues in The Defence of Poesy, then, poetry
does not misrepresent or deviate from nature, but create more nature to represent and to be
represented. Or, as Spiller describes it, “art offers an alternative, competing image that may come
closer to ideas themselves the further it departs from the physical reality of nature” (Spiller 32).
To accurately recover Sidney’s mindset requires hard work to escape the modern mentality that
equates fidelity in representation with objectivity and rationality and a lack thereof with
subjectivity and irrationality, but doing so encourages a profound meditation on representational
fidelity and truth as well as the active role that mind and imagination play in all human
perception--thus tainting all claims of objectivity. For Sidney, imagination is not the source, as
Spiller describes it, of “irrational mysticism,” but instead, again in Spiller’s words, Sidney
believes poetry produces truth because “its primary epistemological connection is with the ideal
world rather than with a sensible world that is imperfect and contingent” (32). I would argue that
the creative and subjective mind is the “broad mind” that does hard work. Indeed, I am aware
that this kind of comparative argument or debate about the quality—or the merit—of the artistic
mind versus scientific knowledge would easily sound misleading and unjust. “Hard work,” I

The similarity between Sidney’s description of the divine power of “vates” in The Defence of Poesy and
Cavendish’s description of augurers in The Blazing World is striking as they both represent the figure of a foreseer
or prophet, someone who can manifest one world into the other by the power of a “broad” mind. Poets do this by
writing while augurers do this by reading. I discuss Cavendish’s use of augurers in the next chapter.
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According to Spiller, Plotinus declared in the Enneads that “the arts are not to be slighted on the ground
that they create by imitation of natural objects, for, to begin with, these natural objects are themselves imitations . . .
but go back to the Ideas [logous] from which nature derives, and furthermore, that much of their work is all their
own; they are moulders of beauty and where nature is lacking” (qtd. in Spiller 32).
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should specify here, is a kind of intellectual work that involves actual creation or materialization
of what had theretofore only existed in the abstract, as an idea—as distinguished from a more
basic and one-for-one act of mimesis. This is a subtle point that needs more explanation: whereas
science often only produces objective and rational knowledge through relatively static models,
art relies on broad minds working hard to connect human reality—“the sensible world”—to “the
ideal world” and transform one knowledge to the other, thus potentially accomplishing more
“hard” work than the scientific mind. And to be specific, the transformation from “one
knowledge to the other” I mentioned above takes place between the minds of artists and those of
audience. The transformation is both epistemological and pedagogical, conceptual but practical,
further developing a private practice of learning into a shared, social virtue. Needless to say, the
popularization of book publishing and accessibility of literary creations bolstered the expansion
of private artistic creativity, making the artist a social and public source of artistic creativity and
establishing a novel dialog between the artist and the audience. The social and communicable
aspect of poetry could not be found in the lone scientist’s lab during the sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries—scientific discovery and knowledge remained private and never fully
optimized even when they were publically announced and acknowledged.
Thus, as I will discuss in a later chapter, Robert Hooke’s Micrographia proves to be one
of the novel scientific publications of his day, attempting to expand the private epistemological
stage of science into a public, social place by incorporating pictorial images and poetic details
into his study. And it is also significant to point out that both Sidney and Hooke describe the
capability of their epistemological device—poetry and science, or more specifically, poetic verse
and the microscopic lens—to be theology-inspired and theologically serviceable, arguing that
their devices can be used to produce a broad and universal kind of epistemology espoused by
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Renaissance humanists. Such wholesome and expandable knowledge is applicable to a wide
array of social, educational, or political situations, offering a pedagogically operative
epistemology encouraging its audience to be mobile in action as well as thoughts. Thus, the
godly work is not just knowing what is morally good but doing what is morally good. For
instance, if Astrophil’s love poetry in Sidney’s Astrophil and Stella is good enough to inspire
Stella to fall in love with him, then Sidney’s poetry, by illustrating and materializing that change
and making it available to the reader, succeeds in being mobile in both actions and thoughts.
Sidney argues that poetry is on the side of religion, and poetic imagination offers nothing that is
ominous towards imaginative methods of explaining theology. Hooke believes that microscopic
details reveal a godly message of harmony and beauty in the design of organisms. Knowledge
and learning exist emphatically to serve moral and teleological goals in Sidney’s Defence and
even in his Sonnet sequence, for writing poetry is an epistemologically mutating and
expanding—thus climbing and optimizing—experience. However, in Hooke’s Micrographia, as
we shall see, the moralizing theological inspiration from microscopic details becomes the main
act as well as the message of the scientist’s observation, leaving very little room for the readers
to use their own imagination to expand the knowledge provided for them. In other words, the
imagination needed to process a poetic representation as a divine representation involves much
more intellectual expansion than the logic that defines the information provided through
scientific discovery as a divine creation. Climbing up to “the ideal world” from “a sensible
world” requires a broad mind and hard work, and scientific reductionism—of both an ontological
and methodological sort— would not only object to the broadness but also suspect the distance
between ideal and reality, viewing the former as unreal and imagined, thus irrational.

42
That a poet can get closer to the ideal world through his work also suggests Sidney is
mindful of Plato’s hierarchically and holistically structured world. In a Platonic world,
knowledge should serve a vehicle to carry an individual to the greater and higher end that is
closer to the most moral and truthful. Everything physical and corporal in a Platonic world, then,
aspires to be better and higher, closer to the idea of incorporeal, away from physical. The
amorous love wants to be a better love, as it lacks the spiritual unity and truth that is beyond the
physical beauty. Most Neoplatonic love sonnets in the sixteenth century thus demonstrate the
ladder of love. With their knowledge gained from studies and practices, Sidney indicates, all the
sciences and arts should aim for the one single end of well doing, which goes beyond knowing
well:
all these are but serving sciences, which, as they have each a private end in
themselves, so yet are they all directed to the highest end of the mistressknowledge, by the Greeks called architectonike, which stands (as I think) in the
knowledge of a man’s self, in the ethnic and politic consideration, with the end of
well doing and not of well knowing only—even as the saddler’s next end is to
make a good saddle, but his father’s end to serve a nobler faculty, which is
horsemanship […] So that, the ending of all earthly learning being virtuous
action, those skills, that most serve to bring forth that, have a most just title to be
princes over all the rest.60
Most notably, Sidney insists here that the most moralistic and truthful end for an epistemological
journey in all the sciences and arts should be “the end of well doing and not of well knowing
only.”61 Therefore, horsemanship, as Sidney mentions in the beginning of Defence, should be
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more than just an end in itself, for it should provide the knowledge that improves the soldier’s
art, which serves the statesman’s art; the end goal is to achieve the most virtuous action. In
sonnet 5 of Astrophil and Stella, Sidney ponders the Neoplatonic doctrines opposed to romantic
love: “True, that true beauty virtue is indeed,/ Whereof this beauty can be but a shade,/ Which
elements with mortal mixture breed” (lines 9-11). I would argue that the action—ascension—is
already part of the Neoplatonic course of knowing, and a great work of art conjoined with
knowledge is supposed to help the mind to be moved and delivered upward, closer to “true
beauty.” Astrophil does describe Stella’s physical beauty that arouses romantic love as a kind of
particular love that is far from true beauty. Pay attention to how Sidney uses a singular
demonstrative pronoun “this” to signify the physical proximity and particularity of what it refers
to—“this beauty” that Astrophil is fallen in love with is the body, “a shade.” Stella’s physical
beauty is merely a shadow—“shade”—of inner virtue that embodies a transcendent and immortal
idea of beauty. Sensual love will only carry Astrophil near the shade of her virtue, not her inner
virtue veiled and shaded by her physical beauty. Only through the hard labor of transcending
physical love and reaching up to the state of spiritual love can Astrophil get closer to her inner
virtue and true beauty. The poet writing love sonnets should convert his physical love into
spiritual love, and this transformation should occur inside art as well as outside it as the art
should create a better, ideal reality, rendering the poem able to transform the reader as well.
Knowledge that doesn’t create movement has little significance in the Platonic world order
because knowledge itself alone isn’t anywhere close to truth—however, the application of
knowledge can create movement closer to ideal beauty and truth. One way to apply such
knowledge and create truth that is more virtuous and ideal than reality, for Sidney, is through
poetry. A poet’s recreation of nature surpasses its original, as it has been transformed into a
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much more improved and specialized form of art, which “offers an alternative, competing image
that may come closer to ideas themselves the further it departs from the physical reality of
nature,” as Spiller describes it.62
As I mentioned at the start of this chapter, Sidney’s persistent call that poetry should
inspire action—specific, virtuous action—in the reader has served to make reader-response
modes of analysis particularly valuable in discussions of his work, especially since Sidney
differentiates poetry from history or philosophy based on this ability. In The Shape of Things
Known: Sidney’s Apology in Its Philosophical Tradition, Forrest G. Robinson explains that “The
assumption that knowledge should inform action gives rise to the central argument of the
Apology—that poetry is the best teacher of that which is most important in action, namely
virtue” (98). Robinson examines Sidney’s definition of poetry as a “speaking picture” and claims
that poetic imitation reigns supreme precisely because of this ability to offer pictorial depictions
of ideas to match the philosopher’s verbal definitions: “Sidney was convinced that moral
abstractions have the greatest pedagogical efficacy when they are made visible to the mind’s eye,
and not when set forth in verbal definitions” (98-99). Robinson’s argument is effective here,
especially for the moral outcome of poetry that Sidney argues for in The Defence of Poesy. The
picture and pictorial in verse, after all, strikes the mind visually—as it is visible—while the nonpoetic word strikes the mind with ideas; a poet can turn words into ideas, but these are ideas not
“visible,” but more like abstractions, words turning into non-concrete concepts only visible to the
mind. And that conceptualization striking the mind with the enhanced power of pictorial
representation—or literary and figural, that is—will inspire the reader to act upon the moral and
virtuous concepts gained from reading poetry. Sidney’s “speaking picture” signifies an artistic
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expression accomplishing the pictorial representation of ideas, and Robinson’s model manages to
reassert a relatively direct model role for mimesis: “poetry is a kind of representational painting
in words, an art of language in which there is a premium on vivid descriptions of external nature”
(99).
It is interesting to note that Sidney’s idea that words can both create virtuous action and
paint an image through a process of abstraction modifies the Neoplatonic dualism that separates
and places incorporeal over corporeal reality. Though based on Neoplatonic dualistic
psychology, the Neoplatonic values are modified to support Sidney’s definition of poetry as
“speaking picture.” Robinson points out Sidney depends “upon the traditions of visual
epistemology for much of the theory of the Apology,” but the work contains innovations of his
own: “That ideas could be seen was the standard assumption during the sixteenth century, but
that they could be seen in a poem was something new” (100). Although Sidney claims that poets
“imitate the inconceivable excellencies of God,” Sidney also argues that there should be “a firm
distinction between philosophy and theology” (101). The distinction Sidney draws between the
realm of nature and divine could have been a “lip service” to the religious misomousoi—as
Sidney terms the poetry haters—but one must still wonder how Sidney makes his argument for
poetry’s divine capability. What makes Sidney’s argument different from the Neoplatonic
beliefs? Robinson describes:
This dichotomy of nature and grace, with the concomitant division between
poetry (“popular” philosophy) and theology, stems from an epistemological
distinction current among many Renaissance Neoplatonists. The doctrines of
religious Hermeticism, received in Florence during the fifteenth century, had
strong alliances with the dualistic psychology of Platonism and provided the
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highly visualized theory of knowledge which underpins the emblem tradition.
During the sixteenth century these doctrines were influential in a variety of
different forms. Sidney probably encountered magical Hermeticism in John Dee,
who considered himself a Christian magnus. […] Sidney’s translation of Mornay
is concrete evidence that he was familiar with visual epistemology in its explicitly
philosophical form. (101)
Robinson sees the influence of the protestant theologian Philippe de Mornay on Sidney’s
formation of the divine capability of poetry. Mornay’s religious tract—De la Verite—was
saturated with the Platonic epistemology of “double vision, ” which Robinson describes as “one
eye looking toward the phenomenal world and the other toward God’s light within the soul”
(102). Furthermore, in Mornay’s description, God’s grace is written to be read. Since God is
“visibly reflected in nature and . . . the divine image is engraved on the human soul,” even
though the essence of God might be impossible for the human mind to grasp, “the eye of the
mind has the natural power to see God indirectly reflected in the external universe and within the
intellect itself” (Robinson 102). Convinced by Mornay’s theology, Sidney’s belief that poetry
provides a visual epistemology similar to the natural vision ensuing from the sight of God’s
reflection is an important point that helps us understand why the epistemological visualization is
such a unique property of poetry. The reason that engages and inspires the human mind to see the
ideas in poetry is something divine, Robinson suggests. Even though such a connection might
blur the distinction between the two different realms—the realm of grace and nature—still the
human mind uses Reason, which is the gift of God, to understand both realms. Poetry, then,
becomes the instrument of God, beyond a pedagogical tool of epistemology but more connected
to theology in its way of inspiring the human mind not only to see but more importantly to

47
appreciate God’s creations and their beauty. Although in my discussion of Sidney, Cavendish,
and Finch I will consider this connection of poetic creation and spiritual seeing in more broadly
philosophical terms, my later discussion of Milton’s “spiritual sight” will explore the connection
in more literal terms.
As I have intimated earlier, the idea that the object of human desire can produce
knowledge, which further encourages the human will to love, is one of the main themes of
Sidney’s Astrophil and Stella. And Sidney doesn’t stop there, as the sonnet sequence embodies
the ladder of love, delivering the poet as well as the reader to the higher sense and understanding
of love. This is the most unique and spiritual capability of poetry; poetry can deliver—as it
“bringeth things forth”—the image of God. The subtle but crucial significance of this claim is
that poetry can imitate the creative act associated with God. Poetry can take us to God through
the image it creates, but it is not the image itself that makes poetry godly or close to God; rather,
it is the transportive act that turns a verbally rendered image into a mentally apprehended—and
theologically indicated—experience of something divine. What is more important is that poetry
alone cannot accomplish this transport—it of course requires the participation of audience to
fully catalyze and complete the act. The reader of poetry thus becomes a crucial part of poetry’s
function of moral integrity and effect.
Providing an insightful reading of Sidney’s moral argument of poetry in Sidney’s Poetics:
Imitating Creation, Michael Mack connects the poetic re-creative force with divine creative
force as he examines Sidney’s claim in Defence that “with the force of divine breath” a poet
“bringeth things forth.”63 Mack explains this famous passage by arguing that Sidney “follows the
method of his humanist predecessors and begins not with the beginning but with the end of
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poetry” (Mack 111). Again, it is important to understand that to bring “things forth” with “the
force of divine breath” alludes to the connection between divine creativity and poetic creativity.64
Sidney also argues in Defence: “But they that with quiet judgments will look a little deeper into
it, shall find the end and working of it such as, being rightly applied, deserves not to be scourged
out of the church of God.”65 Mack takes this even further, mindful of the religiously-inspired
moral attacks Sidney was working against, insisting that it is not just the cause of this creative
force that makes poetry moral, but the end of poetry that justifies “the poet not by what he
receives but by what he delivers” (111). Therefore, Sidney’s argument is not about the cause of
poetry but instead the outcome of poetry, buttressing the moral merit of poetry by transferring
attention from its creation to its future outcome, which can be easily outside of poetry: “the
mystery of creativity is seen most clearly in what the poem originates in the lives of readers”
(Mack 110). The godly work of poetry is not merely contained in the poem itself, then, but is
more accurately measured—as it is a transportive act—in the godly turn in the reader’s mind.
Before addressing the more specific concern of how the diverging Biblical hermeneutics
of Catholics and Protestants shaped Sidney’s poetics, a few more general observations are in
order. Sidney clearly participates in the Christian effort to justify the pagan elements of poetry.
When poetry’s pagan origins became the target of religious criticism, the supporters of poetry
found it necessary to establish a theological merit of poetry wrung out of an essential inner and
inherited moral goodness that was naturally of poetry. As Mack points out, the idea that the
impact of poetry can do something good to the morals of the reader instead of doing harm was a
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carefully constructed argument used not only in poetry’s defense but also in the defense of
humanist theology:
Endeavoring to justify poetry vis-à-vis theology, Boccacio and Petrarch argued
that neither the subject matter nor the effect of poetry was opposed to theology.
Accordingly, they did not emphasize the creative origin of the poem but rather
its not ungodly effect. Poetry’s emulation of theology, deeply embedded in the
humanist poetic tradition that Sidney inherited and advanced, emphasizes above
all else the good moral effect of the poem. In arguing that poetry, just as with
theology, can lead an audience to God, Sidney follows the method of his
humanist predecessors and begins not with the beginning but with the end of
poetry.66
As Mack further points out, both Boccaccio and Petrarch believed that poetry’s pagan origin or
its “ungodly effect” had to be eclipsed by the moral effect of the poem. Thus, Boccaccio finds
the teleological Christian moralistic message to be “hidden in pagan mythology” while Petrarch
“structures his oration as a sermon, while filling it with quotations not from the Bible but from
Virgil and other classical sources” (111). Comparing “poetry to theology” is a typical method
humanists used to “provide that neither the subject matter nor the effect of poetry was immoral”
(111).
To this end, Sidney relentlessly pushes the faultless moral grounding of his poem’s
subject. Falling in love is, according to Sidney’s love sonnets and in the Neoplatonist sense, a
property of intelligence, action propelled by a most virtuous “learned” mind that sees true beauty
and falls in love with the most virtuous; as Sidney explains in Sonnet 16 of Astrophil and Stella:
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Mine eyes (shall I say curst or blest?) beheld
Stella; now she is nam’d, need more be said?
In her sight I a lesson new have spell’d,
I now have learn’d Love right, and learn’d even so,
As who by being poisoned doth poison know. (lines 10-14)
The kind of love that a learned Astrophil says that he has found is indeed visually oriented,
though the sight of Stella that fills him with “the restless fire” is the opposite of what Astrophil
describes as the physical, obvious beauty that attracts the physical eye first but doesn’t fully
satisfy his desire. Astrophil confesses that he was “apt to like” obvious “beauties” that “were of
many carats fine” (line 1-2). A learned man not only being taught and inspired by poetry but
most importantly also being able to create his own poetry, Astrophil realizes that the love he
used to feel is neither real nor good—Astrophil doesn’t have “those restless flames in [him]”
though he used to think that he “was full of thee” (5). Willing to better himself and his poetic
invention, Astrophil desires something more virtuous than a mere physical beauty, “which others
said did make their souls to pine” (6). To be exact, Astrophil is in the state of wanting,
unsatisfied with the accessible and obvious beauty—“many carats fine”—and the shallow
inspirations it incites. Learning what true love is, simply put, is a challenging lesson because
Astrophil must contemplate and “pine” in order to attain it. It is also equally important that
“Love right” that Astrophil espouses is a kind of love that “others” have experienced— “which
others said” that it made “their souls pine”—but Astrophil hasn’t until he meets and falls in love
with Stella. The poet starts his artistic invention “in her sight,” which the poet “a lesson new
have spell’d” (12). The right kind of love Astrophil desires is life changing, as its lessons can be
fatal: “I now have learn’d Love right, and learn’d even so,/ As who by being poisoned doth
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poison know” (13-14). The Neoplatonic moral ground and convention of virtuous love teaches
the poet how to be honorable and heroic through unrequited love.
One senses in Sidney the same philosophy that led Cavendish to criticize Robert Hooke’s
“passive” method of recording scientific truth in Micrographia, the method that ignored the role
of human imagination and ostensibly possessed the ability to observe and record—as in his
drawing of the eye of a fly—an accurate and directly representational “copy” of material
phenomena. Spiller emphasizes that Sidney viewed the poet as “maker,” a term that deflects
attention from the artifact produced—the poem—and recenters it on poetry as an act producing
knowledge. In this definition, Sidney reverses modern views of the “sciences,” putting poetry
above the others because it produces truth where the others merely counterfeit it; the poet “doth
grow in effect another nature,” whereas the scientist— as Hooke demonstrates— is limited by an
allegiance to the project of supposed representational fidelity. Spiller sums up Sidney’s position
nicely: “poetry makes while other sciences only copy” (38).
Although “theology” up till this point in my discussion has often been an unsatisfyingly
undifferentiated term, in fact the specific currents of theological thought contesting for
intellectual space in Sidney’s England—and Europe as a whole—play a fascinating role in
Sidney’s poetics and open up very fertile comparisons with later subjects in my study. As
Timothy Rosendale argues in the introduction to Liturgy and Literature in the Making of
Protestant England, historiographical studies of the English Reformation have swung wildly
between two competing poles, one which believes that “England was a fertile seedbed for
reform, and that Protestant ideas took root quickly, deeply, and widely,” the other that “the latemedieval Church was vitally alive, foundational to English culture, and beloved by the vast
majority of English people, who found its ritual, doctrine, and institutional presence to be
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profoundly satisfying.”67 Much is at stake for literary studies in reconciling the two views, the
former elevating the “word” to almost iconic status in its emphasis on a hermeneutics of literal
representation and the latter retaining a more richly figural conception of language in which
words combine to form images, which in turn lead the reader from the literal to the Ideal. Partly
because contemporary culture celebrates the literal—especially in the triumphal and demystifying claims of technology and science—it is easy to mistake the path by which we got
here as a steady progression, a view which, among other things, as Rosendale also points out,
inscribes contemporary prejudices into literary studies and almost completely removes religion
from the process. Also, however, such a view flattens “Protestantism” to a homogenous force
bearing few distinguishing marks even between the Continent and England. For example, despite
the undeniable insights Peter Harrison shares in his The Bible, Protestantism, and the Rise of
Natural Science—a work that has influenced me greatly in other areas of my study—Harrison
tends to view, as he describes it, an “innovative. . .insistence on the priority of the literal sense”
as the earliest central and distinguishing tenet of a seemingly undifferentiated Reformed and
Anglican Protestantism.68 Certainly, all Protestants were united against the totalizing claims of
Rome, but even in England neither side attained permanent ascendancy:
It is no surprise that the opposing parties in the Civil War defined themselves
centrally in terms of textual affiliation. In fact, it might be useful to rethink the
Civil War as less a matter of old dichotomies of Crown/ Parliament or court/
country and more a conflict between the competing social, religious, and political
visions of a Bible party and a Prayerbook party.69
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In the near-century span between the drafting of the Book of Common Prayer in 1549 and the
start of the War, the theological debate surrounding its centralized authorizing of a more figural
reading of scripture, as opposed to a radically individualistic and literal one, helps us understand
a wide assortment of thinkers and writers who were not explicitly connected to religious writing.
Chief among these is Sidney, who, in The Defence of Poesy, demonstrates a clear awareness of
the competing hermeneutic claims established within competing methodologies of biblical
exegesis in his day. The reader must avoid, however, a simple diagrammatic representation of
figurality versus literality that ascribes one or the other as an emblem of a particular religious
group and equates the increase of one as necessarily effecting the decrease of the other. In fact,
both “Protestant” and “Catholic” theologies exhibited degrees of both, particularly in their
conception of the Eucharist. Here, indeed, the two sides flip, which further complicates the
conceptual model necessary to make sense of the interaction of figurality and Renaissance
literary production. In order to insist on the doctrine of transubstantiation, where the bread and
wine become the literal body and blood of Christ, the Catholic church forwarded a completely
literal reading of the ceremony and the scriptural event behind it. Protestants, however, replaced
the literal transformation with a symbolic act where the bread and wine represented the body and
blood of Christ, either retaining a “real presence” as in Calvin or becoming entirely symbolic as
in Zwingli. One thing that is certain is that the consistent discourse surrounding the need to
distinguish between competing modes of representation in the Eucharist fostered valuable
conversations about signifiers and how they signified both in the Renaissance and in
contemporary literary study.
To be perfectly clear about the basis for my argument, I do believe that the rise of
Protestantism led to a changed relationship between reader and text--and observer and object—
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that stressed increasing levels of literalness. According to Harrison, the emerging Protestant
hermeneutics involved a “collapse of the allegorical interpretation of texts, for a denial of the
legitimacy of allegory is in essence a denial of the capacity of things to act as signs.”70 In one
sense, the Book of Common Prayer (hereafter, BCP) was incredibly literal, for the “Black
Rubric,” added to 1552 Prayer Book during printing, omitted in 1559, then restored in 1662,
advises that despite kneeling during communion, “that is not meant thereby, that any adoration is
done, or ought to be done, either unto the Sacramental bread or wine there bodily received, or
unto any real or essential presence there being of Christ’s natural flesh and blood. For as
concerning the sacramental bread and wine, they remain still in their very natural substances, and
therefore may not be adored, for that were Idolatry to be abhorred of all faithful Christians. And
as concerning the natural body and blood of our Saviour Christ, they are in heaven and not
here.”71 The peculiar publication history of this passage—briefly appearing, then disappearing,
then reappearing (with changes) 100 years later—demonstrates an important aspect of the
Anglican communion; the lack of a really specific conception of the Eucharist, outside of the
brief appearance of the Black Rubric, intentionally left the representational nature of the
sacramental bread and wine open for interpretation for each participant.72
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Just as the symbolic representation of Christ’s body and blood celebrated during each
service accomplished a physical lifting up of the participant to heaven through the hermeneutic
negotiation between representation and the reality of Christ’s power and presence in heaven, so
too did poetry possess the same power to lead the reader to a greater awareness of his erected
wit. Rosendale describes: “the English Reformation (and especially the BCP) had replaced a
belief in the immanent sacramental presence of God himself with a newly stressed faith in the
power of representations and their faithful interpretation to define, express, and transform our
relation to the divine.”73 Once the special interpretive challenges of the Protestant Communion—
especially as presented in the BCP—are considered, Sidney’s poetics correctly emerge as less of
a “middle ground” between Catholic and Protestant hermeneutics and more the result of a very
astute awareness of the philosophical and theological ramifications of an efficacious Eucharist
that involved, in some fashion or other, merely a representation of Christ. I argued earlier that
Sidney found history and philosophy less useful than poetry because they are tied to “what is,”
largely describing things as they actually are, whereas the poet has access to truths far greater
than mere recapitulations of past events or universal principles. That is only part of the story,
however; Sidney’s theological vision permeated all aspects of his writing, so that learning had
but one goal: “This purifying of wit, this enriching of memory, enabling of judgment, and
enlarging of conceit, which commonly we call learning, under what name soever it come forth or
to what immediate end soever it be directed, the final end is to lead and draw us to as high a
perfection as our degenerate souls, made worse by their clay lodgings, can be capable of.”74
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Learning is a spiritual, transformative experience for both the poet and the reader, and Sidney
believes poetry offers the most apt “learning” experience, better than history or philosophy,
through its “purifying of wit, this enriching of memory, enabling of judgment, and enlarging of
conceit.”
Rosendale’s analysis leads us to a more sensitive and nuanced awareness of how words
and representation function in Sidney’s creative process. Lamenting “O absent presence, Stella is
not here,” the poet opens the Sonnet 106 from Astrophil and Stella. Though briefly suspended by
the instant release of the long diphthong sound of “O,” the deliverance of Stella’s name brings
the poem back to the pronounced “absent” subject again, thus subverting the poet’s description
of “absent” Stella by making the description obsolete. Although the poet says she is “not here”
and is an “absent presence” on top of his emphatic, echoing “O” that opens the line, this sonnet
immediately brings itself to the reason why the poet must write, and most importantly, what the
poet is writing about (Sonnet 106, line 1). As soon as the poet says that Stella is not here, Stella
shows back up, in our—the readers’—mind as well as in the line even though the poet exclaims
out loud that she is missing. The poet cannot seem to match what he says with what happens
with his words—what he says about his creation doesn’t reflect what he ends up creating.
Perhaps it is too obvious to suggest that writing poetry is what is on the poet’s mind in
Sidney’s Astrophil and Stella, but the more significant point I am trying to make here that
frequently gets ignored is that the poet cannot trust the means of his own art because she—the
object of his attention—constantly flees away from him; her “figured forth” representation
through poetry is restlessly transforming and moving, as long as she is being discussed through
poetic language. And I might add here that if Stella were the subject of a scientist’s examination
with a magnifying glass or microscope, she would be examined and discussed in parts, shapes,
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functions, etc., as if she were a material. I would suggest that Sidney instructs us that that kind of
looking in and projecting—piercing and magnifying—is indeed a limited way of representing or
articulating any subject because all it does is make it easy for us to see additional matter, which
will still have to be studied through the human imagination and intelligence.75 Furthermore, the
subject of writing poetry is undoubtedly in question from the very beginning of the sonnet
sequence, whereas the voice of a scientist describing scientific inquiry, such as examining a fruit
fly or looking at stars, would proceed in the opposite direction, always towards certainty and
authority. Writing—more specifically, writing good poetry—is compared to a figure of
imperviousness, inaccessibility, and distance. She is both literally and figuratively opaque as the
poet describes how she is often slipping away and hence absent in words and on the page. She
appears to be associated with an abundance of ideas—but these ideas keep reminding the poet of
her absence, further affirming her inaccessibility as the beloved. Unfortunately, for the poet,
Stella signifies the uncertainty and inevitable hardship of writing poetry. The image of the poet’s
struggle with writing good poetry mirrors the image of an unobtainable Stella, as she can be
present only as a verbal referent, “O absent presence, Stella.”76 When Stella is figured forth
through comparisons, she becomes the uttered, written, and read figure, but still not the real
Stella. The mind begins to negotiate with her physical absence by uttering her name or writing
her name or erasing it, as the poet does in the beginning of the sonnet sequence.
Stella must remain absent and distant from the poet so that he can figure her absence out
and articulate her absence forth. The presence of his words takes the place of her absence, as is
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plainly shown in Sonnet 106. To say that the distance between the signified and the signifier is
inevitable is an understatement—this distance is paramount for the art to be kinetic and embody
transformation. This word-to-action transformation is the inspiration for the kind of Neoplatonic
instructive and transformative learning that Rosendale describes in his book; if teaching the
pupils how to read the Bible will train the entire nation to become God’s chosen blessed
kingdom, then it does prove “England’s fundamental sense of identity as a nation at worship”:
Both the Prayerbook Eucharist and the Sidneian poetic insist on the absolutely
critical centrality of figural understanding as a means of spanning the gap between
real and ideal, earth and heaven. Both of these forms of truth must be accessed
and understood in terms of signification, not absolute identity; in other words,
both insist on a conscious engagement with systems of signs that are not (and
cannot be) identical to their referents. And both view this mode of interpretation
as one with profound transformative potential, which offers the possibility (in
differing degrees, of course) of negating the nasty effects of sin itself.77
The reformist church hoped to re-design and re-birth the nation as it trained its faithful Christians
to plough through the veiled metaphors and symbols to find the signified, God. Sidney’s example
suggests that the signified referent should remain veiled and distanced away from the signifying
signs. As Rosendale asserts above, “the gap between real and ideal, earth and heaven” must
remain and more importantly be kept far enough away for a more transformative experience of
“spanning” to take place. This is why “absolute identity” won’t do--God’s true meanings were to
be earned through diligent, hard work, through “a conscious engagement with systems of signs
that are not (and cannot be) identical to their referents.” This antithetical, paradoxical distance
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that Rosendale calls “the gap between real and ideal, earth and heaven” is, however, paramount
in creating the relationship between the signifier and the signified, the word and the message,
and this construction also resonates with the antithetical relationship between the poet and his
art.78
Is it impossible for the poet to create poetry and make his poetry love him back
simultaneously? This is a familiar dilemma—a familiar synopsis of those popular parables
between the subject and the subjected, the thesis and the antithesis, the lover and the loved, the
parent and the child, and the creators and the creatures, or finally, the God and His men. God’s
true message has to be earned—through ploughing, working through bad seasons, sorting good
from bad seeds, recognizing patterns and significance transcending the fidelity of accurate
physical description or narrative:
Much of Christ’s teaching, Sidney observes, is in the form of self-consciously
fictional parables, which should not be mistaken for historical accounts (this
would cripple their moral significance by limiting them to the amoral realm of
mere events); these poetic teachings carry truth by representing and embodying
moral ideas, which are both created and received through the “imaginative and
judging power.” Sidney implies that Christ, in his role as teacher, deliberately
chose the role of poet over those of historian and philosopher.79
The “self-consciously fictional” qualities of parables resemble the often incredibly self-conscious
and self-antagonizing characteristics portrayed in Sidney’s Astrophil and Stella. Without
working through “other’s leaves” and studying “Inventions,” the poet will never gain Stella’s
affection: “I sought fit words to paint the blackest face of woe,/ Studying inventions fine, her
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wits to entertain,/ Oft turning others’ leaves, to see if thence would flow/ Some fresh and fruitful
showers upon my sunburned brain” (lines 5-8). Most parables and biblical allegorical narratives
do appear constructed specifically to present layered meanings, with realism or accurate mimesis
always a secondary concern—if at all—and present guides that must be intuitively interpreted
and figured forth if they are to serve their intended purpose. For example, the children in a
narrative might despise and blame their creators for bringing them to the imperfect, sinful, or
painful conditions they are in, feeling as if these conditions are interminable; unlike their
creators, the children are still too mercurial and malleable to see that time is constant and fleeting
as promised, that they are already anticipating in the course of their universe’s existing and
changing, that this fall—both literally and figuratively of course—is necessary for their growth,
and that at some point during this fall they are transported to a more ontologically stable ground.
Stella then embodies the fissure in the poet’s wounded heart, or “the gap between real
and ideal, earth and heaven.” But let us not forget, the figurative language describing her
absence—the very sign, the very word that embodies her absence, “Stella”—is inaugurated and
uttered out loud because of the emotional rupture induced by Stella’s inaccessibility. No “figured
forth” or “ideal” signs of Stella exist unless the signified, the subjected, the longed after “real”
object is “not here.” Stella, the signified, should not be here/there together with the signifiers that
describe her—“O absent presence, Stella is not here.” Yet Rosendale argues, just as the diligent
and faithful followers will read and study the Book of Common Prayer and search for the true
meaning of God, a great poet will not give up his process of “figuring forth” his beloved, his
quest to articulate truth in poetic representations that offer many more truths.
It is “the transforming power of the figurative,” upon which Sidney anchors and builds
his argument that poetry functions just as effectively in its instructive mission as parables, and,
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furthermore, “Sidney adduces no less a fellow poet and moral instructor than Christ himself.”80
Indeed, Sidney observes God’s word as the inspired word of poetry, and even more, the divine
inspiration for building a nation’s identity in The Defence of Poesy:
Since then poetrie is of all humane learning the most ancient, & of most fatherly
antiquitie, as from whence other learnings have taken their beginnings, since it is
so universal that no learned nation doth despise it, nor barbarous nation is without
it: since both Roman and Greek gave divine names unto it: the one of
“prophesying,” the other of “making.” And that indeede, that name of “making” is
fit for him, considering that whereas other arts retain themselves within their
subject, and receive as it were, their beeing from it, the poet onely brings his own
stuffe, and doeth not learne a conceite out of a matter, but makes matter for a
conceite.81
If Christ has “vouchsafed to use the flowers of [poetry],” poetic language using metaphors and
symbols may generate many more “figured forth” images that are “out of a matter,” far away
from “uncleanness.” Sidney of course has to defend poetry’s language from the sinful, fallen
human reality, hence the argument that poetry is “vouchsafed” by Christ—since Christ used it,
and because the parables use poetic metaphors and symbols, poetry is expiated and excused from
being the fruit of man’s fallen will and instinct, instead becoming one of the means for the fallen
to find God’s truth. Furthermore, as Sidney argues for poetry’s virtuous educational merit, above
and in contrast to history and philosophy, he points out poetry’s kinetic and malleable quality
that makes poetry more adaptable to the change of time and space and thus able to deliver the
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knowledge that is more fit to teach what is more timelessly virtuous.82 Poetry is the means not
only to teach virtuous actions but also inspire the reader to act virtuously by providing the
physical place—or site—for the readers to plough through the veiled metaphors by persistent and
intelligent reading.
Poetry is begotten and constituted under a paradox demanding that, to exist, it must keep
the distance between the Ideal and real. For a poet, “figuring forth” is an obstinately lonesome
process, but it is this self-doubting and effacing process that enables the poet to keep striving for
the poetic greatness that might also help him win Stella’s love. That returning love is, after all,
the end goal for Astrophil; the creator wants his audience to appreciate his creation at the end of
his or her generative course. That generative course cannot exist without the heartbreaking
fissure between Astrophil and Stella, or the signifier and signified in the representation begotten
by the figurative language. The writer always watches his creations departing, already moving
into the distance, waving backwards. Sidney writes in Sonnet 106: “O absent presence, Stella is
not here;/ False flattering hope, that with so fair a face/ Bare me in hand, that in this orphan
place/ Stella, I say my Stella, should appear.”83 All the poet can do is keep calling, keep writing,
with “False flattering Hope” that Stella will return, but this hope is already conditioned with a
qualifier--“false”--that reminds the poet about the figurative assurance that Stella “is not here,”
the proof of Stella’s “absent presence” on the paper, “this orphan place.”84 In other words,
poetry, if truly good, can make Stella appear. Is Astrophil comparing poetry to alchemy?
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If the absence of Stella is what the poet is constantly left with—“with so fair a face/ Bare
me in hand, that in this orphan place”— and that “absence” embodies the proof of the poet’s
heartbreaking experience of writing/begetting, then it is her absence that resolutely lead us to a
poetic “figuring forth.” As Rosendale also writes: “Given poetry’s moral goals, this ‘figuring
forth’ carries an important double (one might even say sacramental) sense in Sidney’s argument:
morality and virtue are figured forth not only in the fictional text but in turn, in the attentive
reader as well.”85 This is the giving, transformative power, and even more specifically, the moral
practicality of poetry that is capable of mutability; good metaphors can make something appear
and reappear, turn words into a moving picture as they endow life “to lifeless things in his well
liked similes,” move someone’s mind so they will fall in love, or inspire someone to learn how to
decipher metaphors and become better readers of the world and its representations.86 Sidney’s
“purifying of wit, this enriching of memory, enabling of judgment, and enlarging of conceit,
which commonly we call learning” cannot occur without the antithetical antagonizing course of
self-reflection and effacement, which makes the poetry writing and poetry reading into a
transformative experience, “a discourse of imagination and self-improvement, capable of
mitigating to some degree our sinful condition and leading us on toward the good.”87 Such
metamorphosis comes from a kind of self-reflective learning initiated by looking inwardly and
fueled by self-purification, -annihilation, and -reformation, which, according to Sidney, cannot
occur without “the inward light each mind hath in itself is as good as a philosopher’s book.”

85

Rosendale 139.
Aristotle, On Rhetoric, 248. Also, as I explained in the Introduction to the dissertation, metaphors begin
with comparison and contrast of two things, and without the difference and the scale to measure these differences,
we would have a very limited way of representing the world.
87
Sidney, The Defence of Poesy, sig.C4v; Rosendale 137.
86

64
The reductionism at the heart of scientific observation undermines the kind of poetic
observation that moves from universals and “fore-conceits” to specific representations wrought
by “the inward light” and, furthermore, leads to a virtually complete dismissal of the creative and
transformative power of metaphor and figural representation. The remainder of my study will
examine the conflict between the two opposing modes of observation—inward versus outward
sight—and representation—figural versus literal. As I discussed earlier, the next chapter on
Cavendish and Hooke will deal with these contrasts explicitly within the context of an emerging
consensus that scientific observation involved close observation and literal representation. The
debate swirling around the new science, as I will show, ensured that the concerns voiced by
Sidney retained their power and cultural currency long after his death.

3

CHAPTER 3: Cavendish’s “Subtle Observations” and Hooke’s “Neer” Observations

By the means of telescopes, there is nothing so far distant but maybe represented to our view;
and by the help of Microscopes, there is nothing so small, as to escape our inquiry; hence there is
a new visible World discovered to the understanding. By this means the Heavens are open’d, and
a vast number of new Stars, and new Motions, and new Productions appear in them, to which all
the antient Astromers were utterly Strangers. By this the Earth it self, which lyes so neer us,
under our feet, shews quite a new thing to us, and in every little particle of its matter, we now
behold almost as great a variety of Creatures, as we were able before to reckon up in the whole
Universe it self.88
And though they had no knowledge of the Load-stone, or Needle, or pendulous Watches, yet
(which was as serviceable to them) they had subtile observations, and great practice; 89
In this chapter I will examine Robert Hooke’s Micrographia and Margaret Cavendish’s
strenuous objections to Hooke’s work as expressed in her The Description of A New World,
Called The Blazing World and Observations upon Experimental Philosophy. I will argue that
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Cavendish, in a manner much like that of Sidney that I discussed in the preceding chapter,
espouses the power of imagination as a tool for spiritual seeing. Furthermore, Cavendish
believed the poetic imagination and faculties such as “Fancy” and “Fiction” able to negate the
threat of modern science, with what she viewed as its false claims of accuracy and proximity to
truth. Cavendish’s claim for “subtile observations” explicitly collides with Hooke’s praise of
“neer” observation; in her poem “It Is Hard to Believe, that there are worlds in this world,”
which I will examine later in this chapter, Cavendish rejects Hooke’s claim for the subtlety of the
microscopic view. In this poem she points out that Hooke’s microscopic view hinges on the
certainty and security of the object under the microscope, but since “Nothing [is] so hard in
Nature,” as Cavendish argues in the poem, Hooke’s microscopic observation cannot grasp the
mutability and uncertainty in Nature.90
For many things our sense dull may scape,
For sense is grosse, not every thing can shape.
So in this World another world may bee,
That we do neither touch, tast, smell, heare, see.
What Eye so cleere is, yet did ever see
Those little Hookes, that in the Load-stone bee,
Which draw hard iron?
As I will show later, Cavendish debunks Hooke’s claim for “subtlety” in microscopic viewing by
arguing what a true subtle observation entails. Hooke’s advocacy for proximity in scientific
observation merely offers, in the passage above, a magnified “shape” but fails to work with the
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observer’s senses to deliver “subtile observations” that could lead the observers to a greater truth
and conceptual clarity.91
Cavendish (1623-1673) lived in a time of great change, none so much as in the field of
science. Cavendish wrote and published thirteen books during her life time, and in most of her
works, whether fiction, plays, poetry, or prose, she continually provides her philosophical
discourse on the advent of early modern science. New technologies were redefining the role of
the “scientist” and would soon send the grand tradition of the “natural philosopher” to the brink
of extinction. Cavendish’s The Description of A New World, Called The Blazing World was first
published in 1666 and then in 1668 as a companion text to her Observations Upon Experimental
Philosophy, and in both The Blazing World and Observations, Cavendish is not at all timid to
express her judgment against early modern science. In Observations, she subverts the efficacy of
magnifying glasses as articulated by Robert Hooke in Micrographia (1665). She acknowledges
Hooke’s work as “the art of Micrography,” rather than calling it the science of micrography, to
express her unequivocal doubt for the efficacy of micrography: “I am confident, that this same
art, with all its instruments, is not able to discover the interior natural motions of any part or
creature of nature.”92 Significantly, Cavendish willfully defines micrography as art. By
identifying micrography as art, not science, she subtly draws attention to the contrasting
definition and use of the two words. According to OED, the word “art” was then defined as more
of a practical skill with less of the denotation of creativity that is more commonly used today: “a
practical application of knowledge” and “something which can be achieved or understood by the
employment of skill and knowledge” (OED, art, n., 3.a). Especially in its early use, the word
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“art” also meant “a body or system of rules serving to facilitate the carrying out of certain
principles” (art, n., 3.a). Meanwhile, “science” signifies “the state or fact of knowing; knowledge
or cognizance of something; knowledge as a personal attribute” (science, n., 1.a). In her
discussion of Hooke’s microscopy, Cavendish clearly points out the discrepancy between the
skill of looking in closely—microscopically—and what can be defined as science or knowledge.
In fact, the two terms are often juxtaposed against each other to suggest the differences
between art as the vehicle of knowledge and science as the knowledge itself. When “science” is
“paired and contrasted with art,” explains OED, it signifies “a discipline, field of study, or
activity concerned with theory rather than method, or requiring the knowledge and systematic
application of principles, rather than relying on traditional rules, acquired skill, or intuition”
(science, n., 4.a). On the other hand, “art” signifies “a practical application of knowledge;
(hence) something which can be achieved or understood by the employment of skill and
knowledge” (art, n., 3.a).93 The etymological background of the two words further reveals the
history of the contrasting definitions behind them: “ultimately, this distinction [between science
and art] is informed by that in ancient Greek between ἐπιστήμη (episteme n.) and τέχνη (techne
n.)” and also “reflected by a similar distinction in classical Latin between scientia and ars [art
n.1]” (OED, science, n., etymology). The word “episteme” comes from “the ancient Greek
ἐπιστήμη, knowledge, understanding, skill, scientific knowledge (ἐπιστάναι to know, understand;
probably, ἐπι- epi- prefix + ἱστάναι to stand and -μη , suffix forming nouns)” (episteme, n.,
etymology). In addition, “techne” comes from the ancient Greek τέχνη, meaning art, thus
referring to “an art, skill, or craft; a technique, principle, or method by which something is
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achieved or created” as well as “a product of [art], a work of art” (techne, n., etymology).
Cavendish claims that, as a science, Hooke’s microscopic experiment fails to fully reveal the
intrinsic motions and designs of nature. Hooke identifies his experiment with microscopy as
“philosophy” more than art, and he proudly announces the benefits of his optic device:
And I do not only propose this kind of Experimental philosophy as a matter of
high rapture and delight of the mind, but even as a material and sensible pleasure.
So vast is the variety of objects which will come under their inspections, so many
different ways there are of handling them, so great is the satisfaction of finding
out new things, that I dare compare the contentment which they will enjoy, not
only to that of contemplation, but even to that which most men prefer of the very
senses themselves.94
Hooke associates his experiment with “experimental philosophy” to present microscopy as an
instrument of knowledge, a science.95 However, Cavendish not only believes Hooke’s
experiment fails to provide “a matter of high rapture and delight of the mind” as Hooke claims
above, but she also points out that Hooke’s Micrographia also misleads the public, which
therefore makes his method not just crafty skill but “art” that is immoral: “[T]his art has
intoxicated so many men’s brains, and wholly employed their thoughts and bodily actions about
pheonomena, or the exterior figures of objects, as all better arts and studies are laid aside; nay,
those are not as earnest and active in such employments as they are; by many of them, accounted
unprofitable subjects to the commonwealth of learning.”96 It is hard to ignore the underlying
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similarity between the poetry haters’ moral attack on poetry, as described in the previous chapter,
and Cavendish’s criticism against Hooke’s “art.” However, note that she distinguishes art as skill
from fancy and poetic imagination. Furthermore, Cavendish targets Hooke’s claim of the
microscope as being able to deliver truth about nature. She believes that the outcome of Hooke’s
experiment rather obstructs obtaining truth, because Hooke fails to establish a single unitary
view of his microscopic subject; as Cavendish asserts: “[A]rtists [she would mean Hooke here]
do confess themselves, that flies, and the like, will appear of several figures or shapes, according
to the several reflexions, refractions, mediums and positions of several lights.”97 Moreover, the
extrinsic and artificial component of Hooke’s method and technology “doth more easily alter
[nature] than inform” the observer about nature, and even misinforms or misrepresents: “that
natural figure may be presented in as monstrous a shape, as it may appear misshapen rather than
neutral.”98 Cavendish’s mordant criticism against Hooke’s experiment in Observations echoes
Stephen Gosson’s accusation against poetry; Hooke’s art is nothing more than sensationalism to
Cavendish, and she believes Hooke and his publication prove to be morally dissolute and
academically incompetent: micrography “intoxicate[s]” its audience with “thoughts and bodily
actions about phenomena,” but yields no tangible facts about the interior figures or functions of
the object of observation so that it fails to profit “the commonwealth of learning.”99 Furthermore,
we can also see how her criticism against the moral letdown of Hooke’s study aligns with
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Sidney’s defense of poetry. Poetry must defend its unique purpose and advantage against the
other ways of seeing and comprehending the world. Though she confronts modern science, as
opposed the fervent moral and religious believer Stephen Gosson’s attack on poetry confronted
by Sidney, both Cavendish and Sidney deal with the antithetical claims made against one of the
oldest and most established methods of representing and understanding the world—poetry—and
the power of poetic imagination that it entails. Most importantly, both Cavendish and Sidney
discuss the moral benefit—or the lack thereof—and the social delight that poetic imagination
brings into the “commonwealth of learning.”100
In contrast, Hooke is confident that his optic device can enable the observer to get “neer”
to the object of his or her observation, “the earth itself, which lyes so neer us.”101 Hooke claims
that a microscopic view can provide a new, enhanced view of nature that is proximate enough to
nature that it can even deliver greater truth than other methods of observation can accomplish,
and he also suggests that looking at the smallest details of nature might help us grasp a vast
insight into God’s grandeur. Hooke sees nature as a text waiting to be unveiled and read more
closely without “all the uncertainty, and mistakes of humane actions, [that] proceed either from
the narrowness and wandering of our senses, from the slipperiness or delusion of our memory”
so that it can reveal more profound intentions and designs of God’s creativity.102 Yet for
Cavendish an advanced view of nature requires more than mechanically enhanced sight. In her
introduction to The Blazing World, she states that even philosophers “may err in searching and
requiring after the Causes of Natural Effects, and many times embrace falsehoods for Truths,”
“Learning” is paramount in Renaissance discussion of knowledge and art. Representation of the world
must contribute something valid and valuable to our comprehension about the world, so that this learning not only
improves our corporeal state but also helps us ascend closer to celestial perfection. As I discussed in the previous
chapter on Sidney, learning is a spiritually transformative and kinetic experience—“purifying wit, the enriching of
memory, enabling judgment, and enlarging of conceit”--for both the poet and the reader.
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and that sometimes human beings are so eager to find the truth that they may still pursue “the
error [that] proceeds from the different motions of Reason.”103 Modern science claims that it can
capture and control nature by “the real, the mechanical, the experimental philosophy, which has
this advantage over the philosophy of discourse and disputation,” and Hooke defines such
science as “the remedies” for “the dangers in the process of humane reason” in his preface to
Micrographia.104 For Hooke, “science” involved minute scrutiny and much repetition, so that
larger systems of knowledge were constructed from the ground up, each step based upon
quantifiable and replicable observations. However, Hooke’s claim of modern science’s certainty,
especially as opposed to “the philosophy of discourse and disputation,” alarms Cavendish:
“[S]ince there is but one Truth in Nature, all those that hit not this Truth, do err, some more,
some less; for though some may come nearer the mark then others, which makes their Opinions
seem more probable and rational then others; yet as long as they swerve from this onely Truth,
they are in the wrong.”105 On the other hand, “Fictions,” Cavendish explains, “are an issue of
mans Fancy, framed in his own mind, according as he pleases, without regard, whether the thing,
he fancies, be really existent without his mind or not.”106 In other words, since “Fictions” don’t
claim to deliver the truth, only duplicating or manipulating the truth, the poetic devices or
faculties such as Fancy, Fictions, or poetic imagination do not deceive.
It might help to trace out the general outlines of both sides of the debate. Hooke was born
at Freshwater in 1635 and was educated at Westminster School, followed by Christ Church,
Oxford, from which he received his degree of M.A. in 1663. During his time at Oxford he
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became involved with modern science while also making contacts with John Wilkins and Robert
Boyle at Wadham College.107 The Royal Society decided to fill one of the positions for Curators
of Experiments with a full-time professional scientist, and Hooke was offered the position in
1662. The Royal Society needed sponsorship since it was, as John Enderby points out in “Hooke
and the Royal Society,” “not a rich organization, and it was important to attract, as members,
well-heeled financiers, landowners, merchants and the aristocracy”(68). Hooke was encouraged
to curate his experiments to “entertain the wealthy dignitaries and so extract from them sufficient
cash to keep the Society afloat and meet the various expenses incurred by [himself] and
others”(68). According to Samuel Pepys (1633-1703), a Cambridge graduate who was
steadfastly interested in new science and later became an important figure of the early days of the
Royal Society, Hooke was a fascinating and prolific scientist. During the last days of the
Commonwealth, Pepys was appointed as Clerk to the Exchequer; he was Clerk of the Acts to the
Navy Board during the Restoration. Pepys’ famous diary, written during 1660 through 1669,
provides significant insights into the Royal Society and Pepys’ fascination with Hooke’s
experiments. Hooke designed experiments virtually every week and discussed them with
educated—and not necessarily learned, but rich—gentlemen. However, his service to the Royal
Society, again as Enderby asserts, “showed how science was of direct concern to government,
commerce, defence and civic policy, and not merely a branch of the entertainment industry”
(74). The form of observation in Micrographia contrasted starkly with the philosophical science
practiced by many of his peers, including his most notable superior, Robert Boyle, and other
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natural philosophers like Newton and Cavendish. A modern scientist might be inclined greatly to
admire Hooke’s meticulous delineation of the properties of a vacuum, but in first postulating its
possibility, Boyle got, and kept, the fame. Experiments, soon to become the general currency of
science, still relegated the experimenter to a level of technician, something akin to the modernday appellation of “blue-collar.” In contrast, the older science tended to be the province of
philosophers, those whose thought moved from limited observations—one might immediately
think of a fortuitous apple fallen to the head—to the construction of grand systems of knowledge
like the law of gravity.
Given Cavendish’s social status, one could easily see a sort of classist distinction and
prejudice in Cavendish’s privileging of intuition and dismissal of Hooke’s observational
paradigm, as well as a self-protective gesture arising from Cavendish’s frank acknowledgement
that she lacked access to the sorts of new machinery increasingly being used by men like
Hooke.108 Still, as I will show below, Cavendish’s objections to Hooke’s work reveal aspects of
her philosophy that are central to her literary output, tracing a now familiar trajectory; on one
side was the new science, cold and calculating, and on the other—hers—was the older “science,”
where human reason and imagination both stood as allies of truth.
Hooke’s Micrographia opens with a trope that compares a corporeal body to a written
text, suggesting that the constituency of small and simple parts will explain the end goal of the
bigger and more complex system: “As in Geometry, the most natural way of beginning is from a
Mathematical point; so is the same method in Observations and Natural history the most
genuine, simple, and instructive. We must first endevour to make letters, and draw single strokes
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true, before we venture to write whole sentences, or to draw large pictures” (1). To legitimize the
moral purpose of the microscope, Hooke tries to bolster its technological advantage beyond the
typical merit of scientific observation. He shows perception in claiming that the beginning of any
meaningful text is simultaneously pictorial and verbal, as his book contains both texts and
images; but the teleocentric moral emphasis on the “true” beginning of a text, the belief that a
small component of a large sentence determines the text’s significance in the world, suggests the
author’s overemphasis on the portent of machinery.109 The microscope can catch errors that are
hidden to our physical eyes:
What may not be expected from the rational or deductive Faculty that is furnish
with such Materials, and those so readily adapted, and rang’d for use, that in a
moment, as ‘twere, thousands of instances, serving for the illustration,
determination, or invention, of almost any inquiry, may be represented even to the
sight? How neer the nature of Axioms must all those proportions be which are
examin’d before so many witnesses? And how difficult will it be for any, though
never so subtil an error in Philosophy, to scape from being discover’d, after it has
indur’d the touch, and so many other tryals?”110
That the microscope can catch “never so subtil an error in philosophy” if the subject of
examination “indur’d the touch” and “many other trials” presents the experimental scientist’s
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compelling argument—it will catch the wrongs of philosophical observations and conclusions
because nothing is “so subtil” under the modern science’s microscopic view.111 The staple of
experimental science’s method is acting and doing—physically interacting with the material
world, described as “touch” or “trials” by Hooke above. He believes the microscopic seeing is
close to touching—it gets “neer” enough to “an error in philosophy” that the errors can’t escape
from the microscopic “trials” and observations. Instead of merely thinking and arguing, an
experimental scientist “touch[es]” the object of his experiment, so he is less likely to miss “so
subtil an error,” whereas pondering philosophers are more likely to do so; here Hooke expounds
on the experimental science’s actual practice as a concrete experience. His experiments are
established on the tangible experience of concrete object rather than abstract thought as he
suggests that “the philosophy of discourse and disputation” has less “regard to the first groundwork, which ought to be well laid on the sense and memory” as opposed to experimental science
that “chiefly aims at the subtilty of its deductions and conclusions.”112 So many errors are made
by “the philosophy of discourse and disputation” because it forgets to pay most attention to “the
first ground-work, which ought to be well laid on the sense and memory” while focusing on
abstract concepts and passive disputations.113 Since the human senses are unreliable after all,
Hooke argues: “The first thing to be undertaken in this weighty work, is a watchfulness over the
failings and an inlargement of the dominion, of the senses.”114 For Hooke the microscope
symbolizes “this weighty work” that accomplishes a triumphant achievement of experimental
science that acts and does the expansion of how far our sight can reach. Therefore, he argues that
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the philosophers who would rather think than act are unlikely to do “[the] weighty work,” to
carefully and painstakingly look at the material existence of the world; in contrast, the
experimental science would offer “a watchfulness over the failings and an enlargement of the
dominion, of the senses” and try to magnify the errors as well as prevent further errors in “the
first ground-work.”115
A careful reading of Hooke’s argument for his optic device will further reveal that even
though a microscope can provide knowledge that is real and practical, the efficacy of his device
as well as the competence of experimental science cannot be explained without some poetic
imagination. Hooke’s instrument offers the illusion of tangible experience while revealing
something intangible, which makes his instrument practical and relevant—one might see the eye
of a fly through a microscope, enlarged and proximate, but in truth it is the seen light that
touches the magnified object under the glass, not the observer’s body. As the light “touch[es]”
the glass and the subject is lit and magnified, this “touch” begins to excavate and penetrate the
boroughs, films, and cells inside an organism. Hooke argues that the act of looking in through
the microscope leads the observer to a greater intellectual proximity to truth, turning a tangible
action into an intangible knowledge. To further support his argument that microscopic looking
can help the observer decipher the dense and obscure content and take the observer closer to
truth, he looks at religious texts, believing that his new way of observation could be used to
unveil the existence of the spiritual realm through deciphering the material body of a religious
script, thus further establishing the pertinence and proficiency of his optic device. One of the first
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microscopic examples Hooke chose to describe in Micrographia is none other than the printed
letters—types—of religious texts with “lines … so small and near together,” made by a copper
plate and roll-press:
[H]aving view’d certain pieces of exceeding curious writing of the kind (one of
which in the bredth of a two-pence compris’d the Lords prayer, the Apostles
Creed, the ten commandments, and about half a dozen verses besides of the Bible,
whose lines were so small and near together, that I was unable to number them
with my naked eye, a very ordinary Microscope, I had then about me, inabled me
to see that what the writer of it had asserted was true, but withal discover’d of
what pitifull bungling scribbles and scrawls it was compos’d, Arabian and China
characters being almost as well shap’d; […] If this manner of small writing were
made easie and practicable (and I think I know such a one, but have never yet
made trial of it, whereby one might be inabled to write a great deale with much
ease, and accurately enough in a very little roome) it might be of very good use to
convey secret Intelligence without any danger of Discovery or mistrusting. 116
It is Hooke’s intention to choose the subject that is not only sacred and secretive, but also
obscure to read, so that by using his microscope he can find more “roome” between small types.
He believes that material reality participates in and manipulates immaterial reality—a point
missing to our naked eye, unfortunately, would be nothing but a point missing. And that missed
point, whether intended by the author or not, would alter or produce resultant meaning of the
text. Thus Hooke argues that the microscope can offer a kind of nearness that enables our naked
eye to reach in and see the hidden context that was previously illegible and unseen. As if peeling
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the layers of a vegetable’s skin, the looking through the microscope that Hooke describes lets
people infiltrate the exterior layers that keep “secret intelligence” distant from the naked eye,
which obscures the hidden meaning of the text; the naked eye, which he calls “a very ordinary
microscope,” cannot obtain the “secret intelligence” because its vision cannot travel through the
exterior layers. The microscope can connect the point a—let us assume this is a beginning point,
perhaps from a person’s eye ball or some physiological point where the image of the subject at
the end of the microscope is captured—to the end point aa, where the eye longingly looks, but
more importantly, what Hooke wants to highlight is that the microscope can also eliminate the
distance between a and aa.
Yet there is something about keeping the distance, sensing the distance between two
things, when trying to build a thought or a sentence. Hooke says “[W]e must first endevour to
make letters, and draw single strokes true, before we venture to write whole sentences, or to
draw large pictures” and insists his optic device will help us to see “single strokes true” so that
we can improve each stroke, thus improve the quality—the truthfulness—of our larger picture;
yet we can’t even tell if the picture or sentence is good—“true”—until comparing each stroke
while seeing each of them next to each other in a larger picture or sentence, a pattern.117 We
don’t always draw a large picture—nor, needless to say, a good one—by “draw[ing] single
strokes true.” In fact, if we focus on the tiny details of each stroke too much, we might forget to
think about the bigger picture entirely. Even if we know how a perfect single stroke looks and
learn how to draw one, we can still produce a bad larger picture at the end if we ignore other
variables that complete the bigger pattern, such as the “room” between letters in a sentence.118

Hooke, “Observ. I. Of the Point of a Sharp Small Needle,” Micrographia, 1.
For instance, as Hooke explains above, when there is only “a very little roome” between letters, it is
hard to read what the text says.
117
118

79
We know something went wrong with minute details when the bigger pattern is out of balance. It
is not just the preciseness of each stroke or letter or word that makes a good sentence, but the
compatibility and flexibility—the room—between the words, and the sharpness of the words also
determine the life of a good sentence.119 This also reveals why Hooke continually uses
metaphors to explain the function and need of his device, though he criticizes the uncertainty and
errors of human reason and senses, which are the crucial instigators of poetic imagination.
Furthermore, the microscope doesn’t just magnify, but it makes things appear bigger than they
really are, more alien, more other; the microscope offers minute details of already small objects
by altering their familiar, regular appearance under the manipulated gaze of the observer. The
altering capability of “fictions” or poetry as suggested by Cavendish helps us comprehend reality
without completely alienating or changing the appearance of the reality. There is a hint of
violence and willfulness as well as a looming sense of termination and eradication in Hooke’s
dedication to “the weighty work,” what Hooke describes as “a watchfulness over the failings and
an inlargement of the dominion, of the senses.”120 The machine will enlarge not only the image
of the object but also the territory of our senses. The power of the microscope Hooke describes in
Micrographia encompasses more than the expansion of sensory domain; it anticipates the
machine’s efficacy in expanding the domain of imperialist power. Note carefully how Hooke
chooses the secretive and obscure text to read under his microscope, and he needs to magnify “a
very little roome” between small types so he can actually see the bigger picture and comprehend
this sacred text. Contrary to Hooke’s claim that his device can eliminate the distance, his device
instead magnifies the “little roome” between types not only in a metaphorical way that the
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meaning is not readily accessible, but also in a physical way. Therefore, the distance is necessary
for seeing and knowing to occur, but it is also necessary for meaning to exist—the distance must
be there to produce more significance, comparison, metaphor, and finally, the need to
communicate. The text Hooke chooses to observe under his microscope is designed to obfuscate
easy reading—it is a sacred text after all. Perhaps even Hooke realizes that what is too obvious to
be understood isn’t worthy of his discussion in his book.121 Without realizing, Hooke exemplifies
the kind of invasive and ambitious scientist who usurps and alters the nature of things.
Furthermore, the center of Hooke’s determined argument hinges more on the device’s
virtual potential than its actual performance. Hooke establishes the impending possibility of the
magnified image to become more than a mere physical sight: “It seems not improbable, but that
by these helps the subtlety of the composition of Bodies, the structure of their parts, the various
texture of their matter, the instruments and manner of their inward motions, and all the other
possible appearances of things, may come to be more fully discovered.”122 The “more fully
discovered” things must reveal something more than their physical state, such as their atomic
structures or their mechanics and designs, in order for Hooke to present his microscopic
discoveries as unveiling something “secretive” and “sacred,” like the decoding of the content of
religious text with “little roome” between types. Yet when reading Hooke’s claim above more
closely, one must realize his machine actually sees--at least the way he describes it--“parts,”
“texture,” “inward motions,” or “appearances,” which, as he stresses, “may come to be more
fully discovered.” Unless an observer with his imagination turns these material things into
something meaningful or something that “may come to be more fully discovered,” the

After all, Hooke’s Micrographia is too poetic—and indeed graphic--to be framed as a collection of
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microscope reveals to an observer what remains to be mechanical and physical--parts, texture,
motions, or appearances, and nothing more, as Cavendish suggests. The small bodies being read
in Micrographia are microscopic texts; after all, Hooke draws them in his book. They are being
observed mechanically—through the microscope—but described metaphorically. The
microscopic seeing encourages Hooke to be more poetic, although that amount of abundant
detail could have made his writing undoubtedly dull. Seeing more—seeing what one couldn’t see
before the microscope--doesn’t result in clarity but more opacity, which is essential to poetic
imagination. Opacity in poetry here functions more like the distances between things that are
necessary for the pursuit of truth, which I discuss above. Not all seeing leads to telling, needless
to say, a story that is telling.123
Mechanically enhanced seeing might yield abundant images, but these images would
mean nothing more than what Cavendish calls “the picture presented in and by the glass,” and
these “pictures” merely represent the images that “the glass only figures or patterns out.”124 It is,
however, the mental faculty that turns the external “figures” and “patterns” into something more
than “pictures,” a body of text that needs to be deciphered and understood. Thus for Cavendish,
not only does the microscopic “glass” alter the information of nature by presenting pictures of
“figure[d]” and “pattern[ed]” nature, but human senses and intelligence also need to accompany
the observation through “the glass” to convey significance that matters in terms of human values.
In fact, even though in his preface Hooke criticizes human sense and reason as unreliable, he
knows an appeal to certain values is necessary for his argument. He asserts the political and
moral timing of his work and other modern scientists’ endeavors as the establishing foundation

I discuss this point about seeing and telling further in the later chapter on Milton’s Paradise Regained
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for a nascent, adventurous, and “inquisitive” nation blossoming with new methods of seeing and
knowing:
The good success of all these great men, and many others, and the now seemingly
great obviousness of most of their and divers other inventions, which from the
beginning of the world have been, as ‘twere, trod on, and yet not minded till these
last inquisitive ages (an argument that there may be yet behind multitudes of the
like) puts me in mind to recommend such studies, and the prosecution of them by
such methods, to the Gentlemen of our Nation, whose leisure makes them fit to
undertake, and the plenty of their fortunes to accomplish, extraordinary things in
this way. And I do not only propose this kind of Experimental philosophy as a
matter of high rapture and delight of the mind, but even as a material and sensible
pleasure. 125
Here Hooke identifies his experiment as a “matter of high rapture and delight of the mind” as
well as “a material and sensible pleasure.” According to his statement above, Hooke intends his
device to be both instructive and entertaining. Hooke’s Micrographia proves to be an
entertaining work of literature that introduces and describes a new method of seeing rather than a
scientific study that examines or proves a theory about microscopic seeing. In other words,
Hooke’s book provides an exhibition, not an explanation. Gerard L’E. Turner explains in “The
Impact of Hooke’s Micrographia and its influence on Microscopy” that even though the
publishing of his book in 1665 gave him the title of the “father of microscopy,” Hooke was
rather a sage than “a serious microscopist in the sense that the Dutchman, Antoni van
Leeuwenhoek, or the Italian, Marcello Malpighi, deserve the title”—instead, Hooke was “a true
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natural philosopher, attracted by the novelty and possibilities of an unfamiliar instrument, and
ready to demonstrate and then to write about what it could achieve” (124).126 Micrographia was
an instant success, and the book’s popularity, Turner asserts, helped in establishing “the
popularity of the microscope with generations of observers, and this in turn supported the
serious, scientific use of the instrument and ensured that it was manufactured in quantity and
steadily improved in design” (124).
In addition, in the block quote above, Hooke suggests that “the Gentlemen of [his]
Nation” can use the microscope as a social as well as political instrument, appointing these
“gentlemen” responsible for refining and enriching the political and cultural landscape of the
English nation. What Hooke calls “the inlargement of dominion” suggests various kinds of
expansion of how far one can see, which also translates into how far one can know and control,
especially for the learned audience of “the Gentlemen of our Nation, whose leisure makes them
fit to undertake, and the plenty of their fortunes to accomplish, extraordinary things in this
way.”127 It is doubtful that Cavendish missed the patriarchal overtone of Hooke’s prophecy for
his device—Hooke’s device is not only deceiving and immoral to Cavendish, but its dominant
male politics usurp the possibility of non-male readership and authorship in constructing new
methods of perceiving and building the world. Therefore, Cavendish sets out to build her own
world, a new world, called “A Blazing World,” where the old political system and gender
structure are absent. Despite Hooke’s claim, Cavendish insists she doesn’t need a microscope or
a microscopic view to look at, understand, and describe her new world; her “first ground-work”
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doesn’t have to “be well laid on the sense and memory” because she uses “sense and memory”—
and her imagination—as “the first ground work.”128
Poetry, I argue, requires and uses an insight akin to spiritual sight so that it can compose
the talk that is not just speaking stuff, but communicating something meaningful. And this is
why, again, the poetic tone in Hooke’s writing is striking to the modern reader, even though
Hooke’s work signified little more than the stock motif of modern science to Cavendish. In
“Books Written of the Wonders of These Glasses” from Science, Reading, and Renaissance
Literature, Elizabeth Spiller points out that the opening paragraph of Micrographia establishes
symbolic representation of the microscope as “a tool that will make it possible to read what he
sees as the most secret texts of the world, the true book of nature”; furthermore, the opening
paragraph tries to prove how the new science has fashioned a new way of reading: “[I]magining
all of creation as being engraven with its own ‘small writing,’ Hooke represents interest in
reading out the ‘small writing,’ the periods and full stops of the world that is his text.”129 On the
other hand, Spiller suggests that Cavendish’s writing reveals a “sense of herself primarily as a
reader”—but, if so, it is clearly an entirely different sort of reader.130 Cavendish appears to pay
less attention to such minute details as “the sharpness of a point the most superlatively, we say,
as sharp as a needle.”131 As a matter of fact, observation for Cavendish is scarcely about looking
at something from one fixed point as is paramount to observational science; imagination, she
insisted, could fruitfully fashion multiple divergent yet equally useful perspectives. For Hooke,
the established, stationed point at the top of a magnifying glass must serve as a beginning point

128
As I have pointed out earlier, Hooke argues in Micrographia that “the philosophy of discourse and
disputation” has less “regard to the first ground-work, which ought to be well laid on the sense and memory” as
opposed to experimental science that “chiefly aims at the subtilty of its deductions and conclusions.”
129
Elizabeth Spiller, Science, Reading, and Renaissance Literature, 139.
130
Spiller 142.
131
Hooke, Micrographia, 1-2.

85
to an observing eye, but to Cavendish such a stationary point of view is unnatural and fixed to
artificially alter the appearance of nature or the course of truth. While Hooke becomes more
focused on looking and looking closely in with his experiment, Cavendish loses interest in much
of the looking because she finds the outcome of Hooke’s observation static, expected, and not
particularly illuminating. Rather, Cavendish has her imagination to help her illuminate and find
the truth. Most importantly, the comparison between Hooke’s looking and Cavendish’s reading
helps us understand the difference between Cavendish’s “subtile observations” and Hooke’s
“neer” observations. Cavendish’s perspective as a reader provides her with an open-ended
position to zoom in and out of the text she observes, but when Hooke’s microscope lets the
observer “neer” the object, perhaps too near, the text becomes a static image, without
communicative meaning, as the observer becomes static and detached from the thing he sees
through the device.
We must also pay attention that while experimental science preaches the practicality and
efficacy of its method, the outcome of such practice often signifies rather abstract conclusions,
despite its persistent lionizing of its epistemological advantage in regards to our seeing and
understanding of the world. Once again, without the aid of imagination, or the spiritual mind,
Hooke’s promise that his observation will result in “something more fully discovered” remains
as a mere virtual promise and collides with the actuality of his experiment. Hooke argues that
“by these helps the subtlety of the composition of bodies, the structure of their parts, the various
texture of their matter, the instruments and manner of their inward motions, and all the other
possible appearances of things, may come to be more fully discovered” (The Preface, sig. A2v),
but without the aid of the creative and spiritual eye, the mechanical or mechanically-enhanced

86
eye might physically get “neer” enough to the object, yet not be “subtle” enough to generate
“something more fully discovered,” despite Hooke’s belief.
That Cavendish espouses the idea that human creativity can not only predict but even
fashion the future through the keen intuitive grasp of inner reality is a less than subtle argument
in The Blazing World. For Cavendish, magnifying glasses merely provide a process of crude
atomic reduction that fails to accomplish what imagination or fantasy can—expanding time and
space, stretching the span of present reality beyond the imagination’s bent that tests our
perception and observation, to foresee and to prove by predicting the existence of the bigger
system. Hooke believes that his experiment will provide an observation that could reduce the
distance from the truth while breaking things into constituent parts, but Cavendish points out that
the physical nearness to something doesn’t signify the acute grasp of it. She gives a specific
name to this intuition-and-creativity driven observation in order to identify and distinguish it
from the mechanistic experimental science when she describes the navigating method of
augurers as “subtile observations and great practice” in The Blazing World:
And though they had no knowledge of the Load-stone, or Needle, or pendulous
Watches, yet (which was as serviceable to them) they had subtile observations,
and great practice; in so much that they could not onely tell the depth of the sea in
every place, but where there were shelves of Sand, Rocks, and other obstructions
to be avoided by skilfull and experienced Sea-men: Besides, they were excellent
Augurers, which skill they counted more necessary and beneficial then the use of
Compasses, Cards, Watches, and the like.132
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Here Cavendish conveys doubts about the aid of machinery and technology—compass, cards,
watches—by emphasizing the capability of “skillful and experienced Sea-men” who are able to
read the “depth of sea” and foresee any obstructions coming before them without any help of
technology. Unlike the experimental scientists with their scopes and compass, augurers, as she
points out, have the skill to practice “subtile observations” without the help of machinery. What
is exactly that “skill”? Is it to observe subtly, or to observe subtle things? Or both? To answer
this question I must ask another—what is a subtle object to be observed subtly, and what
determines something as subtle? When experimental science tries to explain things by resorting
to increasingly greater detail, always dissecting functioning systems into smaller and smaller
constituent parts in an effort to define and understand them, she would argue that the details
themselves do not create any comprehensive significance. The “skill” referenced above is the
sensibility and experience that allow someone to be able to observe and interpret a subject
seamlessly, gracefully, without negotiating its personal space, and thus preserving boundaries
between different worlds. Functionality and aesthetics should complement each other in
harmony; machines, to Cavendish, are too obvious and too intentional to be subtle and effortless.
In other words, she believes experimental science cannot accomplish the sophistication and skill
established by countless years of ancient practice of reading and interpreting natural signs. It is
interesting that she uses nautical navigation as an example to demonstrate that the proximity and
accuracy of the machine do not determine the success of navigation. Minute details are indeed
important, but patterns are paramount in accumulating meanings. More importantly, to recount
the Empress’ criticism against the microscope in The Blazing World, proximity can actually lead
one to inaccuracy and thus more confusion: “Whereupon they took one of their best and largest
microscopes, and endeavoured to view a Whale thorow it: but alas! the shape of the Whale was
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so big, that its circumference went beyond the magnifying quality of the Glass; whether the error
proceeded from the Glass, or from a wrong position of the Whale against the reflection of light, I
cannot certainly tell.”133 The Empress is unsatisfied when the microscope fails to magnify a
whale, as “the shape of the Whale was so big, that its circumference went beyond the magnifying
quality of the Glass.”134 This scene might seem too obvious or foolish to some, and they might
even wonder why anyone would even think about putting a whale under a microscope. Yet
Cavendish’s idiosyncratic argument against the microscope does deliver a good point; she
chooses an object that is obviously too big to be under the point “as sharp as a needle” to reveal
the extremely partial and small pieces of the world the microscope can magnify.135 What Hooke
believes as sharp and subtle as “the point of a sharp small needle” indeed can only deliver
information too small, too localized to effectively and justly represent the whole.136
Furthermore, Cavendish even dismisses the merit of reading such observations written by
an experimental scientist: “To relate all their optic observations through the several sorts of their
Glasses, would be a tedious work, and tire even the most patient Reader.”137 In the historical
context of Cavendish’s observations about experimental philosophy, her admiration of augurers
and derogation of the use of mechanical practice indicate her distrust of Hooke’s method and
practice. Neither his observation nor his rhetoric is able to obvert the shallow impression of
experimental science on Cavendish. An augurer interprets what he observes after watching the
flight patterns of the birds in the sky. One might ask how the practice of augurers differs from
that of experimental scientists such as Hooke. The ancient practice of augury not only needs an
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auspice with a skill to conduct careful observation and produce keen interpretation of patterns in
nature, but it also requires a bird that manifests the signs delivering the omens. An augurer is a
governor of metonymy; the message is the bird itself, the instrument moving and signaling the
sign, embodying the sign. Here we discern that there is an instrument involved, after all, with the
practice of augury, but the perception of this instrument requires insight and patience, an
observational passivity little resembling the forceful invasion of space marking the
technologically-enhanced gaze of the emerging science. Thus, Cavendish, unlike Hooke, who
believes microscopic observation can provide not only acute but also prophetic experience
revealing “secret texts,” identifies the practice of experimental science with the opposite—
confusion and crudity. Furthermore, Cavendish acknowledges that human perception and
sensory experience can lead the human observer to “err in searching and requiring after the
Causes of Natural Effects, and many times embrace falsehoods for Truths” (“To the Reader,”
The Blazing World). Unlike Cavendish, Hooke doesn’t see the chance of such “falsehoods” in his
microscopic seeing; yet an augurer would more likely be aware of the possibility of human error
in reading the pattern, thus focusing more on comprehensive poetic significance than minute
material details of the patterns.
I’d like to return and pay more attention to Hooke’s use of the word “point” to disclose
the significance of subtlety for both Cavendish and Hooke, this is a key concept in understanding
Cavendish’s argument against experimental science. It is not just a small point that the
microscope magnifies; in Hooke’s imagination, a point embodies both a material and immaterial
sense of a significant mark that could change the outcome of a sentence because even such a
small material entity has a significance and function in a bigger text. Through the aid of a
magnifying glass, one can see a point not only microscopically but also metaphorically—optical
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magnification can somehow mediate a symbolic touch that connects one point to the other. This
is indeed an extremely poetic way of looking at the world; the idea of being able to see one thing
and delineate it in a way that it manifests and transforms into another thing evokes the capability
of metaphor.138 Experimental scientists such as Hooke use the divinatory rhetoric of prediction to
establish a moral merit of their scientific experiments, and they argue that through the aid of
machines one might be able to see everything in his or her surroundings and possibly predict the
future, which used to be poetry’s tone and its claim of purpose.139 As Elizabeth Spiller points
out, Hooke’s text literally embodies the body to be read that contains the bodies being read
microscopically. The bodies being read in Micrographia are being observed mechanically—
through the microscope--but described metaphorically. Therefore, a point indeed becomes a
significant point of beginning and ending for an organism being read and observed. Spiller
suggests that Cavendish’s own writing reveals a “sense of herself primarily as a reader”—in
works like The Blazing World and Observations, Cavendish is not only the author but a reader of
scientific writing. However, Cavendish appears to pay less attention to such minute details as
“the sharpness of a point the most superlatively, we say, as sharp as a needle.”140 As I discussed
earlier, Cavendish’s observation is scarcely about looking—looking at something from one fixed
point is paramount to observational science. The established, unmoving point of a magnifying
glass must serve as a beginning point to an observing eye. The human eyes are not only

This resonates with Sidney’s mimetic theory of poetry.
In “Books Written of the Wonders of These Glasses” from Science, Reading, and Renaissance
Literature, Elizabeth Spiller argues that the opening paragraph of Micrographia not only provides a symbolic
representation of the microscope as “a tool that will make it possible to read what he sees as the most secret texts of
the world, the true book of nature” but also shows us how the new science fashioned a new way of reading: “
imagining all of creation as being engraven with its own ‘small writing,’ Hooke represents interest in reading out the
‘small writing,’ the periods and full stops of the world that is his text” (Spiller 139).
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constantly moving but also controlled by human senses, and Cavendish believes that what one
sees through the magnifying glasses does not reveal or present nature in a shape or form that is
closer to truth. And as I also mentioned earlier, if Cavendish does believe in the specific power
of poetry to reflect nature and present multiple differing versions of it, then magnifying glasses
do offer something that fundamentally alters the outcome of poetic imagination and metaphorical
formation. Hence Cavendish calls it “the art of micrographia” and expounds upon its artificiality
that “doth more easily alter than inform.”141 If the nature a poet observes and writes about in his
or her poetry is not observed through the naked eye but moved away from the naked eye,
manipulating what the poet sees by observing his subject of poetry through a magnifying glass,
then the poet begins his poetic thinking with inaccurate information and, as Cavendish puts it,
“deformed” material upon which to build a poetic creation. The most accurate way to observe
and understand the world is in the manner through which it appears and comes to our naked eye
without any mechanical improvement or manipulation: “Wherefore the best optic is a perfect
natural eye, and a regular sensitive perception; and the best judge, is reason; and the best study,
is rational contemplation joined with the observations of regular sense, but not deluding arts.”142
Hooke’s attempt to magnify the capability of the microscope by turning a textual mark into an
organism to be observed and then into a symbolic point to be made should have appeared poetic
and been effective for most readers of his time. After all, his point about the machine’s ability to
turn a point into the point demonstrates the profit of scientific observation conducive to
observing divine knowledge; however, this does not persuade Cavendish. She writes in
Observations: “the several dioptrical instruments belonging thereto, by reason I have neither
studied nor practiced that art; yet of this I am confident, that this same art, with all its
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instruments, is not able to discover the interior natural motions of any part or creature of
nature.”143 She is clearly doubtful of not only its informative accuracy but also its supposed
ability to reveal messages beyond the obvious materiality of the material world. Even when our
senses can perceive things crookedly or incorrectly, information gathered through our own naked
eye and sensory system remains closer to God’s intention for Cavendish: “[T]here is something
more powerful than nature, all the parts of nature (which are infinite) certainly have: And so
God, being an infinite and eternal God, hath an infinite and eternal worship; for every part
conceiving something about itself, and above its nature, worships that supreme, either through
fear, or love, or both; yet knows not what the supreme being is.”144 This is clearly a radically
different attitude in acquiring knowledge than Hooke’s argument for the spiritual merit of his
machine; even though human perception and sensory experience might not be able to give
precise answers to our critical inquiry about the world, nature, and the divine, Cavendish cannot
condone any unnatural aid or thing that does not respect the way God intended us to perceive the
world, which is through the naked eye, without any aid of machines. Looking at God’s creatures
through the magnifying glass would only mean seeing the copy of a copy, not even a copy of the
original: “though the perception may be true, when the object is truly presented, yet when the
presentation is false, the information must be false also. And it is to be observed, that art, for the
most part, makes hermaphroditical, that is, mixt figures, partly artificial, and partly natural.”145
“Besides, there are so many alterations made by several lights, their shadows, refractions,
reflexions,” she writes, and the mechanical presentation of this sort will also, she continues, be
affected by “several lines, points, mediums, interposing and intermixing parts, forms and
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positions, as the truth of an object will hardly be known.”146 Whether it is the poet looking at the
sky to write a poem, an augurer looking at the sky and the bird to predict the weather, or any
person looking at the sky to describe the weather, he or she must look at the presentation that
God intended us to see, not the ones magnified—or, misrepresented—by a machine. Cavendish
argues:
The glass only figures or patterns out the picture presented in and by the glass,
and there mistakes may easily be committed in taking copies from copies. Nay,
artists do confess themselves, that flies, and the like, will appear of several figures
or shapes, according to the several reflexions, refractions, mediums and positions
of several light; which if so, how can they tell or judge which is the truest light,
position, or medium, that doth present the object naturally as it is?147
And should one not find the right light, we are misled by a wrong version, a misrepresentation of
God’s creatures, as if the poet is holding a broken mirror or a horse master is riding on a
deformed or sick horse that cannot perform its duty of reflecting nature as well as it can.
Not only does Cavendish argue that mechanical and atomic representation demote the
nature of things that God intended us to see, but she also points out the fact that if there is no
point to anchor the subject being observed, scientific observation can never succeed. Here we
can recount Cavendish’s description of the augurer’s “subtle observation” that does not require
the subject to be pointed down or marked—literally—in order to be observed. Instead of looking
in to observe smaller details, augurers look at the bigger picture or larger collection of events.
Subtlety in this case almost functions opposite to sharpness of the microscopic view that Hooke
praises, suggesting a broader, open-ended act of looking at the bigger patterns of nature that
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signifies Cavendish’s vitalist materialism. The problem with microscopic looking in, for
Cavendish, begins with a limited scopic situation that takes the subject out of its own context to
the point where the observers cannot tell what exactly they are looking at. When looking through
a microscope, everything else other than the very subject under the point of the glass is
unseen.148 Even though Hooke argues that microscopic observation can magnify the mark at the
beginning and end of a sentence, the sentence disappears while the end point of a microscopic
view zooms in and whitens out everything around it, obliterating how the end mark of a sentence
functions in the sentence or arrives at the end.
In “Of Many Worlds in This World,” it is clear that Cavendish espouses sensory
observations over atomic observations, as she describes the multitudinous world through her
imagination and metaphoric comparisons that abstain from scientific observation. Cavendish
sees an open-ended and expanding world: “Just like unto a Nest of Boxes round,/ Degrees of
sizes within each Boxe are found./ So in this World, may many Worlds more be,/ Thinner, and
lesse, and lesse still by degree”(lines 1-4).149 However, perhaps with “subtile observation, great
practice” we can remember how to use our senses to read ever mutating patterns and decipher
“Thinner, and lesse” signs as augurers do. The microscope, in an attempt to show greater details,
ends up showing less because the observer sees only what the machine reveals. Furthermore, as
Cavendish points out, the left-out margins invisible to the microscopic view change not only the
way one understands the subject but also the way one reads and perceives the world:
“[M]agnifying glasses are like a high heel to a short leg, which if it be made too high, it is apt to
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make the wearer fall, and at the best, can do no more than represent exterior figures in a bigger,
and so in a more deformed shape and posture than naturally they are.”150 For Cavendish, the
microscope is dangerous because it manipulates the way texts are presented to be observed and
read, as if Hooke plays with and defiles God’s text by magnifying one textual detail or
minimizing another. Cavendish believes such manipulation with the original text is far different
from poetic mimesis; in fact, it is immoral to represent the text in a way that encourages a
reading practice that forgets about the bigger picture while focusing on small details and leaving
out bigger patterns. Mechanical misinforming and misrepresenting occur as the machines fail to
conduct “subtle observations.”
In various works by Cavendish, the conceptual expansion of physical space occurs
through imagining what was unseen, instead of seeing everything. Hooke’s Micrographia
presents an argument that the merit of the microscope, ironically, is that it signifies the presence
of something immaterial by showing as much detail as it can. But unlike an augurer’s
observation, microscopic observation leaves very small room for the observers to use their
imagination to combine the missing—unmagnified—pieces. I would suggest that any hints of
conceptual expansion involving observing material growth and change in Micrographia should
evoke the precedence of poetic imagination already working—Hooke’s rhetoric demonstrates the
process of looking in through the tropes of revelation, reflection, and simulation, as if the act is
already part of looking under and throughout, which signifies the act of “looking in” as a
symbolic act of comprehension and prediction. Furthermore, poetry’s capability to enable a point
mark on a page to signify an end of sentence, a point to start or stop a thought, should be unique
and original to the world of metaphoric comprehensions and observations, not a microscopic or
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atomic understanding of the world. What is unique to poetry’s realm should only be used to
preserve poetry’s capability. However, Hooke’s poetic delineation of the microscopic appearance
subverts the Empress’ amiable description of sea men’s “subtle observation” in The Blazing
World. While Hooke claims that the microscopic looking in can enlighten us with a macroscopic
observation and appreciation of God’s inventions that is broader than a mere material
comprehension of the material world, Cavendish argues that it is precisely that act of looking in
aided by a machine that depreciates and devalues the sublime beauty of God’s work. That
successful and sufficient navigation in the sea can be made through “subtle observation” without
an aid of machines signifies not only the Empress’ distrust of mechanical science but also
Cavendish’s faith in ancient traditions and tools of navigation.
I would also suggest that Cavendish may be using a nautical trope to invite us to ponder
something more than the efficiency of ancient ways of navigation. It is not a coincidence that
Cavendish frames her criticism on mechanical tools of navigation inside a story of the Empress’
sea adventure. Presenting a prose narrative for the Empress’ heroic and mysterious adventure in
a remote, imaginary place in time with imaginary characters, The Blazing World becomes a
fantastic romance for the poet herself, and the unpredictable adventure demands a dependable set
of skills and inventions to help the poet navigate through the storm. What forms of poetic
navigation can the poet rely on to navigate through the vast sea of signification other than a wellestablished poetic tradition such as Petrarchan conceit? I would argue that Cavendish espouses
the practice of augurer over the mechanical machines because the augurer’s subtle observation is
close to the practice of poetry writing. If, as Cavendish and Sidney assert, poetry is supposed to
deliver a variety of representations of the world through “subtle observations” and “studying
inventions,” then poetic representation should almost desert the idea of nearness and preciseness;
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then instead of getting rid of the distance between the word and the thing itself, collapsing the
space between vehicle and tenor, poetic representation that comes from “subtle observation” uses
the distance to achieve the impact of nostalgia. Thus the practice of looking in and looking
through the layers of concealment and external appearance fundamentally breaks the system of
poetic representation from the basis of observation. While Hooke diligently looks in and through
the microscope to find God’s secret message, Cavendish looks out to the sky to see God’s secret
message using her own senses. Since looking in is radically different form of observation
compared to looking at and watching from a distance, as the latter seems to involve more
intuition and trained human senses, it will require a different type and class of metaphors to
describe what one observes by looking in or looking at.151
Interestingly, when comparing Hooke’s cautious rhetorical use of nearness and subtleness
in approaching his subjects to Cavendish’s blunt criticism about mechanical inventions in The
Blazing World, one might hastily conclude that oddly, even though she valorizes subtlety, there
isn’t much subtlety when it comes to Cavendish’s rhetoric, especially in her caustic complaints
against the practicality of mechanical devices such as the microscope and telescope. When
Cavendish uses of the term “subtile” to describe a kind of observation, as in the previous passage
I introduced, the term is used to deliver a discerning judgment against the technology that some
might argue advanced a close observation as well as a wide navigation of the world. As subtle as
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it might sound, I would like to argue that for Cavendish what proximity offers to scientific
observation represents the abomination of what nature conceives as beauty—subtlety. And here I
am using the word to describe the beauty found in the material world, both physical or abstract,
that is both so sharp and so distant that its metamorphosis is often unrecognized by or
untraceable to our naked eye. The subtlety is not without its dangers. The kind of double
meaning that the word “subtle” embodies in Cavendish I am trying to point out might be
explained more clearly through the example of Bacon’s use of the word to explain the
paradoxical doubled nature of mechanical inventions as he writes in The Wisedome of the
Ancients: “mechanicall arts are of ambiguous use, serving as well for hurt as for remedy, and
they have in a manner power both to loose and bind themselves.”152 In Humanism, Machinery,
and Renaissance Literature, Jessica Wolfe writes in her introduction that “Bacon’s conflicted
attitude towards mechanical subtlety emerges most clearly in his interpretation of Daedalus in his
1609 De Sapientia Veterum”(Wolfe 12).153 Wolfe explains that Bacon sees Daedalus’ invention
as “simultaneously obfuscatory and enlightening,” and his analysis of the “Daedalian duplicity of
mechanics” in the De Sapientia Veterum helps to explain “his ambivalent depiction of the
discipline in The New Atlantis, where mechanical devices alternate between elucidation and
deception.”154 As Wolfe also points out, Bacon’s scientific method also reveals how Bacon
“oscillates between two contradictory definitions of subtlety,” and the scientific method and the

152
In The Wisedome of the Ancients, Bacon further expresses his discomfort toward the idea that scientific
inventions can offer a commercial exchange value that is perhaps far more real than the promise of future, more
immediate and practical than escaping the labyrinth: “hee which invented the intricate nooks of the Labyrinth, did
also shew the commodity of the clue” (sig. D11v).
153
Jessica Wolfe, Humanism, Machinery, and Renaissance Literature, 12. Wolfe writes that Bacon
interprets the Cretan engineer as an allegorical embodiment of mechanical artifice” in the fable entitled ‘Daedalus,
or Mechanique’ in The Wisdome of the Ancients. Wolfe points out that Bacon’s description of Daedalus’ intricate
and subtle design “represents machinery as simultaneously obfuscatory and enlightening” (12). Wolfe refers to
Bacon’s work with its Latin title.
154
Wolfe 12-13.

99
machines that enabled and could “denote an empirical, highly particularized mode of scientific
investigation” can also “signify an intellectual pitfall” and manipulate or veil truth.155
To assert his moral conviction for his mechanical device, Hooke writes an ambiguously
humble tract about a man-made mechanical device full of irregularities while still capable of
magnifying the divine work of God: “[S]o unaccurate is it, in all its productions, even those
which seem most neat, that if examin’d with an organ more acute than that by which they were
made, the more we see of their shape, the less appearance will there be of their beauty: whereas
in the works of nature, the deepest discoveries shew us the greatest Excellencies.”156 Even
though Hooke seems to underscore the obvious downfalls of the man-made machine, one must
still recognize some truth in Hooke’s claim that the microscope is a “superlative” medium, more
acute than the human eye itself, to watch as much details of nature’s beauty as we can and
appellate God’s omnipotence by transcribing what we see through a microscope as in the
drawings and prints Hooke offers in Micrographia:
An evident argument, that he that was the Author of all these things, was no other
then omnipotent; being able to include as great a variety of parts and contrivances
in the yet smallest Discernable Point, as in those vaster bodies (which
comparatively are also called Points) such as the Earth, Sun, or Planets. Nor need
it seem strange that the Earth it self may be by an analogie call’d a Physical Point:
For as its body, though now so near us to fill our eyes and fancies with a sense of
the vastness of it, may by a little distance, and some convenient Diminishing

155
Wolfe also writes: “Directed one way subtlety reveals truth; directed another way, it obfuscates that
truth. Bacon is ultimately unable either to oppose or wholly to embrace the use of machinery in his scientific method
precisely because machines embody both kinds of subtlety at once” (12). For Cavendish, this polarizing quality of
subtlety signifies a both eye-opening and blinding force leading to truth.
156
Hooke 2.

100
Glasses, be made vanish into a scarce visible Speak, or Point (as I have often try’d
on the Moon, and (when not too bright) on the sun it self.) So, could a Mechanical
contrivance successfully answer our theory, we might see the least spot as big as
the Earth it self; and Discover, as Des Cartes also conjectures, as great a variety of
bodies in the Moon, or Planets, as in the Earth.157
Nevertheless, in Micrographia visual representations take away from metaphoric representation
by presenting both too little of bigger patterns and too much of small details. As I discussed
earlier regarding Hooke’s magnification of a “point,” the nearness negates subtleness—the fact
that one sharp point can get near the other sharp point eradicates the possibility of subtlety. It is
important that Hooke associates physical sharpness with nearness, and even further, with
subtleness. From a small, sharp point, Hooke writes, begins a world; the fact that an
experimental scientist writes in metaphors to explain the world cannot overcome, Cavendish
would argue, the decontextualized nature of the microscopic observations he is preceding from:
“Truly, my reason can hardly be persuaded to believe, that this artificial informer (I mean the
microscope) should be so true as it is generally thought; for, in my opinion it, more deludes, than
informs. It is well known, that if a figure be longer, broader, and bigger than its nature requires,
it is not its natural figure” (Hooke 60). Again, for Cavendish, the physical nearness rather
deforms, not informs; there is only mental subtlety, conceptual sharpness. The distance between
things that create proportions, patterns, and depths makes it possible for augurers to perform their
augury and poets to create better metaphors and use poetic imaginations. Rather than using a
mechanical or external aid that merely offers physical nearness, Cavendish advocates using our
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own innate ability to compare and contrast to comprehend the truth more subtly, and it is the
ability to compare and contrast that inaugurates the artfulness of poetic imagination.
As with the term “subtile” being used in Hooke, the magnitude or extremity of material
subtlety becomes a fascination in Hooke’s microscopic observation. Hooke is fascinated by
sharpness and irregularity of a surface that is part of a bigger, more blunt landscape so that he
can define how sharp one thing is to the other. He wants to replace the practice of “discourse and
disputation” that relies on variables and comparisons with his microscopic studies; he argues that
the “productions of ruler and compasses” fail to deliver the kind of accuracy his microscope can
show: “The Points of Pins are yet more blunt, and the Points of the most curious Mathematical
Instruments do very seldome arrive at so great a sharpness; how much therefore can be built
upon demonstrations made only by the productions of the Ruler and Compasses, he will be better
able to consider that shall but view those points and lines with a Microscope.”158 It is interesting
that both Cavendish and Hooke use the similar analogy of comparison and contrast that only
something equally or more sharp will get through another subtle surface, as the actual tip of the
microscope is sharp and acute. However, while Hooke uses subtlety as a physical periphery
between two things, Cavendish’s delineation of “subtile observation” in The Blazing World
suggests something less material. Redolent of the sophisticated mastery of sprezzatura I
discussed in relation to Sidney earlier, her concept of “subtile observation” is laden with
laborious practice veiled under the “great practice” of keen intuitive knowledge, the kind of
sharp reasoning and swift wit essential for a courtly navigation. The knowledge gained from her
“subtile observation” seems to come from within, never quite seems to be external; it appears
rather simple outside while intricate inside; it is neither noisy nor obvious. Scientists appear
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clunky and loud in The Blazing World because Cavendish believes the “great work” of the
“subtile observation” should remain so subtle that the laborious work underneath and before the
outcome of one’s endeavor leaves enough distance for the audience to do their own “great work”
to appreciate and learn from it. Consider the similarities between political navigating in the court
and poetic “gilding” in artistic creation to achieve subtlety that hides “self love,” a quality that is
essential to these poets whose political and courtly career often determined their poetic career; it
becomes unequivocal that she uses nautical metaphors to express her concerns about the advent
of new science.159 As her description of “subtle observation” and “great practice” highlights the
machine’s affiliation with mechanical rudeness and lack of complexity, Cavendish believes that
mechanical science is not the answer to finding the truth, but rather the source of confusion and
deformation, and that such confusion and deformation of truth will result in the inevitable
changes in social, philosophical, and political views that will threaten the subtle and great way
people used to perceive the world to find truth.
Cavendish is consistent in the presentation of her beliefs. In “It is hard to believe, that
there are worlds in this world,” she argues that the microscopic world threatens the idea of a fluid
and soft world perceived through our sensory system. The title signals the underlying
metaphysical crisis triggered by the discovery of a microscopic world—the institutionalized
representation and knowledge of the fluid and mutable world becomes compartmentalized and
organized by the smaller worlds inside.
Nothing so hard in Nature, as Faith is,
For to believe Impossibilities:
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As doth impossible to us appeare,
Not ‘Cause ‘tis not, but to our sense not cleere;
But that we cannot in our Reason finde,
As being against Natures course, and kinde.
For many things our sense dull may scape,
For sense is grosse, not every thing can shape.
So in this World another world may bee,
That we do neither touch, tast, smell, heare, see.
What Eye so cleere is, yet did ever see
Those little Hookes, that in the Load-stone bee,
Which draw hard iron? or give Reasons, why
The Needles point still in the north lye.
As for Example, Atomes in the Aire,
We nere perceive, although the Light be faire.160
Our sense may be “dull” and “many things” could “escape” from our senses, and the microscope
might provide a sharper, clearer vision of things invisible to our “dull” naked eye; however, the
poet also suggests “sense is grosse” and “not everything can shape.” The microscope aims to
enhance the “grosse” human sense and give a shape to “this world” with the shapes of the “other
worlds in this world.” Although the shape under the microscope is still impossible to touch, taste,
smell, or hear, the inner “other worlds” define the outer—“this world”—as they give a “shape”
to “this world.” The world of subvisibilia, only visible through the microscope, gives new
additional content to the already visible and sensible world; as Christiane Frey points out, the
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microscopic worlds “become an arena for a new kind of science of the invisible just starting to
gain contour” (377).161 By using the word “contour,” Frey alludes to the ideology of shape and
form; without outlining one world from the other, neither world can be defined in terms of its
size or shape.162 Microscopic observation provides a visible knowledge that outlines the world of
the invisible, which gives significance—“contour”—to both the visible and invisible world.
Hooke writes in Micrographia that “the science of Nature has been already too long made only a
work of the brain and of Fancy: It is now high time that it should return to the plainness and
soundness of Observations on material and obvious things.”163 Even though we cannot fully trust
or rely solely on human senses, Hooke continues, accuracy is possible if we use “a sincere hand,
and a faithful eye, to examine, and to record, the things themselves as they appear.”164 Indeed,
these are the values of microscopic examination: remaining faithful to the pure examining
method of natural science while suppressing and policing human imagination and sense
perception. As Frey points out, Hooke believes that the “plainness and soundness of observation”
alone should “supersede” and control the imagination and sensory reflection.165 Only through an
“artificial instrument,” as Hooke describes his instrument, are we able to see the “plainness and
soundness” of the invisible world without being misguided or misinformed by reflection or
imagination.
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Cavendish, however, believes that the microscopic observation provides the “hard”
definition and circumscription of “this world,” which poses a threat to an ever-changing and
developing power of imagination and human sense perception. In addition, the idea of
subvisibilia signifies the infinite existence of “other worlds” inside “this world.” Frey points out
that although “both the microscope and the telescope occasion new theories and techniques of
pure observation,” Hooke believed “microscopic observations in particular lead to far-reaching
meditations on the nature of matter, the infinite smallness of the microcosm, and that which, in
spite of the microscope’s powers of magnification, is not able to be observed. Hooke’s ideal of
limiting observation entirely to what is visible is exceeded precisely with regard to the new,
microscopically delimited world.” Borrowing Cavendish’s words, “it is hard to believe” that
inside “this world” there are “other worlds,” which might contain more “other words” that yet
again contain more “other worlds” inside them, so on and so forth; the microscopic view not
only reveals what cannot be seen through the naked eye but also suggests the possibility of what
hasn’t been seen even through the microscopic view. The poet, in “It is hard to believe,”
carefully reiterates the signifiers that draw attention to the obvious differences between “gross”
physical reality and the “hard” abstract realm. To believe in something, human beings always try
to “shape” something invisible or impossible into visible or probable, thus believable. Once
something takes on a shape and form, it becomes the “hard” certainty.166 Nature does not stay in
a permanent “shape,” she argues, but “faith” does—“Nothing so hard in Nature, as Faith is,/ For
to believe in Impossibilities.” Soft things are hard to shape, and the poet believes that Nature—
“this world”—should remain soft, “gross” without “shape.” Notice the juxtaposition of concepts
such as “hard” and “believe” or “Impossibilities” and “believe”; the word “hard” in the title
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suggests difficulty while the one in the first line of the poem signifies density. Here she also
plays with the word “believe” as in believable knowledge as well as believing in faith. Natural
scientists would argue that things without density are more difficult to know, thus impossible to
even believe in their existence. She would argue that things with definitive shape or density do
not support the very principle of mutability that keeps “nothing so hard in Nature.”
Moreover, as if to accentuate the contrasting images of “hard” things in mutable Nature,
Cavendish includes the image of loadstone pulling hard iron: “Those little Hookes, that in the
Load-stone bee,/ Which draw hard iron.”167 Hooke in Micrographia describes Cavendish’s “little
Hookes” as “attractive virtue”: “Thus have I gently raised a Steel pendulum by a Loadstone to a
great angle, till by the shaking of my hand I have chanced to make a separation between them,
which is no sooner made, but as if the loadstone had retained no attractive virtue, the pendulum
moves freely from it towards the other side.”168 When Hooke strives to endow the magnetism or
the properties of a magnet with abstract values, Cavendish calls it as it would appear through the
microscope—“those little Hookes” pulling the “hard iron.” Hooke prophesies the “plainness and
soundness” of “the things themselves as they appear.”169 Yet Cavendish’s “those little Hookes”
seems far more plain and descriptive than Hooke’s “attractive virtue.”170 Furthermore, here is
Cavendish punning on the name “Hooke” to illustrate the image of a scientist laboring to “hook”
and pull one world to the other so that they are near each other; the nearness between two things
generate subtext for comparison, rather than objective scientific facts. The subtleness of the

Cavendish, “It is hard to believe, that there are other worlds in this world,” lines 12-13.
Hooke 32.
169
Hooke writes in The Preface: “It is high time that [the science of nature] should return to the plainness
and soundness of Observations on material and obvious things” (sig. B1r).
170
In her poem “It is hard to believe,” Cavendish describes how a magnet works using a plain language:
“Those little Hookes, that in the Load-Stone bee,/ Which draw hard Iron?” (lines 12-13). On the other hand, Hooke’s
description of a magnet in Micrographia is more conceptual and allusive: “So vast a difference is there between the
attractive virtues of congruity upon a contiguous and disjoined body” (32). I will leave it to the readers to decide
which description delivers a more vivid and persuasive image.
167
168
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subject, she would argue, rather becomes more comprehensible and vivid through the power of
imagination, rather than the aid of a microscope, which would only take us near the subject we
observe.
Cavendish contemplates—what should one believe, when even though the science has
now revealed the “other worlds” smaller than “this world” or greater than “this world,” there are
possibilities of more “other worlds” that haven’t been uncovered, which again might completely
rearrange or subvert the accepted, “hard” knowledge of the world? How does the microscopic
view, as it reveals such a confined, small world, avoid the partial, capricious, and artificial values
that establish the institutional values such as sizes and shapes that are co-dependent on other
artificial values? Is there truth that overrides these worldly conditions and holds its ubiquitous,
permanent “shape”? The “hard” evidence that the new science offers should come from the
“plainness and soundness” of the natural science, as Hooke argues, but even Hooke cannot avoid
using hyperbolic poetic language to emphasize the potential connection between the plain,
physical phenomenon and the inevitable authority of a non-physical realm, or what Cavendish
calls “Impossibilities.” In the fourth line of the poem it becomes clear—the poet points out that
things are invisible “not ‘cause ‘tis not, but to our sense not cleere.” The poet argues that “hard”
evidence is man-made, as there is “nothing so hard in Nature.” Sometimes what we cannot see or
feel embodies the aura of “Impossibilities” that engages our imagination, and without
imagination, there is no chance for “Impossibilities”: “As for Example, Atomes in the Aire,/ We
never perceive, although the Light be faire.” And if there are no “Impossibilities,” there is even
less chance for faith. Seeing as a sensory perception, whether through the naked eye or enhanced
by “the sincere hand” or optic devices, cannot completely avoid the possibility of mutability and
uncertainty; there might be another world inside the “other words in this world.” There are still
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things unknown and unseen, and the infinite possibility of subvisibilia makes the unseen and
undiscovered region much more significant. What has been touched, explored, or observed,
doesn’t leave much room for imagination and desire; knowledge and faith are two different
things, and here in her poem Cavendish suggests that hard things might offer knowledge but they
offer so little room for faith—hard things are perhaps too real, too “hard to believe” because they
eradicate our need to believe something beyond or invisible to us. Though the poet in “It is hard
to believe” acknowledges the tenuousness of sensory perception, she finds solace in innate
knowledge and faith without seeing microscopically or completely. Hooke’s microscopic
looking into what used to be unseen, shapeless, or unknown subordinates the world under the
microscope as one world gets “shape[d]” by the others that become visible through the
mechanically-aided vision. Cavendish rebukes the natural science’s endeavor to present the everchanging, shapeless—“grosse”—realm of nature as something “hard” with “shape.” By
describing a magnified image as something “hard” and with “shape,” Cavendish argues the
subtlety of microscopic view that Hooke praises fails to take us anywhere “neer” conceptual
clarity or subtlety, but rather dissuades and leads us farther away from “subtile observations” that
could result in a greater truth. We will see this same contrast in the next two chapters on Milton
(and, indeed, the final chapter, on Finch). While Hooke underlines the unreliability and need for
improvement of human senses with the external help of an optic device, Milton, aligning with
Cavendish and Sidney, considers accurate and fruitful vision to be in a significant sense
internally oriented. In the next chapters on Milton I will argue that Milton, in fact, believes the
lack of physical sight doesn’t create as much harm as the deficiency of spiritual sight, as
suggested by Milton’s delineation of Adam and Eve’s spiritual insight and faith in Paradise Lost;
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to appreciate and understand the true beauty and significance of God’s creations, Milton’s texts
imply, one must learn to read and decipher the material world through one’s spiritual eye.

4

CHAPTER 4: Milton, St. Augustine, and Illuminated Sight in Paradise Lost
At the very start of my project, I supplied a series of quotations that would guide my

discussion, among them Sidney’s assertion that “the inward light each mind hath in itself is as
good as a philosopher’s book.” I have now examined Sidney’s assertion in two general contexts:
first, with Sidney himself, as a means of explaining the special position of the poet, who, he
insisted, produces a special sort of truth, working from larger, universal principles and then
assorting specific aspects of the material or physical world to match; and, second, with
Cavendish, in the preceding chapter, I examined the implication of Sidney’s insistence on an
“inward light” in terms of one of the most vigorous debates that would arise in the years
following his death, the rise of experimental science and the steady adoption of an atomistic
materialism seeking truth through minute, repeated physical observations, which the major
authors in my study all stand in stark opposition to. In the following two chapters on Milton, I
would like to focus more specifically on a theme that has been running barely under the surface
of my discussion so far, the way that this “inward light” functions in terms of religion and
spiritual sight, as well as the inference that this spiritual sight is far more complete than Hooke’s
microscopic view. After examining Milton’s monist materialism, which collapses the
traditionally recognized dualism between material and spiritual and thus privileges spiritual sight
as the master of all human perception, I will introduce an additional major figure into my study,
Saint Augustine. The link between Saint Augustine and Milton has been, as I will show, widely
discussed by previous Milton scholars, and rightly so. As Irene Samuel writes in Plato and
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Milton, “As a Christian, Milton rejects Plato’s explanation that we won this knowledge in a
previous existence, that is, he rejects the doctrines of metempsychosis and recollection; but he
finds a convenient substitute in St. Augustine’s theory that God himself imparts knowledge of
the eternal Ideas to the human mind” (139). Indeed, Augustine describes a “mind’s eye” that
correlates perfectly with Sidney’s “inward light,” and these terms are freighted with additional
urgency and poignancy given Milton’s failing physical sight and eventual blindness. After
establishing a foundation for my use of the term “spiritual sight” that connects it squarely to my
earlier discussions of Sidney and Cavendish, the next two chapters will proceed with a series of
detailed readings of Paradise Lost, Samson Agonistes, and Paradise Regained to demonstrate the
importance of recognizing a spiritual sight separate from and superior to physical sight in
Milton’s poetry.
4.1

Milton, Matter, and Materialism
In Brief Notes Upon A Late Sermon Titled The Fear of God and the King by Matthew

Griffith, D.D., Milton composed an acerbic critique against the priest who tricks his pupils into
submitting to the sublime power of a sovereign:
[Griffith] begins in his Epistle to the General; and moves cunningly for a licence
to be admitted Physitian both to Church and State; then sets out his practice in
Physical terms, an wholsom electuary to be taken every morning next our hearts:
tells of the opposition which he met with from the College of state-Physicians,
then laies before you his drugs and ingredients; Strong purgatives in the pulpit,
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contemperd of the myrrhe of mortification, the aloes of confession and contrition,
the rubarb of restitution and satisfaction;171
The attribute of rhubarb as purging aid is both metonymical and figurative here in Milton’s
passage, as it is in other Renaissance poets’ use of the word.172 This immediate and visible
attribute—what it does and how it tastes—also makes this word available for creating religious
tropes about repentance and mortification. However, pay attention to the way Milton uses the
word’s figurative sense—the bitterness of the plant is associated with “restitution” and
“satisfaction,” random concepts that are seemingly unexpected. To understand the figurative
sense of Milton’s use of “rhubarb,” readers should first understand how figurative language
illuminates Milton’s resolution of the problem of mind-body dualism. In Milton Among the
Philosophers, Stephen Fallon argues for Milton’s affirmation of monist philosophy against the
rising authority of a mechanist world picture in the seventeenth century, and one of the most
compelling pieces of evidence for Milton’s monism provided by Fallon is Raphael’s description
of angels’ immaterial and material unity using the tropes of vegetables. Pointing at Hobbes and
Henry More, two of the most prominent scholars and scientists of Milton’s time, Fallon tries to
redirect previous Milton scholarship that “offers a chaotic list of sources and analogues for
Milton’s materialism,” a list that includes ancient through contemporary authorities such as
Gregory of Nyssa, Eusebius, the Zohar and cabbalist Robert Fluud, or Duns Scotus.173 Fallon

John Milton, Brief Notes Upon a Late Sermon, titl’d, The Fear of God and the King; Preached, and
since Published, By Matthew Griffith, D.D., sig.A2r.
172
For instance, in Shakespeare’s Macbeth: “what rhubarb, cyme, or what purgative drug,/ Would scour
these English hence?” (V. 3. 55-56). Also, from now on I will use the standard spelling of the word, “rhubarb.” See:
The Riverside Shakespeare, 2nd ed, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1997).
173
On the notable discussions of the philosophical influences on Milton’s materialism, Fallon credits
Marjorie Hope Nicolson for her early studies of Milton, Henry More, and Thomas Hobbes. For more on Nicolson’s
influential works, see, “The Spirit World of Milton and More,” Studies in Philology 22 (1925): 433-52, “Milton and
Hobbes,” Studies in Philology 23 (1926): 405-33, and “Milton and the Conjectura Cabbalistica,” Philological
Quarterly 6 (1927): 1-18. On the influence of Gregory of Nyssa Fallon mentions William Hunter, and A. S. P.
171
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notes Marjorie Hope Nicolson’s discussion of Henry More’s and Thomas Hobbes’ influence on
the development of Milton’s ontology, though cautioning in the introduction to his book that
Nicholson’s “articles linking Milton to Henry More and contrasting him with Hobbes offer only
a half-truth” (4).
Literal representation can be as opaque as figurative representation if the tenor of each
metaphoric articulation becomes more and more obscure and personal. Milton’s shifting
representation and articulation of the celestial and earthly world reveal the changes in the poet’s
philosophical understanding. “As with Hobbes and Henry More, Milton’s conception of angels
derives from his ontological assumptions” (141), writes Fallon, and we can construe that the
philosophical context of Milton’s depiction of vegetables with soul and angels with body is the
hybrid creation of such “assumptions,” informed by and reacting against the contemporary
metaphysical assumptions of body and soul. Fallon’s argument contrasts with that of Nicholson,
for Fallon insists that Milton never demonstrated the Cambridge Platonists’ dualist response to
the threat of Hobbesian mechanism that circumscribes the power of free will.174 Milton was able
to link material nourishment with spiritual growth; such a trope consistently appears throughout
Milton’s various works, and the trope is self-explanatory: the nourishment of words will feed the
readers’ soul. The power of free will is the power to grow—with virtuous intention, one will look
to God and grow taller and higher. And as the humans can grow and change, so do the angels:

Woodhouse for examining the possible influences of Eusebius, the Stoics, and Robert Fluud. He also suggests John
Rumrich’s Matter of Glory: A New Preface to “Paradise Lost,” which links Milton’s materialism with Duns Scotus.
For further readings on the Cambridge Platonists, see: Rosalie L. Colie’s Light and Enlightenment: A
Study of the Cambridge Platonists and the Dutch Arminians; Philosophy, Science, and Religion in England 16401700 by Richard Kroll, Richard Ashcraft, and Perez Zagorin; A. C. Crombie, Augustine to Galileo: The History of
Science A.D. 400-1650. Reason and the Imagination: Studies in the History of Ideas 1600-1800 edited by J. A.
Mazzeo provides a broad spectrum of seminal works on science, idea, and the world view. Transformation and
Tradition in the Science: Essays in Honor of I. Bernard Cohen edited by Everett Mendelsohn covers a span of
several centuries and contains an excellent section on the history of early science in England.
174
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Wonder not then, what God for you saw good
If I refuse not, but convert, as you,
To proper substance; time may come when men
With angels may participate, and find
No inconvenient diet, nor too light fare:
And from these corporeal nutriments perhaps
Your bodies nay at last turn all to spirit,
Improved by tract of time, and winged ascend
Ethereal as we, or may at choice
Here or in Heav’nly paradises dwell (V. 491-500)
Following Raphael’s speech on the “one first matter” to Adam, according to Fallon, the text
above “makes explicit the monist basis of that materiality” (141). In the previous lines Raphael
introduces “one first matter”: “one Almighty is, from whom/ All things proceed, and up to Him
return,/ If not depraved from good, created all/ Such to perfection, one first matter all,/ Endued
with various forms, various degrees/ Of substance, and in things that live, of life” (V. 469-74).
There is one matter, which is also the first matter; the rest and later are “endued” with different
forms, and the variation of this “one first matter” defines the physical reality of the matter. The
OED offers various definitions and uses of the word “endue” including “to take in, ‘inwardly
digest’” (II. 2. b), “to put on as a garment” (IV. 6. a), and “to be invested with power or quality”
and “to be inherent in” (V. 9. b). The last definition also offers an example from Milton’s Sonnet
7: “And inward ripenes doth much less appear,/ That som more timely-happy spirits indu'th.” No
matter which definition best explains “one first matter all/ Endued with various forms,” there is
an insight supported by Milton that the inward growth directly represents the outward growth, as
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the matter is cloaked by the physical body, inward spiritual growth is literally veiled under the
material body. But the spiritual growth is real and physical as well; the green leaf of the top of
the plant is indeed the sign of the spiritual nearness to God, as much as ethereal angels’ being
light and airy signifies their pure souls, making it possible for them to be near the higher
existence. Inward purity will shape the outward appearance of the matter, as well as pure soul
will compose and shape a body “more spirituous, and pure” enough to be lifted up and be “nearer
to him,” explains Milton in Paradise Lost (V. 475-76).175
According to Fallon, Raphael’s analogy between plant metabolism and the
transformation of body into spirit in this text suggests the possibility of the “ontological
continuity that he has just illustrated, that man can turn into angel” (141). The possibility is real
and limitless though it has not yet happened, not been described yet. Furthermore, the possibility
exists for both angels and men. Whether angel or human, they are all “one first matter,” thus
containing the same substance and going through the same sublimation of their material
substance: “Milton viewed angels and human souls as similar in substance; the tenuously
corporeal angels of Paradise Lost resemble the tenuously corporeal souls of Christian Doctrine.
Milton’s angels are not Aquinas’s disembodied spirits; their substance, like the mode of reason,
differs from man’s ‘but in degree, of kind the same’” (Fallon 142). That Milton often uses tropes
of vegetables and fruits, perhaps most frequently among the gardening tropes in Paradise Lost, is
not uncommon to remark; many scholars have discussed Milton’s use of vegetation metaphors—
as in the scenes when Adam and Eve discuss gardening and labor in Paradise in Paradise Lost as
well as the tropes of farming and seasonal changes in Paradise Regained—in order to reveal the

“But more refined, more spirituous, and pure,/ As nearer to him placed or nearer tending/ Each in their
several active spheres assigned,/ Till body up to spirit work, in bounds/ Proportioned to each kind” (V. 475-79).
175
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religious undertones of Milton’s articulations of literature as the vehicle of religious
transformation and the subsequent elevation of human kind.
Karen L. Edwards, in Milton and the Natural World, provides numerous insightful
examinations of Milton’s understanding of the new knowledge of the world fostered by the
advent of science, and I also find her inclusion of Hooke intriguing:
Hooke’s praise of “a new visible world” in the preface to Micrographia is often
taken to herald the experimentalists’ belief that to see is to know, a belief that led
ultimately to what David Michael Levin has called the “hegemony of vision.” But
Hooke’s praise of optic lenses does not make an easy equation between seeing
and knowing. He acknowledges that that which is seen must be interpreted. To
see a structure does not allow direct access to knowing any more than reading
words does, for the interpreting mind must represent what it sees. (80)
Edwards follows her reading with a passage from Hooke’s Micrographia in which Hooke
discloses that even though he wants to show the “true appearance” of various objects, he feels
the need to provide an additional interpretive step to produce a “plain representation” of them.176
But notice how the microscopic view makes it rather more challenging for Hooke to find that one
“true appearance”:
I never began to make any draught before by many examinations in several lights,
and in several position to those lights, I had discover’d the true form. For it is
exceeding difficult in some objects, to distinguish between a prominency and a
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Hooke, The Preface, Micrographia. sig.F2v. The discrepancy between what one sees and what one
represents—draws or describes--is inevitable regardless of how “plain” the representation can get: “[T]he Gravers
have pretty well follow’d my directions and draughts; and that in making of them, I indeavoured (as far as I was
able) first to discover the true appearance, and next to make a plain representation of it. This I mention the rather,
because of these kind of Objects there is much more difficulty to discover the true shape, then of those visible to the
naked eye, the same object seeming quite differeing, in one position to the Light, from what it really is, and may be
discover’d in another.”
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depression, between a shadow and a black stain, or a reflection and a whiteness in
the colour. Besides, the transparency of most objects renders them yet much more
difficult then if they were opacous.177
As Edwards explains, it is hard to determine the extent to which Milton was influenced by the
new knowledge of the world provided by experimental science. Even though Milton no longer
had sight to read or see the microscopic details of a flea or a plant such as rhubarb, Milton’s
“reformed mode of natural analogy,” as Edwards calls it, is worth examining here because my
discussion of sixteenth- and seventeenth-century poets’ use of figurative language will ultimately
reveal that the discoveries of scientific knowledge of the time advanced not just the abstract,
objective, and empiricist understanding about the world, but also that these scientific discoveries
promoted the legitimacy and expediency of turning poetic representation into day-to-day tropes
about economic and social exchanges such as farming or gardening, and even more importantly,
making tropes about religious enlightenment as real and literal as natural phenomena and
conditions.
Through his description of the purpose of the microscope, Hooke argues that the world
will become better-known through the mechanical aid of the device; thus he strives to “promote
the use of mechanical helps for the senses, both in surveying the already visible world and for the
discovery of many others hitherto unknown, and to make us, with the great conqueror, to be
affected that we have not yet overcome one world when there are so many others to be
discovered, every considerable improvement of telescopes or microscopes producing new worlds
and Terra-Incognitas to our view.”178 That blindness forced Milton to adapt virtually the process
Hooke describes as a new, exciting direction available to the enlightenment is worth pointing out
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Hooke, The Preface, Micrographia. sig.F2v.
Hooke, sig. D2v.
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here. Seeing, in both a material and immaterial sense, becomes real with Milton and Hooke.
Seeing directly leads the observer to discovery and knowledge, thanks to the very basic tenet of
delivering “terra-incognita” into “our view.” Seeing what was invisible, and not being concerned
in what sense an object was invisible at that moment to the naked eye, was never Milton’s loss
when he lost his vision; at least, that was Milton’s belief, and Paradise Lost is there to show his
possession of spiritual vision, more even to prove his spiritual gain. Milton might have lost his
capacity to see what was visible to his naked eye, but not to see what was visible to his inner or
spiritual eye. Hooke almost believes that the microscope offers the similar kind of revelation,
seeing what was invisible through the distortion of the visible. Seeing “terra incognita” or the
darkness first—the obliteration of what is visible to the naked eye to get to the point of seeing
again—before seeing “new worlds” is inevitable for both Hooke’s microscopic and Milton’s
spiritual seeing.
Milton’s tropes involving attributes of plants and animals perform a specific role of
signification in his works; understanding how a plant grows into a tree or produces a fruit helps
us understand Milton’s poetic and religious anticipation for the world that he desires to see in the
future, presented in both Paradise Lost and Paradise Regained. Seeing is indeed the mind’s
work for the blind poet. Milton’s faith and anticipation for religious reformation and poetic
innovation should remind us of the labor required for a pious believer who seeks God’s truth.
Anticipation is critical—it not only exhibits the degree of faith but also postulates time and place
in the future tense. It is clear that Paradise Lost is envisioned by a poet who looks forward to
seeing the Paradise to come; this wishful tone is in the experience of reading the text as if
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different color hues are perceived by the degree of various shades.179 Through Paradise Lost
Milton conveys the faithful believers’ aspiration for the Paradise to which they will someday
return. The narrative about a heavenly place once promised but now lost always has a universal
appeal, especially embodying the emblem of loss and promise of heaven altogether. Even though
the tone of repentance and anguish continues throughout the text, Paradise Lost also leaves
readers wondering what the future will be, inspiring them to look forward into the future, not
look back into the past. The tense of Paradise Lost is in the past, but the readers are already
looking into the future, aspiring to regain what has been lost. Paradise Lost teaches its readers
how to anticipate in and wish for something that is invisible and absent in their present, physical
realm; the physical eye can’t accomplish this learning task.
Trivial things—such as a rhubarb—become significant in Milton’s works because the
small, powerless objects become the symbol of growth and change that are immanent of greater
aspirations. Additionally, time, as with Milton’s life-long political project, must take its course to
make something small and insignificant into something life- and history-changing. Looking
backward is an integral part of looking forward, as microscopic looking in and macroscopic
looking out define each other. For instance, in Areopagitica (1644), Milton argues that a nation’s
cultural sophistication is defined by its “subtle and sinewy” rhetoric: “a Nation not slow and dull,
but of a quick, ingenious, and piercing spirit; acute to invent, suttle and sinewy to discours, not
beneath the reach of any point the highest that human capacity can soar to.”180 Again, pay
attention to the conceptual movement and direction of the adjectives that Milton carefully lists
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The hope is felt, not read—I will explore this idea more fully later in my discussion of the Augustinian
theory of illumination and intelligent order and the difference between and co-existence of wisdom (sapientia) and
knowledge (scientia).
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John Milton, Areopagitica: A Speech of Mr. John Milton, for the Liberty of Unlicens'd Printing, to the
Parliament of England. The passage quoted comes from Complete Prose Works of John Milton, Vol. II 1643-1648,
Ed. Ernest Sirluck, 551.
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above—slow, low, and dull to fast, high, and sharp.181 Milton’s phrase “subtle and sinewy”
reinforces the idea that the invisible but subtle, abstract ideas are a living part of bigger, sharp,
and tangible voices that move the readers to take an action; again, writing—writing poetry, more
specifically—in this sense must go somewhere higher and larger than its printed page; when the
sentence ends, its idea should live on and continue to work outside the text. With or without the
microscopic information of the structure of the world, with or without the articulation of how the
world exists through the aid of science and mechanical advancements, poetic representation finds
a way to represent the world through mirroring and projecting, beyond the limitations as well as
the expectations of scale or detail. Understanding the metaphoric relationships that exist in nature
might be more delightful and instructive than looking through a microscope to find out what the
naked eyes cannot see.
Seeing represents the faith beyond reason or belief for both Hooke and Milton. The
unmoving will to focus and zoom in to find the light of enlightenment is undeniably paramount
in the process of Milton’s looking forward to the regaining of Paradise and Hooke’s looking in to
unveil “terra incognita.” Hooke makes an intriguing statement about opacity and transparency:
“[T]he transparency of most objects renders them yet much more difficult then if they were
opacous.”182 Milton uses the same word “opacous” in describing the nebulosity of the Earth, and
Adam, in Book VIII of Paradise Lost, seems to be suspicious about the Ptolemaic idea of the sun
revolving around the earth, asking Raphael about celestial orders and motions:
When I behold this goodly frame, this world
Of heav’n and Earth consisting, and compute
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For Milton, it seems to me, it is immoral to take time and space if there were no change or anticipation
of change to come. We will revisit the issue of time when I discuss how Adam and Eve disagree about their idea of
how to spend time. The word “spend” here however is polarizing.
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Hooke, The Preface, Micrographia, sig. F2v.
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Their magnitudes, this Earth a spot, a grain,
An atom, with the firmament compared
And all her numbered stars, that seem to roll
Spaces incomprehensible (for such
Their distance argues and their swift return
Diurnal) merely to officiate light
Round this opacous Earth, this punctual spot
One day and night, in all their vast survey
Useless besides, reasoning I oft admire
How nature wise and frugal could commit
Such disproportions with superfluous hand (VIII. 15-27)
Milton’s use of the word “officiate” is also noteworthy. The ambiguous micro- and macro-scopic
implications of Milton’s and Hooke’s use of the word “opaque” reveal perhaps different but
similar views of the way seeing aided their believing. Milton is obscured and veiled by the
opaque sheen that prohibits him from seeing the Sun through his physical eye; he embodies the
opaque body itself, the blinded, veiled orbit, the earth to be looked in, examined and tested, and
protected and renewed by God, the sun. Note that the opacity here is not with God but covering
over the object of examination; the opacity obscures the object’s—Milton’s--view of the sun, or
God. And God is ubiquitous, but our certain corporeal circumstances make it difficult to see
Him. Adam is both suspicious and inspired by the “opacous” sheen that creates distortions and
disproportions and is part of “nature wise,” which is also created by God. In this sense, Milton
implies the challenge he feels in seeing both physically and spiritually since the loss of his
physical sight. This vexing irregularity and irrationality exhibited in nature is the proof of God’s
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work and His existence, as the poet must confront and embrace the similar challenges of absent
physical sight and a shielded view of the physical world. The poet not only embodies the blinded
eyeball, but his blindness to the outside world also makes him compare himself to “the opacous
Earth” after the Fall, as the poet calls the earth “this punctual spot” waiting to be found and
saved by that warm benevolent force far away and above. When Milton compares the earth and
himself to the “punctual spot,” it is clear that he faithfully anticipates the salvation and the return
of Paradise; being punctual and remaining hopeful in the face of darkness requires a practice of
patience and firm faith. The poet represents a persistent believer who patiently waits for the sun
to shine through the poet’s obscured world and help him see beyond his own obstacles and
ambiguities. That Adam wonders “how nature wise and frugal could commit such
disproportions” suggests that the poet is suspicious of the Ptolemaic system, but more
importantly, this insight signifies that the poet, like the night waiting for the daybreak, is so
anxious to be found and shone upon by God’s warm light, soon and persistently, that he wonders
why he doesn’t just circle around the sun, immediately and eternally, so that he can always be in
the presence of such light. But this endless light without darkness will ruin all the grain and
eventually burn up everything, including the poet. Seeing too much, all at once and permanently,
has its fatal consequences, and the poet’s blindness allows his experience of being unveiled to be
even more illuminating.
When Hooke looks through the microscope at the fly’s wings, he is faced with multiple
layers of transparent surfaces, which makes the process of looking through each and focusing
upon a specific plane difficult. Hooke’s statement that “the transparency of most objects renders
them yet much more difficult then if they were opacous” ironically echoes with Milton’s both
frustration and admiration of the ambiguous ways Nature, God’s creation, works; abundance and
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clarity often do not go well together. There are perhaps too many transparent layers, too much to
see and understand at once, so that the abundance of the information available at the eyepiece of
the microscope is perhaps not an ideal situation for a scientist after all. As Hooke says, opacity
confronts him with challenges, but they are challenges that enable and anticipate solutions and
rewards. Perhaps science, religion, and poetry all agree on the slowly realized but certainly
existing value of opacity reigning over the immediate and easily visible value of transparency.
Hooke is aware of the microscope’s potential danger to enhance the technological and
mechanical abandonment of spiritual sight as he tirelessly tries to connect spirituality with the
microscopic view of the world. In Milton’s description of “opacous Earth,” the poet is the one
being looked at, being examined and signified by God, but Hooke’s objects cannot possess, or,
more importantly, cannot unveil, the human qualities of anguish, anticipation, and aspiration. In
his experiment, Hooke plays the part of the examiner who reigns over and looks at the minute
things from the “opacous Earth.” Adam’s macroscopic view of looking out to the
incomprehensible frame of the celestial world is juxtaposed with the blind poet’s microscopic
view of the world that offers him a self-examining look into his imagined world in Paradise
Lost, and this self-reflective, microscopic look into oneself concedes a self-expanding
transformation that guarantees any kind of imperfection or hardship—even including the poet’s
blindness—that is part of God’s design.183 Thus with Milton, opacity is not projected; it is not
away from or outside the poet, but within. Therefore, the poet tries to understand and see the
universe through the less-than-perfect, opaque lens within while the microscope rather tries to
remove it (though the scientist does see the importance and necessity of opacity).
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To state the obvious, but self-reflection is an integral part of understanding God; one must know himself
first to know God.
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Hooke’s desire to access and then interpret “terra incognita” signifies an empiricist quest
for conquering, the sort of reductionist approach to obtaining new knowledge for which science
has often been criticized. If Hooke wants to illuminate as much as possible through his
mechanical device, Milton wants to reflect as much as he believes through his poetic device.
Notice the fundamental fissure between Milton’s seeing rooted in imagination and Hooke’s
seeing anchored to evidence. Milton’s approach to his articulation of the universe, whether
influenced by the new scientific knowledge or not, still protects the domain of mystery and
opacity. The zooming in, illuminating power of the microscope works against the very core of
the mimetic process of poetry, which entails expansion through imitation. Even more,
illumination is not about the light within oneself, but about giving light to something,
someone.184 The word “illumination” always signifies the source of light outside itself, the light
being thrown to something that makes something appear more than obvious. The microscopic
illumination of the object might reveal some material interior of the object, but it cannot reveal
the intellectual or spiritual presence within. The definitions of the word “illuminate” provided in
the OED clearly reveal the transitive verb function of this word, taking one or two objects to
complete its action. The act of illuminating always requires the one that illuminates the other. To
put a light on something is to make something show, and it is indeed a passive revelation, or, to
be exact, not a revelation at all. What Milton then tries to accomplish, by avoiding the empirical
approach of uncovering mysteries by illuminating lights on them and zooming in, is a reflection
upon his own doubts and uncertainties as he slowly but surely comes to a better understating of
the mysteries he hasn’t seen through his physical eyes. This again supports why Milton imagines

According to OED, the word comes from the Latin participial stem of “illūmināre,” which means “to
throw light on, light up, brighten, set in a clear light, make illustrious”; also it means “to baptize, to kindle, to paint
or limn in colours” in medieval Latin. As transitive verb, “illuminate” signifies “to light up; give light to” (OED
1.a).
184
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“the mind through all her powers/ Irradiate” and desires to “there plant eyes” as he pleads for the
spiritual eye in Book III of Paradise Lost; only the spiritual light that “shine[s] inward” can
guide us to see the “things invisible to mortal sight” and to “purge and disperse” falsehood from
truth (III. 51-52, 55).185
The OED entry also offers a useful example of “illuminate” from Paradise Lost,
including the lines from Book VII where Raphael describes God’s creation of light:
And God made two great Lights, great for thir use
To Man, the greater to have rule by Day,
The less by Night alterne: and made the Starrs,
And set them in the Firmament of Heav'n
To illuminate the Earth, and rule the Day
In thir vicissitude, and rule the Night,
And Light from Darkness to divide. (VII. 346-52)
This is not a kind of light that penetrates and blinds, but by degree and gradation it creates its
own significance. Darkness exists on the earth as the lack or disappearance of the day, the
specific time and space that is called “night.” This is a light that gives and creates, even in its
absence.186 The microscopic zeroing-in process involves a different kind of illumination, willed
by a mechanistic claim that probably can more fittingly be paired with a Hobbesian mechanism
that believes that the extension of the material machine is as far as the mind can and ever will be
extended. In Paradise Lost, especially in the conversation between Adam and Raphael, Milton
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This passage (III. 51-55) from Paradise Lost is one of the main inspirations for this dissertation.
The example from Paradise Lost I included above appears in the first list of definitions of “illuminate”
as a transitive verb in OED (1.a). Even though the sense of pervasiveness and exteriority—the light that shines upon
and takes an object to shine its light on—is also inevitable, the sense of giving and regenerative light is more
prevalent in those lines from Paradise Lost. The light shone through a microscope however delivers a different kind
of illumination.
186
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clearly eschews any metaphysical idea that suggests the limitation of free will—not just for
human beings, but for any living thing, such as vegetables and angels. Any living thing has a
potential to learn and grow—to “shine inward,” “irradiate,” “purge and disperse,” and to “see
and tell/ Of things invisible to mortal sight” (III. 52-55).
Adam in the above lines from Book VIII expresses his doubt of the efficiency of divine
creation. He acknowledges the world containing both heaven and earth as a constructed, material
existence when he calls it a “goodly frame” (VIII. 15). When Adam tries to perceive the
physical size and distance of the geocentric celestial sphere that God designed, he is trying to
“compute their magnitudes” (16-17). The earth is a physically small place compared to the
incomprehensible size of other celestial entities, as is seen when we review the signifiers he uses
to describe the earth: “this earth a spot,” “a grain,” “an atom with the firmament,” and “all her
[earth’s] numbered stars” (17-19). Note how the verbs describing Adam’s action change to
reveal different cognitive processes occurring in these lines; at first Adam “beholds” the frame of
the world—he looks, observes, and then he perceives. This act of “beholding” is both active and
passive for Adam; as he looks at/perceives/conceives the idea of what he is looking at, he
imagines the object he is observing —the goodly frame, the stars, and even God—
simultaneously looking back at him, creating a concurrent reciprocal relationship between the
object and the observer. The word “behold” also appears in Book IX of Paradise Lost: “How
shall I behold the face/ Henceforth of God or Angel, earst with joy/ And rapture so oft beheld?”
(IX. 1080-82). The OED suggests that “behold” here is used to signify an action involving
human perception: “to hold or keep in view, to watch; to regard or contemplate with the eyes; to
look upon, look at (implying active voluntary exercise of the faculty of vision)” (I. 7. a). On the
other hand, the stars are “numbered” but they still “seem to roll spaces incomprehensible”—note
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that the “spaces” that are “incomprehensible” signify both the atomist materialist world and the
spiritual world, both worlds making it difficult for Adam to comprehend the divine "frame" of
the world. It is a "goodly" frame, but impossible to be comprehended by human scales and
perception. In his discussion of Hobbes and Milton, Fallon suspects that “simple diametrical
opposition thus does not suffice as a description of the relationship between Milton and Hobbes”
and argues that when most of Milton’s contemporaries supported incorporeal substance to fence
off Hobbes’ mechanist materialism, “Milton’s opposition to him took another form, one that
adopted an assumption shared by Hobbes and the new science: the materiality of all entities. It is
against this common background that Milton’s opposition to Hobbes must be viewed, for the
similarities make Milton’s ultimate repudiation of him more significant” (130).187 The certainty
or lucidity of the material existence doesn’t signal the spiritual existence for Milton; however,
the opacity of the material existence requires the need for spiritual abundance. The machine
doesn’t run because it has been running; nor does it need an external force to get it running. It
runs because of the inner will that initiated its movement. The body cannot move without its
spirit, and the spirit has nothing to show or prove its moving, material existence.
Adam’s description of the earth is redolent of Hooke’s microscopic view of his small
objects, looking from a distance necessary for the observer and the lens to position and observe
the target object. Ironically, though one be microscopic and the other macroscopic, both Hooke

Fallon argues that even though various critics try to explain Milton’s ambiguous view on science by
pointing to “Milton’s Baconian enthusiasm in the ‘Third Prolusion’ and to the eager commendation of scientific
endeavor in the ‘Seventh Prolusion’” and by contrasting those examples with Milton’s reticence toward astronomy
in Paradise Lost and his criticism against showy but futile knowledge in Paradise Regained (135). Fallon explains
that those opinions derive from the assumption that Milton disagrees with the new science “only because it is not
congruent with the wisdom of the past” (135). On the other hand, Fallon suggests, Milton’s apathetic reaction to the
new science, especially starting from the 1640s, is based on “rational and not merely nostalgic grounds” and that we
should notice how “Milton did not wholeheartedly support a project that eagerly co-opted the metaphysics of
Descartes,” as Milton “fundamentally opposed the separate existence of an aspiritual material universe, which was
the laboratory of the new philosophy” (135).
187
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and Milton show their concern and even obsession with the potential view that can be induced
from looking in, for the movement is toward the object, not the vast structure that holds the
content; in other words, when Adam says, “when I behold this goodly frame,” he has already
moved onto questioning the content and function of the “goodly frame.” The adjective “goodly”
could express the quality of good appearance and of well-proportioned as well as something that
is “notable in respect of size, quantity, or number,” as the OED suggests, but what I would like to
point out here is that the adjective “goodly” does focus on the frame of things, the appearance of
things, or the exterior holding and assuming the interior. Adam indeed expounds that the frame
of God’s creation, the world itself as it appears to him, looks good enough as far as appearance is
concerned. Now, the real question is whether the good appearance of something means
something is really good. Granted, this is the most basic and frequent question asked regarding
appearance and reality, but my analysis of this particular passage shows Adam’s quandary about
the discrepancies between what he sees—or what he doesn’t see—and the discrepancies between
perception and truth.188
How does a scientific observation conducted by humans, even with the mechanistic aid of
scopes, observe, and even further, explain, what our sight cannot physically reach? The
microscopic lenses can reach as far as they can, but what awaits after that? How do we believe
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The OED definitions of the word “goodly” emphasize the outwardly, material appearance: “Of good or
pleasing appearance; handsome, beautiful, good-looking; comely, fair” (1.a) or “notable in respect of size, quantity,
or number; fairly large, sizeable” (5). The phrase “this goodly frame” appears in Shakespeare’s Hamlet (II. 2. 298).
Hamlet compares his pretended appearance to the “goodly frame, the earth” where happy pedestrian life seems to
obscure or forget the tragedies and disasters that occur day to day on the earth: “[W]herefore I know not—lost all
my mirth, foregone all/ custom of exercises; and indeed it goes so heavily with/ my disposition, that this goodly
frame, the earth,/ seems to me a sterile promontory; this almost excellent/ canopy, the air, look you, this brave
o’erhanging/ firmament, this majestical roof fretted with golden fire,/ why, it appeareth nothing to me but a foul and
pestilent/ congregation of vapors” (II. 2. 296-303). By comparing his “disposition” and “goodly frame” to “a sterile
promontory” and “a foul and pestilent congregation of vapors,” Hamlet suggests the discrepancy between how he
performs to appear to the world outside him and what really goes on inside his mind that he has to conceal from the
world. I am quoting from the second edition of The Riverside Shakespeare. See: The Riverside Shakespeare, 2nd ed.
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1997).
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and rely on the knowledge gained through observation to define or deter something? When
Adam sees the world and “beholds this goodly frame,” he confesses “something yet of doubt
remains” (VIII. 13). Why do the heavenly bodies circle around the earth at unimaginable speeds
when it is more “superfluous” for the earth to move? Why did nature “wise and frugal” commit
“such disproportions,” wonders Adam (VIII. 26-27). These are the similar suspicions Cavendish
raised against Hooke’s description of microscopic details of minute bodies: a microscopic view
might gain us more variety of seeing the world, but what do we do with all the information? For
Cavendish, the abundance of information from observation threatens the logical representation
and understanding of the world and thus too much information was proven unnecessary and
unproductive for human perception and knowledge of the world. But for Milton the observation
itself, combined with the theological “frame” of the world, creates a logical fissure in human
perceptive understanding of the world. Why is there such an illogical mistake as stars rolling
around the earth when it should be the other way? If there is indeed a fissure in divine logic, then
how do we resolve it? The comely looking “frame,” after all, can contain “such disproportions.”
It is equally significant to note how Milton circumscribes the material limitation as the earth’s
significance while the rest of the heavenly construction expands and blurs physical boundaries—
geometrical and material quantification—that define their scale and magnitude. That the earth’s
opacity blocks itself away from the warmth and light of the sun echoes with the
“incomprehensible” size, distance, and speed of stars and “spaces” (VIII. 20). Note that Adam
says he tried to “compute” the world’s “magnitudes” to understand the “useless” operation of the
stars rolling around the earth. Fallon also points out that during Milton’s time with the advent of
the new science the “materiality (which allowed for observation, quantification, and
measurement) increasingly became a leading test of reality or existence. Proponents of active
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incorporeal substance, by definition imperceptible, scrambled to provide empirical evidence of
the activity of that substance” (134). Measuring units became more and more articulate and
expressive in defining the materiality of both heavenly and earthly worlds. In Paradise Lost
Adam wants to measure a qualitative entity using a quantitative and mathematical reckoning
even though he simultaneously notes that it will be impossible to measure and understand
“spaces incomprehensible” because the earth can only be measured by being compared to such
physical and material entities as “a spot, grain,/ An atom with the firmament” (VIII. 17-8).
Meanwhile, even though humans “numbered” stars and announced that they “seem to roll,” since
the “spaces” the “goodly frame” holds together inside are incomprehensible, how far the stars
“roll” and thus how “swift” the stars “roll” are impossible to be computed. The things
comparable are the things comprehensible; the things with material weight and scale are the
things that Adam can see as well as understand. In Adam’s doubtful inquiries, we spot the poet’s
subtle articulation of how the conventional frame of the celestial world constrains and
manipulates the human logic.
Perhaps then it is more than human logic, perhaps something more like a poetic
imagination that Milton suggests might help us understand such inconsistent and illogical design.
The “incomprehensible” problem that cannot be solved by computing should naturally be dealt
with through a means that is beyond logical and measurable material means. However, Milton’s
monist animist materialism doesn’t just deny everything “material”—what Milton offers is the
combination of the two opposites, not the complete denial or obliteration of the other. The
illogical, inarticulate, and immaterial something is in and with the logical and measurable
material means.
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4.2

Augustine’s Visual Metaphor and Spiritual Seeing
That Milton’s attention to inner or spiritual vision appears related to Saint Augustine has

been widely remarked, and at this point I would like to introduce Augustine into my discussion
to supplement my earlier descriptions of Sidney’s “inward light” (indeed, Augustine’s writings
would have been familiar to the superbly well-read Seidney, as well). In “Vision: The Eye of the
Body and the Eye of the Mind in Saint Augustine’s ‘De Trinitate’ and ‘Confessions,’” Margaret
Miles examines Augustine’s use of visual metaphor and argues that “the metaphor of physical
vision constitutes the leitmotiv throughout Augustine’s many accounts of spiritual vision” (126).
Augustine compares an act of seeing to knowing, and, as Miles astutely points out, “it is a
metaphor which enables Augustine to distinguish internal spiritual things more subtly and to
describe them more easily” (126). Augustine’s metaphor of the “eyes of our hearts, with which
God may be seen” (Sermons 88. 5) not only emphasizes the distance between the material and
immaterial entity, but it also links the physical eye as a constituent part of the spiritual eye, and
this congruency between a material and immaterial entity enables men to see “That which is”
(Confessions 7.17. 23).189 To see the truth, one must feel the truth through one’s heart, Augustine
suggests, so that physical vision is the vehicle that connects the concept with the observer or
receiver of the sensation, just as metaphors work by acknowledging the distance between the
image and the word. The distance between the object and the articulation point—the distance to
the observer’s eye or the brain that receives the image and interprets the distance between the
thing itself and the means to articulate or delineate it—also makes necessary the human effort to
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Sermons on the New Testament 51-94, translated by Edmund Hill, 422 ; The Confessions of Saint
Augustine, translated with an introduction and notes by E. B. Pusey, 152. Various translations of St. Augustine’s
Confessions are available, including E. B. Pusey’s 1950 translation, which I use for my study. For different
translations, see: Confessions of St. Augustine, translated by F. J. Sheed (New York: Sheed & Ward, 1943); also,
Confessions, translated with an introduction and notes by Henry Chadwick (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1991).
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grasp the distance and cancel it, as Miles writes: “Augustine’s model of physical vision
underlines and supports his description of the necessity of human effort, concentration, and
training” (126). As I have argued earlier, this human effort is present in both the activities of
Hooke’s observational science and Milton’s poetic rendering of the Paradise as it is imagined,
but only the blind poet’s epistemological ambivalence suggests that the distance between the
viewer and the object is paramount in every act of seeing and knowing—and, furthermore,
believing.
That “human effort, concentration, and training” to believe in something, even when that
something is invisible to the physical eye, might be why Adam, in Paradise Lost, says “the
sedentary earth/ That better might with far less compass move,/ Served by more noble than
herself, attains/ Her end without least motion, and receives/ As attribute such a sumless journey
brought/ Of incorporeal speed, her warmth and light” (VIII. 32-37). He thinks that the
heliocentric system is less efficient—certainly it is not self-sufficient and not self-initiated for the
earth—than a geocentric system. Though the earth and its tenant, Adam, might be placed in the
center of the universe to receive the warmth and light from the sun, this center is nothing but a
passive object, the “sedentary” receiver as Milton describes it, sitting and resting, exercising no
self-motivation or will to be the active participant in the process of distributing warmth and light
for themselves. Indeed, the warmth and light come from the sun—and alternately, from God for
Adam—and there must be a hierarchy—as one must be the source generating warmth and light
to share and give them to the other, but Adam suggests a more active involvement and, most
importantly, service that he can offer. This service I mention here is paramount in the process of
believing, especially believing in something that is so powerful that seeing it is as blinding as not
being able to see God in His physical presence though the human eye. Through Adam’s doubtful
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speech about the geocentric system, we hear the blind poet’s reasoning that the service one must
offer to receive the warmth and light is logical and just. Furthermore, this reasoning offers
Milton the reassurance that the magnitude of the outcome of his service might be higher and
bigger than those without hardships that might challenge or obstruct the sight of God. I cannot
stress this point more; any believers who seek the light of God should feel as if they are trapped
in the darkness so they feel, as Miles asserts, “the necessity of human effort, concentration, and
training” (Miles 126), and therefore willingly reach out to find the light and warmth from God.
By sitting, as Adam argues, one only receives but never participates. Thus Adam complains that
this “sedentary” position for the earth and himself “commit[s] such disproportions with
superfluous hand” (VIII. 26-27) that it proves wasteful of not only the potential warmth and light
we can receive from God but also all the greater things “many nobler bodies to create” (VIII.
28). To act upon our will to seek after God is not only logical because it is most efficient and
rewarding for both the source of light and the one seeking the light, but also because the harder
one desires and seeks out to see God, the brighter his glory will shine.
And this glorious effulgence involves a kind of interior enlightenment that brightens a
man from inside out, not illuminating by shining the light upon him. The light and warmth are
born and radiate from a man’s interior to his exterior; here, the man’s interiority becomes a
direct, physical reflection of God’s warmth and light. But how does a man reflect or embody the
divine light? To be clear, how does a man metaphorically communicate the warmth and light the
sun provides, which is compared to the warmth and light God embodies? Through “human
effort, concentration, and training” a man worships God, overcoming worldly obstacles and
challenges, and this training can give the believer the mind’s inner eye that allows him to
perceive and communicate the divine light rather directly and immediately, through himself.
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Exteriority then plays a very small part in embodying the divine light, as embodying the divine
light involves the interiority of a man. Since he is not illuminated by the external source of light,
he is self-sufficient through his interiority. In Art and the Christian Intelligence in St. Augustine,
Robert J. O’Connell, S.J., writes that it is “impatience” that leads one to occupy the outer, the
physical things that mediate and communicate the inner knowledge:
It is far from clear that Augustine ever explored this phenomenon on its own
terms: too often, he treats it as a corollary drawn from his epistemological
conception that sets up an antithetic relationship between the operations of sense
and intellect. Sense, he tends to think, apprehends the visible, sensible symbol;
only the mind can attain to vision of the invisible reality that is symbolized. The
visible sun may furnish a symbolic image of the divine intelligible Sun; the
audible word or visible gesture may function as an exterior sign conveying—more
or less trustily—knowledge of some inner personal conception, intention, or
attitude. (40)
Anticipation and patience can be associated with the opposition of science and religion.
According to Svedsen’s Milton and Science, "there could be no absolute issues between
science and religion, though he [Milton] knew the appeal of that quarrel for others," and thus
Milton was only remotely interested in the debates of cosmological theories (44). Svedsen
suggests that Milton was aware of the rivaling ideas about the universe available to him, but for
Milton the "conviction of man's moral responsibility in a theocentric universe outweighed
everything else" (44). Svedsen points out that Milton’s description of the celestial system is
rather “descriptive” than “technical” and thus reveals either “his ignorance of up-to-date
astronomy or his disinclination to shift emphasis away from man” (45). That Milton knew less
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about or paid little attention to some of the fashionable or controversial theories of the spheres
kept him away from “committing his poem to controversy” (45). Milton’s intention with
Paradise Lost was to compose a world of harmony, “the correlation between physical and moral
other, the true and final harmony of the spheres” (44). Thus, Milton deliberately puts his
judgment about particular facts or ideas concerning the universe in abeyance so that he can focus
solely on his poetic articulation.
More importantly, Milton was aware of the conflicting ideas concerning the structure and
operation of the universe, but he had a different agenda on his mind other than figuring out plain
facts. Facts weren’t the most critical concern in his poetic works. Poetry for Milton remained
poetically hermetic and self-sustained. Raphael’s comparison of the structure of the universe to a
plant in Book 5 of Paradise Lost induces a logical question against the encyclopedic classical
and medieval understanding of the universe—in that traditional view of the universe, the Great
Chain of Being is static; Karen L. Edwards also argues in Milton and the Natural World that the
depiction of Raphael’s belief shows Milton’s unconventional view of the structure of the
universe as she writes: “[T]his dynamic scale of being has important consequences for Milton’s
political and theological views” (Edwards 125). This “dynamic” view of the structure of the
universe reveals that Milton believed in a kinetic universe through which the souls could ascend
if they worked hard to get closer to God—as plants will grow closer to the sun. She further
examines Adam’s response to Raphael’s plant metaphor and the placement of scale in this
“dynamic scale of being” in Book 5 of Paradise Lost: “The scale of nature set/ From center to
circumference whereon / In contemplation of created things/ By steps we may ascend to God”
(V. 509-12). Perhaps the obvious idea (that I myself struggled with for a long time) we should
acknowledge here is that the scale being mentioned here is no longer a ladder. The movement is
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not from the lower to higher, but from one horizon to the other, and in this sphere Adam
imagines the scale is differentiated by the distance from the center. The fundamental concept of
movement changes, no longer only about elevation but also about expansion. This is a sonic and
symphonic growth, expanding horizontally and growing vertically--one can ascend to God as the
plants can grow taller and closer to the sun. Furthermore, as Adam describes, there is a
degradation between the scales, but where the center resides is unclear. Where do the steps
ascend? Is it we who stand in the center and ascend toward the outside of the circumference? Or
does God exist in the center and we ascend toward the center? And what are the implications of
shifting the content of the center? What does the placement of our being and His being suggest
about the celestial world and its mechanics, its operation? Does the kinetic scale of the universe
then pose a threat to or buttress the conventional understanding of God’s position and our
relation to God? But most importantly, how does this fit into the Platonic hierarchy of being or
Augustinian order of being?
It is still hard to see that Adam’s doubts and questions about God’s construction of the
universe demonstrate Milton’s skepticism about experimental science. Svedsen observes:
In Paradise Lost, Milton repeatedly moves from circumference to center,
retracing through stock images the arcs of focus upon earth and man. And it is a
two-way passage. Satan and Adam are centers from which radiate the flow of
imagination, as when Adam and Eve contemplate the heavens and pray or Satan
apostrophizes the sun after he has flung himself from its sphere to the top of
Mount Niphates. No other poem is more explicit as to place; in Heaven, Hell,
earth or chaos, the reader of Paradise Lost always sees things from a precise
physical point of view and he always knows what it is. (45)
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Svedsen’s emphasis on the idea of place is useful for my argument as well; assessing one’s place
against the other’s—God’s—shifts the direction of our ascension. Knowing one’s own place or
placement in relation to the higher or lower entities informs individuals of the difference,
gradation, and depth between different matters because a single point of view that already
assumes a perspective about the world can look up or down to find his or her significance in the
universe. Therefore, though Milton doesn’t abandon the encyclopedic tradition of ascension and
gradation, “the present exposition of the Miltonic universe works from circumference to center”
(Svedsen 47). The nature Milton describes in Paradise Lost through Raphael’s analogy of the
scale of being reveals the poet’s consent with the conventional Neoplatonic belief that
differentiates living creatures by their movement. Svedsen explains that “Principles of order,
gradation, and harmony are axiomatic in the encyclopedic view of natural science” (116) and
thus that Milton’s treatment of things moving upward as professed through Raphael’s analogy of
being shows “spiritual gradations are conveyed in the images of movement”(114). Indeed, to be
near God is the ultimate goal at the end of this order. Milton uses the tropes of small and light
things that possess more potential to be mobile, such as plants and insects, though these creatures
are either rooted or sprung from the ground in Paradise Lost:
At once came forth whatever creeps the ground,
Insect or worm. Those waved their limber fans
For wings and smallest lineaments exact
In all the liveries decked of summer’s pride
With spots of gold and purple, azure and green,
These as a line their long dimension drew
Streaking the ground with sinuous trace. Not all
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Minims of nature: some of serpent kind
Wondrous in length and corpulence involved
Their snaky folds and added wings. (VII. 475-484)
The gradation beginning with smallest and lowest is at work here. The insects come from the
ground, and they flourish from and above the ground as the season changes. The insects are also
powerful enough to leave marks on the ground, “streaking the ground with sinuous trace.”190
Milton’s observation of insects and his use of their attributes postulate something larger and
transformative to come, and his description of insects becomes more figurative as he focuses on
what their attributes portend.
Drawing upon Svedsen’s argument that Paradise Lost constantly moves back to the
center “retracing through stock images” of earth and man (45), I also believe that Milton’s epic
poem thus focuses on the movement of nostalgia, remembering the harmonious center that is
now lost. However, I would further point out that the nostalgic movement in Paradise Lost is
also a movement forward, not a movement backward—the movement trying to return to the
center signifies the poet’s anticipation for God’s paradise to return. Perhaps this movement from
“circumference to center” could suggest that man looks at the horizon but not at the sky above; it
could also mean that God’s presence is radiating from the center, and man looks to the center
where God is and moves toward Him. No matter how we try to interpret this movement, one
thing is clear—the scales are still there, and so is the movement. It is only the direction that has
changed. As the upward movement is now replaced by the horizontal movement, the potential
for ascension is replaced by the potential of expansion, a tangential and imaginative movement
rather than a scaling and logical one. Raphael’s dismissal of Adam’s doubts about the

This is also an example of modesty topos—Milton compares himself to an insect that leaves “subtle and
sinewy” marks on the page.
190
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heliocentric system doesn’t necessarily suggest Milton either contested or believed in one
absolute cosmological theory. What Milton believes, however, is the power of anticipation and
hope that induces movement and progression, whether it occurs vertically or horizontally.
It is obvious, considering how much Milton produced as a political writer and how he
anxiously delayed writing his epic poetry until later in the seventeenth century, that every
symbolic gesture he makes with his words—specifically pointing at his colorful use of animal
and plant analogies that frequently show up in his prose as well as poetry—should suggest the
poet’s pronounced appetite for political and natural anatomy. That Milton knew the anatomies of
a bee and an ant is appropriate to point out here. In her chapter “Rehabilitating the Political
Animal,” Edwards discusses Milton’s use of insect tropes—a Royalist bee and a republican
ant—and how Milton used animal tropes to re-appropriate “the ‘old’ natural history” into “an
‘old’ political debate” (128).191 The attribute the poet understands and adds to the creatures in
nature becomes the poetic value; it is not the truthful or factual value, but it is a poetic value that
I am going to discuss further in this chapter. Poetic value, often quite distinct from the scientific
value or literal value, provided a bridge to connect faith with epistemology, for, to Milton, a nonliteral observation of a natural phenomenon wasn’t entirely wrong, if it were seen through
spiritual vision. And, though it seems almost too obvious to point out, in Milton’s case most
things were seen through spiritual vision, especially as he increasingly lost his physical sight.
How would a scientist like Hooke describe an ant or a bee if he could not see at all?
Without his eyesight to look through his microscope, how would he produce his knowledge and
believe in what he sees? And how does a poet, without his sight, draw the world out there
beyond the reach of his sight, certainly enough to describe it with his words? How can Milton be
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certain enough to draw paradise that he has never seen through his eyes, but believe in it enough
to write an epic poem containing twelve books about this place while under the scrutiny of
political turmoil that could end not only his poetic but also political and religious career?
Religious faith always demands a rehabilitation of scientific information. No
phenomenon that nature reveals through a magnifying glass without any temperament of human
anxiety and desire provides the satisfying or mortifying knowledge to inspire a man to believe in
something so much he will endanger his own life and even the wellbeing of his community.
Therefore, a spiritual man must believe nature does one thing to foreshadow or anticipate the
other; and this analogy—and fallacy—works efficiently for both religion and poetry. The
exactness in the truth provided through the scientist’s instrument is irrelevant and useless to a
poet or a preacher unless such scientific fact can be reread and analyzed through a figurative
lens. 192 It is indeed the writer at the end who has to make sense out of what he sees by
describing it into words, as Hooke confesses, and the writer takes the role of both reader and
writer, as he first observes what is in front of him before he writes about it. As much as a poet
might interpret and reinterpret the information he observes from the world, his representation
will also shape the way his readers learn the attribute that “a bee” is associated with the Royalists
while “the parsimonious emmet” associated with the roundheads.193 Edwards describes this
eminent fissure between the scientific knowledge and poetic reinterpretation of scientific
knowledge as “the tension between the two epistemologies”: “[The tension] creates a complex
representational problem for the Creation narrative in Paradise Lost” (128). Of course, the
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Milton, Paradise Lost, Book VII, lines 484-89. “First Crept/ The parsimonious emmet, provident/ Of
future, in small room large heart enclosed,/ Pattern of just equality perhaps/ Hearafter, joined in her popular tribes/
Of commonality.”
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tension Edwards describes here is a kind of tension between political knowledge and scientific
knowledge, but, going back once again to the point I made earlier about seeing and believing and
the inscrutable role sight plays in the construction of personal and cultural epistemologies, this
“tension between the two epistemologies” has existed since classical antiquity, involving the
dualist figuration of material and immaterial realms as well as the dualist articulation of the
world, as in Augustine’s ontology of spiritual and physical seeing. Fallon also describes the
status of Milton’s ontologically-deprived evil while his material angels keep their ontological
integrity as an “Augustinian ontology of evil” (169).194
In Art and Visual Perception: A Psychology of the Creative Eye, Rudolph Arnheim writes
that vision is not mere passive reception.
The world of images does not simply imprint itself on a faithfully sensitive organ.
Rather, in looking at an object, we reach out for it. With an invisible finger we
move through the space around us, we go out to the distant places where things
are found, touch them, catch them, scan their surfaces, trace their borders, explore
their texture. It is eminently active occupation.195
That seeing can immediately establish the tangible materiality of the object without touching it
should recall my earlier argument that Milton’s blindness helps the poet to see what he believes
without actually having seen what he believes in—the physical blindness is spiritual
enlightenment from within, just as the immaterial is immediately material in monism. This is
once again not an external light shed upon the poet, like the light coming through the
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microscope, but the light that comes from within, that shines from inside and glows outside. This
light is almost untraceable and immaterial, though it is perceived through the material eye and
felt as a material sensation. The classical metaphor for seeing does emphasize the idea of
distance, the material as well as conceptual difference between the word and idea. As Margaret
Miles observes: “For classical people who originated the metaphor, sight was an accurate and
fruitful metaphor for knowledge because they relied on the physics of vision, subscribed to by
Plato and many others, that a ray of light, energized and projected by the mind toward an object,
actually touches its object, thereby connecting viewer to the object” (127). Augustine writes in
On The Trinity that “the nature of the intellectual mind is so formed as to see those things which,
according to the disposition of the Creator, are subjoined to intelligible things in the natural
order, in a sort of incorporeal light of its own kind, as the eye of the flesh sees the things that lie
about it in his corporeal light, of which light it is made to be receptive and to which it is adapted”
(XII. 15. 24).196
Supposing that we use our bodily sensations to gain intelligence about the world,
Augustine suggests that “the intellectual mind” occupies both the power of corporeal senses and
incorporeal mind to sort through the “natural order” between man and God, and that man must
use both physical and spiritual faculties to understand its relationship to God. Things that are
readily visible to the corporeal eye are “subjoined to intelligible things in the natural order,” but
one must use more than the corporeal eye to see and understand “intelligible things” that are
higher in the natural order and “in a sort of incorporeal light of its own kind.” In Augustine’s
hierarchical structure of our condition in relation to God, the human or corporeal reality exists at
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the low level and the creator at the top.197 Augustine’s epistemology locates man’s sensation at
the bottom of the epistemological hierarchy, postulating that man can rise above his corporeal
status by way of reasoning—using either wisdom (sapientia) or knowledge (scientia)—to the
higher types of vision. Man, both corporeal and spiritual, possesses both body (rationes
seminales) and soul (ratio hominis) and can perceive reality through both his senses and
imagination, producing wisdom and knowledge. Wisdom (sapientia) represents the knowledge
acquired through the superior reason, and the knowledge gained through the lower reason is
called science or knowledge (scientia). The unique ability to acquire and use sapientia or
scientia sets man apart from other corporeal entities. Furthermore, epistemological knowledge
exists to work antithetically against the hierarchy of being in Augustine’s theory of knowing.
Man should be able to use more than his senses and apply imagination to achieve a spiritual
understanding of reality, and even further, the intellectual level of eternal reasoning, equivalent
to the eternal concepts in the mind of God. As Ronald Nash explains in The Light of Mind,
sapientia and scientia differ in various respects since “science uses the method of investigation,
but wisdom uses intuition” and “the end of scientia is action or accomplishment” (8). While
scientia “enables man to harvest better crops, construct better buildings, or wage war more
effectively,” the end of sapientia is contemplation. And even though, as Nash points out, “the
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preservation and sustaining of human life depends upon scientia,” it is sapientia that delivers
man closer to the eternal knowledge of God: “Wisdom is superior in the sense that it is
concerned with the acquisition of happiness and the ultimate goal of human existence” (8).
Because I find something very congenial and important to my project in his description of
philosophy, I return to Robert J. O’Connell:
Philosophy, it has been said, begins in wonder. But all too often that wonder is
interpreted as something verging on inquisitiveness: the spur of puzzlement that
leads us to want to banish the darkness of ignorance or confusion, to inquire, to
get to know and thus—apparently—eliminate the very wonder that gave inquiry
birth. In other connections, our ignorance or confusion may be seen as touching
on our thirst for satisfaction: we yearn to understand why we are unhappy, how
we may attain to our restless heart’s desire. (167)
This is the kind of light that requires the eye—or the mind—to work to see the truth. No
“sedentary” and passive mind can find the truth because it takes patience and work to open the
mind to see the truth. In Christian Philosophy of Saint Augustine, one of the pivotal works on
Augustine, Etienne Gilson writes that “illumination is rightly considered such a distinctive
feature of [Augstine’s] philosophy that we commonly call his theory of knowledge ‘the
Augustinian doctrine of divine illumination’” (77). Gilson further points out that Augustine’s eye
and mind metaphor clearly “came from the writings of the Platonists” and argues that Augustine
was “satisfied with this philosophical doctrine only because it agrees with the teaching of
Scripture.” More importantly, this metaphor assumes that
the act whereby the mind knows truth is comparable to the act whereby the
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eye sees the body: “menti hoc est intelligere, quod sensui videre.” Moreover, it
assumes that as objects must be made visible by light before they can be
perceived by the sight, so scientific truths must be made intelligible by a kind of
light before they can be grasped by the mind. Finally, it assumes that as the sun is
the source of the physical light which makes the sciences intelligible to the mind.
Thus God is to our minds what the sun is to our sight; as the sun is the source of
light, so God is the source of truth. (Gilson 77)
Augustine further argues that “the corporeal eye, too, does not, therefore, distinguish white from
black objects without a master, because it had already known there colors before it was created
in this flesh” (On the Trinity XII. 15. 24). The incorporeal eye, the mind, receives and projects
wisdom while awake or sleeping, while we use knowledge to weigh and organize the temporal
objects and events: “If then, this is the correct distinction between wisdom and knowledge, that
to wisdom belongs the intellectual cognition of eternal things, but to knowledge the reasonable
cognition of temporal things, it is not difficult to decide which is to be preferred to or placed
after which” (XII. 15. 25). Augustine developed his metaphor of seeing God through the eye of
the mind from the classical account of physical sight as spiritual rays that “shine through the eyes
and touch whatever we see” (IX.3.3). The tangible experience is even mutual and reciprocal—
vision is manipulated by the information already held in the brain as much as the object being
seen is manipulating what gets imprinted in the human brain. “By the vehicle of the visual ray,”
Miles explains, the classical theory of vision imagines the observer’s sight as a tangible beam
that reaches and touches the object distant from the viewer: “the object is not only ‘touched’ by
the viewer, but also the object is ‘printed’ on the soul of the viewer. The ray theory of vision
specifically insisted on the connection and essential continuity of viewer and object in the act of
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vision” (127). As Miles points out, Augustine made it clear that the vision “must be initiated by
the viewer” because, for the sight to fully embody the function of knowing, the individual will
from which the beams originate and are projected determines the luminosity of the sight. In other
words, no sight can be born, exist, or do anything if the sight isn’t aimed at a desired object for
the eye to see and understand; as Augustine writes: “[T]he sensation proceeds, not from that
body which is seen, but from a living body that perceives” (On the Trinity XI.2.3). And where
does that “desire” that finds an object to desire come from? Augustine insists that it precedes the
act of reception: “[B]efore the vision arose, there already was a will which directed the sense to
the body in order that it might be formed by seeing it” (XI.5.9).
4.3

Milton, Poetry, and Vision
It is not premature to say that the blind poet’s sight is already and always willing, even

before he sees anything; the spiritual eye has been open and has sought to reach out to the world.
This will to look out and perceive unseen is undoubtedly physically persistent and spiritually
felt—the blind poet must have the will to see before he sees, and what he sees he sees through
his mind’s eye, not the physical eye. In Book VIII of Paradise Lost, Adam describes what he
remembers about his own creation, waking up and seeing “this happy light” which he knew how
to name right away: “My tongue obeyed and readily could name/ Whate’er I saw. ‘Thou sun,’
said I” (VIII. 273). This “happy” sun is the first thing Adam calls out loud, by its name, and
speaks to, in his recollection of his awakening. Adam starts asking questions to the creatures he
sees, including the sun, about how he came to be what he is: “fair light,/ And thou enlightened
earth, so fresh and gay,/ Ye hills and dales, ye rivers, woods, and plains,/ And ye that live and
move, fair creatures, tell,/ Tell, if ye saw, how came I thus, how here?” (VIII. 273-77).
Obviously, the sun is the source of awakening and enlightenment to Adam, the sun that reveals
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and illuminates the world for Adam to see and learn as he gathers knowledge from observing and
asking questions.
Because seeing is directly linked to his intelligence, as is shown in Adam’s identifying
and calling out names of objects, Adam will apparently learn nothing without the sun. Adam
immediately sees the sun as teleologically both the observer and provider of knowledge for him.
His first words, according to his description, were indeed “Thou sun”—he “obeyed” his tongue
and called out what he “readily could name” (VIII. 272-73). After somehow learning and calling
its name out loud, Adam then asks the sun questions about his creation, as if he assumes the sun
has always been where he is and should know where Adam came from. An awareness of his
surroundings and the first object that sparks an intellectual response informs Adam to identify
the sun as “This happy light,” though the sun doesn’t answer back to him: “While thus I called
and strayed I knew not whither/ From where I first drew air and first beheld/ This happy light,
when answer none returned” (VIII. 283-85). In fact, the following lines demonstrate how Adam
comes to consciousness surrounded by the light and warmth of the sun:
As new waked from soundest sleep
Soft on the flow’ry herb I found me laid
In balmy sweat, which with his beams the sun
Soon dried, and on the reeking moisture fed.
Straight toward heav’n my wond’ring eyes I turned,
And gazed a while the ample sky, till raised
By quick instinctive motion up I sprung,
As thitherward endeavoring, and upright
Stood on my feet; about me round I saw
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Hill, dale, and shady woods, and sunny plains,
And liquid lapse of murmuring streams. (VIII. 253-63)
Clearly, something has awakened him from a deep sleep—it is unclear whether the sun is the
very first thing that awakes Adam. Yet, let us not forget Adam remembers waking up in the sun
light. More clearly, he remembers during the day light, and he sees everything that is around
him, including the bright warming sun that “dried” his “balmy sweat” (255-56).
Adam catches his breath as he awakes—he comes to life by breathing in. The life starts
with the breath, then the knowledge of being alive settles in with his senses; and undoubtedly,
Adam’s first sensory experience is seeing. Milton uses adjectives such as “happy” to describe
Adam’s first sensory experience. Yet seeing doesn’t give any answers to Adam’s inquiry about
his creation. The sun, if what Adam says is true, doesn’t give any answer back, yet he still calls
the sun “happy light.” Simple as it may sound, he is happy in the sun; he is pensive in the shade.
It is paramount to note here that Milton uses the word “pensive” to describe the first man’s first
encounter with his own existence and the quandary of self-identification that inevitably follows.
It is even more important, I would argue, that Adam is sitting down to think “on a green shady
bank” (VIII. 286). Away from the sun, the thinking man finds shade to ponder how he came
about, where or who he is.
But why does he find a shaded area to think? More specifically, if the sun is the source of
knowledge, then why does Adam move away from the direct sun light and find a shady spot to
ponder his own creation? There are a few points I should discuss further here. First, Adam reacts
to the brightness of the sun, but the sun itself fails to be the direct source of knowledge. The
“happy light” does not ponder; the bright, “happy” sun light cannot be the full source of the light
of enlightenment. The “happy light” shines and dries, doing what it does, contented. There is no
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desiring for more. This “happy light” is a kind of self-sufficient, self-consumed light that shines
while it burns--oblivious, simple, just doing its job. Under the shade, the mind is finally at work,
full of thoughts, meditating and reflecting upon his creation until he falls asleep: “Pensive I sat
me down; there gentle sleep/ First found me, and with soft oppression seized/ My drowsed sense,
untroubled, though I thought/ I then was passing to my former state/ Insensible, and forthwith to
dissolve” (VIII. 287-91). What leads Adam to the state of enlightenment seems to be far away
from “the happy light” as Adam falls asleep and then feels as if he is “passing to” his “former
state”(290). The “green shady bank profuse of flow’rs” subtly but surely awakens his pensive
thoughts, leading him to “a gentle sleep” as if he were in a trance, his sensory systems
overloaded with abundant smells and sights of flowers. Under the shade, sitting down, Adam
now pensive—either “sorrowfully thoughtful; gloomy, sad, melancholy” or in a state associated
with “thought, anxiety, or melancholy,” states the OED—finally calms down and falls into his
own thoughts.198 He is now in a reflective, meditative state, instead of tirelessly looking outward
and asking questions to “whate’er [he] saw” (273).
Eve in Book IV asks a very simple question—why they “shut all eyes” at night, when
moon and stars are still bright: “But wherefore all night long shine these, for whom/ This
glorious sight, when sleep hath shut all eyes?” (IV. 657-58). However, Adam believes the night
is when things are veiled for a good reason:
Lest total darkness should by night regain
Her old possession, and extinguish life
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In nature and all things, which these soft fires
Not only enlighten, but with kindly heat
Of various influence foment and warm,
Temper or nourish, or in part shed down
Their stellar virtue on all kinds that grow
On earth, made hereby apter to receive
Perfection from the sun’s more potent ray.
These then, though unbeheld in deep of night,
Shine not in vain, nor think, though men were none,
That heav’n would want spectators, God want praise. (IV. 665-76)
About light and darkness, Adam assumes that the visible light reigns over the lack of light, thus
characterizing the darkness as the loss of light, though it is not useless since it has its proper,
designated purpose to throw into further relief the light seen and make what God has created
shine even brighter. Here Milton is applying Neoplatonic astrology that ranked creatures by their
“stellar virtue” through which animals, plants, and minerals become more refined. The sun is not
for the meek. The coldness and darkness of the night is supposed to refine and temper the
creatures, making them stronger and ready for the sun’s blazing light; and the stronger they are
the more light they can take in and shine outward. The night is not a proper time for the creatures
to show their beauties, but it is instead a time for them to gain “temper or nourish” so they will
be strong enough to receive the sun’s blunt rays. Eve reveals a different understanding of the
light, or more properly, about the darkness of the night, for she doesn’t see the night’s darkness
as the loss of the sun’s light, but simply a different kind of light that shines differently while
serving the same purpose.
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Most importantly, Eve thinks they are not appreciating God’s creation fully enough by
sleeping at night because she believes that those things that “all night long shine” are not only
bright and visible in the darkness but also worthwhile to stay up and see. In contrast, Adam puts
great emphasis on the urgency and authority of the sunlight over “total darkness” as he describes
the night’s servile role as a transitional period to “temper” and make nature “apter to receive/
Perfection from the Sun’s more potent ray” (IV. 672-73). For Eve, darkness still informs and
illuminates, but Adam sees darkness as a subordinated form of the sun’s light. But as I have
pointed out earlier, Adam’s “happy light” is indeed a shallow light that is felt skin deep; the
interaction between Adam and the sun’s light has only been immediately physical, as the sun
dries the sweat and shines brightly on the things he saw yet gives him no answers. No knowledge
is truly gained from the bright sunlight; it is when Adam moves to the shades and becomes
“pensive” he sees more than “whate’er he saw” and begins to really comprehend who he is and
how he came to be. The inward seeing begins when he is away from the blazing sun and sits
down to think “on a green shady bank” (VIII. 286). Maybe Adam should pay attention to Eve’s
doubts. The lack of blazing sun light might make him less “happy” at night, but Adam might
gain more knowledge about himself and the world by being “pensive” under the shades, away
from the sun. Still, that will perhaps only lead him to a more pensive state. God indeed wants his
human creatures to be satisfied and “happy,” and it is for Satan to be in the state of wanting and
being pensive. It is clear that the “happy light” that shines obliviously and blazingly is indeed an
external light that shines on things, but the illumination and enlightenment of the mind occurs
from within, more likely summoned in the darkness or the shaded areas where the sun’s light is
not too bright to obstruct the mind’s eye.
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Adam’s understanding of the sun as the immediate source of enlightenment is not only
premature but also varies from Eve’s understanding of the light, for she sees the light as the
image of God’s creation. The latter needs much more explanation—obviously the latter is a kind
of reading that perceives metaphoric associations that delay a matter-to-matter, linear reading of
“whate’er [one] saw” (VIII. 273). This is not the kind of light that provides us the sight that helps
a man prove a hypothesis or theory but the kind that proves nothing but the need for faith. Thus
the latter is begotten by the lack of light, the bright, happy light that perhaps blocks one from
seeing the other side of light. Shade, Milton’s poem implies, is as vital as light, and Eve is
intuitively tuned to this knowledge. As much as Adam is aware of the fact that the world and its
organisms still breathe and function in the darkness when they are unseen, his understanding is
indeed a rational one. To phrase it more plainly, Adam needs to make sense, for he is the one
asking questions, trying to reason with what he observes and what Raphael states. Knowledge
about his existence and his place is important to him. Thus, when Eve exhibits a rather simplified
curiosity as she wonders why “all night long shine [starlight], for whom/ This glorious sight,
when sleep hath shut all eyes,” Adam tries to reason with her by telling her that nothing is lost,
but at night stars are preparing the creatures to become “apter to receive/ Perfection from the
sun’s more potent ray” (IV. 672-73).
This is a “happy” resolution that Adam can think of, to use the term Milton uses to
describe the full, unapologetically lucid and determined light of the sun; even the stars and the
moon that shine at night will eventually serve their ultimate purpose of completing their part in
the sun’s mission, making their existence at night transitory and preparatory. But we also must
pay attention to Milton’s choice of the word “happy.” Such an uncanny word for this particular
occasion of denoting the sun’s illuminating qualities, it plainly screams bright, drying sunlight,

152
sight of lucidity. Yet the sound and meaning of this word spin out such a feeling of hollow bliss,
ironically so much similar to the feeling of doubts and absence. The word “happy” sounds like
an amplifying noise that obliterates what is around it, and when one is “happy,” there is nothing
else; indeed, that is the point—one needs nothing anymore. The sound—and the idea—of this
word instantly yield a complete eclipse of opacity or eradication of depth and darkness. This
“happy light” is indeed a corporeal delight, a bodily sensation felt through physical senses,
forming a knowledge about the world around Adam, but still not the light that comes from
within, the divine light that brightens from within. Augustine writes in On the Trinity that if a
man wishes for and pursues good things, not evil things, then he will eventually have them, and
thus only he “who has all that he wills, and wills nothing wrongly” is a happy man (XIII.5.8). In
other words, a man is not happy because he wills wrongly. If a man wills rightly, wills for the
good things, as he is already good, he will have what he wills and he will be happy. Happiness
only occurs in good things, and even though the process of getting happiness might be hard and
torturous, it is only “transitory,” as Augustine explains: “For many have bravely directed their
course through these transitory evils towards the good things that shall endure. They are certainly
made happy by hope, even when they are in the midst of transitory evils, through which they
arrive at the good things that shall not pass away” (XIII.7. 10). Wanting—if wanting something
good—is not the reason of unhappiness but the integral starting point of happiness because it
assures man a chance to be happy. And as Augustine anticipates and believes, the man will be
happy. Even though he still desires, it is getting as well as wanting that makes the man happy.
Here it might be useful to revisit Adam’s observation of his surroundings when he
awakes in Book VIII, lines 253-63. Once he is under the shade, something different occurs. It is
the shade that allows him to see things other than the shades. As Etienne Gilson explains: “The
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intellectual mind which Augustine assigns to man as his own and which is, therefore, created,
can be called a natural light, if we may be allowed to use a phrase which Augustine does not
employ but which does no violence to his thought. The result of divine illumination is not,
normally at least, a supernatural illumination; on the contrary, to be the receptive subject of
divine illumination belongs by definition to the nature of the human intellect” (79). According to
Adam’s explanation to Eve, the sun deserves its observers and receivers to witness and prove its
luminosity, but the darkness of the night should remain subservient and obsequious to the sun.
Even if the stars and the moon exist in the darkness, “these then though unbeheld in deep of
night/ Shine not in vain” (IV. 674-75); if these lights during the night didn’t “temper or nourish,
or in part shed down/ Their stellar virtue on all kinds that grow,” then the stars and the moon at
night are being wasteful (IV. 670-71). It is because, as Adam further muses, the creatures created
by God need to reflect and be praised as God’s great work; if not: “That Heav’n would want
spectators, God want praise” (IV. 676). That is the “happy” and virtuous ending for “all kinds
that grow.” In Adam’s rational world, the stars and the moon must exist for fulfilling their
subservient role of supporting the sun, through which everything is illuminated by the “happy
light.”
Adam believes “the happy light” is almost equivalent to the divine light that generates
and illuminates the beginning and the end of every creature. In Book 8, Adam describes the sun
as the source of “the happy light” that enlightens and illuminates even though his need to move
away from the sun to ponder should tell him otherwise. Unlike Eve, Adam can’t seem to
envision the night’s darkness as another representation of “happy light.” Eve actually never
doubts that the stars and the moon must be brightly shining and enjoyable to those who don’t
sleep at night and are able to watch their glory: “But wherefore all night long shine these, for
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whom/ This glorious sight, when sleep hath shut all eyes?” (IV. 657-58). Comparing Adam’s
rationalization of the purpose of night to Eve’s more nuanced insights, we see that Adam must
make sense of the stars and moon spending their energy in the darkness by imagining their
complete, “happy” course as if they are part of the sun’s destiny, a rationalization necessary to
provide a reason for any light existing in the darkness.199 According to Adam, the direct
illumination, the happy light, is the source of knowledge, morality, and beauty. Without the
direct illumination from the sun, Adam believes, there can be no happy light and hence no
knowledge, morality, or beauty.
The “happy light” may, however, undermine access to the very things Adam imagines it
provides. In Art and the Christian Intelligence in St. Augustine, Robert J. O’Connell, S.J., writes:
The philosophic task in any age is not a happy one: rigor of method, care for
evidence must always keep us honest, prevent our aspirations from leading us into
mere sentimental wish fulfillment. It must discipline the idealizations, chasten the
constructions of our metaphysical imaginations so that they do not drift off into
insubstantial fantasy. But the epistemological preoccupation, become
imperialistic, can also hobble our advance, clip the wings of philosophic flight,
prevent us from coming to know the very good our hearts most deeply yearn to
know; it can, in the tones of a perverse kind of piety, interdict our recognizing the
commanding beauty that, as moral beings, we must be ready to assent to.
Philosophical thinking, then, to retain its vitality, to maintain itself in readiness to
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Of course, here I am assuming this is Adam’s own rationalization of how and why the stars and moon
show up at night. Though Milton might simply be borrowing from the Neoplatonic astrology to describe the idea of
stellar virtue, and though he might indeed have doubts about the sun’s predominant virtue over the stars and the
moon, it is worthwhile to closely examine how Adam believes this system must work. Obviously, Adam is uncertain
that anything can be useful or good in the darkness—there can’t be any epistemological discovery in the darkness as
there is no “happy light” and hence, very little ethical or aesthetic merit can be expected from the night.
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respond to the riches of being, must consent to become a constant series of
decisions, interlocking and mutually correcting—epistemological, ethical, and
aesthetic. (169)
It is important to point out that O’Connell thinks it is the philosophical inquiry that desires to
have a “wing” in the first place, but the empirical, practical mindset discourages and obstructs
the wings of philosophical inquiry from flying. Perhaps, though, one might argue that
philosophers and artists alike let their thoughts fly away, until those thoughts are proven not
merely at fault for being abstract, but also at fault in reality, like Icarus’s waxen wings. To have
successfully gone to the sun without having the wings melt and falling into the sea is to end
everything—that is the completion, the “happy” closure that might bring contentment but kills
the desire to want, ponder, and create. The “happy light” suggests the finite contentment that
erases the desire to be close to the sun, as it is inevitable that being in the darkness is what drives
human beings to seek the light. While philosophy lingers on the possibility of lack, empirical
science hangs on the certainty of completion. To write about happiness and to write about the
sun, one must be away from them. But empirical science must zoom in and get closer to the
object of desire, and this is how, as O’Connell points out in the preceding passage, the
“epistemological preoccupation, become imperialistic, can also hobble our advance, clip the
wings of philosophic flight, [and] prevent us from coming to know the very good our hearts most
deeply yearn to know” (169). For Adam, everything has to be explained and reasoned, and as we
see in Paradise Lost, Eve remains satisfied with the answers she receives from Adam; and most
importantly, she doesn’t doubt why the stars and the moon shine at night, but she simply
complains that she doesn’t get to enjoy their beauty at night because she has to be sleeping then.
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The difference between Adam’s and Eve’s thoughts on this issue is subtle but
meaningful—Eve doesn’t think twice about why the stars and the moon are shining in the
darkness, while Adam thinks they are shining at night solely to satisfy the sun’s purpose.
Applying Augustine’s theory about the relationship between ontology and epistemology, Adam’s
teleological reasoning for the lights’ existing in the darkness proves somewhat similar to the
Augustinian theory of knowledge. The following passage provides Gilson’s precise and
insightful analysis of Augustine’s metaphor, but most importantly, it resonates closely with my
argument about the immanent, active light that comes from within as opposed to the passive light
that shines upon and illuminates from outside:
The comparison between God and an intelligible sun serves first of all to point out
the difference between a thing which is intelligible of itself and a thing which
must be made intelligible if it is ever to become so; the sun exists, it is bright, and
it makes bright the objects it illuminates. There is a great difference, then,
between something naturally visible, such as the light of the sun, and something
visible only because of a borrowed light, such as the earth when illuminated by
the sun. In the same way, we must distinguish between God considered in His
own Being, the intelligibility of God which is independent of everything but itself,
and the sciences which derive their intelligibility from that of God. Thus the
comparison allows the truths perceived by the soul no more light of their own
than that possessed by things when deprived of the sun which illuminates them.
However, we must remember that this is only a comparison and that even so, it is
the intelligibility of the sciences rather than their comprehension by the mind that
is here traced to the divine light. (78)
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Interestingly, in this passage Gilson describes the sun’s light as “the intelligibility of God” that is
autonomous and self-sufficient and compares it to “a borrowed light” that is dependent upon the
object to be illuminated. God is the light of the sun, too bright for humans to see, which is
sapientia; though we cannot directly see the sun’s light, we can see what He illuminates, which
with limited vision might produce only scientia. Sapientia, though hard to directly access or see
with the corporeal eye, can be gradually achieved by practicing opening the mind’s eye. Unlike
the physical eye, the mind’s eye doesn’t get blinded by the sun’s light but seeks illumination
from it.
I return to Augustine, who argues that “we ought rather to believe that the nature of the
intellectual mind is so formed as to see those things which, according to the disposition of the
creator, are subjoined to intelligible things in the natural order, in a sort of incorporeal light of its
own kind, as the eye of the flesh sees the things that lie about it in this corporeal light, of which it
is made to be receptive and to which it is adapted” (On the Trinity XII. 15. 24). It is important to
point out that Augustine believes in the possibility for man to acquire higher knowledge and
encourages us to “rather believe” in achieving intellectual vision through higher reasoning to
attain knowledge of God. According to his passage, our soul already is the eye to perceive
incorporeal light, as does our physical eye always see what’s out there in the corporeal world,
under corporeal light. But unlike the physical eye, the soul’s eye—our “intellectual mind”—isn’t
always open and readily seeing “the things that lie about it in this corporeal light.” For one thing,
what the soul’s eye sees is not “the things that lie about it in this corporeal light.” Furthermore, in
order to “see those things which, according to the disposition of the creator, are subjoined to
intelligible things in the natural order, in a sort of incorporeal light of its own kind,” one must
work hard to train the soul’s eye so that it will open to receive such incorporeal light and be able
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to see it at the same time. And that training of the soul’s eye will require both scientia and
sapientia, but most critically, sapientia. And, perhaps it is plausible that Eve, who appears more
taciturn and less studious than Adam in the lines I previously examined, actually exhibits certain
Christian-espoused attributes such as a childlike curiosity and playfulness of a trusting but
intuitive person, who is more tuned to acquiring wisdom (sapientia) than knowledge (scientia).
Seeing what the sun readily illuminates provides man knowledge here and now, but
contemplating under the shade—even falling asleep—allows man to recall and remember.
Adam’s thirst for knowledge provides him with what he desires through scientia, inquiring and
learning while Eve exhibits a certain carelessness towards corporeal knowledge about the world
and its order. She is more concerned with her inner self, inner happiness. Hence she often abides
and accepts Adam’s knowledge (scientia) about things such as the solar system, but when it
comes to her own work and self-efficiency, she has an idea of her own, and she is surely
propelled by her own will: “Let us divide our labors, thou where choice/ Leads thee or where
most needs, whether to wind/ The woodbine round this arbor or direct/ The clasping ivy where to
climb, while I/ In yonder spring of roses intermixed/ With myrtle find what to redress till noon”
(IX. 214-19). She understands what free will can do in gaining happiness, and according to
Augustine, she who, innocent and good, wants something good and not evil, will find happiness:
“If this be our condition this to dwell/ In narrow circuit straitened by a foe/ Subtle or violent, we
not endued/ Single with like defence wherever met,/ How are we happy, still in fear of harm?”
(IX. 322-26). What Eve suggests here is thought provoking and perplexing, as it clearly suggests
that Eve thinks fear makes man unhappy. Or at least that the threat of fear makes one unhappy.
But how does she know what fear is? Does she even know what fear is? Or, is she suggesting
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that Adam, in the passage above, is the one who fears enough to “dwell/ In narrow circuit
straitened by a foe”?
Of course, some might readily argue that Eve’s curious and credulous mind made her
wander off alone in Paradise and eventually led us to our fallen state. But the fault is not entirely
on Eve; most would argue that it is on Satan—she was only curious, only wanting to achieve the
eternal knowledge and get closer to God. For instance, in Paradise Lost Adam acquires
knowledge (scientia) while he asks Raphael questions about the solar system as they walk
together. His intelligence, besides the knowledge already implanted in him such as what he
learns during his dream vision about his own creation, often comes from sources outside him,
such as angelic knowledge coming directly from the angel’s mouth. Eve also learns; however,
her intellectual approach is more self-reliant, self-reflective, and spontaneous. She likes to
wander off and observe things alone, and when she has doubts or concerns, she might discuss it
with Adam. And she listens to Adam and hears what he knows and learned from Raphael, though
she contemplates on her own. Adam would have asked millions of questions before even looking
at the fruit. So what does this mean? If Eve were the gullible one, and Satan indeed approached
her knowing that she would be more susceptible to his plea, then weren’t we already determined
to be fallen? Perhaps the question we should be asking is—why did Milton painstakingly depict
Adam and Eve such as he did? Why does Eve appear to be more spontaneous, intuitive, and
credulous in her thoughts? Milton’s point might be exactly that—Eve had to be the one. Satan
had to go to Eve first.
But there is more. There is Adam, who takes the fruit from Eve. Augustine’s theory of
knowledge provides a clue as to how Milton generates his own understanding and answer to the
question. Augustine’s theory of being—or Platonist Christian hierarchy of being—makes it
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impossible for man to remain perfect and happy as God intended him to be. Any act of acquiring
knowledge is driven by free will; even if God has already given Adam and Eve certain
knowledge about the world during their conception, they still want to know something about the
solar system or why the stars shine at night. It is the persistent will that helps man climb up the
hierarchy of being. And it is the free will that also leads man to fall. Peter A. Fiore, in Milton and
Augustine, argues that “there is a remarkable consistency between this teaching of Augustine and
Milton’s treatment of Adam and Eve before the Fall” (41). Fiore explains that “before the act of
disobedience, there was a weakening of the will, a slipping or falling from perseverance, a failing
to abide in that goodness in which there is no sin. And the actual fall into sin took place with the
eating of the apple” (41). Furthermore, there was a series of events prior to the fall that led to
weakening of the will and eventually to sin, for “it would have been better if Adam had been less
curious about the forbidden tree and had talked less about it to Eve, so as not to influence her
dreams, or if he had heeded his own advice when he hopelessly discouraged her from going out
alone” (41). Fiore further concludes that this paradox between Augustine’s depiction of Adam
and Eve’s god-like perfection and the inevitable existence of the free will that led them to
consent to sin actually yields an opportunity for us to contemplate the subtle complexity of
Christian doctrine. The Fall might have never happened without the free will, and it will be
impossible to understand the depth and complexity of Christian doctrine without the Fall.
In Soliloquies, Augustine describes reason as the contemplation of truth: “[T]he gaze of
the soul is Reason (I. 6.13). It is reason that performs the mind’s “act of looking” (I. 6.13). 200
Augustine further writes in Soliloquies that “very act of looking, even though the eyes be sound, cannot
turn them toward the Light unless three things persist: Faith—by which the soul believes that, that toward which the
gaze has been directed, is such that to gaze upon it will cause blessedness: Hope—by which, the eyes being rightly
fixed, the soul expects this vision to follow: and Love—which is the soul’s longing to see and to enjoy it. […] And
this intellectual vision is that which is in the soul a conjunction of the seer and the seen: as seeing with the eyes
results from the conjunction of the sense of sight and the sensible object, either of which being lacking, nothing can
be seen” (I. 6. 13).
200
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And this soul’s eye doesn’t automatically offer the divine sight; it needs to seek and look to see
the truth; as Ronald Nash observes, “the mere possession of eyes is not enough to guarantee
sight, so too the mind must look if it is to see truth” (64).201 Through the active and diligent way
of looking through the soul’s eye, man can acquire higher reason, and the “object of higher
reason is the eternal world of the forms; its method is contemplation; its end is happiness; and its
result is sapientia” (65).202 But the soul’s eye and man’s will can also err in the course of
reaching for higher knowledge; thus in Satan’s speech to Eve in Book 9 of Paradise Lost we see
Satan naming what Eve will acquire when she takes a bite into the forbidden fruit “wisdom,”
indeed above “science”:
O sacred, wise, and wisdom-giving plant,
Mother of science, now I feel thy pow’r
Within me clear not only to discern
Things in their causes but to trace the ways
Of highest agents deemed however wise! (IX. 679-83)
Here Satan, the author, employs all the right buzz phrases—“wisdom-giving plant,” “mother of
science,” and “the ways of highest agents”—to inspire his cautious audience to commit to
“venturing higher than my lot” (690). Even further, Milton compares Satan’s eloquence and
delivery to ancient classical orators: “As when of old some orator renowned/ In Athens or free
Rome, where eloquence/ Flourished, since mute, to some great cause addressed,/ Stood in
himself collected” (IX. 670-73). Milton seals the lines that describe Satan’s rhetorical delivery
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Nash, The Light of the Mind.
Nash also notes: “Augustine distinguished between the ratio superior and ratio inferior, the higher and
lower reasons. These two aspects of the same mind have different objects, methods, ends, and results. The object of
the lower reason is the temporal world of particulars; its method is investigation; its end is action; and its result is
scientia” (The Light of the Mind 65).
202
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with a final stressed syllable to properly provide the contextual support that Satan actually
believes in his "heroic" cause. As if emulating a speech spoken by a great hero, Satan stands still
and “collected”; note also Milton clearly distinguishes “motion” from “tongue” and describes
each as an integral and independent “part” of Satan’s speech: “while each part,/ Motion, each act
won audience ere the tongue,/ Sometimes in highth began, as no delay/ Of preface brooking
through his zeal of right” (IX. 673-76). A slightly earlier passage challenges the reading of
Satan’s heroic speech and suggests that Satan’s emulation of classical antiquity is false and
insufficient, for it provides him with a model devoid of spiritual illumination. Even though the
poet seems to hyperbolize Satan’s oratorical skills, he also describes Satan with the following
accusatory words: “when now more bold/ Tempter, but with show of zeal and love/ To man, and
indignation at his wrong,/ New part puts on, and as to passion moved,/ Fluctuates disturbed, yet
comely and in act/ Raised, as of some great matter begin” (IX. 664-69). Milton’s iambic
pentameter in the lines that describe Satan’s oratorical delivery provides dignity and distance
without inserting too much decorum or conceit (lines 672-78), but some of those lines spoken by
Satan are written in irregular meter rather than iambic pentameter (look, for example, at lines
679-680). I argue that the iambic pentameter of the first two lines spoken by Satan is
questionable because the same vowels of the first words of these two lines—“O” and “o” in
“mother”—disturb the flow of iambic pentameter (679-80). Moreover, the speech not only
contrasts with the poet’s reading of Satan’s outward display of oratorical greatness but also
confirms a subtle fissure in Satan’s seemingly heroic speech. About Satan’s oratorical delivery
Milton does say the following: “ere the tongue/ Sometimes in highth began” (674-75).
Consistency is the key to the validity of measured lines, and if Satan aspired to attain the
eloquence of Greek and Roman orators, shouldn’t he have consistently “in highth began”?
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Indeed, Milton was known for his aversion to rhyme schemes, but poetic meter is a different
issue, and his admiration of and adherence to the style of ancient Greek and Latin epic poetry
ensures his belief in the poetic meter that was so important in the poetic tradition he emulated.203
Let us then closely examine the first two lines of Satan’s speech to Eve in lines 679-80 by
reading them out loud: “O sacred, wise, and wisdom-giving plant,/ Mother of science, now I feel
thy power.” Most readers would see no metric irregularity in the first line, especially once being
informed that this is Milton’s epic poem consisting blank verse with iambic pentameter and no
rhyme schemes. Opening with a lowly and softly blowing sound of “O” without stress, most
readers will read the line as perfect iambic pentameter. This speech by Satan commences with a
single vowel/syllable that requires another syllable to immediately follow, hence creating
amphibrach, “O sacred” (- / -), short syllables on both sides, and the following syllables thus fall
into the pattern of iambic pentameter.
However, Satan seems to be invoking something that is already inside him, and his later
lines do claim that a piece of the “sacred, wise, and wisdom-giving plant” is indeed inside him:
“now I feel thy power/ Within me clear” and “Look on me,/ Me who have touched and tasted,
yet both live” (IX. 680-81, 687-88). If Satan did invoke something that is inside of him, then
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I want to make sure that the readers are on the same page with me on this argument—as most Milton
readers must know, Milton eschewed rhyme schemes and end rhymes. He found regular rhyme not only numbing
but dumbing of the lively sound and beauty of English language. While abolishing rhyme, Milton remains quiet
about poetic meter in his note on “the verse” added in the second printing, prefacing Paradise Lost in 1667: “The
measure is English heroic verse without rime, as that of Homer in Greek, and of Virgil in Latin; rhyme being no
necessary adjunct or true ornament of poem or good verse, in longer works especially, but the invention of a
barbarous age, to set off wretched matter and lame meter; graced indeed since by the use of some famous modern
poets, carried away by custom, but much to their own vexation, hindrance, and constraint to express many things
otherwise, and for the most part worse than else they would have expressed them. [. . . ] as have long since our best
English tragedies, as a thing itself, to all judicious ears, trivial and of no true musical delight; which consists only in
apt numbers, fit quantity of syllables, and the sense variously drawn out from one verse into another, not in the
jingling sound of like endings, a fault avoided by the learned ancients both in poetry and all good oratory.” Then he
adds and concludes that this abjuration of meter should not be considered by the reader as “vulgar” but as “an
example” to free ancient heroic poetry from “the troublesome and modern bondage of rhyming.” Milton does stick
to iambic pentameter for his heroic epic poem—just no “jingling” rhymes.
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how would he summon it? In a lofty tone, as if lifting up and breathing out something deeply
lodged in himself, couldn’t Satan breathe those words—“O sacred, wise”—out with one
extended “o” with a stress, followed by a trochee (“sacred”) or cretic (“sacred, wise” /- /)? This
could also suggest a dactyl followed by iambic (“O sacred, wise” / / - /). According to Satan’s
description of this “power within” him, shouldn’t such lofty power require a little more gravitas
and time, thus perhaps extending the sound of “O” in the beginning of his invocation of such
power? But most importantly, let us now examine the word “Mother” that begins the next line
(IX. 680). According to Milton, Satan’s tongue “sometimes in highth began”—and the line that
begins with “Mother” exhibits just that. It is clear that iambic pentameter is broken in the next
line, as the word “mother” adds the stress on the first syllable (/ -). Even if one argues that
“mother” can be read in iambic, there is still some irregularity in the syllables that follow the first
syllable (“of science, now I feel thy power” - / - - / - / -/) , which makes this line impossible to
be read in iambic pentameter.
These lines are no aberration, for Satan’s measured lines are often inconsistent and illmeasured. The ebb-and-flow of iambic pentameter is disturbed, and even worse, his lines
“sometimes in highth began” and sometimes don’t. Milton’s delineation of Satan’s oratorical
delivery as a whole therefore suggests a certain obliqueness—literally, something is off. This
irregularity perhaps is most clearly presented in Milton’s careful arrangement of subtle
denotations indicating disturbance and pretense. Satan shows “indignation,” he “new part puts
on,” and “fluctuates disturbed” though he soon collects himself “comely” and “raised, as of some
great matter begin.” Angered as well as amped by his previous failure in convincing Eve, Satan
keeps manufacturing and fabricating a better speech by putting “new parts” on, until Eve will be
moved to take a bite of the forbidden fruit. However, since Satan seems to demonstrate oratorical
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sophistication inspired by classical antiquity, one must not make a hasty conclusion that Satan’s
inconsistent meters suggests that Milton may have regarded classical poetics in a negative light.
Clearly, Satan possesses intelligence and skills as other heavenly angels do, but he “fluctuates
disturbed”—he moves obliquely, as he is motivated by a wrong cause, and for the worse,
inspired by anger. It is more convincing that it is Milton’s intention to show Satan’s oblique
motivation and reasoning in those lines that subtly shift from the normal iambic pentameter to
unexpected and unrecognizable irregular meters.
In addition, Satan insinuates this fruit will give Eve corporeal knowledge (scientia) and,
most importantly, divine wisdom (sapientia): “Wisdom-giving plant, Mother of science” (67980). That both sapientia and scientia come from one plant is noteworthy, but it is paramount to
pay attention to the subtle derivation of what is given and what is begotten. The plant, according
to Satan’s speech, gives wisdom—“wisdom-giving plant”—when the plant is also the mother of
science, who gives birth to science. The difference between “wisdom-giving” and giving birth to
science is that there is anticipation and acknowledgement of a recipient; wisdom is given to
someone or something, whereas science is the recipient itself. Wisdom, according to Satan’s
speech, thus reigns above science as it is closer to the source of divine knowledge; wisdom
resides within the plant and is still part of it, not a reproduction of it, even when it is given,
whereas science is separated from the plant, no longer being the source of divine knowledge.
Therefore, scientia is something that can be found and studied through observation and
examination of the physical world, but to gain sapientia one must be near the origin of the divine
intelligence from which wisdom can be given. Satan’s derivations of the two kinds of knowledge
suggest a backdrop of Augustinian theory of knowledge, but the gradation between the two also
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tempts Eve to want wisdom even more. Since the plant gives it, why shouldn’t she come and
take what the plant does “give”?
Of course this is a trap and a deception—it is not a giving plant, and anything the plant
can give, one must will and labor to take. Satan surreptitiously leaves this part out, focusing on
the appealing claims that wisdom is indeed good, that it won’t kill Eve but rather will give her
more life with the power of divine vision, and that the plant is there to give what Eve or anyone
would like to possess—divine knowledge. But why should she take sapientia from outside,
through a sensory experience? Unless it is scientia she is looking for, shouldn’t sapientia be
sought within oneself, by opening the mind’s eye? In A Treatise of Civil Power, Milton
emphasizes the guidance of the Spirit within oneself, as opposed to scientia gained from analysis
of external events:
First it cannot be deni’d, being the main foundation of our protestant religion, that
we of these ages, having no other divine rule or authoritie from without us
warrantable to one another as a common ground but the holy scripture, and no
other within us but the illumination of the Holy Spirit so interpreting that scripture
as warrantable only to our selves and to such whose consciences we can so
perswade, can have no other ground in matters of religion but only from the
scriptures. And these being not possible to be understood without this divine
illumination, which no man can know at all times to be in himself, much less to be
at any time for certain in any other, it follows cleerly, that no man or body of men
in these times can be the infallible judges or determiners in matters of religion to
any other mens consciences but their own.204
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Aside from the historical implications of passage above, Milton supports Augustine’s theory of
knowledge and divine illumination and believes that the knowledge gained through looking at
the world outside the self only reveals its scientific origin, which is distanced from the self, as
opposed to the knowledge acquired through the way of looking inwardly, looking into the self,
by contemplating, which helps one to reach sapientia. Surprisingly, or, perhaps not, even though
intuitive, Eve, who seems to be more in tune with her inner knowledge, doesn’t see that she does
have the divine light within her. Her mind’s eye is shutting down tightly, as she is tempted and
persuaded by Satan.
Milton’s meditations upon the limitations of physical sight, as well as its possible
impairment of spiritual sight, involved far more than his own failing vision. Catherine Wilson’s
The Invisible World: Early Modern Philosophy and the Invention of the Microscope offers a
valuable study of the way the early modern period reacted to the emergence of modern science
and how the extension of empirical sight enabled and disabled the spiritual and philosophical
outlook to natural world:
The orderliness of the cosmos in the medieval tradition, the rankings of
angelology and the hierarchical system of enclosed spheres, might be supposed to
have conveyed a certain smug security. But medieval philosophy was ambivalent
toward the natural world and the value of the sense of vision. Curiositas was one
of the sins most repellent to Augustine; the profound ocular aestheticism of the
Confessions is the other face of the fear that visuality and spirituality are as
mutually exclusive as gratified lust and salvation. Representatives of Christianity,
a religion of self-examination stressing not the obedience to external law but the

Writings, 450. See also: The Works of John Milton, vol. 6, ed. Frank Allen Patterson (New York: Columbia UP,
1932) 1-41.
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purification of motive, argued that this task was sufficiently absorbing to leave no
energy available for external applications of the questioning faculty, a view that
persisted until physic-theology and popular science converted the knowledge of
nature in an idle culture into a moral pastime far less dubious than the reading of
novels. (22)
As expected, seeing through the physical eye was trusted by neither medieval philosophy nor the
Christian religion; furthermore, seeing too much and too closely through any sort of scientific
machine using the physical eye meant the betrayal of the spiritual eye, and even worse, the
squandering of the full potential of the divine light that should be actively engaged in the
illumination of the mind. Christianity’s obsession with the inward vision necessarily found the
physico-theological view of the emerging sciences as thwarting the necessary separation between
the external, physical world and the spiritual world within, and Hooke’s microscopic view of the
physical world does indeed blur the line between the two. Without sufficient inward
contemplation, we have only knowledge observed through sensory experience, and though the
empirical knowledge is important, one cannot gain sapientia through empirical knowledge. If
Eve had been trained to see through spirituality, she would have noticed Satan’s “words replete
with guile” (IX. 733). In a way, visuality offers more reason for Eve to be tempted—after all, she
sees Satan alive and well after consuming the fruit. What she sees through her physical eye
makes her incredulous of the knowledge she has gained from God via Adam while she becomes
more credulous of what she sees with her eyes.
Even though Eve has exhibited far more autonomy when tuning in to her intuitive
reasoning and contemplative thoughts, she here shows how no human is truly prepared to fight
against a tempter who tries to allure him or her with any means possible, including the possibility
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of immortality. Notice how Eve’s speeches noticeably get shorter and shorter, as Satan’s
speeches get not only longer but enticingly more elaborate and persuasive; while “she scarce had
said, though brief,” Satan’s becoming “more bold,” as if the tempter sucked and took the inner
strength out of the tempted (IX. 664). Satan begins his first persuasive speech in Book IX, line
532, which goes on for seventeen lines (lines 532-548). Eve’s replying lines to Satan last for
fourteen lines (553-66). Satan’s lines are consistently longer than ten or more lines, with an
exception of the lines 626-30, where Satan replies briefly to Eve’s retorts. Satan’s speeches are
consistently long and verbose, at the same time articulate and studded with notable rhetorical
devices (IX. lines 568-612, 679-732) compared to Eve’s speeches that remain simple and short
(lines 615-24, 647-54, 659-63).205 This pattern of Eve’s brief speech ends when she is fully
persuaded and tempted, so she herself now delivers a long, elaborate speech that resonates with
imagery and repeats content from Satan’s speech (lines 745-79); this is one of the two longest
speeches spoken by Eve during the temptation scene, though this one is before eating the fruit.
Almost tempted, “yet first/ pausing a while, thus to herself mused” (743-44), now Eve utters the
lines that echo those of Satan’s: “This fruit divine,/ Fair to the eye, inviting to the taste,/ Of
virtue to make wise: what hinders then/ To reach, and feed at once both body and mind?” (77679). Eve now “mused” (744), for she is not using her wisdom (sapientia) to reason with Satan’s
argument, but with the material knowledge he just has gained through looking and hearing as
“his words replete with guile/ Into her heart too easy entrance won” (733-34) and her sight is
“Fixed on the fruit she gazed” (735). The verb “muse” is a peculiar word choice by the poet to
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Ten lines, eight lines, and then five lines—as we can see, Eve’s lines are strikingly shorter than those of
Satan. Of course, I am not at all arguing that the length determines the quality of the speech, but we must pay
attention to how the poet contrasts Satan and Eve’s speeches in this way—the juxtaposition is peculiar. Satan
delivers one of his most cunning and spectacularly subtle and surreptitious speeches at the moment of tempting Eve,
while Eve’s speeches remain strikingly matter of fact and concise. Of course, ultimately Eve delivers a long,
articulate speech that mirrors and builds upon Satan’s verbose and long speeches.
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signal the subtle but certain shift in Eve’s mind, as the word could mean both contemplating and
talking to oneself discontentedly. The most obvious and popular meaning of the word is “to be
absorbed in thought” and “to meditate in silence” (OED 1. a) as an intransitive verb or “to
ponder over, reflect upon; to contemplate” (1. c) as a transitive verb. As an intransitive verb, th
word “muse” can also mean “to grumble, to complain, or to murmur discontentedly” (4. a). Since
Milton clearly describes “his words replete with guile/ Into her heart too easy entrance won,”
there is no doubt at this point that Eve is swayed. Eve “to herself mused”--something has ruffled
her simple, contemplative mind, but it wasn’t just Satan’s speech alone, and she is musing “to
herself” as if she grumbles and complains to herself. The peaceful solitude and quiet has been
interrupted and is gone, and she now hears murmuring noises inside, grumbling and complaining
because she is vexed by this quandary presented by the serpent and wonders why she can’t have
the fruit after all.
Her musing acts as an inner complaint and reasoning against her inner wisdom, but most
importantly, it functions as a turning point where we witness Eve’s capability to use her
intelligence to examine the situation through a louder and more vociferous discourse. This is
especially significant because she hasn’t been vocal or aggressive enough to argue against Satan,
as I have pointed out earlier. Her speeches get briefer and weaker, so that one almost wonders
why she doesn’t fight harder as Satan gets more aggressive and persuasive in his argument.
Something about Eve’s silence, I think, I should clarify and explain here. Her lack of outward
speech should not be criticized or measured as lack of intelligence; surely, when comparing the
conversations between Adam and Raphael and the ones between Eve and Satan, there are some
obvious differences between them, such as, for instance, the length of Eve and Adam’s speech.
As I pointed out earlier, while Satan’s speeches get longer and more elaborate, there is not much
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written evidence that shows her vigorous intellectual contest against Satan; furthermore, since
Adam consistently speaks in lengthy, articulate lines while conversing with Raphael, it is indeed
difficult for the reader to ignore the striking difference between these constructions. For
example, in Books 7 and 8 of Paradise Lost when Adam requests Raphael to explain how God
created the world and how the celestial system works, Raphael answers Adam in a long,
continuous discourse that lasts throughout Book 7, and then in Book 8 Raphael encourages
Adam to “dream not of other worlds” and suggests “know what passes there; be lowly wise:/
Think only what concerns thee and thy being” (VIII. 173-74).
However, in Book 8 we notice Adam gathering what he has learned from Raphael and
using his intelligence to ask questions and voice his opinion outwardly to Raphael:
How fully hast thou satisfied me, pure
Intelligence of Heav’n, angel serene,
And freed from intricacies, taught to live,
The easiest way, nor with perplexing thoughts
To interrupt the sweet of life, from which
God hath bid dwell far off all anxious cares,
And not molest us, unless we ourselves
Seek them with wand’ring thoughts, and notions vain.
But apt the mind or fancy is to rove
Unchecked, and of her roving is no end. (VIII. 180-89)
Adam here is clearly aware of how the mind might wander/wonder, even though he begins his
question with a polite affirmation of Raphael’s answers. However, what is perplexing here is that
though Adam says that God has prepared and wants Adam to follow the “easiest way” (VIII.
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183), he is already locked into philosophical inquiries that are anything but simple or easy. Adam
is a complex thinker, and his insights and inquiries in Book 8 lines 180-216 (also lines 250-559,
a long, continuous speech describing his recollection of being created by God) show plenty of
evidence that Adam is able to assay Raphael’s speech and develop his own argument against
Raphael. But Adam also quickly yields; though he thinks “apt the mind or fancy is to rove/
unchecked, and of her roving is no end,” he believes such “roving” has its end
Till warned, or by experience taught, she learn,
That not to know at large of things remote
From use, obscure and subtle, but to know
That which before us lies daily life,
Is the prime wisdom; what is more, is fume,
Or emptiness, or fond impertinence,
And renders us in things that most concern
Unpracticed, unprepared, and still to seek. (VIII. 190-97)
I am suspicious of, or at least interested in, how readily Adam puts the progression of his
thoughts in abeyance and accepts Raphael’s suggestion: “Therefore from his high pitch let us
descend/ A lower flight, and speak of things at hand/ Useful, whence haply mention may arise/
Of something not unseasonable to ask/ By sufferance, and thy wonted favor deigned” (VIII. 198202). Figuratively speaking, here we see Adam’s reasoning coming down to earth, back to
“things at hand” and the practical questions that are “not unseasonable to ask” that could give
him “useful” answers. Adam here, I would argue, makes a mistake of linking “the easiest way”
with “a lower flight”—his mind is already deep in the way of an informed, educated mind,
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voicing insights from a fully functioning intelligent mind operated by scientia, and it is hard to
say that the cause of his immediate withdrawal to “the easiest way” is inner wisdom and faith.
Rather, it seems to me that he is using deductive reasoning to eliminate what is the least
practical and least reasonable to believe. More importantly, “the easiest way” could signify
gracefulness and the easy execution of writing, as one of the OED definitions of the adjective
“easy” demonstrates: “of written compositions: Showing no trace of effort; smooth, flowing” of
a writer or thinker (A. I. 4. b); it could also imply a kind of nautical trope, as in something “not
hard pressed: not hurried, gentle; said of motion, a breeze, a fire, etc” (A. I. 5. a). Adam, in
Paradise Lost, refers to sapientia when he says, “to know/ That which before us lies in daily life,/
Is the prime wisdom” (VIII. 192-94), but it is hard to say that Adam’s reasoning comes from “the
prime wisdom” offered in “daily life” as so far most of his intelligent decisions have been
influenced by Raphael. Adam clearly thinks the more “apt the mind,” the more likely it will
“rove” (VIII. 188), which supports my suspicion that Adam follows Raphael’s lead and hasn’t
truly wiped out his doubts and questions; “the easiest way” to Adam is still less challenging, “a
lower flight” (VIII. 199). Adam describes “what is more [than the prime wisdom] is fume,/ Or
emptiness” (194-94). Yet we should pay attention to the way Adam gains knowledge about the
world; though he says what one could gain outside the natural knowledge is “fume” or
“emptiness,” most of Adam’s knowledge comes from an articulate source, an interactive,
Socratic discussion with Raphael. Adam knows about “the easiest way,” but he doesn’t practice
it. And if “the easiest way” is what God intended us to live, then this course of action must be
intuitively in us. When dealing with that inner wisdom, an internal contemplative dialogue
between reason and self should take precedence over an external exchange of knowledge. The
one that actually takes knowledge in “the easiest way,” without any trace of effort or eagerness
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to learn, is Eve. After all, “the easiest way” must be able to simplify “perplexing thoughts” to
render them less perplexing, and most importantly, “the easiest way” will require less words to
articulate either perplexing or “sweet” ideas. Thus Eve’s musings show her inner wisdom, albeit
wisdom that is tainted by Satan.
Looking at lines 739-44 from Book 8 carefully, one should notice that her musing is
further heightened by her sensory experience: “Meanwhile the hour of noon drew on, and waked/
An eager appetite, raised by the smell/ So savory of that fruit, which with desire,/ Solicited her
longing eye; yet first/ Pausing a while, thus to herself she mused” (739-44). And Milton’s
brilliance is that he hasn’t forgotten that she is a human being, who after all does get hungry and
senses her hunger. That her musing coincides with her heightened sensory experience isn’t a
coincidence. Whether it is silent or murmured to herself, the grumbling speech she makes in the
next thirty-five lines (745-79) must have been echoing inside her head. These lines reveal her
reasoning as unsettled and confused, fluctuating between why she should or shouldn’t follow
Satan’s suggestion. By the time she “muse[s],” she is already convincing herself
For good unknown, sure is not had, or had
And yet unknown, is as not had at all.
In plain then, what forbids he but to know,
Forbids us good, forbids us to be wise?
Such prohibitions bind not. But if death
Bind us with after-bands, what profits then
Our inward freedom? In the day we eat
Of this fair fruit, our doom is, we shall die.
How dies the serpent? He hath eat’n and lives,
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And knows, and speaks, and reasons, and discerns,
Irrational till then. For us alone
Was death invented? (IX. 756-67).
For the worse, her musing has already been tempered by the inevitable corporeal reality—it is
about lunch time and she feels “an eager appetite” as her body’s sensory system nags her to
smell the fruit, see the fruit, and eat the fruit: “An eager appetite, raised by the smell/ So savory
of that fruit, which with desire,/ Solicited her longing eye” (IX. 740-43). Now her body
“raise[s]” her desire for the fruit and thoughts of eating the fruit. In the above lines spoken by
Eve, Milton juxtaposes the two words “knowing” and “had” to demonstrate how Eve confuses
two different kinds of knowledge, one inspired from the divine light, the spiritual knowledge and
wisdom, or sapientia, and the other obtained through corporeal experience and learned
examination, the external knowledge and worldly information, or scientia. Eve seems to equate
nescience with immateriality: “unknown” is “not had” and “had and yet unknown” is “not had at
all” (756-57). If never “had,” it is never known; for Eve, lack of knowledge signifies both
material and immaterial scarcity.206 This is a very subtle and slippery argument; Eve here could
mean that if she does not know something at this point, then she has never had that knowledge.
The first condition, “for good unknown, sure is not had,” could imply having as obtaining the
knowledge through physical experience, at which point knowledge becomes a material
possession, like knowledge being transported from the fruit to the mind of a person just by
consuming the fruit; yet the second condition—“had and yet unknown, is as not had at all”—is
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In addition, this passage about Eve demonstrates Milton’s monism or animist materialism. As Fallon
observes in Milton among the Philosophers, Milton’s monism involves the idea that a single material substance
which is "animate, self-active, and free" can compose everything in the universe: “But where Hobbes assimilated
mind to matter and explained mental events mechanically, Milton assimilated matter to current notions of mind and
moved toward the position that all corporeal substance is animate, self-active, and free” (81).
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much more opaque and defies analysis. Once again, it is hard to tell whether the word “had”
signifies either the physical consumption of the fruit that yields the knowledge of “good,” or the
spiritual possession of the knowledge of “good” that Eve should have already “had” intuitively.
If the first is the case, then what kind of knowledge is Eve acquiring? Sapientia? Or scientia? If
the latter is true, then obviously taking the fruit from the tree and eating it signifies she has lost
her own divine light and didn’t work hard to regain its strength to fight against the temptation.
The lines 756-57 could simply mean that if one never had experienced “good” then he or she will
never know what “good” is. Yet I would argue the peculiar mentioning of knowing and having in
Eve’s crucial musing suggests a strong platonic and Augustinian backdrop. Then the line “had
and yet unknown, is as not had at all” questions the possibility of inner light that could exist
before the physical or experimental knowledge. If that is the case, Eve denies all her intuitive
knowledge and wisdom that set her apart from Adam and made her a more autonomous thinker
than Adam. Depending on how we read those lines, one can argue that Eve turns immaterial,
spiritual sapientia into something interchangeable with material and physical scientia that can be
possessed, or that she challenges the possibility of spiritual knowledge by saying that knowledge
is something tangible, something that can be observed and possessed, so that without scientia
there can’t be sapientia “at all.” Eve no longer believes that the invisible, immaterial “good” can
be apprehended through finding and reigniting the inner divine illumination.
Satan’s words become more powerful, the poem seems to indicate, because they are
accompanied by visuality, and the above lines reveal how what Eve sees takes over and dims the
illuminating light that is Eve’s spirituality, eclipsing and disabling her wisdom to reason and
fight against Satan’s temptation. By this point, Eve is fully occupied by what she sees in front of
her, as sapientia loses its place and strength to keep illuminating the inner wisdom that she
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desperately needs—and, by extension in Milton’s theology, all humans need—ever more to fight
against Satan’s temptation.
Wilson argues that Augustine’s and the general medieval theology’s theory of divine
illumination rather proves the Platonic Christian fear of the empiricist doubting of the realness of
spirituality, and that, as she asserts in the passage I cite above, “the profound ocular aestheticism
of the Confessions is the other face of the fear that visuality and spirituality are as mutually
exclusive as gratified lust and salvation.” When physical seeing began to offer sights as real and
detailed as the microscopic or telescopic views of things previously unseen or invisible before
those devices’ inventions, seeing began to be more real than knowing—at least the rationalist
philosophers and theologians began both to predict and to fear the implications of such
challenges as empirical discoveries piled up and science advanced. As Wilson describes above,
visuality is the misleading, unwarranted portent that blurs the spiritual communication with and
affirmation of God attained through the mind’s eye, without seeing God through the corporeal
eye. In that sense, visuality offers more reason for Eve to be tempted. What she sees through her
physical eye makes her incredulous of what she knows already as she becomes more credulous
of what she sees with her eyes. Hence, Satan’s cunning timely words tempt her, “Look on me,/
Me who have touched and tasted, yet both live,/ And life more perfect have attained than fate/
Meant me, by vent’ring higher than my lot” (IX. 687-90). Pay close attention to the display of
visual signs Satan lays in front of Eve, encouraging her to trust what she sees in front of her. As I
have already discussed above, this abundance and assurance of immortality through physical
seeing undermines the idea of God and wisdom gained through patient self-examination and selfillumination. Satan cleverly asks—“Look on me” (687). If individuals could “touch” and “taste”
immortality as a physical existence, not as an abstract idea, wouldn’t they at least begin to
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compare the sight of God they see and the vision of God they know and wonder if perhaps they
should believe what they see through their eyes instead of what they envision? Whether or not
Eve was already fallen at this point of Satan’s persuasion is not the point of my argument here,
for regardless of whether or not she was, we can agree on one thing—Satan is certainly banking
on empirical evidence to convince Eve. Indeed, Milton’s subtle and thorough construction of
Satan’s argument gives Satan one of the most vexing and ominous questions directly challenging
the ontology of religious faith:
The Gods are first, and that advantage use
On our belief, that all from them proceeds;
I question it, for this fair Earth I see,
Warmed by the sun, producing every kind,
Them nothing; if they all things, who enclosed
Knowledge of good and evil in this Tree,
That whoso eats thereof, forthwith attains
Wisdom without their leave? And wherein lies
Th’offense, that man should thus attain to know?
What can your knowledge hurt him, or this Tree
Impact against his will if all be his?” (IX. 718-28)
Satan here says he is not even sure why he must believe, or even worse, why anyone must fear
something that they never know exists since they don’t see its existence in the things all around
them. Subtly polarizing and distorting the singularity and omnipresence of God, Satan uses the
plural “gods” and in a confessional tone proclaims his failure to see God in everything around
him.
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The argument Satan makes here is that if God is omnipresent and omnipotent, he should
have been able to see Him readily, physically, everywhere in the physical world. But this is
exactly why, as Wilson asserts, “medieval philosophy was ambivalent toward the natural world
and the value of the sense of vision”—spirituality is devalued as it is materialized. However, this
is not to say that Milton paints his God without spirituality, diminishing the abstract idea of God,
to profess his monist faith. The idea of God’s being held in the mind’s eye and the faith in the
possibility that God can be seen through the physical eye confirm the co-existence of spirit and
body, but Satan’s speech cleverly describes his Augustinian “curiositas” as a wise and observant
way of understanding God while simultaneously debunking the very fact that God created what
he sees. All these points about Satan’s speech should lead us to one understanding about Satan—
he has a bad spiritual sight, he is a bad reader of God. Or, at least, he is a proponent of ruining
spiritual sight by confusing spiritual seeing with the ready and easy visuality that he argues
should reveal God’s presence without the painstaking process of self-examination and
contemplation. Eve, however, has a good spiritual eye; unfortunately she is not using it, and
Satan happens to get her before she even fully opens it. Thus, the wrong sight—the physical
sight—captures her mind, and her mind’s eye is occupied by the sight of “curiositas”: “his words
replete with guile/ Into her heart too easy entrance won:/ Fixed on the fruit she gazed, which to
behold/ Yet rung of his persuasive words, impregned/ With reason, to her seeming, and with
truth” (IX. 737-38). The gaze is fixed onto the thing visible—not with the spiritual eye, but with
the corporeal eye. This passage, I would argue, exhibits the very reason for medieval
philosophy’s ambivalence towards visuality; physical sight possesses the ability to blind and
obstruct spiritual sight. Thus, Satan’s speech here perhaps suggests the poet’s gratitude, for the
loss of his physical sight accords with Christianity’s fear—at least following the medieval
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tradition—that the abundance of physical seeing could ruin one’s spiritual seeing. Even further, I
might argue that here we see the expressions of concern from a poet who espouses the kind of
patient, self-contemplative “inward” seeing that his poetry champions.

5

CHAPTER 5: Inward Vision in Milton’s Samson Agonistes and Paradise Regained
Instead of being told through the creator’s point of view, Book VIII of Paradise Lost

presents the story of Adam’s creation recollected by Adam, the created. According to his
memory, Adam says that after “new waked from soundest sleep,” he began to muse about what
he sees “about [him] round”: “Hill, dale, and shady woods, and sunny plains,/ And liquid lapse
of murmuring stream” (262-63). Adam does not know or cannot recall who he is or where he
comes from: “But who I was, or where, or from what cause,/ Knew not; to speak I tried, and
forthwith spake” (VIII. 270-71). Then, all of a sudden, he is able to call the sun by its name: “My
tongue obeyed and readily could name/ Whate’er I saw. ‘Thou sun,’ said I, fair light” (VIII. 27273). Notably, after his “tongue obeyed and readily could name/ Whate’er [he] saw” (272-73),
Adam is able to identify the things he sees “round” him and speak to them. Adam cannot say the
names of what was “round” him at first, but once he was able to “name/ Whate’er [he] saw”—
the sun—he begins to talk to everything he sees around him: “Ye hills and dales, ye rivers,
woods, and plains,/ And ye that live and move, fair creatures, tell,/ Tell, if ye saw, how came I
thus, how here?/ Not of myself; by some great Maker then,/ In goodness and in power preeminent” (275-79). Seeing the sun and its “fair light,” Adam calls its name out loud, making his
first attempt at communication. Light leads Adam to awareness of himself and his surroundings.
Closely looking at Adam’s encounter with light, I will attest that light described by Adam in
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lines 260-290 in Book VIII signifies more than the illuminating physical light. Light leads to
seeing, seeing begets communication, and finally communication results in narratives.
Light revealed to Adam reveals what Adam sees, for light gives definition to the things
Adam sees. How Adam wakes up and sees himself and the world further demonstrates how
seeing portends the light in an intellectual or psychological sense of the word; opening one’s
physical eye to the world illuminates and defines—or redefines—the meaning of self and the
other. That Adam recollects seeing the light for the first time when telling the story of his
creation is critical for our understanding of Milton’s insights on seeing as spiritual enlightenment
in Paradise Lost. Adam’s recollection of seeing the world around him reveals the most basic yet
the most comprehensive goal of seeing—telling. Seeing what is around him leads to a realization
of the existence of “some great Maker” (278). This seeing prompts a narrative, and in this way
seeing fulfills its greater potential—psychological enunciation of self and documentation of
spiritual enlightenment. For example, in The Confessions of Saint Augustine, Augustine writes
Let now the numerous variety of things furnish me some example. I behold the
day-break, I foreshow, that the sun, is about to rise. What I behold, is present;
what I foresignify, to come; not the sun, which already is; but the sun-rising,
which is not yet. And yet did I not in my mind imagine the sun-rising itself (as
now while I speak of it), I could not foretell it. But neither is that day-break which
I discern in the sky, the sun-rising, although it goes before it; nor that imagination
of my mind; which two are seen now present, that the other which is to be may be
foretold. Future things then are not yet: and if they be not yet, they are not: and if
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they are not, they cannot be seen; yet foretold they may be from things present,
which are already, and are seen. (XI. 18. 24.)207
Augustine’s reaction to “the day break” reveals that what one “behold[s]” now, which is
“present,” isn’t all that telling is about; as his narrative above shows, while bending the horizon
of time, telling comes to its existence. What one can “foresignify” is something “to come,”
which the spiritual, immaterial eye can see beyond what is there or already there, like “the sun
which already is,” even though “they cannot be seen.” Augustine interprets—foresignifies—the
rise of the sun from seeing the day break.
In Book VIII of Paradise Lost, after recognizing and identifying that what he sees is the
light, Adam also foresignifies the presence of the sun, which is more interesting especially
because Adam is able to identify and call out the name of the sun even though he has just seen
the light. Yet something in Adam, something almost immanent, urges him to utter the words,
“thou sun”: “tongue obeyed and readily could name/ Whate’er [he] saw” (VIII. 272-73). Looking
at both Adam’s and Augustine’s reactions to the visible world, I notice that spiritual seeing needs
a kind of visual stimulus to initiate a negotiation between the physical sight and the envisioned
sight inside the mind. The visual element is immanent in the spiritual vision. Furthermore, that
Adam is able to signify the sun “this happy light” (VIII. 285) supports that the sensory
experience of seeing provides a vital aid in not only gaining but also articulating the material
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The Confessions of Saint Augustine, translated with an introduction and notes by E. B. Pusey, 291.
Various translations of St. Augustine’s Confessions do show variations, especially with the word “foresignify” in the
passage I presented above. For instance, while Pusey says “What I behold, is present; what I foresignify, to come,”
Chadwick’s 1991 version uses the word “forecasting” instead of “foresignify”: “What I am looking at is present,
what I am forecasting is future” (Chadwick 234). F. J Sheed’s 1943 translation says the following: “What I am
looking at is present, what I foretell is future” (Sheed 275). Although the differences between “foretell,” “forecast,”
and “foresignify” might be small, I can’t ignore how “foretell” and “forecast” somehow flatten the sense of poetic—
verbal—incantation that comes through the word “foresignify.” Although some studies suggest Chadwick’s
translation as more current and authoritative, I am partial to Pusey’s 1950 translation, so I am going to refer to
Pusey’s 1950 translation throughout my study.
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knowledge about the visible world as this knowledge adds to the content of Adam’s telling. But
there is still one question: is “happy” what he sees, through his eyes? Where did the idea of
modification come from, and where did the modifier come from? But then, where did this urge to
say—“tongue obeyed and readily could name/ Whate’er [he] saw” (VIII. 272-73)—“thou sun”
come from, after seeing and identifying light as the sun? Without knowing that the light he sees
is the sun or is coming from the sun, Adam can “foresignify” the first visible object that he sees
as his consciousness moves out of darkness to the light. Augustine has seen and known about the
sun-rising, but Adam has just woken up from a sleep—at least this is what he recalls. Adam’s
“foresignifying”—if we borrow Augustine’s term—is both more advanced and more nascent
than what Augustine implies because it is never revealed how Adam gained his incipient
knowledge about the “happy” sun after his very first awakening. Yet most importantly, both
Augustine’s and Adam’s use of foresignification reveals that what they end up describing
extends well beyond the material magnitude or quality of what one sees—signifying beforehand,
simultaneously, or subsequently requires a prophetic sight. This differs greatly from “scientific”
seeing, devoted to objective reproduction, and produces an entirely different sort of narrative or
model concerning the material features of one’s surroundings.
Clearly, in Paradise Lost, Paradise Regained, and Samson Agonistes, Milton underlines
the potential for prophetic sight as the only kind of seeing that results in meaningful story,
signifying and recording something beyond the physical eye’s ability to see. Seeing becomes
knowing, and knowing propels telling. And telling is the most instrumental element of
continuing and confirming faith. Sight is the tool needed for the construction of text, and the
instrumentality of telling gets further developed and examined in Samson Agonistes, where the
lack of sight—opting out from the abundance of seeing—helps Samson recollect his faith
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through dark times. It is also equally intriguing that while optical devices were understood to be
advancing and correcting human vision, as the microscope can allow observers to see the most
subtle and small object invisible to the naked eye, Milton offers criticism against optic devices
mirroring that in The Blazing World, where Cavendish points out the inorganic, clumsy, and
perfunctory aspect of optical devices. It is even more noteworthy, perhaps, to point out the
obvious; that the poet with his own diminishing eye sight makes a point about how optical
devices rather magnify irregularities and unveil more imperfections of our own natural condition
than our own natural sight, which can be full of imperfection. Both for the scientists and the
poets, the goal is to present what they see. In that sense, optical devices and poetry assume a very
similar objective—revealing and presenting what one sees. “By the help of Microscopes,” Robert
Hooke argues in Micrographia, “there is nothing so small, as to escape inquiry; hence there is a
new visible world discovered to the understanding.” The visible world definitely expanded,
microscopically or macroscopically, as the scientific inventions and knowledge advanced, but
the physical views of the world that became available through the optic aids still demanded
vigorous acts of inward reasoning.
As the quantitative increase in distance and scope of the world became visible with the
advent of new science, it inspired a change in the conceptual view of the world. This increasing
availability and accessibility of the physical world could not completely disprove the spiritual
presence of the qualitative world, and such uncertainty towards constantly growing awareness of
terra incognita foreshadowed the change in conventional perception of both the celestial and
corporeal structure of the world, which furthermore influenced the philosophical view of the
world. Various Renaissance poets and thinkers attest to the prosthetic instrumentality of optic
devices such as the microscope and telescope that rather refract and diminish the human spirit

185
rather than enhance it; they were far more invested in poetry that explores intellectual subtlety
and human imagination and hubris as an instrument of sight—surely, Milton and the other poets
I discuss here not only recognize but also self-consciously caution that the continuity and
diffraction between the mechanically-enhanced and natural sight may alter the attribute of
sapientia in poetry. In Milton’s later poems such as Paradise Regained and Samson Agonistes,
the greater landscape or smallest detail that mechanically enhanced seeing can provide doesn’t
portend either the moral or aesthetic quality of the narrative it tries to produce unless the sight is
reckoned by the spiritual sight and told through the sight that is spiritually enhanced. Milton
displays the mechanically enhanced sights as not only optical illusions but moral and spiritual
deprivation, comparing the optic devices to the prosthetic eyes that only spiritually indigent
creatures like Satan vaunt about owning and using.
In “Augustine on Evolution, Time, and Memory,” John Caiazza examines Augustine’s
interpretation of the Book of Genesis and detailed commentaries on “the time bound nature of
physical and biological processes in relation to God’s creative action” (116). Skeptics have
argued the inconsistency of God’s creating light the first day and the sun and the moon on the
third day, but as Caiazza points out, for those who wrote the script, it was more important to
focus on “the [light’s] metaphoric role as the basis for understanding the universe, that is, as the
sign and effect of God’s rationality” (117). The light unveils and teaches, through “sign and
effect,” God’s work by performing the “metaphoric role” of making the signs visible and
illuminating their meanings; light, then, ultimately is for reckoning God’s work, hence the
“effect of God’s rationality.” How Milton presents Adam’s waking up, becoming aware of his
surroundings, and seeing light reflects the process of reckoning “the sign and effect of God’s
rationality” as the process eventually leads Adam to an action, when he “readily could name,”
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that signifies the onset of his intelligence. That signification—the language being yielded or
begotten by seeing light—of Adam’s coming to the realm of language demonstrates exactly the
“light’s metaphoric role” Caiazza describes; the light as a metaphor should carry its observer to
insightful illumination. Even though Adam says “who I was, or where, or from what cause, knew
not,” Adam is able to name “whate’er [he] saw” right where he was illuminated by “whate’er
[he] saw,” which reveals the metaphorical role of light as spiritual awakening and guidance. The
light awakens something in Adam, and he “obey[s]”:“to speak I tried, and forthwith spake,/ My
tongue obeyed and readily could name/ Whate’er I saw. Thou sun, said I, fair light” (VIII. 27173). Adam sees light, light illuminates and activates his mind, and Adam’s tongue “obey[s]”
what his mind triggers him to “forthwith sp[e]ake.” Adam’s first encounter with light
demonstrates how the “light’s metaphoric role” delivers “the sign and effect of God’s
rationality” (Caizza 117).
Adam’s description of the nearness and urgency of ubiquitous light further reveals the
paradoxical nature of the “sign and effect of God’s rationality.” As a metaphorical sign, light
suggests the inward and meditative illumination, but its material sign exists externally and comes
to Adam from outside as he sees the world around him made visible by light; and to make the
light’s illuminating effect complete and rational, Adam articulates what he sees through another
form of materialized sign, the “name” of the “fair light” (VIII. 272-73).208 What was external is
internalized, rationalized, and came back to its external state again. The sign of God’s rationality
is farther away from Adam while the effect of God’s rationality occurs near Adam; more than
Moreover, as Adam makes clear, the light he refers to is “thou sun,” which is more than ubiquitous and
almost pervasive; thus, the event foreshadows a possibility of Adam’s lack of insightful understanding at the point
of seeing the light. I examine this point further where I compare seeing under the sun’s rather straight, intrusive light
as non-poetic light, as opposed to seeing in the shade, and argue that opting out from the abundance of light is
equivalent to seeing through the un-aided, natural eye, which will make us rely more on sapientia, while
mechanically-enhanced seeing will rely more on an artificial, material aid of worldly knowledge that promotes
physical enhancement and increase over spiritual depth.
208
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near, it occurs in his mind. The mind’s interiority manifests the external sign into a proximate
significance, proximate enough to embody our mind’s interiority and compact enough to fit and
be articulated in these lines. What makes the external and material sign become internal and
immaterial? What makes the physically immobile sign conceptually mobile? What Adam’s
tongue obeys is sapientia, “the sign and effect of God’s rationality,” the immanent authority of
spiritual interiority. And that spiritual interiority shapes the way one sees, turning the external
and material sign into internal and immaterial significance—spiritual seeing directly influences
the moral and aesthetic authority of telling. In this chapter, divided into three sections, I will
examine Milton’s poems and discuss how spiritual and poetic seeing generates a more persuasive
narrative and epistemological authority than mechanically enhanced seeing that promotes servile
and insular narrative. Regardless of his physical blindness, Milton exhibited an aesthetic and
moral vigor in his narrative that suggests that spiritual seeing affirms one’s poetic insight and
religious faith, while mechanically enhanced observation or scientific examination often points
to the kind of seeing that only works to analyze and disprove.
5.1

Seeing as Expansion, Seeing as Examination
The scene of Satan’s temptation of Eve reveals why logical reasoning can fail to defend

and sustain against Satan’s manipulation of both the sensory system and human logic. Scientia,
as opposed to sapientia, ascribes to the artificial and instrumental aspect of knowledge; this
learned knowledge often challenges the inner knowledge attempting to create suspicion about,
conceptualize, or even fabricate its antecedents. Seeing accompanied only by scientia is bound to
perceive and suspect any unexplained prohibition supplementing ideology and class—why can’t
Eve have the fruit, obtain knowledge, and live forever too? Scientia hinges upon using the sight
to question and inspect, and as scientific knowledge increasingly became the key to
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understanding the natural world, the mechanical enhancement of human sight signaled an
inefficacy of the realm of religion and folk worship and thus the improbability of seeing the
invisible world or of any scholastic examination of spirituality versus physicality. Sapientia
became even more spiritual, too unreal, unless the spiritual world can be defined and measured
in the same terms as the natural world. Catherine Wilson writes:
Consider again the suggestion that the objectivity of science is a consequence of
the perspective adopted by the mathematizing atomist who escapes both the
inconsequentiality and discursiveness of the superficial performances of idle
virtuosi and the illusions of subjectivity. And note first that the reductionist
accounts of human perception and the elimination of sympathies and antipathies
and other evident projections of the human psyche into nature were not the
necessary accompaniments of atomism or mechanism. For Descartes, Galileo, and
Boyle, mechanism and corpuscularianism were paired with sensory reductionism,
the denial of real qualities. But Gassendi, Charleton, and for a time Thomas
Hobbes, equally celebrated as moderns in their day, believed in visual species that
they construed materially as icons, films, or idola, “decortications or sloughs,”
which, emitted from the object, flew through the air like snakeskins carrying “an
exact resemblance of all Lineaments and colours,” as Charleton described them,
entered into the eye and mind, and so made us see. (Wilson 20)
Wilson further points out that even seeing itself as sense perception became the target of
Cartesian reductionism: “The doctrine that qualities are simply the effects of corpuscular
arrangement was an additional hypothesis, in which the knowledge that the eye was somewhat
like an optical device, a camera obscura that projected a picture on the back of the eye, had to be
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forgotten. The new view was that the eye was responding to a pattern, as Descartes knew, of
pressures” (20). Descartes believes that sight is “the most noble and universal” of human senses
and that “there is no doubt that the inventions which serve to improve its power are the most
useful which can exist” (from Dioptrique, qtd. in Wilson 20-21).209 Yet this kind of classification
of seeing as the mechanical means that serves merely our sensory perception implies that “seeing
is essentially servile” (Wilson 21).
Under the aid of optical technology and scientific knowledge, seeing, as a sensory
experience becomes even more servile as the distance necessary for conceptualizing and
imagining what could be seen but hasn’t been seen gets diminished. If sensory experience only
informs one’s physical condition and controls how one conducts his or her life, then the
knowledge one possesses about the physical world becomes suspect of being tenuous and false.
Perhaps these scientists do the work of philosophy, disarranging and unnaturalizing by
questioning and analyzing, not relying on the given nature of things. Unfortunately, as I will
argue, trying to reinforce the atomic reality of our existence cannot allow a room for “the
illusions of subjectivity” and “human perception”; once the optic inventions try to prove the
material reality of our existence by improving our seeing, seeing indeed becomes “essentially
servile.” Atomic reality will eventually encourage, as Wilson asserts above, “the elimination of
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In his short treatise published in 1637 titled Dioptrique or Optics, René Descartes presents his purely
mechanical optical theory, which argues that our visual experience should match the physical objects we see:
“Hence you will have no reason to conclude that there is no need to suppose that something material passes from
objects t our eyes to make us see colours and light, or even that there is something in the objects which resembles
the ideas or sensations that we have of them. In just the same way, when a blind man feels the bodies, nothing has to
issue from the bodies and pass along his stick to his hand; and the resistance or movement of the bodies, which is the
sole cause of the sensations he has of them, is nothing like the ideas he forms of them. By this means, your mind
will be delivered from all those little images flitting through the air, called ‘intentional forms,’ which so exercise the
imagination of the philosophers” (Descartes: Selected Philosophical Writings 58-59). Furthermore, looking out to
the stars and the moon or looking at the microscopic details of our body or the “little images flitting through the air,”
as Descartes describes them, appears to deflect introspection and take away from the Christian ideal of selfexamination.
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sympathies and antipathies” and the evacuation of spiritual reality; once sensory experience is
deemed unstable, then natural seeing without any artificial aid becomes not only suspect but also
subservient to mechanically enhanced seeing. Mechanism and corpuscularianism, or sensory
reductionism, can’t fully explain how the material experience can induce something immaterial.
As with Hobbes and Gassendi, yet more material constructions are needed to signal and point at
the immaterial, such as “icons, films, or idola, ‘decortications or sloughs’” (Wilson 20). Hooke
argues that “every considerable improvement of Telescopes or Microscopes [produces] new
worlds and terra incognita’s to our view” because he believes these scopic devices will not only
expand the scope of visuality but also increase and improve the detail and quality of visuality.
Even further, “by the help of Microscopes,” Hooke argues in The Preface to Micrographia,
“there is nothing so small, as to escape inquiry; hence there is a new visible world discovered to
the understanding” (sig. A2v). However, a microscopic view simply provides one of many
additional perspectives, as Wilson argues:
And this is indeed a conclusion one might derive from leafing through the
Micrographia. We are told there, because we could not otherwise guess it, that
what we are seeing are bits and fragments of familiar substances—moss, mold,
and vermin—presented under an unfamiliar aspect. Mold looks like a lunar forest,
a flea looks like a crustacean, and so on. We might as well be seeing new
landscapes and new forms of life; only their labels identify them. And from this
one might then infer that the microscope can give us no information—or at least
no direct information—about our macroscopic world and its objects, except
information of the general form “this is how it looks under the microscope.”
(Wilson 244)
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If “there is a new visible world discovered,” as Hooke says, and the purpose of scientific
instruments such as the microscope is to enhance the human sight and make the visible more
clear and perceivable to the physical eye so that the visible becomes more than just visible, then
shouldn’t these instruments make “a new visible world” understandable to the mind as well? And
by saying “understandable,” I mean to reveal and teach the viewer new knowledge about this
“new world”? Yet, the instrument cannot show more than a material texture under “an
unfamiliar aspect,” that is, under the microscope; as Wilson says above, “what we are seeing are
bits and fragments of familiar substances—moss, mold, and vermin—presented under an
unfamiliar aspect.” Can a microscope inform viewers that the presented images—often little
more than textures—they see through a microscope are more than just a texture, that they are
indeed “mold” or “a flea” even though they might look like “a lunar forest” or “a crustacean”?
How do viewers identify what they see through a microscope after all? Most observers, when
presented with “a new world” in front of them, respond with a consistent and similar process of
recognition and assimilation—“that looks like so and so”—to make the unfamiliar familiar as
they remember aspects of the old familiar world and compare them to this new world in front of
them. In Leviathan and the Air Pump: Hobbes, Boyle, and the Experimental Life, Steven Shapin
and Simon Schaffer suggest that Hooke envisions his scientific instruments as serving both
instructive and editorial duties upon human senses and, furthermore, to inform human reasoning:
“Scientific instruments therefore imposed both a correction and a discipline upon the senses. In
this respect the discipline enforced by devices such as the microscope and the air-pump was
analogous to the discipline imposed upon the senses by reason. The senses alone were
inadequate to constitute proper knowledge, but the senses disciplined were far more fit to the
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task” (37).210 Shapin and Schaffer further note: “Things would be seen that were previously
invisible: the rings of Saturn, the mosaic structure of the fly’s eye, spots on the sun. And other
things, essentially invisible, would be given visual manifestations: the pressure of the air,
aqueous and terrestrial effluvia” (37). However, even though what was “previously invisible”
can become visible through the scientific instruments, the microscopic view remains as another
example of “visual manifestations” still to be figured out and identified by the human mind. The
unreliability of the human senses, combined with the realization of the artificiality of the
machines, perhaps lead us to ponder the following question: how can human beings with the
infirmities of human senses recognize or identify good from evil, or Satan in the disguise of a
serpent, when they can’t even see well enough through their natural eyes?
In his very brief mention of the microscope in Paradise Regained Milton in his restrained
voice presents his objection to such a claim that one can expand and increase the quality of
human sight with a mechanical instrument. Brief and rather ambiguous, Satan’s mentioning of a
microscope still deserves a detailed analysis. In his gaudy descriptions of the site of political
power, which he uses to tempt Christ, Satan reveals that power stretches as far as one can see,
and in his case, he can see quite far:
there the Capitol thou seest
Above the rest lifting his stately head

Shapin and Schaffer argue that “the power of new scientific instruments, the microscope and telescope
as well as the air-pump, resided in their capacity to enhance perception and to constitute new perceptual objects” in
Leviathan and the Air Pump: Hobbes, Boyle, and the Experimental Life (36). Indeed, even though “a crustacean”
might not be the view of a new world, one must take this into consideration—seen through a natural eye, a flea
would appear as a speck, nothing like a crustacean. Shapin and Simon further point out: “The experimental
philosophy, empiricist and inductivist, depended upon the generation of matters of fact that were objects of
perceptual experience. Unassisted senses were limited in their ability to discern and to constitute such perceptual
objects. Boyle himself reckoned ‘that the Informations of Sense assisted and highlighted by Instruments are usually
preferable to those of Sense alone’” (36). As Shapin and Simon point out, Hooke believed that “scientific
instruments enlarged the senses” and thus opened up a new, wider and more detailed view of the world that a natural
eye cannot see: “In Hooke’s view, the task was one of remedying the ‘infirmities’ of the human senses” (36).
210

193
On the Tarpeian rock, her citadel
Impregnable, and there Mount Palatine
The imperial palace, compass huge, and high
The structure, skill of noblest architects,
With gilded battlements, conspicuous far,
Turrets and terraces, and glittering spires.
Many a fair edifice besides, more like
Houses of gods (so well I have disposed
My airy microscope) thou may’st behold
Outside and inside both, pillars and roofs
Carved work, the hand of famed artificers
In cedar, marble, ivory or gold. (IV. 47-60)
Satan here says that he has “disposed” his “airy microscope” because “the imperial palace”
seems to be so much “more like/ houses of gods”; in other words, “the imperial palace”
possesses such characteristics of divinity—“houses of gods”—with “many a fair edifice” and
“pillars and roofs/Carved work, the hand of famed artificers/ In cedar, marble, ivory or gold.”
This is an unusual use of the trope of the microscope, especially because the idea of a
microscope’s being “airy” doesn’t quite make sense right away. The word “airy,” just as with
Milton’s use of the word “happy” in Paradise Lost that I discussed previously, seems too
conspicuous within its context. OED offers various definitions and uses of the word “airy,” the
most obvious of which describes a state of being “in the air” or “of or belonging to the air, esp.
as distinguished from the earth, water, etc.; living or located in the air” or “located high in the
air, lofty” or being “exalted” and “celestial” (OED, I. 1. and 2.). When interpreted with this
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intended meaning, “airy microscope” could simply mean looking into something from above, up
in the air, up in the sky, so that Satan is bragging about his panoramic, eagle’s eye view upon the
imperial palace. However, the word also has some other significant connotations, such as “being
the nature of air,” either exhibiting the “consistency or appearance” of air to mean an “airlike” or
“immaterial” condition of something or being “composed of air” to signify “soft” or a “spongy”
state (OED. II. 5. a-b). The connotation that I am most interested in discussing here, however, is
one that is depreciative, which represents a condition that is “intangible” or “insubstantial” or
“slight”; it further could refer to a person’s “empty character” or judgment to mean something
“superficial, shallow” and even further, “speculative, conjectural” (OED. II. 6. a-c).
There can be many explanations why Satan mentions this new scientific instrument to
make his point about the great details of the interior and exterior decor of the imperial palace.
One of the immediate and obvious explanations that come to mind is to bolster and hyperbolize
the exquisite details of these palaces to influence and persuade Christ. Satan “disposed” his “airy
microscope” because every small detail of these imperial palaces is so meticulously constructed
that they are even more apparent when magnified. Descriptions like “Turrets and terraces, and
glittering spires” and “pillars and roofs/Carved work” further suggest height, implying the bird’seye view or a wide open perspective from high above. And if Satan were indeed looking down to
these palaces, the details must look small—thus the need for “microscope” to magnify the small
details. However, considering the size of objects that can go underneath the magnifying glass,
why would Satan want to use a microscope to look at something “conspicuous far”? Satan makes
a point that he flies so high and is located somewhere up high enough that he has to look at the
details of these “huge” palaces through a microscope. By signifying the magnitude of these
imperial palaces and their political and economic power—“the Capitol thou seest/ Above the rest
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lifting his stately head / On the Tarpeian rock, her citadel/ Impregnable, and there Mount
Palatine/ The imperial palace, compass huge”—Satan further implies his own “impregnable”
power that supposedly resides “above the rest lifting his stately head” (IV.48-50). He is after all
as powerful as how much he can see. As I pointed out earlier, implication of the height is the key
here. His self-positioning above all the rest of a miniscule world reveals Satan’s thirst for vanity
and self-aggrandizement, and his birds-eye view descriptions of the imperial palaces might
indeed demonstrate that Satan does possess the power of such towering and immense sight, but it
also reveals that his power is only as powerful as where he positions himself to be. And let us not
forget, he has “disposed [his] airy microscope” (IV. 56-57). The magnificent details of the
imperial palaces that Satan is able to see and describe, without the airy microscope or any
mechanical aid, demonstrate the material beauty and political power of the edifices themselves,
but they offer not much to prove Satan’s power, not even his seeing power, except for the fact
that he can fly high.
In fact, one must wonder about the following: a microscope is used to see objects that
appear too small for the naked eye, so why doesn’t Satan use a telescope to see palaces that are
remote and larger than himself, instead of a microscope? In fact, Satan does mention “telescope”
a few lines before he mentions his “airy microscope” in Book 4, line 56-57 of Paradise
Regained. While he has “disposed” his microscope because the details of the palaces were so
“well” constructed that they were “conspicuous far,” he still finds the telescope necessary to use
in lines 40-42:
On each side an imperial city stood,
With towers and temples proudly elevate
On seven small hills, with palaces adorned,
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Porches and theatres, baths, aqueducts,
Statues and trophies, and triumphal arcs,
Gardens and groves presented to his eyes,
Above the heighth of mountains interposed.
By what strange parallax or optic skill
Of vision multiplied through air, or glass
Of telescope, were curious to inquire:
And now the Tempter thus his silence broke. (IV. 33-43)
Notice how Satan’s picturesque description of what he calls “long but in breadth not wide” (IV.
27) in the lines above contrasts with the specific and illustrated depiction of the city in lines 4459, presented earlier. The description of the imperial city above provides pastoral scenery, open
and idyllic, that is also synchronized by monuments and landmarks. Lines 35-38 demonstrate a
sense of balance between nature and man-made artificial edifice, rhythmically listed: “On seven
small hills, with palaces adorned,/ Porches and theatres, baths, aqueducts,/ Statues and trophies,
and triumphal arcs.” On the contrary, in lines 44-59 where Satan describes the “outside and
inside both” (58), the proper names and specific names of things and places dominate his
description: “On the Tarpeian rock, her citadel/ Impregnable, and there Mount Palatine/ The
imperial palace, compass huge” (49-51), “Turrets and terraces, and glittering spires./ Many a fair
edifice besides, more like/ Houses of gods” (54-56), or “Outside and inside both, pillars and
roofs/ Carved work, the hand of famed artificers/ In cedar, marble, ivory or gold” (58-60). The
broad patterns of the pastoral landscape are marked by the elements of human civilization to
create boundaries and definitions for Satan to want to see more—something more than a
continuous pattern of green pasture or stream of water or mountains. Satan cleverly mentions the
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telescope for seeing “long but in breadth not wide” (27), but when speaking of minute details he
knows he is supposed to use a microscope.
No matter how high Satan flies, however, the cities are not getting small enough to fit
under the microscope. How can one fit “Turrets and terraces, and glittering spires” underneath
the magnifying glass? Satan’s statement is full of inconsistencies. When he says “I have
disposed/ My airy microscope,” he still admits that he needs some kind of optical instrument to
look at smaller details inside the palace—yet he is not even near the palace. Nothing that he
describes in the first 60 lines or so in Book 4 is small enough to be under a microscope. He has
removed himself so far away by flying high above the city that he will need a telescope to see the
details of the palace. To top it all off, he speaks of the wrong instrument to do so. The fact that
Satan thinks of a microscope in a situation where he is looking at things “huge” enough to be
“conspicuous far” exemplifies his voracious appetite for self-aggrandizement and magnification
of his power. The higher and farther he is from the objects he wants to see, the more power from
his panoramic view he can get. So why does Satan use a microscope instead of telescope to look
at things “conspicuous far,” and what does it say about Satan’s sight? Magnifying small details
is not the main goal for him because he is concerned with bigger things; he doesn’t want to be in
the position of the lower and smaller—he still wants to be above “the rest,” high up to be able to
possess all the views. This is why a telescope won’t do—Satan can’t accept the fact that he is the
smaller component of the universe that needs to look up and zoom in to realize that there is a
wider and bigger universe out there.
Nonetheless, the telescope is being mentioned in line 42 as the “optic skill” that Satan
would occupy to obtain the sight “curious to inquire” (42-32), even though somehow Satan
switches from telescope to microscope—obviously a wrong switch—while looking at the remote
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site of the imperial palace. Satan’s arrogance and ambition make him contradict himself. He
wants to show off how much he can see, so he says he sees something so remote that it will take
a telescope to satiate his curiosity; however, he won’t admit his need for a telescope because he
wants to exaggerate the magnitude of his height and size. Thus he quickly switches to “an airy
microscope,” as if all the remote details of the city he sees from the sky are so small that he can
fit them under his special optic device. It is noteworthy that Satan mentions the two optic
instruments in close proximity to each other—lines 42 and 57—albeit the telescope appears in
the lines where Satan muses to himself while the microscope appears in his speech to Christ.
First of all, these instruments are both optic devices designed to enhance the limited sight, the
human sight, which suggests that Satan’s sight is limited, just like that of humans. On the other
hand, this could also mean Satan’s own thirst for material power restrains his ability to see.
Furthermore, Satan’s topographical musings point to the attributes of a verse genre characterized
by the description of a particular landscape; the prospect poem uses a common motif in poetry
and hymnody, often viewed from a height. Prospects often portray a distant, heavenly site that
displays the common aesthetic attributes such as pastoral and sublime imagery. Since
topographical poetry often indirectly contemplates cultural or social issues or addresses a
political issue concerning the fashioning of an English national identity, poets used the poetic
descriptions of the landscape as a poetic vehicle to express political or social concerns as well as
to blend and seek compromise between extremes. These poetic descriptions present peaceful and
paradisal scenery, distant enough from the observer that the observer can obtain the aerial view,
yet close enough to be seen and described by the observer. Both devices, telescope and
microscope, require not only the observer but also the object to be on a certain plane or space for
the observation to occur, which in turn strictly limits one’s perspective. Seeing through the
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natural eye, on the other hand, might not provide sights as accurate or fixed as those provided
through the optical instruments, but it does provide multiple perspectives. Thus Satan probably
can only see “long, but in breadth not wide,” for telescopes and microscopes do not have the
optic ability to show a wide scope of things. By examining these perplexing descriptions of
Satan’s use of optic instruments, we see that Satan contradicts himself in order to inflate his
account of his power and to persuade Christ. Because Satan wants to prove to Christ that he can
be as high and far from any earthly existence as he is above “the heighth of mountains
interposed” (39), he has to vaunt the distance—height—that enables him to obtain certain sight
of the city, and the telescope signifies the distance and remoteness; however, because he doesn’t
want to perceive himself smaller than the world, he has to gain more height and be on top of the
imperial city so that he can look down on it and use the “microscope” as if the city and its
content are too small for him.
This brings me back to Milton’s own blindness—actually, more about the idea of lacking
one of the most significant human senses and how this lack of physical sight could enhance the
power of the spiritual sight. What Satan lacks, I would like to argue, Christ has in bounty.
Though Satan might be able to see multitudinous things, his perspectives are limited. He might
be able to see things through a panoramic view, flying above, but he cannot see the interiors that
are small or hidden unless the details are made visible by human endeavor or divine operation.
Thus, reading the “airy microscope” as something “intangible” or “insubstantial” or “slight” or
even “superficial, shallow” and even further, “speculative, conjectural” (OED. II. 6. a-c) makes
more sense, especially when this earthly mechanical device is paired with Satan in the poem.211 I

This pairing, I would argue, further reveals Milton’s skeptical view of the newly created scientific
instruments and their advances that thwart a human perspective that is less intrusive and manipulative. For example,
in New Science, New World, Denise Albanese examines Milton’s suspicion towards the newly developed optical
instruments and suggests that Milton might indicate that such “optic skill” is “the Devil’s work” after all (129).
211
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would argue that lack of good sight for Satan is also demonstrated in his lack of knowing which
instrument he should use for the different objects. Even the new science employing the optical
instruments of Galileo is unable to help Satan distinguish or trace the spatial depth or difference.
That he is able only to describe a nebulous and unreliable view of paradisal prospect
foreshadows Satan’s dismal fate that he will always remain remote and exiled from Paradise.
However, as I will discuss later, Satan does not admit he is responsible for his own future as he
covets earthly power with his physical sight. Without prophetic insight, he cannot see the sign or
the indicator that he will fail to tempt Christ. The only thing he relies on is his own experience,
and the past experience of winning over Eve gives him the reason to believe he can win again.
Thus Satan is perplexed by his continuous failure in tempting Christ; as shown in Book 4 of
Paradise Regained, Satan is “perplexed and troubled at his bad success/ The Tempter stood, nor
had what to reply,/ Discovered in his fraud, thrown from his hope,/ So oft, and the persuasive
rhetoric/ That sleeked his tongue, and won so much on Eve,/ So little here, nay lost” (IV. 1-6).
Most importantly, Milton also points to Satan’s weakness, for Satan is “self-deceived and rash”
(IV. 7-8).
In Paradise Lost Satan looks at the right object using the right glass—a telescope for
stars—while positioned correctly, looking up at the stars that are far “above all hills,” but in
Paradise Regained Satan’s actions around the instruments indicate his tenuous knowledge of the
instruments and his negligence about their use: “By what strange parallax or optic skill,/ Of
telescope, were curious to inquire” (IV. 40-42). Perhaps it is because he is “self-deceived and
rash” and that Satan is too anxious to pass up the opportunity to use the help from any apparatus
to enhance his sight and further to secure his chance of persuading Christ. Furthermore, as if
Satan became too anxious to trust that Galileo’s glass would be enough, he says he has a
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microscope in hand, which he later disposes anyway (lines 40-42 and 56-57). Maura Brady, in
“Galileo in Action: The ‘Telescope’ in Paradise Lost,” aptly describes the applied, additional, or
added artificial aspect of Satan’s use of optic devices as his “prosthetic” sight, a term I find
especially appropriate and will borrow for my discussion.212 Satan’s sight is limited because he
can only see through his physical eye as most humans do with their non-spiritual sight, which
proves why Satan desperately wants to have an access to these artificial devices. However,
Milton makes it very clear that there is no ex machina that can help one possess spiritual sight if
one is only aware of physical sight. The vision that one gains from a “prosthetic” apparatus
cannot readily supply knowledge as comprehensive as the organic sight can. Too small or too
big, the images from microscope or telescope are partial to a bigger entity—they are pieces that
must be joined together to make sense and even to be used to create a hypothesis. Not to
mention, there is always the machine in between the observer’s eye and the object. The
mechanically enhanced sight, Brady insists, is obstructive compared to our regular human vision
because it is external, an additional application from outside to enhance what ends up being most
internal, vision. Satan with his attempt to qualify his limited earthly vision by using the
mechanically enhanced vision therefore confirms that his vision only possesses “the very
mechanisms of vision for the human observer,” what Brady describes “would obstruct the view
of a celestial being.”213
The vision that Christ possesses is a prophetic vision, not a prosthetic vision. To Satan
who tries to tempt Christ with a prospect of imperial grandeurs, Christ replies:
Nor doth this grandeur and majestic show

Maura Brady, “Galileo in Action: The ‘Telescope’ in Paradise Lost,” Milton Studies 44 (2005), 148.
Brady describes: “When read as prosthetic to the observer’s body, the ‘glass of Galileo’ approaches angelic sight by
augmenting fallible human vision” (148).
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Of luxury, though called magnificence,
More than of arms before, allure mine eye,
Much less my mind; though thou shouldst add to tell
Their sumptuous gluttonies, and gorgeous feasts
On citron tables or Atlantic stone;
(For I have also heard, perhaps have read)
Their wives of Sertia, Cales, and Falerne,
Chios and Crete, and how they quaff in gold,
Crystal and myrrhine cups embossed with gems
And studs of pearl, to me shouldst tell
Who thirst and hunger still. (IV. 110-21)
Christ finds Satan’s evidence for his argument not only erroneous but also unmoving. All the
physical luxury Satan describes is uninspiring to Christ because even though the physical
“grandeur and majestic show/ Of luxury” does “allure [his] eye,” the material “magnificence”
merely appeals to his physical eye but “much less [his] mind” (IV. 110-11, 112, 113). The
“magnificence” refers to material exaltation and lavishness, which does not impress Christ’s
spiritual eye, though he admits that his physical eye does notice the magnitude of the empire’s
material greatness. Christ’s response is surprisingly honest and humble; notice how he candidly
informs Satan that he knows about the earthly subjects: “for I have also heard, perhaps have
read”—especially when compared to Satan’s over-confidence and pertinacious attitude toward
his constant failure to convince Christ. What Christ knows from hearing and reading, like the
knowledge gained from external sources constructed by others, moves “much less [his] mind.”
Satan remembers his victory against Eve and believes he can trick Christ as well, making him
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“perplexed and troubled” at his failure (IV. 1). If Satan had possessed a prophetic vision, he
would have known that he cannot tempt Christ; even though Satan’s “prosthetic vision” still
provides nebulous vision, his lack of spiritual vision makes it impossible for him to turn his eyes
onto himself. The prosthetic vision provided through optic devices not only fails to enhance
natural vision, but it can also obfuscate our chance to achieve prophetic vision on our own.
Satan’s ambivalent and erratic delineations of the imperial city in Paradise Regained
suggest that Satan values power to possess a variety of different sights over the validity or
accuracy of the sight (IV. 40-60). Perhaps Milton suggests that, whether with or without the help
of optic devices, Satan is doomed, banned from the site of Paradise that he covets and longs for
through his eyes. No matter what instrument Satan possesses, not only is the Paradise still far
away from him, but the optic technology is also questionable; thus he cannot obtain a good
physical view of Paradise. The telescope’s technological imperfection was well-known during
Milton’s time, partly explaining the moral and epistemological paucity associated with Galileo’s
instrument in Milton’s writing. More importantly, the blurry and ambiguous sights in Paradise
Lost and Paradise Regained are often hyperbolized and espoused by Satan, foreshadowing his
earthly and selfish desire to possess abundance of sight, even if faulty. In his anxious mind Satan
thinks that even though the distance is “long” he can still take it all in because it is “in breadth
not wide” (IV. 27). Again, this clearly demonstrates what is inside and outside of Satan; inside is
the abundance of corporeal desire and anguish but the absence of spiritual insight; thus there is
always a paradise outside of him where he cannot be physically while there is no paradise inside
of him, which completely alienates him from paradise physically and spiritually. Desperate,
Satan attempts to use any power, any machine, or any apparatus to be near Paradise, but until he
can possess the inner spiritual light, he remains blind to the true sight of Paradise. Satan’s
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description of the heavenly view of the imperial city’s prospect reveals Milton’s criticism of
human artifice and the tenuous and artificial truths that it provides, which exemplify the lost and
abandoned site of Satan’s mind. Satan is physically distant from and absent in Paradise; thus he
is always in need of external devices to connect himself to the site; however, Satan’s mind longs
for paradise too, though it is absent of any ability to host or to train any inner light that can lead
him to the inner Paradise. Satan embodies physical and spiritual mayhem.
Milton’s view of the new scientific discovery and its impact on morality and
epistemology is closely linked to his co-existing Augustinian and monist materialist beliefs.
Considering all the concepts of moral and epistemological accuracy, certainty, and empirical
probability, we see that Milton’s poetry demonstrates moral and epistemological accuracy by
being certain in his religious beliefs but not entirely in empirical probability. Satan’s moral and
epistemological inaccuracy is revealed by his uncertainty—his reliance to the optic devices and
what they might show, which reveals Satan’s lack of confidence in using his own physical sight
alone. He does not trust his own sight, even when the blind poet exhibits incredible certainty in
his insight. Satan’s sight is bound to his own greedy desire to see everything at once, and Satan
has no time to ponder or contemplate what he sees. His wanting to see more obviates him from
obtaining moral and epistemological clarity, resulting in epistemological darkness and moral
anguish. Again, with his scarce inner knowledge, Satan fails to achieve the knowledge of the
other, what is outside of him, such as God or goodness, whose moral and epistemological order
doesn’t skip time. Satan’s ambiguous seeing method shows that he readily sees vast earthly
establishments but fails to comprehend God conceptually. Therefore, lines 40-60 demonstrate a
permutation of sights, stretched out through deduction or focused through magnification, yet
always induced by Satan’s own anxiety to override Christ and persuade him.
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5.2

Seeing as Anticipating, Seeing as Believing
Milton’s belief concerning physical and spiritual sight is rather simple. One’s bad

physical sight might not hinder one’s spiritual sight, but one’s bad spiritual sight will obstruct
one’s physical sight. For instance, in Sonnet 22, Milton writes that even though he is unable to
see the world through his physical eyes, he still imagines how the world perceives him. Unable
to look outside of himself, his vision is more than inward bound—it is turned so inwardly that it
deceives, that it does not show the abundance of his spiritual sight to “outward view,” to the eyes
that seek only material sights to prove; he is protected in his own darkness, which blinds the
“outward view” by the others, who would look for “blemish or spot” but wouldn’t see it.
Cyriack, this three years’ day these eyes, though clear
To outward view, of blemish or of spot,
Bereft of light their seeing have forgot,
Nor to their idle orbs doth sight appear
Of sun or moon or star throughout the year,
Or man or woman. Yet I argue not
Against Heaven’s hand or will, nor bate a jot
Of heart or hope, but still bear up and steer
Right onward. What supports me dost thou ask? (Sonnet 22, 1-9)
“The conscience,” the poet says to his friend, is “what supports [him]” (line 10). This conscience
drives and leads the poet straight into the storm; instead of retreating from the storm, he says he
will “still bear up and steer/ Right onward” (8). An outward distortion, the loss of physical sight,
induces an inward disruption and internal grafting of the mind, but through contemplative and
faithful reasoning, the poet finds himself in a shielded orb that is his faith and imagination,
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sailing and not lost, with a firm sense of direction as he will “bear up and steer/ Right onward.”
Even though his eyes appear “clear/ To outward view,” the poet knows his blind eyes are full of
blemishes and opacities as they are “bereft of light” (3). Only the poet knows “thir seeing have
forgot” as he is looking out and experiencing the darkness—“bereft of light”—from inside out.
The poet not only identifies his eyes being “idle orbs,” but the “idle orbs” are what his blind eyes
can physically see—close your eyes and describe what appears before your eyes. In Sonnet 22
the description of the poet’s sight is so intricately developed as he begins to describe his anguish,
doubt, acceptance, and hope; the poet moves back to his inner self, articulating his emotional
thoughts—he will “argue not” and “nor bate a jot/ Of heart or hope” (7-8). When the poet says
he will “still bear up and steer/ Right onward,” the readers are led back to the sight of amplified
action or demonstration, that is, exteriority, again. The exteriority and interiority of this image is
paramount to understand how the poet defines his blindness. Physical sight only recognizes his
eyes being “idle,” being unable to see; therefore, nothing occurs in the world of a blind person,
as the blind eye balls embody “idle orbs” (4).
Milton’s Sonnet 22 demonstrates how the abundance of spiritual sight triumphs over the
physical blindness by juxtaposing the subtle but fundamental difference between what the poet
sees and what he imagines—the differences that constitute exteriority and interiority of the poet
and how the world might perceive his blindness, while readers are led by his imagination that
envisions how he appears to the outside world. The poet’s thoughts remain protected from “the
world’s vain masque,” for while they move from inside to outside of the poet, what the poet sees,
despite his being blind, is not bound or limited by the physical dimensions, but rather, his
blindness allows the poet to move freely between the sights imagined and seen. This oscillation
between inside and outside also helps the poet articulate the necessary distance and separation
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between the inner and outer world that the blind poet must maintain in order for his inner spirit to
remain pure and strong against the worldly infirmities and temptations. The poet is thrown into
such harsh, unfortunate storms, and the waves of criticism regarding Milton’s failed reformation
effort rise from “side to side” (line 12), which signifies another external movement that is seen
and occurs in the world distant from the poet. The poet believes it is “Heaven’s hand or will” that
creates the storm, and he, through his conscience, decides to “bear up and steer/ Right onward”
(7 and 8-9). Paired with human elements that control, guide, and intend, this divine authority
tests the poet’s unbreakable faith and devotion that the poet attests for his future poetic and
religious career. The poet’s blindness yields an internal source of spiritual strength in Sonnet 22,
which Milton describes as “[his] noble task”; reading Milton’s poems inspires the readers to
wonder how the poet fulfills this “noble task” through his poetic works once he became blind:
readers come to realize the lack of physical sight does not hinder his spiritual journey as he is
“content though blind,” protected from “the world’s vain masque” (Sonnet 22, lines 13-14). His
works are even more focused on the sight of the invisible world and the subject of a “noble task”
against the worldly temptation in the works I will examine later. In Paradise Lost, Paradise
Regained, and Samson Agonistes Milton clearly shows that his sight deficiency is only physically
bound, and so is the limitation of it.
That which could be seen and understood through the spiritual sight has fewer limitations
physically and spiritually because of the support of his “conscience” (Sonnet 22, line 10). For the
poet who does not have physical sight, “Bereft of light” and “idle” signify neither limitations nor
impassiveness; his blindness yields a chance for the poet to become more productive, to open up
the spiritual eye and subscribe to spiritual sight. His conscience leads the poet to “still bear up
and steer/ Right onward”; the poet promises that he will never give up, that he will never let

208
himself dwindle. The word “steer” typically signifies an action to “guide a vessel by means of a
rudder or the like” or “to guide a vessel in a certain direction; to sail or row towards a specified
place” (OED, 2. a. and c.). Yet the word “steer” is nuanced with mechanical conduct and
operation that guides “something that is in motion”; according to OED it also signifies an action
“to guide (a chariot, a horse, cattle, etc.),” “to guide (a plough),” or “to guide the course of (a
vehicle, a bicycle, a balloon, etc.) by mechanical means; to guide (a floating object) by taking
advantage of a current” (OED, 3. a, b, & c). Besides the machines and vehicles being mentioned
above, there is one more possibility for the kind of vehicle that Milton might “steer” to “right
onward”—to steer and write onward with his pen. The nautical conceit as a metaphor for writing
becomes even more convincing when the line is read out loud. The pairing of the words “bear”
and “steer” is peculiar, as there is initially a sense of less movement while the latter suggests the
application of force to lead and move.214 The word “bear” clearly implies forces being held in, as
it signifies thrusting down or holding against the external forces or weights; yet the word “steer”
expresses a sense of external projection of inner desire or will. Reading the line out loud, one
should notice there is a timely line break, which makes the reader pause, just before “Right
onward.” This purposeful line break further yields a fresh start for the next phrase “Right
onward” at the beginning of the new line. Clearly, this is the blind poet’s declaration that he will
still keep writing and continue his poetic and religious journey despite of the loss of his physical
sight. “The conscience,” then, could represent a kind of spiritual arbiter, or even the watchful eye
of the conscientious and contemplative mind (sonnet 22, line 10). Note that this conscientious
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According to OED, the word “bear” can have the following general connotations: I. to carry; II. to
sustain; III. to thrust, press; IV. to bring forth. Also, “bear up” means “to keep up one's courage or spirits; to
maintain one's ground (against difficulties); not to succumb” (OED, 21. C). The word “bear” clearly implies forces
being held in—as it signifies thrusting down or holding against the external forces or weights, while the word
“steer” expresses a kind of external projection of a desire or will.
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mind of the poet is aware of how “all Europe talks from side to side” (12) about “[his] noble
task” that is “overplied/ In liberty’s defense” and has ended in vain (10-11). Though the poet is
dejected by “the world’s vain masque” (13), the sonnet’s last line also suggests a sign of hope
and even gratitude that shows how the poet overcomes self-criticism and self-doubt by realizing
that the physical blindness has shielded him from “the world’s vain masque” and the severity of
its worldly judgment that could have made him even more self-conscious had he still had his
sight—“content though blind” (14). Sonnet 22 shows how spiritual seeing takes self-governance
and practice because a conscientious poet is not only challenged by the external criticism, but he
competes against his own self-criticism. The poem is a reminder and promise to the poet himself
and his friend Cyriack that the poet must use self-restraint and self-determination—and not
“overpl[y]” his “conscience” this time (10)—to abide and still “bear up and steer/ Right onward”
(8-9). The need for spiritual seeing fuels the poetic imagination in Sonnet 22 because the sonnet
focuses on the sight of a distant, unpredictable future that is invisible to the physical senses.
Simply put, the lack of physical sight enhances the poet’s spiritual sight while an abundance of
physical sight creates “the world’s vain masque” and more opacity to the poet. This bitter but
worthy lesson is immanent in spiritual seeing and furthermore necessary to poetic imagination
because self-criticism and self-awareness are the very core of poetic inspiration.
With his persistence and mechanically enhanced gears, Satan in Paradise Regained sets
out to see Christ with his own eyes, ironically, and prove him wrong. Satan tells Christ that he
has never ceased his eye’s searching for Christ since he first knew about Christ’s birth: “[O]f thy
birth at length/ Announced by Gabriel with the first I knew,/ And of the angelic song in
Bethlehem field,/ On thy birth-night, that sung thee Saviour born./ From that time seldom have I
ceased to eye” (IV. 503-507). And Satan makes certain that he will tempt Christ; he tries with

210
every earthly resource, yet nothing works: “Since neither wealth, nor honour, arms nor arts,/
Kingdom nor empire pleases thee, nor aught/ By me proposed in life contemplative,/ Or active,
tended on by glory, or fame,/ What dost thou in this world?” (IV.368-72). However, the
following speech by Christ to Satan in Paradise Regained not only reveals why Satan’s attempts
fail but also reinforces Milton’s treatment of the theme of spiritual vision. Here, Milton links the
inner contemplative vision of Christ with the superior power of spiritual knowledge that reigns
over the external corporeal vision of Satan and his vast material knowledge:
Think not but that I know these things, or think
I know them not; not therefore am I short
Of knowing what I ought: he who receives
Light from above, from the fountain of light,
No other doctrine needs, though granted true;
But these are false, or little else but dreams,
Conjectures, fancies, built on nothing firm.
The first and wisest of them all professed
To know this only, that he nothing knew; (IV. 286-94)
I have two points to make here. First, Christ is clearly uninterested in “these things,” the material
things that are subject to know or be known. Second, Christ prefers “light from above” over
“knowing what I ought,” which further suggests Christ espouses spiritual understanding over
more empirical exploration. Knowledge, especially here circumscribed by the object “what I
ought,” signifies the kind of conventional knowledge Christ avoids—after all, knowledge that
one “ought” to know can be despotic, antagonizing insightful and spiritual thinking; to Christ
conventional knowledge signifies “conjectures, fancies, built on nothing firm” (IV. 292). The
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kind of knowing Christ calls out as “false” above is aligned with scholarly, orthodox knowledge,
and thus the subjects of such “knowing” are often superficial and worldly “things,” pronouncing
“what [one] ought” to know. Christ even points out that “doctrines” are unnecessary “though
granted true” (IV. 290). Again, the word “granted” there signals artificial authority of the
doctrines. It should become clear not just that Satan’s resources are only worldly “things,” but
that they also signify a shallow materiality of “things” that possess no epistemological or moral
worth to Christ. Christ’s acute insight reveals the capriciousness and artificiality of conventional
knowledge; for Christ, there aren’t even specific or proper modifiers to describe this kind of
knowledge—thus, “these things.”
Furthermore, Christ’s criticism of conventional knowledge above also subverts the
concepts conventionally associated with spiritual knowledge or poetic inspiration, as he calls the
orthodox knowledge “false, or little else but dreams,/ Conjectures, fancies, built on nothing firm”
(291-92). His analysis of “these things” and his argument against material knowledge echo with
Sidney’s argument for poetry, which emphasizes inward vision and abundant truths separated
from mere arrangements of matter. In the lines above, we see Milton comparing Satan’s
abundance of earthly knowledge to “nothing firm.” Here, Milton’s accomplishment is closely
related to Sidney’s, for Milton actually inverts the attack against poetry, reversing the common
comparison of poetry to the source of fictional imagination and moral corruption by describing
conventional “knowledge” as “fancies” and “dreams” (IV. 290). Against the poetry haters’
criticism of poetry’s supposed emotional, unsound, and immoral influence, Milton argues for the
sinuousness and heterogeniousness of poetic sentiment: “The first and wisest of them all
professed/ To know this only, that he nothing knew” (293-94). Sapientia begins with selfawareness and intuitive insight, just as poetic uncertainty admits and professes the idea that
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“nothing [is] firm” and embodies the very truth it tries to reflect and instruct. Sidney’s argument
for poetic imagination’s supple capability to mimic but also to inspire nature should also remind
us of Milton’s argument for “subtle and sinewy” rhetoric that is more sustainable than the
rhetoric of excess and certainty. It is through the rhetoric of excess and the prosthetic sight that
Satan tempts the human race and attempts to humiliate Christ. Man-made knowledge practices
more confinement and intolerance against other men, and the conditional and capricious
foundations of the fact-driven knowledge or knowledge generated by scientific observations
prove its lack of firmness. Milton suggests this hypocrisy through his “subtle and sinewy” poetic
language, the kind of narrative that unveils one thing by obscuring the other.215 Christ’s use of
“firm” here doesn’t refer to physical firmness, but abstract idea of firmness, in such way that
“subtle and sinewy” suggests the strength and firmness of poetic imagination that abides the
shifting conventions and worldly forces. Scientia, after all, is built upon “these things” that can
be altered, if proven untrue by the conventions. This conventional knowledge can’t be true until
it is proven to be true by a certain school of thought or group of scholars. The poetic imagination
is closely linked with the spiritual eye, and, in describing the invisible reality, Milton clearly
expresses his contempt for the abundance of earthly sight that leads only to more confusion and
obstruction of spiritual seeing. Satan’s inability to see outside himself and his ambition suggests
his lack of spiritual insight, which clearly leads to shallow “conjectures” that what he sees
through his physical eye is worthy enough to move Christ. Satan, as we saw, even incorporates
technological help, which proves to be only a prosthetic but not a prophetic aid; what Satan
needs even to be able to understand and communicate with Christ is not a material aid, but a
spiritual one.
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After several vain attempts, Satan is “now/ Quite at a loss, for all his darts were spent”
(IV. 3666). It is interesting that Christ compares the material abundance—“wealth,” “honour,”
“arms,” “arts,” “kingdom” or “empire”—offered by Satan to “dreams,” “fancies,” and “nothing
firm” (IV. 366-72). That Satan is completely unable to see why Christ cannot be tempted
suggests that true blindness for Milton involves a spiritual, not a physical, lack. Physical
blindness merely veils what spiritual sight can both recover and even improve with insights that
physical sight can’t capture. Inner blindness means the loss of spiritual sight, a greater loss than
physical blindness; obviously for Milton, one can repair and restore the outer, material loss, but
the loss of inner sight results in ineffable calamity; thus, Satan is inevitably outside of paradise,
seeing paradise as an always distant place but also always in hell, spiritually deprived of God’s
love. Spiritual blindness suggests the occlusion of epistemological clarity and moral sense; even
though Satan might be able to see a wider and fuller content in the world, nothing he sees
through his physical eye helps him understand why he is wrong and why he cannot win over
Christ. This is also why Satan fails to grasp that scientific aids are only material aids that connect
one material reality to another and that a physical, prosthetic instrument cannot be transformed
into a spiritual, prophetic aid that might unveil the spiritual reality through the physical one.
Satan’s failure should also make us wonder—is anyone lacking spiritual insight damned, for
instance? The Reformation theologians argued that the individual could come to an
understanding of God through study of scripture. Satan is an extreme case that nevertheless
illustrates a deceptive pattern of thought Milton viewed as very tempting to all humans—that our
physical sight must tell the truth. This is why Milton stresses the importance of reading the
scripture right, through the spiritual eye, instead of the physical eye. Especially from the
Enlightenment onward, humans have been increasingly prone to ignore the spiritual and revel in
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the material; a sole reliance on material vision like Satan’s presents for Milton an impossibility
of even comprehending the existence of a spiritual realm, as, again, is seen in Satan’s puzzlement
over his failure to tempt Christ. Even at the start of Paradise Lost, Satan is presented as a
materialist. His response to being cast out of heaven isn’t a metaphysical one typified by remorse
or the hope of absolution; instead his response is to rise from his armies from the dark and plan
revenge through his massive forces. Milton depicts Satan being more active than being
introspective so that his defeat was a military rather than moral one.
Milton, as a Puritan, might be expected to have a literal style of biblical exegesis, but, in
keeping with my insistence that spiritual vision was more important to Milton than the more
linear ordering of knowledge typified by material vision, Milton clearly espouses a far more
flexible style of reading of scripture.216 Interestingly, Milton’s divergence from contemporary
Protestant norms cuts both ways, for his reading style sought not just one true meaning but
enabled multiple interpretations of individual lines or passages. An example is Milton’s reading
of Psalm 2:7: “I will declare the decree: the Lord hath said unto me, Thou art my Son; this day
have I begotten thee.” As Hugh MacCallum points out in Milton and the Sons of God: The
Divine Image in Milton’s Epic Poetry, “Milton departs from Protestant exegesis by welcoming
the literal sense of the passage from Psalm 2:7 and endorsing its subordinationist implications”
(82). In other words, although Protestant orthodoxy demanded a figurative reading here to make
Jesus co-eternal with the Father, Milton did not feel compelled to narrow his reading to a certain

In This Great Argument: A Study of Milton’s De Doctrina Christina as a Gloss upon Paradise Lost,
Maurice Kelley also describes Milton’s flexible poetic praxis: “In Paradise Lost, however, Milton seeks to figure
forth precept in a concrete, speaking picture, to present ethical teaching in a form that is both attractive and
stimulating; in short, to teach by the feigned image of poetry; and this concept of the feigned image, as the name
implies, liberates the poet from the narrow and straitening confines of dogmatic truth. Thus, as a Protestant
theologian, Milton is bound to induction or deduction from Scriptural proof texts; but as a Renaissance poet, he may
aim rather at imaginative truth, and is free to enliven his subject, to give it interest and attraction, either by invention
or by reshaping his source materials in any manner that his sense of literary values may direct” (98). The reader, of
course, immediately notes how Kelley’s passage resonates with Sidney’s The Defence of Poesy.
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dogmatically endorsed meaning. Michael Bauman explores the same issue in “Milton’s
Theological Vocabulary and the Nicene Anathemas,” pointing out that “Milton does not accept
the Nicene notion that the son was ‘begotten not made.’ For him, the terms are frequently
interchangeable” (77).217 Perhaps it is exactly that—“the terms are frequently
interchangeable”—that troubled the poetry haters. Milton’s inclination for “interchangeable”
terms coincides with his campaign for “subtle and sinewy” use of language that signals the
element of deviation immanent in poetry and certainly in Milton’s poetry, which is vital for
poetic imagination but a threat to the stability of morality and conventions. Nonetheless,
Milton’s use of poetic language reveals how he supports the idea of seeing as anticipating and
portending.
The distinction between literal and non-literal reading of the Bible is tied to my
discussion of Milton’s spiritual vision versus Satan’s material vision because they represent
antithetical modes of processing reality. As Peter Harrison asserts in The Bible, Protestantism
and the Rise of Natural Science:
The Protestant insistence on the literal sense of canonical texts had far-reaching, if
unintended, consequences. As we have seen, the allegorical reading of scripture
proceeded from a particular attitude to the world of things. The allegorical
methods of interpretation pioneered by Philo and Origen were premised upon the
notion that the things in the phenomenal world referred to by words in canonical
texts actually represented, through resemblance, other things. To insist now that
texts be read literally was to cut short a potentially endless chain of references in
which words referred to things, and things in turn referred to other things. A
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literal reading of the scripture was one in which the previously open-ended
process of deriving a series of references from a single word was terminated once
a word had performed its basic task of referring to a thing. (114)218
One process, as with Sidney, enables “many Cyruses,” the other only one.
Satan’s spiritual blindness, as opposed to Christ’s indifference to the material world,
signals Milton’s treatment of blindness as not just a mere poetic conceit for Milton but a real and
always-present private concern. This argument can be further developed through a discussion of
Samson’s physical blindness and spiritual awakening in Samson Agonistes and the comparability
between Christ and Samson as prophetic figures. While Manoa expresses his grief over
Samson’s loss of his sight and imprisonment, he still believes that Samson’s loss must serve a
greater purpose in God’s plan for Samson:
And I persuade me God had not permitted
His strength again to grow up with his hair
Garrisoned round about him like a camp
Of faithful soldiery, were not his purpose
To use him further yet in some great service,
Not to sit idle with so great a gift
Useless, and thence ridiculous about him.
And since his strength with eyesight was not lost,
God will restore him eyesight to his strength. (Lines 1495-1503).
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From Manoa’s faithful and prophetic lament in Samson Agonistes, we can infer how Milton
treats physical blindness as a spiritual challenge to overcome, not a mere physical disability.
Manoa says his son is “not to sit idle with so great gift” and still believes that Samson’s true
strength is not completely usurped because “his strength with eyesight was not lost” (line 1502).
Subtly, Milton juxtaposes Samson’s eyesight with Samson’s “great gift,” for Samson’s infallible
gift is an inner strength, although it could easily be interpreted as a physical, visible strength.
Samson’s great strength “was not lost” because Samson’s physical strength comes from inside; it
is God’s “great gift” after all. Even when Samson’s faith is challenged, Milton shows, Samson
cannot obliterate what is begotten from God’s love and given to Samson as a gift. Further, notice
that Manoa believes being “idle with so great a gift” is “useless” for Samson. Not using his gift
is wasteful, and God will not let “such a great gift” go idle. Manoa’s prophecy reveals that no
matter what physical or spiritual agony Samson is chained to, Samson is destined to recover his
spiritual strength, which will compensate for the rest of his physical loss. Thus the “gift” remains
in Samson as a spiritual entity—faith—rather than a material strength such as physical strength.
When Manoa insists Samson’s lost eyesight will be restored, Milton doesn’t mean the
literal, physical strength; faith will restore not only the physical sight but also the spiritual sight
that is being usurped, as much as Milton hopes the faith will carry him on even after his cause
failed. It is the figurative strength that does the literal work of restoration and further might even
be able to transform the permanently damaged physical into the state of spiritual, as when it
“restore[s] him eyesight to his strength” (1503). Note that Milton suggests that the restoration of
Samson’s eyesight goes further than mere material restoration but rather up “to his strength.”
The last few lines of the semichorus toward the end of Samson Agonistes reveal that Manoa’s
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prophecy indeed came true and the restoration of Samson’s eyesight entails something greater
than the restoration of physical eyesight, “inward eyes illuminated”:
But he though blind of sight,
Despised and thought extinguished quite,
With inward eyes illuminated,
His fiery virtue roused
From under ashes into sudden flame,
And as an evening dragon came,
Assailant on the perched roosts,
And nests in order ranged
Of tame villatic fowl; but as an eagle
His cloudless thunder bolted on their heads. (lines 1687-96)
Thus, Manoa’s prophecy tells that as long as Samson can overcome his doubt and sorrow, he will
gather his spiritual strength again. Samson will be able to exert the necessary strength even to
restore or replace his lost physical asset of eyesight, so that the loss of eyesight is not the worst
that can happen to Samson—it is the loss of “so great a gift” that would be fatal. If we accept
that Samson’s strength is not a mere physical gift, Manoa foresees that Samson’s restoration of
his spiritual sight will lead not just to a recovery but improvement of material limitation through
spiritual restoration.
That spiritual sight can be gained from a material loss of Samson’s eyesight should
suggest that Samson’s physical loss is necessary for the restoration of both his physical and
spiritual strength. This should also demonstrate Milton’s simultaneous use of both literal and
figurative language, regardless of his Protestant religious belief. Without the figurative
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interpretation and signification, faith loses one of its most effective narrative tools—prophecy.
And I will argue that religion made more sense for Milton when prophetic aid performs as a
facilitator of knowing and learning because his use of faith proves that faith is internal, both in
literal and figurative sense, even when one experiences faith being visible. Harrison points out
the role of the advent of scientific reasoning and rhetoric in the slow abdication of metaphorical
representations:
[A]s an inevitable consequence of this way of reading texts nature would lose its
meaning, and the vacuum created by this loss of intelligibility was gradually to be
occupied by alternative accounts of the significance of natural things—those
explanations which we regard as scientific. In the new scheme of things, objects
were related mathematically, mechanically, causally, or ordered and classified
according to categories other than those of resemblance. (114)
Prophetic sight is deeply connected to what Harrison calls “intelligibility” above, which in the
context of poetry can refer to Sidney’s concept of poetry’s imagination and its capability to not
only mimic but also inspire nature. Rather, it is through prosthetic sight that Satan attempts to
extend and improve the quality of his seeing; as I have discussed in other chapters, in the preface
to Micrographia Hooke argues for the necessity of the external and mechanical instrument to
discover the microscopic world. In order to understand and describe “a new visible world,”
Hooke seems to argue that a new way of seeing has to be invented; however, “a new visible
world” is still represented through the old method of singling out one small aspect of the bigger
landscape portraiture.
The optically enhanced vision evoked the philosophical problems of disproportioned
representation of physical reality that was co-produced by the machine and the “operations of the
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sense, the memory, and reason” (The Preface).219 Again, scientifically aided vision cannot
surpass its prosthetic material reality, unable to circumvent the stigma that it can improve merely
the physical sight, and remains as an artificial instrument attached to and controlled by the body.
Hooke wanted to perfect and standardize the unstable expressions and appearances gathered
from human sensory perceptions by “adding of artificial Organs to the natural” (The Preface).220
There is a clear similarity between Augustine’s spiritual eye, Harrison’s “intelligibility,” and
what Hooke calls “the natural”—they are identified or tested by what exists outside of them,
what lacks their organic and internal attributes. They represent the inner, spiritual instrument of
seeing that requires inner knowledge and spiritual willingness to see the physical world through
self-knowledge and spiritual contemplation before the material communication with the physical
world takes place. What Harrison calls “alternative accounts of the significance of natural
things” or the sight enhanced by “adding of artificial organs to the natural” indicate a physical
reality that remains subordinate to the soul; more importantly, for Augustine, whether prosthetic
or prophetic, physical or spiritual, seeing can “never take place without the soul.” Augustine
observes:
Hence, the parent, as it were, of that vision, that is, of the form which arises in the
sense of one who sees, is the form of the body from which it arises. But yet the
latter is not a true parent, and consequently the former is not a true offspring. For
the vision is not completely begotten by the form of the body alone, since
something else is applied to the body in order that it may be formed by it, namely,
the sense of the one who sees. […] For that body which is seen is not at all
spiritual. On the other hand the vision, which takes place in the sense, is indeed
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mingled with something spiritual, because it cannot take place without the soul.
But the whole is not so, since that which is formed is a sense of the body. (On the
Trinity XI.5.9)
Spiritual seeing not only makes the invisible objects visible to the mind’s eye, but it makes both
the visible and invisible world far more perceivable and conceivable to the mind; prosthetic
vision doesn’t improve or impact physical vision much, and for the worse, it could rather
interfere with spiritual vision or even obstruct prophetic vision. After all, as Hooke is clearly
aware, the images seen through the “artificial organs” can easily provide erroneous information,
misleading and misinforming “the natural” as much as the natural, physical vision can do the
same alone because there is no guarantee that the machine or the physical vision will not err;
thus he suggests the scientist rely more on the hypothetical stability of his artificial instrument
and less on the tenuous human imagination and sensory experience.

5.3

Seeing as Reflection, Seeing as Protection
The optical instruments are as susceptible as human imagination and sensory experience

to not only alter or obfuscate physical reality but even challenge moral and epistemological
values. Margaret Miles also points out how the natural world can only be seen and understood
more accurately by seeing through the mind’s eye, “the accurate ‘seeing’ of the visible objects”
which “involves the exercise of spiritual vision” (Miles 139).221 Here, we can also relate Miles’
assertion of the need for seeing and perceiving the nature accurately to Maura Brady’s assertion
that Satan’s lack of accurate vision not only reveals his lack of epistemological and moral clarity
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but also the implications of “spotty” vision provided by Galileo’s intellectual and mechanical
achievement.222 After all, the machine cannot reveal the nature alone, without human
manipulation; as Brady argues, “[T]he dangers associated with Galileo’s instruments in Paradise
Lost are moral as well as epistemological, that stargazing might tempt a viewer to aspire to
godhead.”223 Milton makes it obvious that there is an interruption and obstruction of the
astronomer’s solid and clear view of the moon in Paradise Lost:
He scarce had ceased when the superior fiend
Was moving toward the shore; his ponderous shield
Ethereal tempter, massy, large and round,
Behind him cast; the broad circumference
Hung on his shoulders like the moon, whose orb
Through optic glass the Tuscan artist views
At evening from the top of Fesole,
Or in Valdarno, to descry new Lands,
Rivers or mountains in her spotty Globe. (I. 283-91)
When Milton refers to Galileo’s instrument in Paradise Lost, Brady insists, “the astronomer’s
activities are highlighted in ways that recall the historical Galileo’s methodological, rhetorical,
and pedagogical labors with the instrument, and suggest that these labors may interfere with or
distort vision” (139).
Brady further points out that these lines also reveal how the astronomer—the observer or
the gazer—“actively participates in the production of vision” (140). The astronomer’s vision of
the moon is not purely inductive, after all; as the “purposive infinitive ‘to descry’ suggests,”
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Brady argues, even before the astronomer looks at the moon, he might already have an idea of
what he is about to observe. He is already informed and manipulated by the features of the moon
that “the Tuscan artist” has already viewed through “optic glass.”224 In addition, the negative
connotation of the periphrasis “Tuscan artist” suggests Galileo’s endeavor and invention as a
skilled artistry, underlining the ongoing argument against poetry makers that poetry and poetic
imagination encourage idle life and even ignore the lack of morality because a poet doesn’t do
anything practical, unlike a soldier who fights in a war.225 Most importantly, by applying the
word “artist” to Galileo, “Milton links the work of the scientist with that of the poet, emphasizing
the importance of the imagination—of expectation, hypothesis, and the inductive leap—in
scientific endeavor” (Brady 140). This could easily be Milton’s refutation to Hooke’s claim for
“artificial organs” improving “the natural.”226 Human imagination and sensory experience, even
with the ample possibility of being erroneous and instable, are still as innately involved with
scientific observation and prosthetic seeing. According to Milton, both poet and scientist need
artistry to convert what they see into what they believe. Such transformative artistry cannot occur
without the spiritual sight, sapientia, the kind of seeing that takes place and sustains its power
because of faith. Even the scientists must believe in a kind of closure to their search and
experimentation. Such artistry’s moral purpose or aesthetic merit is proven by its ability to hide
the trace of transformation as much as possible, to make the artistry and the will as invisible as
possible. To further Brady’s point, Milton in Paradise Lost methodically analyzes the new
science’s moral and epistemological inconsistency by comparing the optical instrument—“her
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spotty globe”—to poetic imagination (I. 291). That poetry sustains its moral and epistemological
clarity by constantly reminding itself of its imaginative foundation makes it a more morally and
epistemologically suitable vehicle to convey truth.
I would also like to reintroduce the aspect of the prospect poem clearly suggested in both
Satan’s description of “an imperial city” in Paradise Regained and the “artist” who, standing at
“the top of Fesole,” views “new lands” through “the optic glass” in the lines above from
Paradise Lost. Scientists are associated with Satan, who uses seeing as an agency of controlling
knowledge; Satan’s prosthetic gaze through the optical instruments suggests that he is an
embodiment of the empirical gaze that associates knowing by seeing and describing what it sees
obsessively. To those who associate seeing with agency, the quality of what they see becomes
less critical; instead, how far one can see becomes paramount to an empirical gazer. A morally
questionable and epistemologically confused gazer cannot see truth no matter what “artificial
organs” he occupies to enhance his bad vision.227 As Augustine writes, “the vision, which takes
place in the sense, is indeed mingled with something spiritual, because it cannot take place
without the soul.”228
This also brings us to question the moral and spiritual maturity of the observer and what
kind of gazer Satan, Samson, Eve, Adam, or even Christ represents in Milton’s poetry I have
examined so far. Do some of Milton’s characters possess a spiritually, morally, and ethically
mature gaze and use their vision to gain spiritual growth, rather than material access and gain?
And, if they rather exhibit the lack of a spiritually and morally mature gaze, what does Milton
say about such lack? And finally but most importantly, what does Milton suggest about the new
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science’s way of seeing and representing the world as opposed to poetry’s mimetic ability?
Satan’s obsession with how far he can see reveals that he associates seeing with agency, as much
as Eve becomes susceptible to Satan’s temptation when she ignores the inner knowledge she
already has from her spiritual vision. Samson’s loss proves that even a man blessed with a divine
physical strength can easily lose control of and abuse his physical strength to satiate his earthly
desires. However, Samson’s avoidance of Dalila after losing his sight reveals Milton’s rather
complicated treatment of physical sight—physical sight is as tenuous as spiritual sight will allow.
At his weakest mental stage, therefore, Samson cannot bear Dalila even to get near him; he
specifically orders Dalila, who just wants to “approach at least, touch [his] hand,” to stay away:
“Not for thy life, lest fierce remembrance wake/ My sudden rage to tear thee joint by joint./ At
distance I forgive thee, go with that” (Samson Agonistes, lines 951, 952-54). Just because
Samson cannot see physically doesn’t mean he cannot see spiritually.229 Furthermore, Samson’s
reaction to Dalila’s request reveals how a blind man’s searching hands can observe more
thoroughly and subtly than the eyes while also highlighting the capability of poetic conceit,
which connects two distant, most unlikely things--what can’t be seen by hands and what can’t be
touched by eyes. Poetic metaphors can connect two distant things, physical and spiritual, earthly
and godly, and haptic and visual. Now, relying more on his spiritual and moral sight, Samson in
turn feels more intensely about his moral and spiritual lack. When his spiritual sight is unstable,
he cannot even control his physical senses, thus ordering Dalila to keep her “distance” (954).
Perhaps also supporting the theory that physical sight is the seed of our earthly desire, Milton
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subtly points out the undeniable power of physical sight that manipulates human body and mind.
And this material desire manifested in physical seeing is why no one is safe from becoming a
morally tenuous, spiritually impervious observer.
In addition, one can also argue that it is because of our weakness that we need such
“artificial organs” as an “optic glass” to enhance our limited natural vision. In Milton and the
Natural World, Edwards points out that scientists like Robert Boyle and Thomas Browne tried to
defend science by explaining that the knowledge gained from natural science can protect human
kind from “the consequences of seduction” (Edwards 39). As Edwards describes, Boyle suggests
that if Eve had used the scientific reasoning and experimented with “the serpent’s claims, she
would not only have avoided the Fall; she would have discovered in the created world further
evidence of the Creator’s glory, power, and wisdom” (39). However, Edwards effectively locates
the weakness in Boyle’s argument, pointing out the fact that God has already endowed Eve with
solid knowledge, even before the advent of new science, and all she needed to do to avoid the
Fall was look inside and find her spiritual light. Edwards observes:
Yet Eve knows enough. Had she properly valued her own experience of the
natural world, she would not have been led astray by the marvelous talking
serpent. But she accepts his interpretation of God’s other book for her own, a
form of intellectual laziness with the most serious consequences. Speaking of our
individual responsibility to work out the meaning of God’s Word for ourselves,
Milton declares in De Doctrina Christiana: “God offers all his rewards not to
those who are thoughtless and credulous, but to those who labor constantly and
seek tirelessly after truth.”230
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Edwards’ observations are particularly useful in my own analysis. For instance, the bounty of
visual information Adam remembers observing when he wakes up can’t give him much spiritual
knowledge about the invisible world without his contemplating on it; Adam signifies the sun as
the “happy light” and ignores some of the critical observations and insights that inform him
about the sun’s bright light otherwise. Adam falls short of fully engaging his intuitive, inner
knowledge as he gains more education from and relies on Raphael’s knowledge, and soon Adam
begins to sound like Raphael, depending on scientia, consciously correcting his own insights and
wisdom. Contrary to criticism narrowly targeting Eve’s yielding to Satan’s temptation, her
ability to figure forth and foresignify is striking compared to Adam’s dependence on Raphael,
albeit she does become a victim of Satan’s temptation because she begins to rely on her physical
senses, especially what she sees and hears, the latter most likely to be tainted by Satan’s
manipulation. However, that should only prove the importance of sapientia. Without the
individual’s faith and willpower to seek the truth, no scientific observation or instrument can
help one not only to find the truth but also to protect the truth. The new science might argue for
greater material knowledge’s being more beneficial than a lack of material knowledge; however,
without spiritual and moral soundness, there is no guarantee that one can protect and preserve
what he or she already knows. That the “optic glass” conveniently envelopes and removes the
spiritual labor of finding what to look at before determining a method of seeing creates a certain
breed of lazy observers; a gazer who is not aware of the power of his or her own gaze is as
dangerous as an empiricist gazer because one could easily yield one’s right to see spiritually to
seeing far and wide through “optical glass” and be satisfied with how much appears visible.
Considering Milton’s own lack of physical vision, his treatment of Satan’s, Eve’s, and
Samson’s lack of spiritual vision reveals his faith in an individual’s ability to gain spiritual vision

228
even when physical vision is taken away. Yet Milton shows very little faith in the possibility of
revelation or restoration of spiritual vision through scientific seeing. The observer at the other
end of the optic instrument always represents a spotty sign of doubt and opacity in Milton’s
poems that I have been discussing. Even though Milton eschewed the idea of monarchy, he still
believed in the efficacy of hierarchy, like many of his seventeenth-century contemporaries. It is
the orthodoxy of Platonic hierarchy that buttressed the tradition of implementing spiritual over
physical knowledge, thus teaching that mature vision must be founded on the system of
hierarchy. One could also blame hierarchy as a tool for compensating for a failure to gain moral
vision, but for Milton hierarchy is a far more moral and spiritual agent to access mature vision
than the “optic glass.” When one looks through a microscope with a goal to achieve, not only
does the instrument become an extension of mechanical power, but the observer’s act of seeing
through the instrument also provides a steadfast control and power over his subject, which the
observer might have never thought possible through his natural eye. The symbolic extension of
both power and peril that the “optic glass” represents for Milton echoes the glorified empiricist
signage of expansion and control enabled by seeing as wide and far as one can from above. With
the optical instrument or any kind of “artificial organs” trying to improve “the natural,” how is
any artist safe from becoming an empirical gazer? Perhaps I should revise my previous statement
and suggest that a morally questionable and epistemologically confused gazer is afraid to see—
instead of “cannot see”—truth. No “artificial organs” can enhance one’s bad, confused, and
immature spiritual vision.
The connection between the lack of spiritual vision and the fear to use spiritual vision
raises the question of awareness, especially with Samson. Samson seems aware of the difference
between inward and empirical—literal—sight. For Samson, the power of empirical or literal
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sight, which is closer to phenomenological perception than the inner vision or insight, is too
visceral, too real to be felt; it wounds him when he is touched, as he exclaims to Dalilah he might
hurt her if she touches him. Samson’s reaction to Dalilah reveals how much he is wounded, for
the two reflect each other like a mirror image. This should give us a good clue that Dalilah, so
full of visual glory, is the site to be afraid of and to avoid. Samson’s reaction to Dalilah’s request
to touch him after he has lost his sight unveils a significant change in Samson’s ability to see;
when his physical sight is gone, his spiritual sight doesn’t go away. The physical wound from the
loss of his sight becomes a new, gaping wound for his spiritual sight to illuminate; and now the
physical sight gone, Samson sees only through his spiritual eye. The loss of physical sight
intensifies his other sensory faculties. But aside from such speculation, one can clearly see that
Samson’s reaction to Dalilah’s request to touch his hand shows both anguish and fear. Even if
Samson denies her request to touch him just because he despises her, why does her touch matter
so much to Samson, especially after his fall? Perhaps Samson is afraid that he can feel—
interpret—Dalilah’s touch. Dalilah’s touch embodies a metaphorical sign that provides more
than literal touching; neither does it inflict any physical sensation yet. It might seem that I am
making a dull point here, but we must pay attention to the fact that the mimetic representations of
sensory experiences are being compared to Samson’s spiritual inner sight, and his inner sight
reads and interprets symbolic representations, far different from literal seeing or empirical
looking. Note how Dalilah hasn’t even touched him yet—she only asks him if she could “touch
[his] hand”--though Samson’s dramatic reaction suggests that he is being threatened by the idea
of—or the vision of, more likely—her touching (Samson Agonistes 951). Obviously to Samson,
her touch is symbolic; even without his physical sight, Samson can interpret what her “touch”
means; thus, upon hearing her request to “touch” him, Samson is already reacting against what
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the word augurs. He hears the word, and he interprets what he hears. This is not too far from
reading a text and interpreting its meaning; as a matter of fact, for Samson, I would like to argue,
the hearing of Dalilah saying the word “touch” brings him the image of her touching, which
becomes a text that Samson reads and interprets. Hearing becomes a sight, and the sight
functions like a tactile experience when the sound or the noise heard becomes a signification; the
sound becomes a text to be interpreted, which further proves touching and hearing not only
tactile but also textual. Samson’s reaction to Dalilah exhibits how haptic experience can become
even more visual once it becomes textual, which further demonstrates not only a politics of gaze
and touch but also the transformative power of poetry that Sidney argues for in The Defence of
Poesy.
The definitive epistemological discipline of the spiritual vision over physical sight comes
from biblical tradition. Consider specifically the following significant verses from the Bible: “the
light of the body is the eye” (Matthew 6:22) or “For God doth know that in the day ye eat
thereof, then your eyes shall be opened, and ye shall be as gods, knowing good and evil”
(Genesis 3:5).231 Much Judaeo-Christian philosophy strives to substantiate the concept of
hierarchy and separation between the body and soul. The eye is the material and symbolic organ
that embodies a vehicle that delivers the physical light into the body and spiritual light into the
soul. The physical organ of the eye enables both seeing physically and seeing spiritually. One
sees the material world, from which God’s beauty and truth enter into spiritual knowledge. The
physical light distributed in the body through the eye stands for the spiritual light of a see-er that
reflects the spiritual maturity of the see-er. Therefore, the lack of willpower, self-governance, or
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spiritual insight can be revealed through the vision the eye sees; the eye that sees the bad vision
might signify the augur of bad faith.
Therefore, the bad spiritual sight—the failure to see spiritually—comes after the bad
spiritual vision—the inability to see spiritually. In other words, any abeyance in seeing
spiritually should explain the human awkwardness in front of the enigma of spiritual sight, when
dealing with anything sublime or divine. Gazing at any material object becomes more than mere
material communication between the observer and observed, but this interaction presents a
special spiritual challenge in the fallen world where everything we see doesn’t reflect God’s
beauty and truth. In Paradise Lost, even before the fall, Eve could have avoided gazing at the
fruit, but she places her eye on the fruit and “Fixed on the fruit she gazed” (IX. 735).232
Willpower governs the gazing body; whether Satan looking at Eve or Eve looking at the fruit, the
gaze plainly signals what it desires. This is why the spiritual maturity of the gazer becomes
paramount. The inner light should shine over and push out the dark shades of material
temptations. And the need for spiritual strength becomes even more urgent when the moral,
ethical, or epistemological clarity of the gazer is at risk. I would argue that the faith of the gazer
controls the fate of the gaze, the culmination of the act of gazing/looking.
Surely, once blind, Milton’s Samson is even more aware of the two faculties of seeing in
Samson Agonistes—the irony is that he is even more aware of others’ gazes once he has lost his
own: “Now blind, disheartened, shamed, dishonoured, quelled,/ To what can I be useful, wherein
serve/ My nation, and the work from Heanv’n imposed,/ But to sit idle on the household hearth,/
A burdenous drone; to visitants a gaze,/ Or a pitied object” (563-68). Milton’s sonnet 19 delivers
a more optimistic outlook on being blind, but in both Samson’s speech above and Milton’s
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sonnet 19 “When I consider how my light is spent,” the reader gets the sense that the blind
speaker is struggling with the notion that the blind person cannot do anything. The despair for
now, in present, always seems so dark and daunting that it blocks the person’s capacity to grasp
that much ability remains, albeit it seems as if such ability has also disappeared along with the
physical sight. In sonnet 19 Milton’s tone begins with bitterness and despondency, yet the poet
quickly recovers the tone of dedication and purpose, proving that the physical hardship makes
him more aware of “that one Talent which is death to hide” (3). Importantly, the loss of sight
doesn’t stop him or make him “hide” his “talent”; rather, the poet argues he is even more
dedicated to fulfill his “talent” as he sees his “soul more bent” to make his talent work. That
“bent” is crucial, implying an exterior force that reshapes the poet’s will, literally bending it
toward his “Maker.”
Also in Samson Agonistes, about 100 lines after Samson’s woeful speech upon his
blindness, Milton reveals through the voice of the Chorus that the inability to see the world
forces one to look inwardly, to find the strength within, to “feel within/ Some source of
consolation from above/ Secret refreshings, that repair his strength,/ And fainting spirits uphold”
(663-66). At this point of the play, Samson is still in the agony, “all helpless with th’ irreparable
loss/ Of sight, reserved alive to be repeated/ The subject of their cruelty, or scorn” (644-46); he is
neither convinced nor able to see his fall as “secret refreshings” as the Chrous tries to tell him
(665). There is something to be said about the difference between what the Chorus tells the
audience and what Samson says in Samson Agonistes. The revelation of “secret refreshings”
arrives to Samson much later in the play, though such insight has already been pre-announced by
the Chorus. To whom is the Chorus really speaking, then? In “Reading Samson Agonistes,” Joan
S. Bennett points out that “we are not to look at this play—it was ‘never intended’ for the stage;
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rather, we are to listen for the language of the spirit complicating the words spoken by all the
characters, words such as ‘strength’, ‘dark’, ‘light’, ‘blindness’, ‘vision’, ‘prison’, ‘liberty’,
‘choice’, ‘promise’, ‘reason’, ‘fool’, ‘random’, ‘chance’, ‘necessity’, ‘love’, ‘law’, ‘deliverance’”
(Bennett 222).233 Bennett further argues that it is the experience of reading Samson Agonistes
that will inspire the readers to believe in and act on the right cause: “[W]e should expect, then,
that by entering into Samson’s experience we will emerge strengthened in mind and spirit to
meet such suffering directly in its full and complicated force in our world and in ourselves”
(221). Milton presents a different kind of tragedy through Samson Agonistes where the words do
more than present a mere reflection or imitation of the world—here we are reminded of Sidney’s
“many Cyruses,” where words possess genuine constitutive power—and provide a persistent,
singular inspiration to raise Samson to a greater act and give the readers a hope for the new
“secret refreshings” (Samson Agonistes 665) if they still believe in the cause of the Reformation.
The words in Bennett’s list above occur throughout the work in a careful pattern showing how
one moves from darkness to light—again, closely examine not only the meanings of the words
but also the order in which they are mentioned. Falling from the blessed state of his physical
strength into the lack of strength, sight, and hope, and then slowly climbing back up to the vision
and light, Samson falls and rises showing us how his physical blindness is necessary for his
spiritual awakening. What we see consistently throughout Paradise Lost, Paradise Regained,
and Samson Agonistes is that losing the spiritual sight is surprisingly easy—but once lost, the
consequences are catastrophic, for it is not easy to restore. In Samson Agonistes, even Samson,
who was “[God’s] nursling once and choice delight,/ His destined from the womb,/ Promised by
Heavenly message twice descending” (633-35), has to lose his sight and strength first to begin to

Joan S. Bennett, “Reading Samson Agonistes,” The Cambridge Companion to Milton, ed. Dennis
Danielson, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1999) 219-235.
233

234
use his spiritual sight. We must not forget however that the spiritual sight can be restored and
thus differs significantly from the physical sight, which once lost is much more difficult if not
impossible to restore.

5.4

Seeing as Telling, Seeing as Foresignifying
Let us consider the visual imagery of the winged eye, the emblem of the insatiable

Renaissance “QUID TUM” (“what is next?”) intelligence thirsty for the abundance of
knowledge. If Hooke looked further into the small objects that could be seen through the natural
eye, one could say the sixteenth-century British geographer Richard Hakluyt looked farther to
the horizon to see what could be seen through the natural eye. Both, certainly, provide useful
models of an outward gaze eager to digest, quantify, and map man’s material surroundings, and
Hakluyt’s dispassionate delivery provided a model to invoke even greater claims if objectivity.
Promoting overseas expansion and the colonization of North America, Hakluyt published
travelogues such as The principal Navigations, Voyages, Traffiques and Discoveries of the
English Nation that became the most authoritative texts to inform the early English voyages to
North America. Hakluyt’s flat tone and remote voice throughout his writing certainly yields the
portrait of a rational, objective author and eye-witness who can be trusted for both the purpose of
commerce and religion—his language is precise and his information effective in covering as
many facts as possible, without losing the focus from his subject—as he describes the objects to
be seen, examined, and recorded for the empire to use in colonization. Stephen H. Clark explains
why Hakluyt’s writing style became the most emulated writing style for historical, empirical, and
most importantly, imperial narrative in Travel Writing and Empire: Postcolonial Theory in
Transit:
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A reading in the language of surveying is thus a point on a standard scale (or
ladder) which correlates a selected object with a given fixed datum; the method is
essentially that adumbrated by Hakluyt. In this kind of reading meaning is as
monologic as it is possible to be. Plurality and ambiguity are utterly excluded, for
only one point can occupy that place at that time—or rather, that place and that
time within that formal system. The unknown is produced by extrapolation from
the known, but the known itself is ultimately an arbitrary datum. Like any
mathematical language, the geometry of surveying is self-defining and selfsufficient and this property contributes to its appearance of unquestionable
rightness when, as a language, it is used to describe the world. (110-111)234
Advanced optical devices and means of transportation allowed the Renaissance scholars to see
further, and being able to see more seemed to have become paramount to such prolific political
and cultural periods as the Renaissance. There is so much to be seen and recorded, it seems as if
Hakluyt had to constantly record what he saw, not what he felt—of course this is also why
empirical writing represents itself to be more factual and reliable. Hakluyt’s writing, for
example, is far more objective and dry than Hooke’s writing in Micrographia. Hakluyt is so
trapped in the moment of describing and recording, he forgets to see what is really there—all his
narratives are devoted to objective reproduction, page by page expanding the domain of his sight.
Producing an entirely descriptive narrative depicting his surroundings, Hakluyt seems to be
surrounded and lost in an unknown forest, in the middle of “a new visible world.”
The attempt at dispassionate, objective prose, however, highlights even further the
materialist bent of Hakluyt’s voracious eye. Describing is intended as a means of conquest and

234

1999).

Stephen H. Clark, Travel Writing and Empire: Postcolonial Theory in Transit (New York: Zed Books,

236
control, just as we have seen in Milton’s depiction of Satan; yet lacking poetic imagination or
inner sight, the narrative remains flat and one-dimensional. Instead of working on his own
redemption and salvation, Satan still cannot see why he is expelled out of Heaven. In Paradise
Lost, completely obscured by “darkness visible” (I. 63), resentful and sorrowful Satan exhibits
perhaps the most easy, typical behavior expected out of a confused and angry child who is
unable to see why he is being punished. Unfortunately, Satan remains that way eternally, and he
is always surrounded by Hell “on all sides round” and can’t seem to get away from “darkness
visible.” Satan’s affinity to quantity and consumption unfortunately doesn’t help him see through
his situation but forces him to see only his situation. To see outside and beyond that “darkness
visible,” Satan will have to look inward, forget what others have but not forget the individual
beauty and significance God gives to each one of his creation. Yet Satan proves to have no
capability to look inward; he is too obsessed with what he sees outside himself to see what he
could possess spiritually—his sight is driven by the conquering spirit of “quid tum,” and there is
no way to remedy the inner spiritual impairment that makes him look only at what he does not
have, what is outside him.
The spiritual sight works to focus on what is the innermost and significant knowledge,
whereas Satan’s earthly sight spins and expands out of control, and as John Leonard points out in
“Language and Knowledge in Paradise Lost,” “Satan uses the plural to allege divine
malevolence” (Leonard 140).235 In contrast, as Diane McColley writes in “Milton and the
Sexes,” “what seems to matter most to [Milton] is the eachness of each being” (McColley
185).236 Just as for Hakluyt, number and quantity signify power to Satan, but neither power nor
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material abundance means anything to Milton because what he cares about is as small or
immaterial as “eachness of each being.” For Milton, God is for each one of us, and that singular
focus of God makes each one of us so rich and satisfied that we won’t need any additional
external devices to expand our world or conquer the other. To be unable to call God with a
singular case or name indeed reveals Satan’s lack of ethical, moral, and spiritual maturity; that
inability suggests that Satan lacks the inner knowledge or spiritual sight necessary to accept that
he is wrong to challenge God who is the only God. As I described earlier, in Book 8 of Paradise
Lost Adam tells the story of his creation and remembers how he acknowledged the “happy light”
even when he didn’t even know who he was. Even without knowing who he is, then, Adam is
still able to recognize the inner light. Satan, on the other hand, throughout both Paradise Lost
and Paradise Regained, deliberately tries to remain silent about God’s singular existence and the
significance of his singularity. This un-mentioning of God’s singular existence is a rhetorical
ploy not only to confuse Eve with vague rhetoric that pluralizes and undermines God’s authority
but also to convince himself of his cause—if God were not just one omnipotent entity and Satan
were up against several gods, then Satan might have a better chance to win the battle against the
multiple gods. Satan’s rhetorical creativity comes through his great ability to deceive, which also
includes self-deception. This logic proves, moreover, that Satan is indeed aware and scared of
God’s one, singular entity—plural gods signify fragmentation and denudation of one powerful
entity. In addition, how Satan gravitates toward scientific devices such as the telescope and
microscope in Paradise Lost and Paradise Regained to gain more access and control over
physical knowledge reveals Milton’s uncertainty and suspicion toward using such external
agencies to enhance one’s sight when, instead, sight can improve internally if each one of us is
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willing to realize the spiritual sight that is already in us. John Leonard suggests in “Language and
Knowledge in Paradise Lost” that “Adam asserts his will by setting limits to it” while Satan is
“tactlessly blunt”(138). Leonard’s argument coincides with McColley’s point about humility that
springs from knowing and respecting the “eachness of being” that is prevalent in Milton’s
understanding of love and individuality (185).237 The criticism against Eve’s departure from her
husband to be alone emphasizes the very fact that she disobeys Adam because of her
individuality—but it is because of that individuality, her “eachness of being” as I would argue
along with McColley, that Eve also gets her own education, albeit her course is far more
condensed and difficult. This education is a life-long lesson to each human being, as we learn to
properly use and celebrate our freedom to choose and be responsible for the choices we make.
McColley says that Milton “was radical in his insistence on women’s spiritual completeness,
responsibility, and fitness for ‘all rational delight’” (185). I ask a familiar question—why would
God create us so weak that we inevitably fall? Perhaps God respects us more than we do since he
gave us the liberty to be ourselves, celebrate, respect and develop “eachness of each being”
through the freedom to learn and fall and learn again.
Milton’s “darkness visible” can be read both ways after all. For Satan it means the doom
inescapable, but perhaps Milton suggests something more than inescapable darkness all around
him—after all, Adam and Eve fall, too. As we see from Satan’s reaction compared to Adam and
Eve’s, “darkness visible” is not an absolute condition of doom, for what is visible can also be
invisible if it is veiled, and darkness must be there to show the light where it should shine.
Satan’s reaction to “darkness visible” reveals that he might prefer darkness invisible, which truly
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represents the eternal doom, without growth or change.238 Darkness unveils the light, so darkness
must be present, be “visible” to make things seeable, a point that resonates deeply with the
poetry of Finch that I will examine in the next chapter. The unveiling of “darkness,” the negation
of light and darkness, is the life-long lesson and development of one’s spiritual light. The light’s
obliteration of darkness—making darkness visible by making it invisible—articulates the need
and function of “darkness visible.” By negating the physical eye, the spiritual eye matures, and
the fruit of this generative and creative negation is, not just for Milton but for all the readers of
Milton’s work, an inner eye that is capable of seeing “darkness visible.” It’s the poetic mind that
finds the light looming within and beyond darkness, not the eye that measures and examines
what is visible now, here. This way Satan will never be past darkness; he will not only be stuck
in permanently static and consistent “darkness” but also always outside of the realm of “visible.”
In Probability and Certainty in Seventeenth-Century England, Barbara J. Shapiro points
out that the logic and rhetoric of seventeenth-century England became the persuasive means of
“enlarging and expanding similarities” to ground the new facts and experiences that became
available through the advent of new science. The used-to-be hierarchy between rhetoric that
formed popular discourse and the learned communication dominated by logic and dialectic began
to deteriorate, and the relationship between them started shifting: “Amplification and
ornamentation were skills taught by rhetoric and employed by poets as well as writers aspiring to
eloquence. These practices were so deeply ingrained that they were not employed as mere
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illustration, but had become part of Renaissance proof and argumentation” (229).239 As Shapiro
notes, persuasive rhetoric dominated every mode of communication and learning:
We have seen that seventeenth-century philosophers, scientists, and historians
were attempting to reconstruct knowledge by grounding it on fact and experience.
This realm of the ‘probable’ rather than the logically certain was traditionally the
realm of rhetoric. By the seventeenth century, however, rhetoric appeared to be
too emotional, too personally biased, too ready to accept common opinion, and
too amplified, verbose, and poetic for their purposes. Practitioners of the new
fact-oriented learning became restive with the standard models of writing and
thinking.240
Rhetoric aims to win the argument, as its goal is not truth, but being persuasive based on
probability. Certainty here takes more than factual or experimental proof—certainty is exactly
why Satan puts identifying God’s singularity in abeyance. Certainty assumes epistemological
darkness and requires one to plunge blindly into the unknowable while probability always hinges
on the middle ground. With probability, chances are, Satan will feel trapped in the darkness that
makes everything invisible. Satan cannot embrace probability because he must use seeing as an
agency of controlling knowledge. To those who associate seeing with agency, the quality of what
they see becomes less critical while how far they can see becomes paramount to such an
empirical gaze.241
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In The Empty Garden: The Subject of Late Milton, Ashraf H. A. Rushdy suggests that
Adam’s “first glimmers of consciousness” and Augustine’s dialogue with the world in the Book
of Meditation exhibit a similar pattern of learning to understand God properly.242 According to
Rushdy, this pattern of learning requires inner contemplation, through which one can transcend
the corporeal knowledge perceived from the physical world into spiritual knowledge: “To see
through the earthly and carnal to the heavenly and spiritual, to treat the material of vice in such a
way that it is made the stuff of virtue, to meditate on the world in order to ascend to heaven:
these are the options available to the faithful being in the duress of temptation.”243 Rushdy
further argues that through “an act of meditation,” Christ in Paradise Regained is able to “see
through the earthly and carnal” and distinguish Satan and his earthly temptations from the
“heavenly and spiritual” (264). Christ through meditation achieves “the intellect filled with the
Spirit” that enables him to “enigmatically address an intellect devoid of spiritual apprehension in
order to address a different audience at a different level of understanding—the spiritual readers”
(264). Then, meditation yields a spiritual battle ground, or engenders spiritual tensions that allow
the mind to perceive the difference between earthly and heavenly. Even though one can perceive
the spiritual world through meditation, the difficulty of seeing the heavenly through the earthly
ensues from the worldly knowledge observed through the physical eye, which often intercepts
observation into the spiritual realm. Without the persistent and cautious contemplative effort to
sustain the mind’s eye that sees the spiritual world, the physical eye often tricks us into
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becoming a bad reader of the spiritual world who forgets “the use of the eye beyond sense and
reason, the most ethereal of the capacities unique to the human soul” (263).244
Darkness gives the time needed for light to take its form. Milton did not write visible
darkness—he wrote “darkness visible” because the illumination is the most important thing one
must anticipate, and he is certain that it is coming, that things will be visible. Augustine sees
what is there—“what I behold, is present”—but what he sees through his physical sight also fuels
his imagination and suggests that the antecedent of something “visible” is indeed “darkness.”
The idea of something becoming “visible” gives time and space the meaning that makes the dark
present more bearable, and suggests the sort of fertility and fecundity of darkness that I will
explore in the works of Finch in the next chapter. Poetic authorship, though it may seem odd at
first to the reader, surprisingly relies on a certain level of blind trust and faith that the intended
meaning will not get completely lost in the intervening space between the author and reader.
Furthermore, the realm of poetry or certainty doesn’t remain static, but constantly intersects with
the realm of probability. Human imagination and sensory experience, with the possibility of
being erroneous, are responsible for both scientific observation and prosthetic seeing. Seeing
becomes knowing, and knowing propels telling. Telling is hardly objective; there is no seeing
that doesn’t involve self. If it is possible that the mechanically-enhanced sight is responsible for
magnifying the blemish on “her spotty globe,” then it is also possible to erase or unsee that spot
by the spiritually-guided eye.245 Telling, whether for the scientist or the poet, is the artistry that
converts what one sees into what one believes. Indeed, telling is the most internal yet
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communicative instrument of celebrating and confirming one’s belief. However, seeing that
doesn’t “foresignify,” to borrow Augustine’s term, or lead to what Sidney calls “figuring forth,”
is pointless and hollow to the artistry of poetry. This is why poets who are especially committed
to using the poetic imagination to understand and represent the world must defend the artistry
that requires the illumination of the spiritual eye, the spiritual light that is able to see that there is
the light that becomes even more imminent and ubiquitous in the darkness.
6

CHAPTER 6: “No Fierce Light Disturbs, Whilst It Reveals”: Illuminating Darkness in
the Poetry of Finch

That the World may ne'er invade,
Through such Windings and such Shade,
My unshaken Liberty.
No Intruders thither come!
Who visit, but to be from home;
None who their vain Moments pass,
Only studious of their Glass,
News, that charm to listning Ears;
That false Alarm to Hopes and Fears;
That common Theme for every Fop,
From the Statesman to the Shop,
In those Coverts ne'er be spread,
Of who's Deceas'd, or who's to Wed,
Be no Tidings thither brought,
But Silent, as a Midnight Thought,
Where the World may ne'er invade,
Be those Windings, and that Shade: 246

The darkness of the night signifies an intimate and private source of poetic imagination in
Anne Finch’s poetry—Finch sees the night’s lone and enigmatic presence as equally ubiquitous
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and intense as the bright daylight. The night’s quiet and subdued state heightens the poet’s
sensitivity to the subtleties of nature, whose never-ceasing mutability becomes more magnified
and dramatized by the stillness of the night than by the radiance of the daylight. The night’s
unwavering darkness doesn’t signify obscurity and destruction in Finch’s poetry; rather, she
describes the inexorable night’s darkness as a personified solitary poetic genius—a
representation of mysterious aptitude, bottled in the pensive and ingenious intellectual abyss of
an inspired poet who anticipates unleashing a greater insight. While the night’s darkness
embodies the dynamic and enthusiastic “inward light” that fuels the poet’s creativity, Finch’s
polarizing depiction of light as both the excessive and homogenizing institutional force of
uniformity and the night’s antecedent necessary for yielding the darkness challenges the
traditional and deterring notion of darkness as the deficient state of light. Finch’s poems also
reveal how the poet’s imagination becomes more engaged and productive in a delicate but
refined mental state intensified by the opposite psychological states—for instance, in “The
Consolation,” the poet’s depressed and subdued mood is compared to the delirium and
colorfulness of nature and the grandeur of mythical figures who never seem to fall but rise: “See,
Phoebus breaking from the willing skies,/ See, how the soaring Lark, does with him rise” (lines
1-2). What rises does fall, and to Finch, this duality and mutability in nature signifies the promise
of rebirth and regrowth:
Glorious, and high, but shall they ever bee,
Glorious, and high, and fixt where now we see?
No, both must fall, nor can their stations keep,
She to the Earth, and he below the Deep,
At night both fall, but the swift hand of time
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Renews the morning, and again they climb,
Then lett no cloudy change, create my sorrow,
I'll think 'tis night, and I may rise to-morrow.247
Finch sees the night’s darkness as a liminal doorway to poetic daybreak—darkness is as
significant as light for her poetic imagination to become active. Fittingly, “The Consolation,” a
poem about night being the poet’s consolation, opens with an invocation of Phoebus, the Greek
god whose chariot pulled the sun, and the lark, the popular mythological and literary symbol of
daybreak.248 The night is closely represented with the possibility of the fall in the poem, but the
fall also generates and propels the creation.
This chapter will examine Finch’s enthusiasm and affinity for night and her esoteric and
unconventional poetic decision to magnify the night’s darkness as the source of poetic creativity
and psychological solace. While she praises the lack of light as an indication of advanced artistic
and individual independence, she also suggests that the topos of light as the ubiquitous symbol of
knowledge and life reinforces the homogenous cultural institutionalization of dualistic values
such as light and dark or good and evil. By highlighting and reassessing the estranged values of
the things usurped of light, Finch debunks the ego-ocular-verbocentrism of the hegemonic social
and class structures that concenters and hyperbolizes the more apparent and pronounced.249

247
Anne Finch, “The Consolation.” The Poems of Anne Countess of Winchilsea: From the Original Edition
of 1713 and from Unpublished Manuscripts Edited with an Introduction and Notes by Myra Reynolds, 18. Lines 916.
248
The poem opens with the introduction of two mythical figures—Phoebus and the lark. The following are
the first six lines: “See, Phoebus breaking from the willing skies,/ See, how the soaring Lark, does with him rise,/
And through the air, is such a journy borne/ As if she never thought of a return./ Now, to his noon, behold him
proudly goe,/ And look with scorn, on all that's great below” (lines 1-6).
249
In the introduction to Modernity and Hegemony of Vision, David Michael Levin discusses how vision is
one of the predominant modes of perception, and the culture of vision dominates the discourses of knowledge in
Western culture: “Can it be demonstrated, beginning with the ancient Greeks, our Western culture has been
dominated by ocularcentric paradigm, a vision-generated, vision-centered interpretation of knowledge, truth, and
reality? If so, many more questions follow. Can it be argued that, in the period we call ‘modernity’ (the period

246
Finch’s casting the light away to preserve her creative relationship with the night further reveals
her acute awareness of her marginalized subjectivity as a female poet, a subjectivity that inspires
her poetic imagination; she also doubts and challenges the gospel of scientific objectivity,
championing instead poetic individualism and subjectivity. Thus, she belongs to a continuing
tradition of female writers including Cavendish who were skeptical of the modern scientific
project and struggled to preserve their female subjectivity. Female writers of the English
Renaissance, as they are constantly aware of their political and social limitations, express a
similar anxiety and criticism against the advent of science. Cavendish, through her struggles with
The Royal Society, illustrates the precarious position of the “woman of science” in seventeenthand eighteenth-century England; Finch, who followed a generation later, also found herself
exiled to the margin of scientific knowledge. Women writers of seventeenth- and eighteenthcentury England such as Cavendish and Finch wrote about their experiences of being outsiders
from the patriarchal production of knowledge and power; they share the distinction of offering
alternate modes of discovering truth and, in their works, provide an interrogation of at least some
aspects of the foundational doctrines of modern mechanistic philosophy that brought about what
Susan Bordo has defined as “Masculinization of Thought.”250 I am far from presenting these
poets as representing the entire discourse against the fashioning of modern science in the
seventeenth century, but they are intellectually related to one another in presenting important
critiques and alternate modes of knowing the universe that lost out to science and were neglected
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or misunderstood to the point of outright hostility over the next centuries.251 And only recently
have the complaints of these seventeenth- and early eighteenth-century skeptics regained a
foothold in philosophical inquiries into the foundational beliefs of science, for contemporary
theorists routinely decry the totalizing claims of science as both improbable and inherently
dangerous in the social arrangements that they hail forth in modern civilizations.252 In Science,
Reading, and Renaissance Literature: the Art of Making Knowledge, 1580-1670, Elizabeth
Spiller also considers the entire experimental paradigm something that by definition attempts to
hide its subjective and man-made nature, as “Experimentation depends on creating artificial
situations for the purpose of discovering universal scientific laws” (7).253 Spiller further argues
that these scientific experiments were not about scientific discoveries but about empirical
reinforcements that support the pre-existing social and cultural hierarchy of patriarchal
hegemony: “From most premodern philosophical and historical perspectives, this goal represents
an epistemological paradox, yet by the end of the seventeenth century claims for the power of
experiments are becoming widely accepted along with new assumptions about the existence of
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universal scientific laws that they point to.”254 At the start of the following century, Finch’s
exploration of a subjective, mutable self under the influence of the passions provides an
especially cogent critique of the masculine, self-aware figure of the scientist then coming into
prominence.
Furthermore, Finch’s consistent representation of the human psyche as the source of
mutability shows the poet’s own potential to grow and excel while she challenges the patriarchal
tools of a process of knowledge production that oversimplifies women merely as intellectually
servile and socially marginalized. The poet’s pensive and sometimes inactive, sedentary mood
prevailing in Finch’s poetry is merely external and deceiving. The poet’s affinity for quiet
solitude signifies not only her desire for social independence and personal solidarity but more
importantly her intellectual independence. This is also why the sense of mutability and
individualism governs Finch’s sense of time and space in her poetry—over and over Finch points
out that mutability and heterogeneity tower over stability and regularity as her poetic inspiration
comes from ambivalence and opaqueness. Finch wants to retreat from the hegemony of
regularized, masculine time and space. Solitude might be the only way she can confront and
delay the traditional sense of time. Therefore, she must use the space of solitude—the shaded
areas and the poetry itself—to delegate the expected flow of time. She retreats from the punctual
time, seeking out the night’s darkness that always antagonizes the daylight. Such an eccentric
and capricious denial of the socially and ideologically accepted use of time and space provides
the psychological dynamic and unease useful for informing the poet’s creative imagination.
Even though Finch seems to advocate a choice between the two opposites by praising the night’s
enigma and solitude over the daylight’s expressive refulgence, her literary virtues often seem to
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rise from a synthesis of the two opposites, a kind of intimate fantasy fusing the two opposites.
Articulated through her intensely strained emotional voice, the visions of mysterious and solemn
night, or winding roads shaded by trees, represent a maverick gesture and convey the intrepid
outlook of the poet. The amalgamation of all aspects of reality, either effulgent in the light or
variegated in the shade, produce a more accomplished and compelling representation of reality.
Finch’s argument for the underappreciated or usurped themes such as darkness and melancholy
might come across as one-sided, but her awareness of divergent aspects of reality suggests
otherwise. Finch’s argument for the heterogeneous view of darkness cannot succeed without
admitting the necessity of light. The element of ambivalence and heterogeneity was prized in
poetic production during the English Renaissance and seen as the basis of the poetic imagination;
the poetic imagination, as Sidney argued and many others subsequently affirmed, requires
opposites—metaphors analyze and merge dissimilarities to generate the sharpness and subtlety
of meaning a poet desires to articulate without succumbing to the conventional shelving of
hierarchy between two things. Finch’s romantic view of psychological clamor and emotional
intensity as the source of poetic inspiration further points to the seventeenth- and eighteenthcentury’s neoclassical attempt to join fancy and judgment to explain wit. In an effort to define
poetic inspiration or imagination, many critics debated the proper definition of the term “wit” in
the ever-changing critical effort to locate and describe the imaginative source of poetry. Hobbes
argued that fancy minus judgment or reason could not constitute wit; fancy and judgment should
work together to accomplish wit, and Finch’s attempt to marry the effects of sensory perceptions
and reason in her poetic creations echoes the idea that wit embodies both intellectual judgment
and artistic imagination.
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6.1

Poetry’s Promise of Mutability and Finch’s Use of Mutability
The tropes involving the human body and its sensory operation often reveal the

metaphoric association between the writing body and the body of a written composition. In
Finch’s “The Spleen,” the association between touch and figurative language extends to the
poet’s figuration of her own malady as un-touchable, ungraspable. The spleen, the malady itself,
is a metaphor for the poetic predicament that the poet faces and has to overcome—and the poet
might have chosen the most fascinating and challenging subject to test and show off her poetic
skills. Her triumph over this task will be a poetic achievement, one that deserves hyperbole.
Finch believes poetry can capture and clothe the spleen, this protean beast that does not “remain
in one continued shape.” As the poet reveals in “The Spleen,” the taming of the malady signifies
being able to capture the private and subjectively experienced symptoms into words,
transforming the internal into external. This is poetic metaphor’s singular capacity—joining two
opposites, even unlikely ones. As Finch describes the spleen, she turns her own, mostly ocular
private sensory observations into her poetry’s public realm where the reader experiences both
ocular and tactile effects. The protean form is captured in the poem. Even though it might change
its form afresh every time it is read, the fact that Finch’s poetic imagination delivers the
figuration of the spleen remains unchangeable.
Furthermore, in Finch’s nocturnal poems, the poet’s rejection of light is often associated
with her deliberate denial of the conventional production of ocular epistemology; as I have
argued before, seeing is closely linked with telling, yet the eyes that saw and hands that wrote
belonged to those writers who thrived on the speaking ego of the male author. The poet’s
dismissal of the day light reveals her attempt to evade the obligation of performing the exchange
of social and ideological values of the hegemonic system, but such specific affinity towards
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nocturnal images further signifies her desire to obstruct and delay the practice of ego-ocularverbocentrism by producing the images of the other: the narrator often suspected of possessing a
rather eccentric, feminine, and fragmented ego strained by melancholy, the night’s darkness
devoid of worldly significance, and the conscious censoring of the “lines intend for publick
view.”255 By magnifying the unconventional properties of the night, the spleen, and feminine
subjectivity, Finch negates the ocular verbocentrism that generates the ideological narratives of
patriarchal hegemony. Sensory perception and emotional experience govern Finch’s poetic
imagery and her attempt to restore the internal values that lost out to the social and ideological
values that carry significance in the external world.
The poet in Finch’s poetry, represented as a lone, romantic figure possessing a singular,
anti-social, and eccentric genius, often appears to remove herself from the external pressures of
social conventions as well as poetic tradition. Nevertheless, her poems often demonstrate her
awareness of the ruling poetic conventions of the day as she points to the conundrum poetic
conventions pose to the genuine and personal articulation of intimate thought. Even through her
association with the peculiar themes of nocturnal imagery and melancholy, Finch has been
historicized, linked and associated with certain poetic traditions. Wordsworth once described
Finch as one of the very few exceptions since Milton whose poetry “contain[s] a single new
image of external nature.”256 However, Charles Hinnant cautions that Wordsworth’s famous
claim on Finch’s poetry only provides “the archaeological nature of [Wordsworth’s] enterprise,
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which revived interest in Finch’s poetry only by constructing a kind of historical mythology in
which the poems become recognizable from the vantage point of their Romanticism” (Hinnant
27). Hence, to Wordsworth, Finch’s poetry represented “an early, buried version of that
Romanticism” (27). Many critics followed Wordsworth’s “historicizing approach to Finch’s
poetry,” a project that only undermined Finch’s works as unfinished, still-in-progress,
“adumbrations—shadows that looked forward to the fulfillment to come” with the full flowering
of Romanticism (27). Hinnant suggests that it was Reuben Brower who first offered a counter
criticism against Wordsworth’s historicizing of Finch. By recognizing Finch’s difference and
“distance from the Romantics,” Hinnant describes, Brower “locates these so-called nature poems
early in Finch’s career and thus grounds them in a seventeenth-century tradition of metaphysical
poetry” (Hinnant 27). If the development of a poetic movement reflects a linear historical
progression, Brower’s reading of Finch places her at the mature end of a seventeenth-century
movement when Wordsworth lines her up at the incubating start of an eighteenth-century
movement.
In addition, part of Finch’s poetic inspiration often comes from the idyllic solitude found
in a pastoral landscape. Finch combines the peaceful pastoral life with the night’s silent solitude
and creates an ideal setting for her own private development of poetic imagination and
intellectual discernment. Finch also invokes classical muses such as “Phoebus breaking from the
willing skies” and “the soaring Lark” for inspiration, only to reject such external conventions in
favor of her own emotion and imagination. Finch demonstrated an increasing awareness of the
poetic traditions of her own period as well as those governing older verse. Her work’s affinity
with the metaphysical tradition is evident in poems such as “The Petition for an Absolute
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Retreat,” which represents the distanced perspective of the speaker through the image of the
telescope, an emblem common to much religious poetry of the seventeenth century.
Yet Finch’s poetic creativity is more intensely connected to—or comes from, to be more
specific—her corporeal body. The corporeal body reminds the poet of the distance between
celestial perfection and corporeal inadequacy, and the poetic metaphor is the poet’s tool to move
upward. The desire to get closer to the celestial perfection—to ascend from small to great or
partial truth to complete truth—governs the motion of the poetic imagination. Indeed, Finch’s
poetic metaphors are meaningful and succinct as they indicate upward motion. Yet Finch’s
poems openly discuss her physical malady affecting her mind, and instead of trying to veil the
symptom, she explores and exploits the symptoms—the symptoms become the subject of her
creation, not the obstacle for her creation. Tuned to the reveries of unnoticed and obscure
subtleties, Finch delves into the abyss of a contemplative melancholic mind. This perhaps
contradicts the upward propelled motion of poetic imagination. How do the cynical and
unbalanced characteristics of the spleen or the lack of light embody the ascending motion to
ontological perfection and undisturbed truth?
Finch’s representation of the malady shows the poet’s profound grasp of the polarizing
effects of the spleen, and it is Finch’s poetic ambition to confront and join the conflicting
opposites together. Finch’s poetry shows that the ascension to truth by poetic imagination can
also happen on a rather unconventional, meandering journey, by travelling “thro’ those Windings
and that shade.”257 Finch’s winding and shaded path will reveal the poet and her reader things
that could have been absent or hidden had she taken the hierarchical path to truth. In this sense,
Finch resolves the moral dilemma caused by her polarizing formal and thematic subjectivities
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found in her poetry. She understands that her subjectivity is polarizing to her poetic ambition.
The spleen is both mobilizing and immobilizing; she embodies the spleen. The spleen inspires
and discourages the poet, and even though the poet might dread its conflicting effect on the body
and mind, she finds the spleen’s derailing impact on both body and mind forceful and sensational
enough to stir her poetic imagination. The happy life without depression, the bright light without
the shadow, in other words, results in a torpor of the poetic imagination. Notice the
transformation she traces out in “The Spleen”:
I feel thy Force, whilst I against thee rail;
I feel my Verse decay, and my crampt Numbers fail.
Thro’ thy black Jaundice I all Objects See
As Dark and Terrible as Thee,
My Lines decry’d, and my Employment thought
An useless Folly, or presumptuous Fault:
Whilst in the Muses’ Paths I Stray,
Whilst in their groves, and by their Secret Springs
My hand delights to trace unusual things,
And deviates from the known and common way.258
The poet clearly suffers from the malady that blurs her poetic creativity: “my verse decay, and
my cramped numbers fail.” Like a nebulous fog, her body moves too slowly, but her mind
changes too constantly. However, in the midst of hazy “paths [she strays],” the poet also
encounters something “unusual” and tangible as her “hand delights to trace unusual things,/ And
deviates from the known and common way.” Being lost in the spleen’s “dark and terrible” forest
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proves to be an inspiring experience; the poet who initially felt herself losing her creativity in the
battle against the malady somehow finds poetic inspiration and strength in the state of “dark and
terrible.” Finch isn’t the first poet who tackled the subject of melancholy—though her approach
is startlingly genuine, intimate, and emotional, as opposed to the grieving elegy tradition from
the previous century or the poems about pensive solitude and melancholy popularized by
Milton’s Il Penseroso.
It is also paramount to notice that the overall temperament and mood of “The Spleen”
echo with the mysterious, unruffled, self-sufficient coolness of the night that eschews the light’s
“vulgar croud,/ [its] slaves, more clamorous and loud.” To Finch, darkness is enigmatic,
romantic, and singularly creative while the day light is “vulgar,” “loud,” just like the slavish
majority that blindly follow the obvious—indeed, they become the “slaves” of the malady by
choice:
Whilst in the light, and vulgar Croud,
Thy Slaves, more clamorous and loud,
By Laughters unprovok'd, thy Influence too confess.
In the Imperious Wife thou Vapours art,
Which from o'erheated Passions rise
In Clouds to the attractive Brain,
Until descending thence again,
Thro' the o'er-cast, and show'ring Eyes,
Upon her Husband's soften'd Heart,
He the disputed Point must yield,
Something resign of the contested Field;
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Til Lordly Man, born to Imperial Sway,
Compounds for Peace, to make that Right away,
And Woman, arm'd with Spleen, do's servilely Obey.259
Finch points out how the symptoms of the malady are easily misinterpreted and glorified by the
popular majority. Regardless of the real symptoms of melancholy, which Finch vividly describes
in her poems, the melancholic temperament, as articulated in such expressions as “the aromatic
pain”—from which Pope borrowed his famous “die of a rose in an aromatic pain”—became
romanticized and mimicked by many, as exhibiting these symptoms became the sign of cultural
refinement and malaise prescribed for the higher class. Finch’s description of the spleen as “the
vapours” that exist “in the imperious wife” derides the appearance—“new are thy motions, and
thy dress”—of the malady that became fashionable among women who perform a state of
physical weakness and mental frailty as the sign of femininity and servility.
Though this might not seem plausible, the hyperbolic descriptions of the spleen might be
the most fitting rhetorical choice for Finch to create the vivid impression of how the spleen
attacks and usurps her mental and physical condition. The symptoms Finch illustrates show
nothing but tedium, yet it is challenging and unpredictable— “thou Proteus to abused
mankind”—and the ominous yet mysterious appearance of the malady seduces the ordinary
people, so that showing the symptoms of the spleen becomes fashionable: “New are thy motions,
and thy dress.” Finch portrays the spleen through the hyperbole of “unusual things” where the
“muses’ paths [the poet] stray,” through which the poet also “deviates from the known and
common way.” The spleen therefore becomes a metaphor for her poetic vision—the sublime
“force” of “the airy phantoms” might also be the “dark and terrible,” but Finch does not deny the
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spleen’s mystical power over mankind; rather, as the poem reveals, she is fond of its association
with terifying and unorthodox unpredictability and mutability. Though she opens “The Spleen”
with the question, “What art thou, Spleen, which ev’ry thing dost ape?” one can argue after a
careful reading of the poem that Finch realizes what could “ape” the poet is the lack of
melancholy. The nonfigurative, the ever-changing attributes of the disease challenge the poet to
become more alert and perceptive. As the poem progresses, Finch’s use of figurative language
slowly unveils that the spleen does deserve the hyperbole and the “perplexing form” (line 5).
Further, the poet’s struggle against the melancholy is not just an internal and personal one; it is
also a source of her professional ambition and distress. Although her poetic works were
published anonymously, “The Spleen” clearly demonstrates how the poet feels her “verse decay,
and [her] cramped numbers fail” because of the poet’s private anguish and anxiety from the
malady.260 The complaint is both private and public; her complaints against the spleen constitute
the poem, but the poem can also be seen as the triumphant song of the spleen—a Pindaric ode to
the spleen. Finch chooses one of the most outward and hyperbolic modes of poetry to express her
anguish over the most intimate and inward clash between her personal and professional space. In
this sense, the poet’s brave and unconventional poetic decision also deserves as much hyperbole
as the malady itself.
Because the conflict between her personal and professional life creates “the contested
field,” Finch articulates her debilitating inner, psychological war through the images of solitude,
darkness, and melancholy.261 In doing so, Finch further suggests that the creative space of a poet
should be isolated and protected from any external forces threatening the poet’s intellectual
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integrity and creative solitude; poetry-making requires diligent study and contemplative solitude,
but sometimes it also involves skillful negotiations with the outside world. For instance, the main
subject of Milton’s Sonnet 8 is Pindar, and the poem reveals that he is about to be assailed and
thrown out from his home. The old poet who occupies his old home is about to be evacuated
from his home; Milton represents Pindar as the emblem of deteriorating past poetic tradition by
describing the moment where the poet is threatened and pushed out of his establishment by the
militant, external forces. Milton’s Sonnet 8 embodies, both figuratively and literally, the creative
nook that holds and protects Pindar inside.262 Poetry provides a sanctuary for a poet who is in
political exile, but even under the shield of poetry the poet is being threatened by the external
forces.263 Thus, in Sonnet 8 Milton pleads that his life should be spared just as the house of
Pindarus was spared from being destroyed when the army of Alexander the Great sacked Thebes:
“These defenceless dores may sease,/ If ever deed of honour did thee please,/ Guard them, and
him within protect from harms” (lines 2-4). The house being occupied by a poet signifies a
poetic space being occupied by a poet. Here, one can argue that a poet’s creative inner space
isn’t always protected but often ends up being unlocked and bombarded by external forces as
much as a poet fabricates the world people read and remember. However, as Sidney argues in
The Defence of Poesie, a poet can imitate and create many versions of truth and even enhance the
original; Milton argues that his pen will prevail through any political pressures--the poet holds
the power not only to record history but also manipulate it: “He can requite thee, for he knows
the charms/ That call Fame on such gentle acts as these,/ And he can spred thy Name o're Lands
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and Seas,/ What ever clime the Suns bright circle warms” (lines 5-8). The space of poetry is
forgiving and affirming—it is personal and public, egotistic and didactic.264
When it comes to Finch, a female poet writing in the late seventeenth and eighteenth
century, the poet’s personal space is her poetic space; her personal space and poetic space are
one, walled away from the outside. Most often, a female poet during this time period cannot
build enough physical and mental distance between her domestic and social or personal and
public domain; thus, the two will collapse or coincide. In Handmaid to Divinity: Natural
Philosophy, Poetry, and Gender in Seventeenth-Century England, Desiree Hellegers writes:
“While the symptoms of the spleen or hysteria confirm the ‘femininity’ and delicacy of the upper
class woman, they also undermine her claim to intellectual quality and justify her confinement to
and subordination within the private space of the home” (148).265 The opening question of
Finch’s poem, “What are thou SPLEEN which ev’rything dost ape?” expresses the poet’s
“central concern with the flexibility of the discourse of the spleen and with the semiotics of
disease” because the public discussion of her malady could render her vulnerable and again,
feminine to the society.266 At first, “the contested field” seems to suggest that her domestic and
social space becomes too “crowd[ed]” with the malady. Too many occupants populate her
already clouded mind. The battle between her malady and her verses keeps getting more intense
as the contested field remains over-crowded, and the conflict becomes more acutely poetic;
hence she feels “[her] verse decay, and [her] cramped numbers fail.” However, according to
Finch’s description of the malady, we can induce that melancholy isn’t entirely the source of her
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physical and mental debilitation but rather a source of sublimity and magnificence for the
poet.267 In fact, as she feels more anxious to write poetry and as her mind is more occupied by
the melancholy, she feels something that “delights” with “[her] hand while she “trace[s] unusual
things.” What kind of experience can offer the poet such delightful experience with her hand,
tracing “unusual things” while under the spell of the spleen? Where do the readers see the
unusual things she traces “whilst in the muses’ paths [she] stray[s]”? Is it plausible to argue that
her crowded, “contested field,” turns out to be a more generative and active field of poetic
inspiration?
In “Melancholy in Anne Finch and Elizabeth Carter,” John F. Sena points out that even
though “melancholy was the bête noire of some Englishmen, the malady was looked upon with
pride and deference by many. If melancholy caused physical infirmity and psychological
distress, it was also associated with genius and artistic creativity” (115).268 In addition, Hellegers
points out that “the public form of the Pindaric also seems to be a particularly appropriate
medium for treating a phenomenon that was viewed, from the late seventeenth century onward,
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as peculiarly English.”269 During the sixteenth century, Renaissance scholars and writers
perceived that the melancholic artist possessed an aura of artistic superiority, and even today
artists tend to link creativity with suffering, solitary confinement and pensive melancholy. To
many seventeenth and eighteenth-century English upper class aristocrats, the spleen signifies a
privileged sickness “associated specifically with the upper classes and with a sedentary life of
luxury. In this respect, as John Mullan among others has emphasized, the spleen marked not
simply affliction but also privilege.”270 Associating the malady with more refined and “superior
mental endowments” wasn’t entirely without medical foundation either. Physicians also believed
that the spleen was caused by “physiological factors similar to those responsible for intelligence
and wit.” Those with more sensitive and refined spirits were more susceptible to the melancholy.
Great heroes and talented people throughout history were often described as those touched by
this malady, and the spleen had become a rather fashionable disease for poets and thinkers alike
in the eighteenth century. In “From Delusion to Illumination: A Larger Structure of L’Allegro-Il
Penseroso,” David M. Miller argues that the pleasures only melancholy can provide can never be
fully appreciated without knowing the pleasures from mirth: “The delights of L’Allegro are real
and valued, but like the glories of Greece they cannot stand against the ecstasy of Christian
contemplation. Partial truth is inferior to complete truth. It is Il Penseroso who represents the
proper Christian pattern” (37).271 Miller incorporates a taxonomy borrowed from Lawrence
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Babb’s discussion of Il Penseroso in “The Background of Il Penseroso” that posits two distinct
kinds of melancholy—black and gold—and associates the latter with a more divine and artistic
portent for poets: “Golden melancholy was the concern, not of physicians, but of poets. And its
products were not despondency amid madness, but the highest of man’s artistic achievements.”
Milton also refers to the black melancholy as “loathed” while golden melancholy remains
“divinest” (33).272 Finch’s melancholy embodies both gold and dark; it not only comes to her as
a dark and untraceable “monstrous vision” that surreptitiously usurps her at night, but the poet
also associates the melancholy’s numbing hallucinatory effect with enlightening, divine golden
melancholy.273
In “The Spleen,” Finch’s description of golden melancholy deviates from Milton’s
association with poetic inspiration and the malady, however, as Finch shows a clear aversion
toward the malady’s debilitating effect—“the jonquil o’ercomes the feeble brain” (40). Finch’s
critical tone against “men of thoughts refined” who are “fool[s], to imitate the wits” (64) and the
“coquette, whom ev’ry fool admires” (99) suggests that she is against the popularization of the
malady—she might be complaining that the malady becomes too accessible and common, losing
its novel and distant existence.274 Hellegers also points out the fashionable artistic attribute of
melancholy fail to include the certain members of society: “For the male writer, at least, displays
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of splenetic symptomatology became a means of affirming or enhancing social, political, and
intellectual authority. The discourse of the spleen, Finch implies, legitimates ‘scientifically’ the
claims of upper-class men to power and privilege.”275 It is not the spleen’s capricious and
ominous visits the poet eschews; she abhors the patriarchal force behind the medical science and
society’s identification of the malady as a feminine symptom of weakness and vulnerability. As
Miller suggests, Milton’s “twin” poems of duality—melancholy and happiness, day and night,
solitary and social person—envisage delivering the “complete truth.”276 Finch values the artistic
depth and complexity she can draw from the symptoms of the spleen greater than the pain and
malady caused by the illness. The oscillating but persistent fore- and overshadowing of the
spleen’s physical and mental symptoms render the duality tenuous and capricious. It can easily
sway the “vulgar crowd,” who servilely follow its “dynamic charm”; unlike the “vulgar croud,/
thy Slaves, more clamorous and loud,” the poet isn’t deluded by the spleen’s dynamic charm:
“New are thy Motions, and thy Dress.”
Furthermore, the contemporary fascination with the malady deserves Finch’s unfavorable
tone because she believes that those who idolize and imitate the creative spirit of melancholy do
not possess the poetic and creative capacity that she herself possesses. While the “vulgar crowd”
chase and idolize the malady, the malady sought and chose the poet—in other words, she had no
choice but to receive the malady and surrender. In the beginning of the poem, she does appear to
be passive and powerless when the dark symptoms of melancholy take over her at night. With
the spleen, everything seems to be out of balance, out of proportion: “From Harmony no help is
had; Musik but soothes thee, if too sweetly sad,/ And if too light, but turns thee gayly mad.”277 It
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is hard to achieve “harmony” with the spleen because an element of magnification and
manipulation—mutability—generates the enigmatic power of the malady. Yet Finch’s
representation of her malady evolves from a self-effacing and self-deprecating articulation to an
active and vivid description of the illness propelling the manic genius poet. Though she petitions
against the spleen, she finds the malady enigmatic and its effect on the mind tangible: “secret, the
mysterious ways,/ by which [it] dost surprise, and prey upon the mind” (144-45). Even when she
finds the malady gloomy and unfair, she describes the perturbed and jaundiced state of affliction
with self-contradictory and oxymoronic expressions such as “fantastic harms” or “the dire effects
of thy more pow’rful charms” (112, 115). The exaggerated contrast—the imagined distance—
between the spleen’s dark and yellow or destructive and creative capacity proves that the
melancholy’s power is actual and functioning, controlling the poet’s creative process whether
she desires it or not. Without the dark shadowing of melancholy, there is neither depth nor
definition to keep things sharp and intense: “Through thy black jaundice I all objects see,/ As
dark and terrible as thee,/ My lines decried, and my employment thought/ An useless folly, or
presumptuous fault.” The melancholy, whether it represents creative inspiration or demonic
malady hindering artistic creativity, influences the sharpness of the artist’s work.
Yet vision of darkness doesn’t automatically mean impeding poetic creativity. Although
the poet says the melancholy is shapeless and formless, her description of the spleen as “black
jaundice” presents the melancholy in both black and gold colors. Unlike the articulation of
melancholy as either golden or black in temperament, Finch’s depiction of melancholy in “The
Spleen” combines the two characteristics and creates a more believable and accurate picture of
the malady—it can’t be defined as one or the other, and when the malady is both creative and
destructive the poet seems to be most confused but greatly inspired. This complicated yet murky
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state of melancholy leads her to “the Muses’ paths” where “in their groves, and by their secret
springs” she comes across the tangible delights while “trac[ing] unsual things.” In the midst of
melancholy’s dark cloud, Finch employs various sensory perceptions to keep a keen sense of
herself and her capacity to write poetry—the first twenty-five lines of “The Spleen” involve
ocular experience. From lines 26 to 43 she focuses on describing how she experiences her
malady through the sense of smell. Quite fittingly, the third sensory experience she employs is
touch, which she closely aligns with ocular experience to demonstrate how colors are being
manipulated into moods, to express her heightened state of feeling melancholy. The description
of her hands tracing unusual things is a trope for both writing and envisioning, and her ocular
experience coincides with tactile experience. Compared to her earlier descriptions of the
melancholy creeping into her bed as she passively lies there, she is more active and her
experience is more tactile when “[her] hand delights.” In the beginning of the poem Finch’s
description of the spleen provides a rather elusive picture of melancholy; constantly shifting
between the extremity of moods, being resolutely sad or intensely happy, the poet describes the
spleen “Proteus to abus’d Mankind,/ Who never yet thy real Cause cou’d find,/ Or fix thee to
remain in one continued Shape/ Still varying thy perplexing Form” (lines 2-4). In the beginning
of the poem Finch perceives the spleen lacking a tangible or real body, thus a Protean but hollow
form. The hyperbolic attention the spleen receives from the poem—“the son of Bacchus pleads
[its] pow’r” and “Retained thy pris’ner, thy acknowledged slave,/ And sunk beneath thy chain to
a lamented grave”—gives this elusive and distant temperament a more concrete identity (94,
149-50). And this tangible identity of the poet’s malady also redefines the poet; after all, the
sickness initiates internal struggle and germinates the poetic mind, and prepares the poet’s
professional career. Without the poetic urgency that encourages the poet to oblige “the Spleen,”
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the poem loses its personal significance that distinguishes itself apart from any other poems
professing the romantic view of melancholy.
The poet’s sensory experience of the malady is mostly ocular in the beginning of her
poem, but when she begins to describe her writing process, the details of her splenetic experience
interfering with her writing experience becomes more tactile. Here in “the Muses’ paths” the
poet actually feels something tangible, but imagines her poem gaining more tangible flesh.
Although the poem begins with the description of the spleen as protean and intangible, the spleen
slowly takes a concrete form; the once “monstrous vision,” impossible to trace or grasp, has been
captured and written down. As the poet “trace[s] unusual things” and “[her] hand delights,” the
blurry sight of the spleen becomes less abstract and intangible, though the poet still preserves the
malady’s mysterious entity as opaque and clandestine. Finch compares the malady to the motion
of the sea—the waves rise and fall; affliction and change are essential part of artistic begetting—
“Now a Dead Sea thou’lt represent,/ A calm of stupid discontent,/ Then, dashing on the rocks
wilt rage into a storm” (6-8). The rising and crashing motion of the sea wave echoes with Finch’s
own experience with the malady’s unpredictable and violent visits. Clearly, writing about the
spleen gives the poet a sense of purpose and control over the malady even though she laments
the difficulty of pinning down—“fix thee to remain in one continued shape”—this protean
affliction inside herself; however, she knows where she can encounter and confront this protean
form: inside the frame of poetry, in “those windings and that shade,” as she writes in “The
Petition for an Absolute Retreat.” This attempt is ambitious and heroic, and Finch’s poetic
aspiration becomes more forcible and acute as the malady’s deterrence over her artistic creativity
becomes more controlling and consuming of her body. The deterrence generates more
encouragement, not discouragement of the poet’s artistic creativity.
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Finch’s description of the melancholy does not veil the malady’s debilitating effect;
rather, her poem begins with the description of how the spleen spreads and takes over the poet’s
body like a slow, surreptitious, nightmarish dream: “On sleep intruding dost thy shadows
spread,/ The gloomy Terrours round the silent Bed,/ And croud with boading Dreams the
Melancholy Head.” She complains that the spleen’s unpredictability and covertness keep the
poet “trembling sometimes” in “a panic fear” (9-10). Eleanor M. Sickels’ The Gloomy Egoist
also examines the different seasonal and weather themes involving the expression of melancholy.
Sickels argues that there is a large group of poets whose poems show “the continuing and
increasing love for pensive autumn and barren or stormy winter” and that “the moods
represented are roughly analogous to those of evening and night” (Sickels 267). Most poets
desire the scholarly pensiveness and nocturnal solitude associated with melancholy: “The poet’s
love for evening was partly conditioned by the fact that only then was [the poet] released from
labor and free to indulge his delight in solitary rambles” (270). In Finch’s “The Spleen,” when
the malady visits the poet during the solitary quietness of evening, the poet’s reaction seems to
illustrate a desirable disposition of malady.278
Finch’s ominous description of the malady slowly turns into ornate renderings of the
spleen’s power in elevated tropes and hyperbolic tones. When under the attack of spleen, she is
both active and passive; she is not only being consumed and controlled by the illness but also
inspired and mobilized. Thus the night becomes the time of change and transformation. The
poet’s description of her “day” life—her social and public life as a wife, which is also her
domestic life—at first seems to create inflexible exteriority that circumscribes the poet’s creative

In The Poetics of Melancholy in Early Modern England, Douglas Trevor writes: “The dreamy optimism
of ‘Il Penseroso,’ which disregards sickness as a potential consequence of late-night, solitary studying, is an
indication of the rather remarkable disposition that Milton uncovers in himself in the face of Galenic warnings”
(160).
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motions. But this friction and congestion between the poet’s various inner and outer identities
further suggests that what populates the poet’s “congested field” is not outside the poet but rather
inside. The melancholic interiority of the poet expands and congregates, which makes the poet
feel restricted and crowded inside.279 In the night when she is secluded and isolated by darkness,
she finally finds her inner poetic self that gets tucked away and ignored during the day’s social
and public time. Finch’s affinity toward the inner, private world becomes more apparent in other
poems; for example, in “A Nocturnal Reverie” she eschews the obvious, intrusive, and loud
public world that seems to undermine and impede her poetic career.
6.2

Female Subjectivity and the Lack of Light
The subtitle above precisely represents the close and inseparable relationship between the

two topics; very few female thinkers or poets, or female subjects in general, before and during
Finch’s time period, perhaps with an exception of Queen Elizabeth, had been the illuminating
subject of literary or scholarly discussion. Finch’s assertion of a subjective, mutable self under
the influence of the spleen further provides a persuasive critique of the masculine, self-aware
authority figure that governs the production of knowledge—the male figure of the poet, the
scientist, or even the husband. Finch will need to be presented as part of continuum of a longer
tradition extending even before Cavendish of female writers recognizing that science was a
social project organizing intellectual endeavors in a way that privileged male participation and
superiority.
Although Finch clearly suspects the social dangers of science on account of its
relentlessly gendered nature, she chooses a less self-aggrandizing method than Cavendish’s

This “congested field” also echoes Finch’s complaint that the “cramped numbers fail.” There is indeed
the frame that holds poetry, where its lines are numbered. This is again why writing an epic poem becomes not only
a poetic but also a spiritual accomplishment.
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direct and expressive criticism to voice her concerns. The autobiographical nature of Finch’s
observations of her own physical malady makes her work one of the most compelling critiques
imaginable of the possible existence of an objective consciousness able, in the manner of Bacon,
to purposefully remove one’s subjectivity from one’s own experience of the world; unlike
Cavendish, Finch is uncomfortable with representing herself in the linear narrative of Cartesian
ego that controls and dominates the terrain through measuring and mapping her control—here it
would be her authorial terrain. Finch is suspicious of both empiricism and rationalism—she is
suspicious of the enterprise of knowledge production. As Hellegers points out, Finch’s “The
Spleen” presents the poet’s criticism against the “medical narratives that naturalize and
legitimize the privileged position of a masculine elite atop the hierarchies of gender, class, and
race.”280 Yet the ideological practice of science overrides and usurps the social and political
critique of the dominant masculine view of the female body written by women; the tradition of
western metaphysics reiterates feminine attributes as naturally inferior to those of men and,
Finch’s “‘The Spleen’ recognizes that late seventeenth-century medical narratives simply
reconstruct existing conceptions of feminine instability evident in the works of male poets from
Sidney onward under the aegis of a new narrative authority.”281 Contesting the “existing
conceptions of feminine instability,” Finch’s works such as “The Petition for an Absolute
Retreat,” “The Consolation,” “A Nocturnal Reverie,” and “The Spleen” focus on reevaluating
the heterogeneous irregularities found in the immaterial realm of human psyche and emotions. In
these poems, the poet asserts that the social and public activities of the day belong to “the Fair,
the Gay, the Vain” and further suggests that the peculiarities of introverted social outcasts should
be left alone to enjoy “more extensive Joy,/ When all Heaven shall be survey’d/ From those
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Windings and that Shade.”282 These eccentricities must perform under the veil of normality and
abide by the scrutiny of pedestrian happiness during the bright day light. However, in the
darkness of the night, when socially and publically obliging forces are subdued and discouraged,
the oddities feel secure enough to express their true identity. The night’s darkness takes over the
vociferous and triumphant daylight that once antagonized and cornered the oddities to the shaded
areas; unlike daylight, the darkness of night does not forcefully magnify and expose these
unconventional subjects to the visible world. Finch signifies the brilliance of the daylight as the
external, obvious, and inevitable attributes of forceful hegemony—too much light will end up
marginalizing the sight, and too much certainty will obliterate the chance of new discovery.
Finch often represents the appropriate, dominant sense of time as an antagonizing male
figure, and the poet employs her poetic construction to challenge and decenter the linearly
projecting time that is necessary to create the fictive “I.” Linear time reinforces the existence of
the Cartesian ego by assuring its consistent placement and reappearance in the flow of time and
history. In such linear fashion, time plays a threatening, arbitrary role that ignores and forgets
lives outside its linear pattern. Finch’s playful protest against linear time renders pointless the
speaking “I” of Cartesian thought and even further challenges the Platonic hierarchy of low and
great, dark and light, body and spirit, or corporeal and celestial world. For instance, in “The
Spleen,” the speaker’s physical malady distorts the recollected ordering of sensory experience,
disabling time’s orderly linearity and the sense of a superseding Cartesian ego. When the
speaking center shifts, the reliability of the narrator and narrative becomes suspect. In “The
Spleen,” the depressed mind is being controlled by the depressed body; the mind’s clock must
oblige the body’s, albeit the body can’t keep up with the passage of time due to the melancholy
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that often sustains and wallows in one memorable—or perplexing—moment in time. The
Platonic preference of mind over body is put in abeyance by the poet’s protest against the unity
of time. By employing madness to question the ideological center of “I,” Finch’s poetry suggests
a possible escape from the rituals of patriarchy and human reproduction that construct the subject
as a willing participant in the putatively male realm of sexual politics and scientific knowledge.
Freed of linear time, Finch’s text plays with the normative pattern of classical rational
thought and validates experiences normally viewed as inappropriate when seeking “truth”:
vision, dream, and fantasy. Finch’s affinity towards temporality undercuts the notion of
continuous rational objectivity as well as the empiricist outlook of the universe that scientific
experimentation presupposes, one which views the possibility of reducing material events to
abstract models that can be labeled as truth. Such a practice, however, required a belief that
individuals could exist outside of the obvious events they are observing under the lurid light of
mechanical devices and make objective measurements and descriptions; viewed in this light,
Finch also represents an articulate spokesperson for a persistent strain of anti-mechanist thought
in England. Finch’s refusal to publish under her own name demonstrates her self-effacing
censorship against her own poetic career. Then it becomes clear why the poet desires to find a
place to keep her poetry live and hidden at the same time, away from the expected, regular
surveillance of dominant ideology, apart from the socially-constructed narratives of time that
summon the routine performances of social and class ideology that hinder Finch’s poetic
pursuits. For Finch time is punctual and objective; it is unforgiving and controlling—time is
patriarchal and male. The tropes of sensory impressions in “The Spleen” and “A Nocturnal
Reverie” reveal how Finch anxiously attempts to manipulate time in order to preserve her poetic
exile and refuge against time’s clockwork.
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In Finch’s "A Nocturnal Reverie," the indicators of the flow of time such as conjunctions
and prepositions appear punctually and persistently in the beginning of every third or fourth line,
as if to prove that the poet’s anxiety over time becomes more intensified as the time passes. The
frequent reminder of time and place—“In such a night”—throughout the poem reveals the poet’s
attempt to hold time in abeyance: “In such a night, when every louder wind/ Is to its distant
cavern safe confined;/ And only gentle Zephyr fans his wings,/ And lonely Philomel, still
waking, sings;/ Or from some tree, famed for the owl’s delight,/ She, hollowing clear, directs the
wand’rer right:”(lines 1-6). The poet’s struggle against time’s greed and selfishness is
inevitable—even though the poet “Joys in th’inferiour World and thinks it like her Own” and
desires to “abroad remain,/ Till Morning breaks” (lines 46-8), time is indifferent to the poet’s
wishes and will not stop, and with its growth will summon the day break:
When the loosed horse now, as his pasture leads,
Comes slowly grazing through th’ adjoining meads,
Whose stealing pace, and lengthened shade we fear,
Till torn-up forage in his teeth we hear:
When nibbling sheep at large pursue their food,
And unmolested kine rechew the cud;
When curlews cry beneath the village walls,
And to her straggling brood the partridge calls;
Their shortlived jubilee the creatures keep,
Which but endures, whilst tyrant man does sleep;
When a sedate content the spirit feels,
And no fierce light disturbs, whilst it reveals;
But silent musings urge the mind to seek
Something, too high for syllables to speak;
Till the free soul to a composedness charmed,
Finding the elements of rage disarmed,
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O’er all below a solemn quiet grown,
Joys in th’ inferior world, and thinks it like her own:
In such a night let me abroad remain,
Till morning breaks, and all’s confused again;
Our cares, our toils, our clamors are renewed,
Or pleasures, seldom reached, again pursued.283
The entire poem is only fifty lines long, but I wanted to cite this admittedly large portion of the
poem to make it immediately clear to the readers how the lines are initiated by the anticipation of
time. Note the progression of adverbial elements: “When,” “Till,” and “In such a night.” The
flow of time is against the poet’s hope for a longer period of creativity—she wants to remain “in
such a night” “when a sedate Content the Spirit feels” (39), but “morning breaks, and all’s
confused again” (48). By constructing twenty-five heroic couplets recording the obscure yet
fantastic charms and virtues of a night, Finch creates a unique figure of night suspended by the
sinuous flow of sensory impressions. “In such a night,” all the senses are heightened and
celebrated. Hues and shapes of nature are “seen” (10); the mythic creatures—Zephyrs and
Philomel—are heard (4 and 5); “[t]hro’ temp’rate Air” the night wanes down the “repelling”
odours (22). Night’s solidarity generates clarity and authority that the day’s hectic and clamorous
dominance over the world prevents—only through night does the poet find her identity: “in
the’inferious World and thinks it like her Own” (46).
Night provides an intimate refuge for the poet where her sensory perceptions are
enlightened by the night’s calm and sublime energy: “no fierce Light disturbs, whilst it reveals;/
But silent Musings urge the Mind to seek/ Something, too high for Syllables to speak” (40-1).
The stereotypical representation of night as the time of inactive darkness is subverted by Finch’s
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prompt and persistent invocation of night’s capacity to queue up and orchestrate such
overwhelming sensory experiences. “In such a Night,” as Finch repeatedly points out, the night’s
profound and sublime control over sustained time triumphs over the day’s brilliant but shallow
expressions of busily moving and fleeting time: “All’s confus’d again:/ Our Cares, our Toils, our
Clamour are renew’d” (48-9). The trope of “night” in “A Nocturnal Reverie” represents the sign
of serenity and protective sanctuary for the poet. As a metaphor—it could be metonymy—of
sustained time and space filled with nature’s poetry, “night” supplies poetic energy to the poet
who clearly eschews the day’s obvious servile commitment to the flow of time. Time gets more
transparent and comprehensible during the day as the daylight’s transparency obliges people to
be more social and rational. At night, time loses such advantage and faces a much harder task;
the world becomes clandestine and unpredictable. In “A Nocturnal Reverie,” night’s display of
obscure yet fantastic and singular happenings provides a more generative and productive time for
the poet. In addition, this is a particular night distinguished from all the other nights—“In such a
night” signifies one specific night, a specific incident—and this specific time is expanded and
extended as it is remembered and reiterated by the poet.
But what is "Something, too high for syllables to speak" after all? Various scholars point
to the idea of "the sublime,” and though the idea originated from classical Latin thought, it was
still a less-known idea during her life time; thus it is fitting for a female poet like Finch who
strives to challenge the male-dominated poetic tradition to find her poetic inspiration from the
nocturnal carnival of sensory impressions that occur in “shaded” places. This is how Finch
removes herself from the recurring assembly of old poetic tradition. She also criticizes the
overused and exhausted expressions of Renaissance poetic conventions and claims her poetic
novelty over the conventional poetry by demonstrating her ability to capture the daydream of
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something obscure and dark—night as the sublime. The image of “sedate” darkness is yet
awakened and brightened by the magnificent sights of nature’s unbelievable festivity at night,
which are also juxtaposed with the piercing brilliance of the morning light. However, it is the
night that the poet longs for, as she dreams to retreat from the mundane, repetitive day-to-day
conventions of patriarchal society and the reiteration of classical poetic traditions that never fail
to intrude into poetic space.284 This burning sun will find the speaker in Finch’s poetry and burn
her poetic inspirations, a trope that is not distinct to Finch. Sidney’s Sonnet 1 from Astrophil and
Stella employs the metaphor of old poetic conventions as the burning sun: “I sought fit words to
paint the blackest face of woe,/ Studying inventions fine, her wits to entertain;/ Oft turning
others' leaves, to see if thence would flow/ Some fresh and fruitful showers upon my sunburnt
brain” (lines 5-8). Just as Sidney complains about being sunburnt by the unavoidable ray of the
Petrarchan poetic conventions that influenced and fashioned sixteenth-century English poetry,
Finch in the early eighteenth century also faces a similar conflict. Tradition is unavoidable as it is
punctual and recurring like the day, but as the day returns so does the night, and every new
generation of poets struggles to find a place to hide away from or negotiate with that burning
sun, “Tyrant-Man” (38). Since “Tyrant-Man do’s sleep” during the night and the burning sun of
poetic tradition stops shining at night, Finch celebrates night time.
In addition to recording the night’s sensory impressions, Finch seems to commemorate
the night’s reverie by giving it a more concrete form. The intricate and consistent grammatical
and prosodic structure of “A Nocturnal Reverie” proves the poet’s seriousness in celebrating the
night’s sublime energy versus the “lengthen’d Shade” the day “fear[s]” (31). Though the
happenings during the night seem less organized, a close reading of the first few lines will show

In “The Consolation,” for example, classical figures such as Phoebus and the Lark represent poetic topos
that constantly rise and revisit—inspire--poets.
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that there is a certain schedule marked by a repetition of time indicating refrains and the same
sensory impressions—hearing, sight, and smell. As I mentioned earlier, the sentences are
punctuated by closed couplets, with iambic pentameter. The poem’s twenty-five heroic couplets
frequently open with time-indicating words that signify when and where the poet longs to exist,
instead of when and where the poet actually exists. Thus, in reality, the poet exists in the
punctuality of numbers and recurring words—ending in masculine rhyme—rather than the time
of night where all the fantastic festivities of sensory explosions and anthropomorphic
occurrences that she imagines occur. Poetry is, furthermore, both a trap and escape—Finch is
trapped inside the grammatical and prosodic structure of heroic couplets while the heroic
couplets carry the poet closer to her desired, imagined place, when and where she longs to be.
Then we can read the entire poem as an extended/expanded adjective that modifies “such a
night.” Since the object of this extended adjective is outside the poet, the poet’s reverie must
continue until the object comes “before our/her eyes,” until the adjective and the object exist as
one without the difference or distance between the two.285 Making a noun dress up and act like
an adjective is what poetic metaphors can do—whether it is the night or the spleen, these nouns
represent more than an object but a condition or state that suggests a specific action. Finch’s use
of these nouns suggests such specific choice that they simultaneously become connotations of
condition and action.
In addition, nouns such as “the spleen” and “the night” in Finch’s poems signify much
more than depression or the lack of light; they prefigure a noun-to-verb conversion. As the topos
of spleen and night signifies beyond the absence of cheerfulness and light, its metaphorical
dimensions extend out to mean actions that anticipate and emulate the attributes of melancholy,
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darkness and solitude. In “The Petition for an Absolute Retreat,” Finch decides to stray away
from the clear and obvious path to find “a sweet, but absolute Retreat,/ Mongst Paths so lost, and
Trees so high.” It is Finch’s own decision to curb the social and cultural conventions under the
bright light to advocate the nocturnal life of a lonely artist. She negates the day light and social
life to gain nocturnal freedom and professional solitude working as poet; she vociferously
eschews empty ideological conventions while she praises the necessity of an inward and pensive
mind that works to challenge and shift hegemonic practices of values devoid of personal and
individual desires. Some might argue that Finch’s poetic creativity feeds on antithetical
negotiations between opposites such as night and day or darkness and light, yet in Finch’s poetry
both sides appear necessary to generate poetic creativity. To conclude this chapter and my
somewhat experimental discussion of Finch’s poetic imagination as a movement toward
synthesis, not antithesis, ascension rather than declension, or unification rather than
fragmentation, I would like to compare Finch’s use of the topos of solitude and shade with
Milton’s use of the topos of light and darkness to suggest that solitude and independence
constitute the interiority of a poet.
Although both Milton and Finch show their anxiety working under certain disadvantaged
circumstances, the presiding poetic tradition propels Milton’s poetic ambition while poetic
conventions or professional ambitions are secondary to Finch’s private desire to write.286
Emotion and spirituality guide her eccentric, female, and poetic subjectivity. It is intriguing that
both Finch and Milton write about female characters seeking solitude and independence to
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Not only was Milton writing his epic poem late in his poetic career, but he also had to emulate the
monumental poetic achievement of Virgil, who arrived many centuries before his time. Time seems to be
antagonistic to both poets. However, Finch tries to obstruct time’s social regularity and ideological authority by
retreating from the visible and communal passage of time. By negating conventional time, Finch can shut out the
external noises of doubt and anxiety about her malady and subjectivity.
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personify the lonely practice of maintaining the spiritual light. After all, the poet personifies a
metaphor for light—the poetic imagination can illuminate the spiritual and intellectual darkness
devoid of insight and faith. To climb and achieve the greatness of Virgil, the poet must turn to
his or her public and professional ambition, but to sustain in the poetic spirit, the poet must, as
Milton writes, turn to “the mind through all her powers/ Irradiate, there plant eyes, all mist from
thence/ Purge and disperse, that I may see and tell/ Of things invisible to mortal sight” (PL III.
51-55). Even in the physical darkness, Milton turns to “the mind” and “there plant[s] eyes”—the
blind poet illuminates a world devoid of imperfection and mortality through the mind’s eye.
Time alone is paramount; both the poet in Finch’s “The Petition for an Absolute Retreat” and
Eve in Milton’s Paradise Lost express how they desire solitude to be able to work independently
and efficiently. In Book IX, Eve suggests to Adam:
Thou therefore now advise
Or hear what to my mind first thoughts present;
Let us divide our labour, thou where choice
Leads thee, or where most needs, whether to wind
The woodbine round this arbour, or direct
The clasping ivy where to climb, while I
In yonder spring of roses intermixed
With myrtle, find what to redress till noon:
For while so near each other thus all day
Our task we choose, what wonder if so near
Looks intervene and smiles, or object new
Casual discourse draw on, which intermits
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Our day’s work brought to little, though begun
Early, and th’hour of supper comes unearned. (IX. 212-19)
For the first time in Paradise Lost, Eve initiates the conversation with Adam, and to introduce
her argument, Eve tells Adam the system of their labor isn’t efficient. Nature grows faster than
Adam and Eve, and Eve thinks they might benefit greatly from diving the labor: “Adam, well
may we labor still to dress/ This garden, still to tend plant, herb and flow’r,/ Our pleasant task
enjoined, but till more hands/ Aid us, the work under our labor grows,/ Luxurious by restraint”
(IX. 205-209). Calmly but succinctly, Eve points out to Adam that they are not working well
together, and that they would work better if they divided the tasks and worked alone. Adam
suggests that God didn’t intend the time Adam and Eve spent together solely for working: “For
not to irksome toil, but to delight/ He made us, and delight to reason joined” (242-43). They
spend time together in socializing and courting as well: “Yet not so strictly hath our Lord
imposed/ Labor, as to debar us when we need/ Refreshment, whether food, or talk between, food
of the mind, or this sweet intercourse/ Of looks and smiles” (235-39). Adam dismisses Eve’s
suggestion that their current work routine might not be sufficient; instead he speculates that Eve
might need some time away from the work load and that she might also be tired from the “talk
between” and perhaps needs some alone time: “[B]ut if much converse perhaps/ Thee satiate, to
short absence I could yield./ For solitude sometimes is best society,/ And short retirement urges
sweet return” (247-50). Despite Adam’s persuasion, she prefers to spend the time differently
from the way Adam does—Eve introduces the concept of individual time. By addressing her
need to be alone to do what she likes to do, Eve tries to inform Adam that her time does define
her sense of self, whether she is going to spend her time doing productive work or simply
walking in the garden. Just as Eve argues that she needs her time alone to do her own preferred
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work, Finch also pleads for the similar kind of freedom and alienation from social ties that take
away from her independent experience of time. This is a new way of negating time, especially by
using poetry, to deny and stall any obsequious movement toward the epistemology of time. As I
pointed out earlier, this is Finch’s special way to antagonize the regularized and domesticated
sense of time through her poetry.287 The time Eve shares with Adam, in other words, is a social
time, which in some ways, doesn’t help Eve understand her sole existence, besides the one
defined by being Adam’s mate. For Finch, the time spent pondering and meandering alone in
nature signifies the time spent being productive; for Milton, Eve’s independent use of time
means an opening for potential mutability, a kind of paradigm shift not only in the ontology of
time but also the ontology of his verse, for this shift in defining and using time as a private and
productive space in Paradise foregrounds a philosophical and structural reason for Satan’s
temptation to take place in Paradise, where the Fall hasn’t occurred. However, my point is not
about the moral argument that she becomes greedy of work and time or how Eve’s desire for
independence leads humanity to the scene of temptation; I am describing something else.
What Eve really wants becomes clear when we read Finch’s argument for solitude and
retreat; perhaps Milton couldn’t say it for Eve, but what Eve really seeks is an experience of
being alone, time spent by and for herself, time and existence completely reserved for herself—

Imagine any casual conversation regarding time: “what time is it?” “It is four O’clock” (this often
signifies it is time for one to do something, like go, leave, eat, sleep, etc.). This simple question about what time
(more specifically, it asks “what time is now”) directly addresses the issue of identifying time. Whether we are
addressing the concept of kairos or chronos, human beings ultimately identify and understand time by actions; hence
the verbal tense: “I did” and “I will do.” But this further signifies that we also try to understand time by
materializing it into a space—a passage, line, or an interval—occupied by actions that produce comprehensible,
identifiable objects as the evidence of time: “things I did” and “things I will do.” For instance, wrinkles indicate the
age—they not only signify that the time has passed, but also embody their being by their doing. Wrinkles signify
(their doing) the passage of time (their being). Human beings rely on nature to figure out the passage of time, and it
is natural that nature’s passage of time always leaves the fruits of its labor that make its existence comprehensible to
us (i.e. vegetation tales, topos of seasonal changes).
287

281
“an absolute retreat” as Finch petitions. In addition, we must not miss the fact that Adam’s way
of experiencing and identifying time signifies a fundamentally different habit—Adam is hardly
alone in Eden. In Book VIII Adam remembers how he came to his existence; soon after he “new
waked from soundest sleep,” Adam begins to acknowledge his surroundings. However, while
naming all the animals in Eden, Adam feels a “sudden apprehension” (354). God promises Adam
all the creatures in Eden belong to him, but he is still wanting more: “but in these/ I found not
what methought I wanted still” (354-55). Adam defines this certain lack as the lack of “who
partakes” (364) and tells God, who listens to his complaints: “In solitude/ What happiness, who
can enjoy alone,/ Or all enjoying, what contentment find?” (364-66). In Paradise Lost, Adam’s
time is social and communal. With very few exceptions, Adam is always seen paired with
someone--conversing with Raphael or God, or working and conversing with Eve. Adam says he
doesn’t want Eve to have any other experience with time except for the time spent together. The
point I am trying to make here is not about Adam’s perception of time, but rather that the
concept of time spent alone is alien to Adam, which is, ironically, the only way the creator would
occupy his time. Thus God says the following to Adam: “A nice and subtle happiness I see/ Thou
to thyself proposes, in the choice/ Of thy associates, Adam, and wilt taste/ No pleasure, though in
pleasure, solitary./ What think’st thou then of me, and this my state,/ Seem I to thee sufficiently
possessed/ Of happiness, or not?” (399-405). Happiness for God, of course, is uninterruptible
and, most importantly, incomprehensible to Adam or human beings: “The highth and depth of
thy eternal ways/ All human thoughts come short, supreme of things,/ Thou in thyself art perfect,
and in thee/ Is no deficience found” (413-16). Because God is complete within himself, Adam
argues, “No need that thou/ Shouldst propagate, already infinite,/ And through all numbers
absolute, though one” (419-21). Adam argues that God will never experience loneliness or
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incompleteness because he is absolute and ubiquitous by himself alone, but that is not Adam’s
case.
In addition, it is paramount to emphasize that the lone time is associated with the
creator’s time. This is why Eve’s suggestion of abandoning social time signals a beginning of
something ominous—if God occupies the self-contained, independent solitary time, what does
Eve’s desire for working and being alone foretell? Or, is it because the tragic fall is inevitable
and also necessary for the new beginning if the character desires for greatness and aspired to
ascend closer to God or truth or celestial perfection? Eve’s desire to test and embrace this novel
concept of time reflects what God says about his appreciation of solitude. Many scholars have
argued Eve’s separation from Adam foreshadows the ominous seed of trouble in Eden because
Eve’s solitude made it more possible for Satan to succeed his plan.288 However, one should
notice a simple fact—Satan can tempt Eve when he is with her, physically in the same place at
the same time, conversing with her. The Fall happens when Eve shares her time, not when she is
alone. Even when Eve wakes up from a dream and tells Adam about the troublesome dream she
had where she was tempted to eat the fruit from the Tree of Knowledge, she wasn’t alone—in
her dream she was visited by one “with gentle voice” and when she wakes up Adam is right
beside her. Roughly put, social time yields nothing but trouble, as God simply said: “in the

For instance, Maurice Kelley in This Great Argument suggests that Milton’s depiction of Adam reveals
“that his fall is a foregone and inevitable conclusion"(149), and E. M. W. Tillyard believes that Adam and Eve are
practically fallen before the actual temptation takes place in Studies in Milton (London, 1951). For an earlier essay
exploring this topic presenting the similar type of criticism suggesting the fall is an inevitable reflection on human
being’s weakness and imperfection, see A. E. Barker, "Structural Pattern in Paradise Lost,” Philological Quarterly,
28 (1949). However, Diane McColley argues for the necessity for Eve’s freedom and her ability to make choice in
“Free Will and Obedience in the Separation Scene of Paradise Lost.” Studies in English Literature, 1500-1900. 12.1
(Winter 1972): 103-120. She acknowledges that some might perceive the separation scene in Book IX of Paradise
Lost presents Eve and Adam are “originally flawed and their failure was inevitable, and thus blaming their Maker
for sin and woe, a notion Milton consistently repudiates in both poetry and prose. Rather, the scene portrays
potentially sufficient beings in the process of healthful growth, facing difficulties and learning the meaning of
obedience to God's behests and imitation of God's ways” (103).
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choice/ Of thy associates, Adam, and wilt taste/ No pleasure, though in pleasure, solitary” (VIII.
400-402). Yet the solitary time gives much more pleasure to the creator. Since Eve’s solitude
was interrupted, Finch demands “an absolute retreat” where she can control or manipulate time
and “taste” the “pleasure” from solitude, the pleasure of being able to create something of her
own.
Adam is also concerned with creating something of his own—he argues to God that
procreation and multiplication of his kind will result in betterment of his kind, “by conversion
with his like to help” (VIII. 418). Adam believes that earthly and flawed mortals can ascend
closer to the celestial truth through reproduction—through the union of two souls in love, as
based on the idea of the Platonic ladder of love—and multiplication of self: “But man by number
is to manifest/ His single imperfection, and beget/ Like of his like, his image multiplied,/ In unity
defective, which requires/ Collateral love, and dearest amity” (VIII. 422-26). On the contrary,
Eve in Paradise Lost and Finch’s poetic persona exhibit a rather spiritual and artistic bent for
extending and improving their own existence than Adam’s biological one. Adam pursues
biological mimesis while Eve and Finch desire poetic mimesis. As I have argued in the previous
chapter on Paradise Lost, Eve’s rhetorical command significantly improves and blossoms as she
takes some time alone, away from Adam. Her arguments against Satan’s pernicious speech
reveal spiritual depth and insight that she does not readily exhibit when she converses with
Adam. The solitude gives her time to think and a sort of shade to illuminate her mind. Without
Eve’s independent and unconventional spirit, Paradise Lost will not work—the poem will not
exist. Had she not gone into the woods alone and fallen into the temptation, God’s paradise
would have never been lost. And this loss is ever more essential and foundational for the
existence of art.
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However, as Adam says, we do not conceive how God creates, and corporeal creations
cannot occur without mutability. Milton’s epic poem needs a fall with an epic magnitude. The
routine of antithesis and synthesis sustains and propels the corporeal realm. Both Eve and
Finch’s poetic persona know where they need to be to experience the joy of a complete solitude
and retreat—thus they both end up in the shaded woods. Finch exclaims about a chance to be
alone in the beginning of “The Petition for an Absolute Retreat”: “Give me yet, before I dye,/ A
sweet, but absolute Retreat,/ ’Mongst paths so lost, and trees so high,/ That the world may ne’er
invade,/ Through such Windings and such shade,/My unshaken liberty.” Then she further
describes how her private time is being lost by participating in the pedestrian chores of daily
social life. She eschews those with “listning ears” who let their time be usurped by the
expectations of social and ideological conventions: “None who their vain Moments pass,/ Only
studious of their Glass,/ News, that charm to listning Ears;/ That false Alarm to Hopes and Fears;
That common Theme for every Fop,/ From the statesman to the shop,/ In those Coverts ne’er be
spread,/ Of who’s Deceas’d, or who’s to Wed.” Finch declares that a private space
undomesticated and untouched by the values of the outside world will result in a pure, true form
of art. The “cleanliness” of true art will separate itself from the fake—the artist doesn’t have to
forcefully lay out the differences other than simply making art that remains true to the artist’s
convictions and desires, free of the “intruders” from the external world: “Courteous Fate! afford
me there/ A Table spread without my care,/ With what the neighb’ring Fields impart,/ Whose
Cleanliness be all it’s Art.”289 In a single description of a common house object such as a table,
Finch succinctly condenses the two distinctively opposite images of a woman occupying her
working space; Finch’s description of “a table spread without care” challenges the common
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reactions from the reader who would more likely imagine a women’s naturalized, expected
working place where she cooks and irons rather than the image of a woman sitting at her table
working tirelessly on her poetry.290 The domestic image of women’s cooking space dissolves
into Finch’s idealized creative space where the hard working poet sits at her messy table with all
her works spread out “without [her] care.” Finch carries on with the comparison between writing
and cooking to develop her argument for the aesthetic and moral wholesomeness of “plain,
unstudied” (28) art “unshaken” (7) by affected styles and established conventions. Finch
compares the cleanliness of pure art to the least cultivated or manipulated—in a sense, as pure as
it is, raw—food:
When, of old, the Calf was drest,
(Tho’ to make an Angel’s feast)
In the plain, unstudied Sauce
Nor Treufle, nor Morilla was;
Nor cou’d the mighty Patriarch’s Board
One far-fetch’d Ortolane afford.
Courteous Fate, then give me there
Only plain, and wholesome Fare.
Fruits indeed (wou’d Heaven bestow)
All, that did in Eden grow,
All, but the Forbidden Tree,
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Imagine—the image of a messy table with the scratched-out or ink-stained papers spread out
everywhere in a room is exactly what we are accustomed to envision when we think of a writer’s creative space.
More importantly, this space is often associated with men. The ideology of women’s neatness often traps her in a
place where the anticipation for domestic labor is inevitable. It is expected that a poet’s working table should be
spread out, “without [the poet’s] care,” because the poet—a male figure—should only focus on doing the work of
creation, and not the trivial work of cleaning. Only many centuries later, the conventional image of writing has
become gender neutral.
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Wou’d be coveted by me. 291
Notice also how Finch chooses “the calf,” the young of the domestic cattle, to “make an angel’s
feast” and that she uses only “the plain, unstudied sauce” to dress the meat. No elaborate or “farfetched” (31) ingredients and flavors will do—the poet wants to make something fresh and good
inside and out by keeping the beginning ingredients untainted by worldly affectations. A feast
good enough to feed angels must begin with fundamentally good and pure ingredients, and a
good poem should begin with a good foundation as well; a good thought bears a good fruit,
“unstudied” and “unshaken” by the pressures or power of the external world, Finch argues, as it
is planted in the mind illuminated and nourished by the spiritual light. Neoplatonist overtones
permeate this passage as the poet seeks for the marriage of spiritual and physical solace and
purity to produce poetry “Whose Cleanliness be all it’s Art.” The poet stresses the importance of
the pure ingredients for “an Angel’s feast” even though she also implies there could be nothing
as clean or good as angels—hence the parenthesis around the concessive clause “(Tho’ to make
an Angel’s Feast).”292 The poet argues that one must use “unstudied” ingredients to create “only
plain, and wholesome Fare” for angels and that she would prefer uncooked, fresh raw food for
this “wholesome fare”: “fruits indeed (wou’d Heaven bestow)/ All, that did in Eden grow,/ All,
but the Forbidden Tree” would be “coveted” by herself. The innate purity is immanent in a true
work of art, and the poet wants to feed her readers an honest work of art.
If spiritual renewal and purification, in Milton’s words a kind of metaphysical
renaissance “plant[ed]” in the mind to “purge and disperse,” can only occur through the poet’s

Finch, “The Petition for an Absolute Retreat.” Lines 26-37.
Also note that the line “When, of old, the Calf was drest” can signify both the young animal and the
muscle part of an old cow. The latter undoubtedly shows the new comes from the old, and the pure and brilliant can
come from the dark and earthly. Finch sets off the “old” from “the calf” with commas and by placing “old” before
“the calf.” Finch’s arrangement of the nouns by chronological occurrence—old came first, then the calf, and then the
calf was dressed--also shows the artificiality of syntax and time construction in a sentence.
291
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creative meandering in solitude, Eve’s desire to be alone and meander in the garden is essential
for the desired fruition of pure and wholesome art. Most importantly, acknowledging one’s
desire for solitude as an indication for artistic ambition supports the idea that Finch and Eve’s
wandering in solitude generates a mature artistic fruition and enlightenment of the mind, in
contrast to the popular condemnation of Eve’s behavior leading us to the unfortunate Fall.
According to Finch’s assertion for the innate purity that determines the merit of one’s work, both
abstract and corporeal “cleanliness” in poetry can only come to exist through a private practice
and routine of being a poet. A clean and serene spiritual state cannot be achieved through an
over-night “absolute retreat” away from any contamination or pressure from the external world.
“Retreat” must become a habit, a practice, and this practice should become the poet’s life. This is
Finch’s conviction for her poetic career; the space of “absolute retreat” must be domesticated—
naturalized—into a poet’s creative space. The “windings” and the “shade,” the private and
hidden space where the poet can do her work without any interference or restrictions from the
outside world, signifies a kind of pure “heaven” where she creates for spiritual nourishment.
Milton, however, is not in dire need of solitude or darkness; he is usurped of physical
light, surrounded by darkness and solitude. Milton begins Book III of Paradise Lost with what is
known as “the invocation to light,” which lasts for the next fifty-four lines. While praising God
as the eternal source of both spiritual and physical light, Milton also bares is soul, expressing
how his blindness pushes him into an utter isolation from the world: “But cloud instead, and
ever-during dark/ Surrounds me, from the cheerful ways of men/ Cut off, and for the book of
knowledge fair/ Presented with a universal blank/ Of Nature’s works to me expunged and razed,/
And wisdom at one entrance quite shut out” (III.45-50). “Since God is light,” Milton says, God is
in a sense unapproachable just as the brightness of a light makes approach physically blinding:
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“Since God is light,/ And never but in unapproached light/ Dwelt from eternity, dwelt then in
thee,/ Bright effluence of bright essence increate” (3-6). Milton’s comparison of God as
“unapproached light” also alludes to the blind poet’s bewildered emotions toward the loss of his
physical sight, as he cannot escape from the feelings of abandonment and isolation from God.
Once again, “unapproached light” represents a light not only too bright to be seen but also
signifies a light unseen. God who obliterated the poet’s sight is the same God who is being
compared to light; yet the poet confesses that he still cannot comprehend—approach—God.
Milton feels isolated from God as he is isolated from physical light. However, even though the
overall tone of these lines might show polarizing emotions toward God and his blindness, Milton
still believes physical blindness will encourage him to find the inward light that will illuminate
the spirit and overcome the lack of physical sight. Rather than spending his time lamenting over
the loss of his physical sight, Milton exclaims that he must turn to “So much rather thou celestial
light/ Shine inward, and the mind through all her powers/ Irradiate, there plant eyes, all mist
from thence/ Purge and disperse, that I may see and tell/ Of things invisible to mortal sight” (PL
III. 51-55).293 After all, it consoles Milton that the darkness he endured would be replaced by a
greater spiritual light to come; even though he is blinded from the physical world, the poet can
rely on the spiritual light that “shine[s] inward.” Pushed away from the world visible to mortal
sight, the poet must “plant” his eyes where the mind has endured self-criticism and self-doubt;
the poet believes that the light visible to one’s mortal sight cannot “irradiate” the mind the way
the spiritual light can “shine inward” and “purge and disperse.” If he can open his spiritual eye

Although I have already quoted these lines earlier, I can’t stress the significance of lines 51-55 from
Book 3 of Paradise Lost enough. They became the guiding light throughout my dissertation and especially helped
developing my discussion of the importance of the inward light for poetic imagination.
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and look inside him, he may see the “celestial light”; he “may see and tell/ Of things invisible to
mortal sight.”
Shades are as important as lights in artistic representations, and Finch’s ardent assertion
of the importance of shade, solitude, or melancholy in her poetry always amounts to an argument
vouching for the most fundamental element of poetic imagination—mutability. In Finch’s “The
Consolation” the poet finds solace in the circle of rise and fall and internalizes the physical law
governing mutability by mimicking the routine of mutability in the form of poetry.
See, Phoebus breaking from the willing skies,
See, how the soaring Lark, does with him rise,
And through the air, is such a journy borne
As if she never thought of a return.
Now, to his noon, behold him proudly goe,
And look with scorn, on all that's great below.
A Monark he, and ruler of the day,
A fav'rite She, that in his beams does play.
Glorious, and high, but shall they ever bee,
Glorious, and high, and fixt where now we see?
No, both must fall, nor can their stations keep,
She to the Earth, and he below the Deep,
At night both fall, but the swift hand of time
Renews the morning, and again they climb,
Then lett no cloudy change, create my sorrow,
I'll think 'tis night, and I may rise to-morrow.
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The images of mythical creatures and their magnificent ascension toward celestial perfection
occupy the first ten lines until the concept of “Glorious, and high” reaches its highest point of
escalation and exaltation of Phoebus and the Lark accomplished by the two lines opening with
the repeated words, “Glorious, and high” (10). The “high,” brilliantly accented by the rising
intonation preceding the question mark that concludes line ten, is depressed by a following turn
that swiftly sinks into the sound of resolute decline—“No, both must fall” (11). Any poet who
desires to “climb” the ladder of poetic greatness must endure the agonizing feeling of being
defeated. Yet the routine of falling and rising continues as long as the poet cannot stop seeking,
as Sidney writes in the beginning of his sonnet sequence Astrophil and Stella, “fit words to paint
the blackest face of woe” while “Studying inventions fine” and “Oft turning others' leaves, to see
if thence would flow/ Some fresh and fruitful showers.”294 Finch debunks ocular-verbocentric
ideology and its perpetuation of the reduction of the topos of falling, darkness, or melancholy
into the image of absence and deficiency. Finch emphasizes that the fall must occur—so can
“again they climb,” as the ascendant spirit must begin somewhere to propel the poet to move
forward and, as Finch’s earlier contemporary Milton insisted, “steer/ right onward.” 295

7

CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION

Large projects inevitably feel incomplete to those undertaking them, and mine is no
different. Much of my method has been exploratory and suggestive rather than definitive, an
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dissertation, which I have discussed in the previous chapters. I thought it would be appropriate to end my last
chapter (aside from the conclusion) of my dissertation with the image of motioning up and moving forward,
especially after my plunging into and navigating through the vast sea of the dissertating abyss.
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honest reproduction of my own intellectual bent; therefore, many works that I had intended to
include always seemed to remain just outside the scope of my study. Clearly, in the future I hope
to expand my examination of the topos of light and inner vision to produce a more
comprehensive analysis of the authors in question, as well as incorporate a wider array of
seventeenth- and eighteenth-century writers who share the same intellectual concerns I have
traced out in the preceding pages. A clear summary here in my conclusion of what I have
accomplished so far should help create a more solid foundation for such future endeavors.
As I have demonstrated, Sidney’s conception of figurative language and the poetic
imagination provides a very useful foundation for an exploration of “inward light” represented in
the works of Cavendish, Milton, and Finch. I have connected these figures in my study for a
variety of reasons. For example, as I stated at the outset, Cavendish, Milton, and Finch all appear
aligned in their insistence that accumulated sensory data gathered through scientific devices do
not get one closer to “truth.” Because all three lived through the inception and early triumph of
modern, experimental science, their varying yet consistent antagonism to the new science
definitely provides a useful window through which to observe what they did consider a valid
means of locating truth. In my study, Sidney’s reliance on “inward light” represents an alternate
source of truth, one championed by all three of the later poets in my study (even Finch, whose
inversion of light to darkness doesn’t diminish the interior, introspective nature of the truths she
envisioned her poetry as uncovering). Sidney’s phrase opened up several important lines of
investigation. For starters, the commonplace of light—or its lack—is ubiquitous in literary
descriptions of truth, and, more importantly, serves to impart a sense of certain and absolute
clarity to metaphoric representations combining light and truth. Furthermore, Sidney’s argument
for inner vision and spiritual energy, the “inward light,” suggests that uncovering truth requires a
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turning inward. Truth can be misrepresented to the physical eye, but most importantly, truth can
seldom be measured in a dimension capable of going under the actual scrutiny of instruments
like the microscope. Inward vision or “inward light,” for the subjects in my study, suggested a
spiritual authority distinct from corporeal reality, one that surpasses material temporality.
In the dichotomy of “looking out” and “looking in” that I proposed, Sidney’s works made
him an appropriate exemplar of the latter. The “inward light” that he advocates in The Defence of
Poesy clearly announced the power of the individual imagination to grasp or produce truth in a
process that renders the material world subordinate to the spiritual vision of the poet. Although
literally looking in—through the microscope—Robert Hooke occupied the opposing pole of my
dichotomy, for his influential work championed and popularized reliance upon physical sight and
truth constructed from observable physical minutia. I have argued in this dissertation that
Hooke’s microscopic seeing—and thus the reductionism inherent in modern science—
undermines the autonomy of spiritual sight, which Sidney considers sacred to the poetic
imagination and describes as an “inward light each mind hath in itself.” As I showed, these two
modes of knowledge-production work in opposing directions. Sidney argued for the primacy of
universals and “fore-conceits” that preceded individual representations of truth through
metaphoric and figural representation, whereas Hooke and other scientists envisioned more and
more accurate representations of truth built from accumulated physical and sensory details. In
Hooke’s experiments, light is the external source to reveal and magnify the small, and he claims
that his book Micrographia illuminates the great and spiritual in the worldly and low. Regardless
of the spiritual cast of Hooke’s stated goals, however, light always remained for him an external,
mechanical force, whereas the light materialized in poetry—“inward light”—is a spiritual and
intellectual source to illuminate the small, the hidden, or even the intangible.
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Cavendish, the subject of my second chapter, wrote extensively about the “new” science
and is important because she immediately perceived in Hooke’s works what she considered to be
the damagingly materialist impetus of the new scientific method. The contrast between
Cavendish and Hooke proceeds from my discussion of Sidney and Hooke in that it pits the same
two ways of seeing and knowing the world against one another. As I stated in chapter two,
Cavendish believed the contemplative mind could uncover legitimate and large truths from very
limited or even singular sensory impressions; in contrast, Hooke sought truth through the
repetition of careful observation, hypotheses, and testing. Cavendish argues that Hooke’s
microscopic view defines the world by subordination, or worse, atomistic misrepresentation, and
in a series of scathing and belittling narratives attempted to undermine faith in the veracity of the
prosthetic sight of the new scientific instruments. Unlike Sidney, Cavendish stands out as an
especially forthright and practical critic and poet because her matter-of-fact, self-reflective
criticism of Hooke’s Micrographia makes the conflict between the scientific and the poetic
search for truth more discernable and the agitated position of poetry—and poets—in the advent
of new science more actual and urgent. Cavendish further predicts and details how the
microscopic or atomistic view of the world will not only challenge the realm of poetic mutability
and imagination but also subcategorize marginalized subjectivities.296
Milton, the subject of chapters three and four, wrote consistently about seeing both
physically and spiritually. As I argued, poetic seeing for Milton induces the irradiating light; it
enlightens him intellectually and spiritually while exposing him to a spiritual radiation that
“purges and disperses” corporeal sights, but leaves him with the sight of “things invisible to
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For example, in The Blazing World, a remarkably early work of science-fiction, Cavendish chooses a
young woman, a conventionally marginalized subject, as a heroine of her story, who leaves her contemporary world
to discover a utopian new world in another star, where she becomes the emperor of this new world that she governs
using her own free will and reasoning.
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mortal sight.”297 Thus in my analysis he is positioned squarely in line with Sidney, and I
introduced Augustine as an additional foundation for my examination of Milton’s spiritual sight.
Though the poet is unable to see outwardly, he does not need to look elsewhere anymore; Milton
insists in Paradise Lost that the “celestial light” will “shine inward,” illuminating and escalating
his “mind through all her powers” (III. 51-52). Once one becomes aware of the importance of
inward and spiritual sight in Milton’s work, one understands that they comprise a theme that
Milton returned to repeatedly and consistently in his major works.
Although most literary representations of light as truth materialize the spiritual authority
of truth in a form of illumination and transcendence, my discussion of Finch showed how she
sees the lack of physical light as a gateway to access poetic dawn—the poet becomes most
independent and fruitful in exploring her poetic imagination and composing her poetry when she
is away from both the physical and symbolic presence of the abundant and pervasive light. Finch
compares the day light to the homogenous ideology that is everywhere—the ubiquitous day light
undermines things devoid of conventional uniformity and normality. As I argued, her affinity for
darkness is an esoteric and singular gesture breaking away from homogenous Western poetic
conventions, one that even, I believe, undermines the verbo-ocular-ego centric values of the
hegemonic social and class structures she attempted to escape in her quest for the less visual and
less obvious. Finch emphasizes the role of shade as much as light in her poetic representations
and encourages readers to rely on inward vision and intuition. Also, Finch’s explorations of
melancholy and the lack of light in her poetry signal the most essential element of poetic
imagination—mutability. The poet finds solace in the never-resting routine of rising and falling
and advocates the physical law governing mutability in her poems, so that the topos of darkness
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and the nocturnal motif recur and replace the conventional image of light. Above all, Finch
reassures the readers that truth can be found in less obvious, less likely places if we do not lose
the “inward light.” Thus, I end my dissertation with Finch’s suggestion that enlightenment can
occur in the absence of light, hoping that when this extended academic exercise is over, I will
find additional thoughts to illuminate under the guidance of my own “inward light.”
I have, of course, uncovered multiple corollary projects I would like to pursue. For
example, no discussion of these authors can avoid the obvious fact that they are split into two
gendered pairs. As my tentative incorporation of gender in the preceding chapters shows, I am
obviously interested in how the regulation of gender shaped the creation and reception of works
by these authors. The burgeoning interest in the intersection of gender studies and science
continues to create new materials that can profitably be imported into literary studies,
particularly in the examination of the works of Cavendish. Furthermore, Milton’s Eve, it must
have been obvious, emerged for me a figure of particular interest, for—her conventional role as a
villain notwithstanding—she appears to possess a flexibility of mind and wisdom lacking in
Adam, another division breaking upon the lines of gender.
Of all the subjects of my study, however, I definitely wound up with a special affinity for
and admiration of Finch. I hope to investigate further Finch’s exploration of various sensory
experiences through her unconventional use of poetic imagery. I am repeatedly struck by the way
she internalizes the lack of sound—quietness—and the lack of light—darkness—to create an
esoteric aesthetic combining subjectivity and poetic ambition. The marriage between subjectivity
and poetic identity Finch portrays in her poems disrupts the conventional motif of ego-centric
and commanding authorship, for she does not hide her psychological downfalls and social
unease. Finch’s open and revealing portrayals of her uneven, unconventional inner demons help
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her create a unique poetic identity independent from the dominant image of the male author. The
suspense and horror engendered by her psychological, inner monstrosity does not discourage the
poet but rather inspires her to be even more engaged in her inner unknown dark abyss. Finch
develops her own romantic aestheticism that embraces darkness and the sublime over the
conventional sense of the beautiful, far preceding Edmund Burke’s exploration of the sublime in
A Philosophical Inquiry into the Origin of Our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful, published
almost half a century later in 1757. Burke’s idea of the sublime focuses on external stimuli and
the effect of astonishment on the readers, but Finch’s internalization of darkness, fear, and the
sublime reveals the poet’s own psychological confrontation and awakening inside her mind
rather than the emotional reaction being roused in the readers, which sets her apart from
nineteenth-century romanticism.298 Indeed, Finch was ambivalent about the reading public, and
Finch wrote in her poem “The Introduction” that she does not intend her lines “for publick view”
(line 1) because she is afraid that her work might receive “so many censures” (2) and the
conventional critics, clearly implied as male, “all might say, they’re by a woman writ” (8).299
The idea of growth through inner psychological chaos does require “inward light.” In
Book IV of Paradise Lost, Milton shows through the description of Satan’s inner hell that the
thought of hell is as horrific as being in hell: “Horror and doubt distract/ His troubled thoughts,
and from the bottom stir/ The Hell within him, for within him Hell/ He brings, and round about

In “Essay Supplementary to the Preface of 1815” to a collected volume of his poems, Wordsworth
exaggerates and misrepresents Finch’s descriptions of and emotional reactions toward nature as the nascent sign of
the nineteenth-century Romanticism.
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Finch is aware of the unfortunate fact that the conventional readers and critics who are male will say:
“Alas! a woman that attempts the pen,/ Such an intruder on the rights of men,/ Such a presumptuous creature, is
esteemed,/ The fault can by no virtue be redeemed” (9-12). And she also acutely points out how those critics
condemn women who want to think and create things for--and by--themselves: “They tell us we mistake our sex and
way;/ Good breeding, fashion, dancing, dressing, play/ Are the accomplishments we should desire;/ To write, or
read, or think, or to inquire/ Would cloud our beauty, and exhaust our time,/ And interrupt the conquests of our
prime” (lines 13-18).
298
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him, nor from Hell/ One step no more than from himself can fly/ By change of place” (IV. 1823). Satan laments that he carries hell within himself, that “Which way I fly is Hell; myself am
Hell” (IV. 75). There is no “inward light” for Satan, nor does he even try to “look in [his] heart”
before he confines himself in hell. However, Finch is able to “look in [her] heart and write,”
confronting her inner darkness to inspire her poetry. 300 In Sonnet 5 of Astrophil and Stella,
Sidney asserts: “It is most true, that eyes are form’d to serve/ The inward light; and that the
heavenly part/ Ought to be king, from whose rules who do swerve,/ Rebels to Nature, strive for
their own smart” (lines 1-4). This “inward light” clearly proved extremely illuminating for
Sidney, Cavendish, Milton, and Finch.
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